Tag Archives: Cryptography

Three common cloud encryption questions and their answers on AWS

Post Syndicated from Peter M. O'Donnell original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/three-common-cloud-encryption-questions-and-their-answers-on-aws/

At Amazon Web Services (AWS), we encourage our customers to take advantage of encryption to help secure their data. Encryption is a core component of a good data protection strategy, but people sometimes have questions about how to manage encryption in the cloud to meet the growth pace and complexity of today’s enterprises. Encryption can seem like a difficult task—people often think they need to master complicated systems to encrypt data—but the cloud can simplify it.

In response to frequently asked questions from executives and IT managers, this post provides an overview of how AWS makes encryption less difficult for everyone. In it, I describe the advantages to encryption in the cloud, common encryption questions, and some AWS services that can help.

Cloud encryption advantages

The most important thing to remember about encryption on AWS is that you always own and control your data. This is an extension of the AWS shared responsibility model, which makes the secure delivery and operation of your applications the responsibility of both you and AWS. You control security in the cloud, including encryption of content, applications, systems, and networks. AWS manages security of the cloud, meaning that we are responsible for protecting the infrastructure that runs all of the services offered in the AWS Cloud.

Encryption in the cloud offers a number of advantages in addition to the options available in on-premises environments. This includes on-demand access to managed services that enable you to more easily create and control the keys used for cryptographic operations, integrated identity and access management, and automating encryption in transit and at rest. With the cloud, you don’t manage physical security or the lifecycle of hardware. Instead of the need to procure, configure, deploy, and decommission hardware, AWS offers you a managed service backed by hardware that meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. If you need to use that key tens of thousands of times per second, the elastic capacity of AWS services can scale to meet your demands. Finally, you can use integrated encryption capabilities with the AWS services that you use to store and process your data. You pay only for what you use and can instead focus on configuring and monitoring logical security, and innovating on behalf of your business.

Addressing three common encryption questions

For many of the technology leaders I work with, agility and risk mitigation are top IT business goals. An enterprise-wide cloud encryption and data protection strategy helps define how to achieve fine-grained access controls while maintaining nearly continuous visibility into your risk posture. In combination with the wide range of AWS services that integrate directly with AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS), AWS encryption services help you to achieve greater agility and additional control of your data as you move through the stages of cloud adoption.

The configuration of AWS encryption services is part of your portion of the shared responsibility model. You’re responsible for your data, AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) configuration, operating systems and networks, and encryption on the client-side, server-side, and network. AWS is responsible for protecting the infrastructure that runs all of the services offered in AWS.

That still leaves you with responsibilities around encryption—which can seem complex, but AWS services can help. Three of the most common questions we get from customers about encryption in the cloud are:

  • How can I use encryption to prevent unauthorized access to my data in the cloud?
  • How can I use encryption to meet compliance requirements in the cloud?
  • How do I demonstrate compliance with company policies or other standards to my stakeholders in the cloud?

Let’s look closely at these three questions and some ways you can address them in AWS.

How can I use encryption to prevent unauthorized access to my data in the cloud?

Start with IAM

The primary way to protect access to your data is access control. On AWS, this often means using IAM to describe which users or roles can access resources like Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) buckets. IAM allows you to tightly define the access for each user—whether human or system—and set the conditions in which that access is allowed. This could mean requiring the use of multi-factor authentication, or making the data accessible only from your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC).

Encryption allows you to introduce an additional authorization condition before granting access to data. When you use AWS KMS with other services, you can get further control over access to sensitive data. For example, with S3 objects that are encrypted by KMS, each IAM user must not only have access to the storage itself but also have authorization to use the KMS key that protects the data. This works similarly for Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS). For example, you can allow an entire operations team to manage Amazon EBS volumes and snapshots, but, for certain Amazon EBS volumes that contain sensitive data, you can use a different KMS master key with different permissions that are granted only to the individuals you specify. This ability to define more granular access control through independent permission on encryption keys is supported by all AWS services that integrate with KMS.

When you configure IAM for your users to access your data and resources, it’s critical that you consider the principle of least privilege. This means you grant only the access necessary for each user to do their work and no more. For example, instead of granting users access to an entire S3 bucket, you can use IAM policy language to specify the particular Amazon S3 prefixes that are required and no others. This is important when thinking about the difference between using a service—data plane events—and managing a service—management plane events. An application might store and retrieve objects in an S3 bucket, but it’s rarely the case that the same application needs to list all of the buckets in an account or configure the bucket’s settings and permissions.

Making clear distinctions between who can use resources and who can manage resources is often referred to as the principle of separation of duties. Consider the circumstance of having a single application with two identities that are associated with it—an application identity that uses a key to encrypt and decrypt data and a manager identity that can make configuration changes to the key. By using AWS KMS together with services like Amazon EBS, Amazon S3, and many others, you can clearly define which actions can be used by each persona. This prevents the application identity from making configuration or permission changes while allowing the manager to make those changes but not use the services to actually access the data or use the encryption keys.

Use AWS KMS and key policies with IAM policies

AWS KMS provides you with visibility and granular permissions control of a specific key in the hierarchy of keys used to protect your data. Controlling access to the keys in KMS is done using IAM policy language. The customer master key (CMK) has its own policy document, known as a key policy. AWS KMS key policies can work together with IAM identity policies or you can manage the permissions for a KMS CMK exclusively with key policies. This gives you greater flexibility to separately assign permissions to use the key or manage the key, depending on your business use case.

Encryption everywhere

AWS recommends that you encrypt as much as possible. This means encrypting data while it’s in transit and while it’s at rest.

For customers seeking to encrypt data in transit for their public facing applications, our recommended best practice is to use AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). This service automates the creation, deployment, and renewal of public TLS certificates. If you’ve been using SSL/TLS for your websites and applications, then you’re familiar with some of the challenges related to dealing with certificates. ACM is designed to make certificate management easier and less expensive.

One way ACM does this is by generating a certificate for you. Because AWS operates a certificate authority that’s already trusted by industry-standard web browsers and operating systems, public certificates created by ACM can be used with public websites and mobile applications. ACM can create a publicly trusted certificate that you can then deploy into API Gateway, Elastic Load Balancing, or Amazon CloudFront (a globally distributed content delivery network). You don’t have to handle the private key material or figure out complicated tooling to deploy the certificates to your resources. ACM helps you to deploy your certificates either through the AWS Management Console or with automation that uses AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or AWS SDKs.

One of the challenges related to certificates is regularly rotating and renewing them so they don’t unexpectedly expire and prevent your users from using your website or application. Fortunately, ACM has a feature that updates the certificate before it expires and automatically deploys the new certificate to the resources associated with it. No more needing to make a calendar entry to remind your team to renew certificates and, most importantly, no more outages because of expired certificates.

Many customers want to secure data in transit for services by using privately trusted TLS certificates instead of publicly trusted TLS certificates. For this use case, you can use AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA) to issue certificates for both clients and servers. ACM PCA provides an inexpensive solution for issuing internally trusted certificates and it can be integrated with ACM with all of the same integrative benefits that ACM provides for public certificates, including automated renewal.

For encrypting data at rest, I strongly encourage using AWS KMS. There is a broad range of AWS storage and database services that support KMS integration so you can implement robust encryption to protect your data at rest within AWS services. This lets you have the benefit of the KMS capabilities for encryption and access control to build complex solutions with a variety of AWS services without compromising on using encryption as part of your data protection strategy.

How can I use encryption to meet compliance requirements in the cloud?

The first step is to identify your compliance requirements. This can often be done by working with your company’s risk and compliance team to understand the frameworks and controls that your company must abide by. While the requirements vary by industry and region, the most common encryption compliance requirements are to encrypt your data and make sure that the access control for the encryption keys (for example by using AWS KMS CMK key policies) is separate from the access control to the encrypted data itself (for example through Amazon S3 bucket policies).

Another common requirement is to have separate encryption keys for different classes of data, or for different tenants or customers. This is directly supported by AWS KMS as you can have as many different keys as you need within a single account. If you need to use even more than the 10,000 keys AWS KMS allows by default, contact AWS Support about raising your quota.

For compliance-related concerns, there are a few capabilities that are worth exploring as options to increase your coverage of security controls.

  • Amazon S3 can automatically encrypt all new objects placed into a bucket, even when the user or software doesn’t specify encryption.
  • You can use batch operations in Amazon S3 to encrypt existing objects that weren’t originally stored with encryption.
  • You can use the Amazon S3 inventory report to generate a list of all S3 objects in a bucket, including their encryption status.

AWS services that track encryption configurations to comply with your requirements

Anyone who has pasted a screenshot of a configuration into a word processor at the end of the year to memorialize compliance knows how brittle traditional on-premises forms of compliance attestation can be. Everything looked right the day it was installed and still looked right at the end of the year—but how can you be certain that everything was correctly configured at all times?

AWS provides several different services to help you configure your environment correctly and monitor its configuration over time. AWS services can also be configured to perform automated remediation to correct any deviations from your desired configuration state. AWS helps automate the collection of compliance evidence and provides nearly continuous, rather than point in time, compliance snapshots.

AWS Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit, and evaluate the configurations of your AWS resources. AWS Config continuously monitors and records your AWS resource configurations and helps you to automate the evaluation of recorded configurations against desired configurations. One of the most powerful features of AWS Config is AWS Config Rules. While AWS Config continuously tracks the configuration changes that occur among your resources, it checks whether these changes violate any of the conditions in your rules. If a resource violates a rule, AWS Config flags the resource and the rule as noncompliant. AWS Config comes with a wide range of prewritten managed rules to help you maintain compliance for many different AWS services. The managed rules include checks for encryption status on a variety of resources, ACM certificate expiration, IAM policy configurations, and many more.

For additional monitoring capabilities, consider Amazon Macie and AWS Security Hub. Amazon Macie is a service that helps you understand the contents of your S3 buckets by analyzing and classifying the data contained within your S3 objects. It can also be used to report on the encryption status of your S3 buckets, giving you a central view into the configurations of all buckets in your account, including default encryption settings. Amazon Macie also integrates with AWS Security Hub, which can perform automated checks of your configurations, including several checks that focus on encryption settings.

Another critical service for compliance outcomes is AWS CloudTrail. CloudTrail enables governance, compliance, operational auditing, and risk auditing of your AWS account. With CloudTrail, you can log, continuously monitor, and retain account activity related to actions across your AWS infrastructure. AWS KMS records all of its activity in CloudTrail, allowing you to identify who used the encryption keys, in what context, and with which resources. This information is useful for operational purposes and to help you meet your compliance needs.

How do I demonstrate compliance with company policy to my stakeholders in the cloud?

You probably have internal and external stakeholders that care about compliance and require that you document your system’s compliance posture. These stakeholders include a range of possible entities and roles, including internal and external auditors, risk management departments, industry and government regulators, diligence teams related to funding or acquisition, and more.

Unfortunately, the relationship between technical staff and audit and compliance staff is sometimes contentious. AWS believes strongly that these two groups should work together—they want the same things. The same services and facilities that engineering teams use to support operational excellence can also provide output that answers stakeholders’ questions about security compliance.

You can provide access to the console for AWS Config and CloudTrail to your counterparts in audit and risk management roles. Use AWS Config to continuously monitor your configurations and produce periodic reports that can be delivered to the right stakeholders. The evolution towards continuous compliance makes compliance with your company policies on AWS not just possible, but often better than is possible in traditional on-premises environments. AWS Config includes several managed rules that check for encryption settings in your environment. CloudTrail contains an ongoing record of every time AWS KMS keys are used to either encrypt or decrypt your resources. The contents of the CloudTrail entry include the KMS key ID, letting your stakeholders review and connect the activity recorded in CloudTrail with the configurations and permissions set in your environment. You can also use the reports produced by Security Hub automated compliance checks to verify and validate your encryption settings and other controls.

Your stakeholders might have further requirements for compliance that are beyond your scope of control because AWS is operating those controls for you. AWS provides System and Organization Controls (SOC) Reports that are independent, third-party examination reports that demonstrate how AWS achieves key compliance controls and objectives. The purpose of these reports is to help you and your auditors understand the AWS controls established to support operations and compliance. You can consult the AWS SOC2 report, available through AWS Artifact, for more information about how AWS operates in the cloud and provides assurance around AWS security procedures. The SOC2 report includes several AWS KMS-specific controls that might be of interest to your audit-minded colleagues.

Summary

Encryption in the cloud is easier than encryption on-premises, powerful, and can help you meet the highest standards for controls and compliance. The cloud provides more comprehensive data protection capabilities for customers looking to rapidly scale and innovate than are available for on-premises systems. This post provides guidance for how to think about encryption in AWS. You can use IAM, AWS KMS, and ACM to provide granular access control to your most sensitive data, and support protection of your data in transit and at rest. Once you’ve identified your compliance requirements, you can use AWS Config and CloudTrail to review your compliance with company policy over time, rather than point-in-time snapshots obtained through traditional audit methods. AWS can provide on-demand compliance evidence, with tools such as reporting from CloudTrail and AWS Config, and attestations such as SOC reports.

I encourage you to review your current encryption approach against the steps I’ve outlined in this post. While every industry and company is different, I believe the core concepts presented here apply to all scenarios. I want to hear from you. If you have any comments or feedback on the approach discussed here, or how you’ve used it for your use case, leave a comment on this post.

And for more information on encryption in the cloud and on AWS, check out the following resources, in addition to our collection of encryption blog posts.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security how-to content, news, and feature announcements? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Peter M. O’Donnell

Peter is an AWS Principal Solutions Architect, specializing in security, risk, and compliance with the Strategic Accounts team. Formerly dedicated to a major US commercial bank customer, Peter now supports some of AWS’s largest and most complex strategic customers in security and security-related topics, including data protection, cryptography, identity, threat modeling, incident response, and CISO engagement.

Author

Supriya Anand

Supriya is a Senior Digital Strategist at AWS, focused on marketing, encryption, and emerging areas of cybersecurity. She has worked to drive large scale marketing and content initiatives forward in a variety of regulated industries. She is passionate about helping customers learn best practices to secure their AWS cloud environment so they can innovate faster on behalf of their business.

re:Invent 2020 – Your guide to AWS Identity and Data Protection sessions

Post Syndicated from Marta Taggart original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/reinvent-2020-your-guide-to-aws-identity-and-data-protection-sessions/

AWS re:Invent will certainly be different in 2020! Instead of seeing you all in Las Vegas, this year re:Invent will be a free, three-week virtual conference. One thing that will remain the same is the variety of sessions, including many Security, Identity, and Compliance sessions. As we developed sessions, we looked to customers—asking where they would like to expand their knowledge. One way we did this was shared in a recent Security blog post, where we introduced a new customer polling feature that provides us with feedback directly from customers. The initial results of the poll showed that Identity and Access Management and Data Protection are top-ranking topics for customers. We wanted to highlight some of the re:Invent sessions for these two important topics so that you can start building your re:Invent schedule. Each session is offered at multiple times, so you can sign up for the time that works best for your location and schedule.

Managing your Identities and Access in AWS

AWS identity: Secure account and application access with AWS SSO
Ron Cully, Principal Product Manager, AWS

Dec 1, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 12:30 PM PST
Dec 1, 2020 | 8:00 PM – 8:30 PM PST
Dec 2, 2020 | 4:00 AM – 4:30 AM PST

AWS SSO provides an easy way to centrally manage access at scale across all your AWS Organizations accounts, using identities you create and manage in AWS SSO, Microsoft Active Directory, or external identity providers (such as Okta Universal Directory or Azure AD). This session explains how you can use AWS SSO to manage your AWS environment, and it covers key new features to help you secure and automate account access authorization.

Getting started with AWS identity services
Becky Weiss, Senior Principal Engineer, AWS

Dec 1, 2020 | 1:30 PM – 2:00 PM PST
Dec 1, 2020 | 9:30 PM – 10:00 PM PST
Dec 2, 2020 | 5:30 AM – 6:00 AM PST

The number, range, and breadth of AWS services are large, but the set of techniques that you need to secure them is not. Your journey as a builder in the cloud starts with this session, in which practical examples help you quickly get up to speed on the fundamentals of becoming authenticated and authorized in the cloud, as well as on securing your resources and data correctly.

AWS identity: Ten identity health checks to improve security in the cloud
Cassia Martin, Senior Security Solutions Architect, AWS

Dec 2, 2020 | 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM PST
Dec 2, 2020 | 5:30 PM – 6:00 PM PST
Dec 3, 2020 | 1:30 AM – 2:00 AM PST

Get practical advice and code to help you achieve the principle of least privilege in your existing AWS environment. From enabling logs to disabling root, the provided checklist helps you find and fix permissions issues in your resources, your accounts, and throughout your organization. With these ten health checks, you can improve your AWS identity and achieve better security every day.

AWS identity: Choosing the right mix of AWS IAM policies for scale
Josh Du Lac, Principal Security Solutions Architect, AWS

Dec 2, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 11:30 AM PST
Dec 2, 2020 | 7:00 PM – 7:30 PM PST
Dec 3, 2020 | 3:00 AM – 3:30 AM PST

This session provides both a strategic and tactical overview of various AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies that provide a range of capabilities for the security of your AWS accounts. You probably already use a number of these policies today, but this session will dive into the tactical reasons for choosing one capability over another. This session zooms out to help you understand how to manage these IAM policies across a multi-account environment, covering their purpose, deployment, validation, limitations, monitoring, and more.

Zero Trust: An AWS perspective
Quint Van Deman, Principal WW Identity Specialist, AWS

Dec 2, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 1:00 PM PST
Dec 2, 2020 | 8:30 PM – 9:00 PM PST
Dec 3, 2020 | 4:30 AM – 5:00 AM PST

AWS customers have continuously asked, “What are the optimal patterns for ensuring the right levels of security and availability for my systems and data?” Increasingly, they are asking how patterns that fall under the banner of Zero Trust might apply to this question. In this session, you learn about the AWS guiding principles for Zero Trust and explore the larger subdomains that have emerged within this space. Then the session dives deep into how AWS has incorporated some of these concepts, and how AWS can help you on your own Zero Trust journey.

AWS identity: Next-generation permission management
Brigid Johnson, Senior Software Development Manager, AWS

Dec 3, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 11:30 AM PST
Dec 3, 2020 | 7:00 PM – 7:30 PM PST
Dec 4, 2020 | 3:00 AM – 3:30 AM PST

This session is for central security teams and developers who manage application permissions. This session reviews a permissions model that enables you to scale your permissions management with confidence. Learn how to set your organization up for access management success with permission guardrails. Then, learn about granting workforce permissions based on attributes, so they scale as your users and teams adjust. Finally, learn about the access analysis tools and how to use them to identify and reduce broad permissions and give users and systems access to only what they need.

How Goldman Sachs administers temporary elevated AWS access
Harsha Sharma, Solutions Architect, AWS
Chana Garbow Pardes, Associate, Goldman Sachs
Jewel Brown, Analyst, Goldman Sachs

Dec 16, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 2:30 PM PST
Dec 16, 2020 | 10:00 PM – 10:30 PM PST
Dec 17, 2020 | 6:00 AM – 6:30 AM PST

Goldman Sachs takes security and access to AWS accounts seriously. While empowering teams with the freedom to build applications autonomously is critical for scaling cloud usage across the firm, guardrails and controls need to be set in place to enable secure administrative access. In this session, learn how the company built its credential brokering workflow and administrator access for its users. Learn how, with its simple application that uses proprietary and AWS services, including Amazon DynamoDB, AWS Lambda, AWS CloudTrail, Amazon S3, and Amazon Athena, Goldman Sachs is able to control administrator credentials and monitor and report on actions taken for audits and compliance.

Data Protection

Do you need an AWS KMS custom key store?
Tracy Pierce, Senior Consultant, AWS

Dec 15, 2020 | 9:45 AM – 10:15 AM PST
Dec 15, 2020 | 5:45 PM – 6:15 PM PST
Dec 16, 2020 | 1:45 AM – 2:15 AM PST

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) has integrated with AWS CloudHSM, giving you the option to create your own AWS KMS custom key store. In this session, you learn more about how a KMS custom key store is backed by an AWS CloudHSM cluster and how it enables you to generate, store, and use your KMS keys in the hardware security modules that you control. You also learn when and if you really need a custom key store. Join this session to learn why you might choose not to use a custom key store and instead use the AWS KMS default.

Using certificate-based authentication on containers & web servers on AWS
Josh Rosenthol, Senior Product Manager, AWS
Kevin Rioles, Manager, Infrastructure & Security, BlackSky

Dec 8, 2020 | 12:45 PM – 1:15 PM PST
Dec 8, 2020 | 8:45 PM – 9:15 PM PST
Dec 9, 2020 | 4:45 AM – 5:15 AM PST

In this session, BlackSky talks about its experience using AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) end-entity certificates for the processing and distribution of real-time satellite geospatial intelligence and monitoring. Learn how BlackSky uses certificate-based authentication on containers and web servers within its AWS environment to help make TLS ubiquitous in its deployments. The session details the implementation, architecture, and operations best practices that the company chose and how it was able to operate ACM at scale across multiple accounts and regions.

The busy manager’s guide to encryption
Spencer Janyk, Senior Product Manager, AWS

Dec 9, 2020 | 11:45 AM – 12:15 PM PST
Dec 9, 2020 | 7:45 PM – 8:15 PM PST
Dec 10, 2020 | 3:45 AM – 4:15 AM PST

In this session, explore the functionality of AWS cryptography services and learn when and where to deploy each of the following: AWS Key Management Service, AWS Encryption SDK, AWS Certificate Manager, AWS CloudHSM, and AWS Secrets Manager. You also learn about defense-in-depth strategies including asymmetric permissions models, client-side encryption, and permission segmentation by role.

Building post-quantum cryptography for the cloud
Alex Weibel, Senior Software Development Engineer, AWS

Dec 15, 2020 | 12:45 PM – 1:15 PM PST
Dec 15, 2020 | 8:45 PM – 9:15 PM PST
Dec 16, 2020 | 4:45 AM – 5:15 AM PST

This session introduces post-quantum cryptography and how you can use it today to secure TLS communication. Learn about recent updates on standards and existing deployments, including the AWS post-quantum TLS implementation (pq-s2n). A description of the hybrid key agreement method shows how you can combine a new post-quantum key encapsulation method with a classical key exchange to secure network traffic today.

Data protection at scale using Amazon Macie
Neel Sendas, Senior Technical Account Manager, AWS

Dec 17, 2020 | 7:15 AM – 7:45 AM PST
Dec 17, 2020 | 3:15 PM – 3:45 PM PST
Dec 17, 2020 | 11:15 PM – 11:45 PM PST

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is a common topic among companies that work with sensitive data. If an organization can’t identify its sensitive data, it can’t protect it. Amazon Macie is a fully managed data security and data privacy service that uses machine learning and pattern matching to discover and protect your sensitive data in AWS. In this session, we will share details of the design and architecture you can use to deploy Macie at large scale.

While sessions are virtual this year, they will be offered at multiple times with live moderators and “Ask the Expert” sessions available to help answer any questions that you may have. We look forward to “seeing” you in these sessions. Please see the re:Invent agenda for more details and to build your schedule.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security how-to content, news, and feature announcements? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Marta Taggart

Marta is a Seattle-native and Senior Program Manager in AWS Security, where she focuses on privacy, content development, and educational programs. Her interest in education stems from two years she spent in the education sector while serving in the Peace Corps in Romania. In her free time, she’s on a global hunt for the perfect cup of coffee.

Author

Himanshu Verma

Himanshu is a Worldwide Specialist for AWS Security Services. In this role, he leads the go-to-market creation and execution for AWS Data Protection and Threat Detection & Monitoring services, field enablement, and strategic customer advisement. Prior to AWS, he held roles as Director of Product Management, engineering and development, working on various identity, information security and data protection technologies.

Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/11/indistinguishability-obfuscation.html

Quanta magazine recently published a breathless article on indistinguishability obfuscation — calling it the “‘crown jewel’ of cryptography” — and saying that it had finally been achieved, based on a recently published paper. I want to add some caveats to the discussion.

Basically, obfuscation makes a computer program “unintelligible” by performing its functionality. Indistinguishability obfuscation is more relaxed. It just means that two different programs that perform the same functionality can’t be distinguished from each other. A good definition is in this paper.

This is a pretty amazing theoretical result, and one to be excited about. We can now do obfuscation, and we can do it using assumptions that make real-world sense. The proofs are kind of ugly, but that’s okay — it’s a start. What it means in theory is that we have a fundamental theoretical result that we can use to derive a whole bunch of other cryptographic primitives.

But — and this is a big one — this result is not even remotely close to being practical. We’re talking multiple days to perform pretty simple calculations, using massively large blocks of computer code. And this is likely to remain true for a very long time. Unless researchers increase performance by many orders of magnitude, nothing in the real world will make use of this work anytime soon.

But but, consider fully homomorphic encryption. It, too, was initially theoretically interesting and completely impractical. And now, after decades of work, it seems to be almost just-barely maybe approaching practically useful. This could very well be on the same trajectory, and perhaps in twenty to thirty years we will be celebrating this early theoretical result as the beginning of a new theory of cryptography.

Round 2 post-quantum TLS is now supported in AWS KMS

Post Syndicated from Alex Weibel original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/round-2-post-quantum-tls-is-now-supported-in-aws-kms/

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) now supports three new hybrid post-quantum key exchange algorithms for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 encryption protocol that’s used when connecting to AWS KMS API endpoints. These new hybrid post-quantum algorithms combine the proven security of a classical key exchange with the potential quantum-safe properties of new post-quantum key exchanges undergoing evaluation for standardization. The fastest of these algorithms adds approximately 0.3 milliseconds of overheard compared to a classical TLS handshake. The new post-quantum key exchange algorithms added are Round 2 versions of Kyber, Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation (BIKE), and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE). Each organization has submitted their algorithms to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as part of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization process. This process spans several rounds of evaluation over multiple years, and is likely to continue beyond 2021.

In our previous hybrid post-quantum TLS blog post, we announced that AWS KMS had launched hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2 with Round 1 versions of BIKE and SIKE. The Round 1 post-quantum algorithms are still supported by AWS KMS, but at a lower priority than the Round 2 algorithms. You can choose to upgrade your client to enable negotiation of Round 2 algorithms.

Why post-quantum TLS is important

A large-scale quantum computer would be able to break the current public-key cryptography that’s used for key exchange in classical TLS connections. While a large-scale quantum computer isn’t available today, it’s still important to think about and plan for your long-term security needs. TLS traffic using classical algorithms recorded today could be decrypted by a large-scale quantum computer in the future. If you’re developing applications that rely on the long-term confidentiality of data passed over a TLS connection, you should consider a plan to migrate to post-quantum cryptography before the lifespan of the sensitivity of your data would be susceptible to an unauthorized user with a large-scale quantum computer. As an example, this means that if you believe that a large-scale quantum computer is 25 years away, and your data must be secure for 20 years, you should migrate to post-quantum schemes within the next 5 years. AWS is working to prepare for this future, and we want you to be prepared too.

We’re offering this feature now instead of waiting for standardization efforts to be complete so you have a way to measure the potential performance impact to your applications. Offering this feature now also gives you the protection afforded by the proposed post-quantum schemes today. While we believe that the use of this feature raises the already high security bar for connecting to AWS KMS endpoints, these new cipher suites will impact bandwidth utilization and latency. However, using these new algorithms could also create connection failures for intermediate systems that proxy TLS connections. We’d like to get feedback from you on the effectiveness of our implementation or any issues found so we can improve it over time.

Hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2

Hybrid post-quantum TLS is a feature that provides the security protections of both the classical and post-quantum key exchange algorithms in a single TLS handshake. Figure 1 shows the differences in the connection secret derivation process between classical and hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2. Hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2 has three major differences from classical TLS 1.2:

  • The negotiated post-quantum key is appended to the ECDHE key before being used as the hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) key.
  • The text hybrid in its ASCII representation is prepended to the beginning of the HMAC message.
  • The entire client key exchange message from the TLS handshake is appended to the end of the HMAC message.
Figure 1: Differences in the connection secret derivation process between classical and hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2

Figure 1: Differences in the connection secret derivation process between classical and hybrid post-quantum TLS 1.2

Some background on post-quantum TLS

Today, all requests to AWS KMS use TLS with key exchange algorithms that provide perfect forward secrecy and use one of the following classical schemes:

While existing FFDHE and ECDHE schemes use perfect forward secrecy to protect against the compromise of the server’s long-term secret key, these schemes don’t protect against large-scale quantum computers. In the future, a sufficiently capable large-scale quantum computer could run Shor’s Algorithm to recover the TLS session key of a recorded classical session, and thereby gain access to the data inside. Using a post-quantum key exchange algorithm during the TLS handshake protects against attacks from a large-scale quantum computer.

The possibility of large-scale quantum computing has spurred the development of new quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. NIST has started the process of standardizing post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). A KEM is a type of key exchange that’s used to establish a shared symmetric key. AWS has chosen three NIST KEM submissions to adopt in our post-quantum efforts:

Hybrid mode ensures that the negotiated key is as strong as the weakest key agreement scheme. If one of the schemes is broken, the communications remain confidential. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Methods for Transport Layer Security 1.2 draft describes how to combine post-quantum KEMs with ECDHE to create new cipher suites for TLS 1.2.

These cipher suites use a hybrid key exchange that performs two independent key exchanges during the TLS handshake. The key exchange then cryptographically combines the keys from each into a single TLS session key. This strategy combines the proven security of a classical key exchange with the potential quantum-safe properties of new post-quantum key exchanges being analyzed by NIST.

The effect of hybrid post-quantum TLS on performance

Post-quantum cipher suites have a different performance profile and bandwidth usage from traditional cipher suites. AWS has measured bandwidth and latency across 2,000 TLS handshakes between an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) C5n.4xlarge client and the public AWS KMS endpoint, which were both in the us-west-2 Region. Your own performance characteristics might differ, and will depend on your environment, including your:

  • Hardware–CPU speed and number of cores.
  • Existing workloads–how often you call AWS KMS and what other work your application performs.
  • Network–location and capacity.

The following graphs and table show latency measurements performed by AWS for all newly supported Round 2 post-quantum algorithms, in addition to the classical ECDHE key exchange algorithm currently used by most customers.

Figure 2 shows the latency differences of all hybrid post-quantum algorithms compared with classical ECDHE alone, and shows that compared to ECDHE alone, SIKE adds approximately 101 milliseconds of overhead, BIKE adds approximately 9.5 milliseconds of overhead, and Kyber adds approximately 0.3 milliseconds of overhead.
 

Figure 2: TLS handshake latency at varying percentiles for four key exchange algorithms

Figure 2: TLS handshake latency at varying percentiles for four key exchange algorithms

Figure 3 shows the latency differences between ECDHE with Kyber, and ECDHE alone. The addition of Kyber adds approximately 0.3 milliseconds of overhead.
 

Figure 3: TLS handshake latency at varying percentiles, with only top two performing key exchange algorithms

Figure 3: TLS handshake latency at varying percentiles, with only top two performing key exchange algorithms

The following table shows the total amount of data (in bytes) needed to complete the TLS handshake for each cipher suite, the average latency, and latency at varying percentiles. All measurements were gathered from 2,000 TLS handshakes. The time was measured on the client from the start of the handshake until the handshake was completed, and includes all network transfer time. All connections used RSA authentication with a 2048-bit key, and ECDHE used the secp256r1 curve. All hybrid post-quantum tests used the NIST Round 2 versions. The Kyber test used the Kyber-512 parameter, the BIKE test used the BIKE-1 Level 1 parameter, and the SIKE test used the SIKEp434 parameter.

Item Bandwidth
(bytes)
Total
handshakes
Average
(ms)
p0
(ms)
p50
(ms)
p90
(ms)
p99
(ms)
ECDHE (classic) 3,574 2,000 3.08 2.07 3.02 3.95 4.71
ECDHE + Kyber R2 5,898 2,000 3.36 2.38 3.17 4.28 5.35
ECDHE + BIKE R2 12,456 2,000 14.91 11.59 14.16 18.27 23.58
ECDHE + SIKE R2 4,628 2,000 112.40 103.22 108.87 126.80 146.56

By default, the AWS SDK client performs a TLS handshake once to set up a new TLS connection, and then reuses that TLS connection for multiple requests. This means that the increased cost of a hybrid post-quantum TLS handshake is amortized over multiple requests sent over the TLS connection. You should take the amortization into account when evaluating the overall additional cost of using post-quantum algorithms; otherwise performance data could be skewed.

AWS KMS has chosen Kyber Round 2 to be KMS’s highest prioritized post-quantum algorithm, with BIKE Round 2, and SIKE Round 2 next in priority order for post-quantum algorithms. This is because Kyber’s performance is closest to the classical ECDHE performance that most AWS KMS customers are using today and are accustomed to.

How to use hybrid post-quantum cipher suites

To use the post-quantum cipher suites with AWS KMS, you need the preview release of the AWS Common Runtime (CRT) HTTP client for the AWS SDK for Java 2.x. Also, you will need to configure the AWS CRT HTTP client to use the s2n post-quantum hybrid cipher suites. Post-quantum TLS for AWS KMS is available in all AWS Regions except for AWS GovCloud (US-East), AWS GovCloud (US-West), AWS China (Beijing) Region operated by Beijing Sinnet Technology Co. Ltd (“Sinnet”), and AWS China (Ningxia) Region operated by Ningxia Western Cloud Data Technology Co. Ltd. (“NWCD”). Since NIST has not yet standardized post-quantum cryptography, connections that require Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) compliance cannot use the hybrid key exchange. For example, kms.<region>.amazonaws.com supports the use of post-quantum cipher suites, while kms-fips.<region>.amazonaws.com does not.

  1. If you’re using the AWS SDK for Java 2.x, you must add the preview release of the AWS Common Runtime client to your Maven dependencies.
    <dependency>
        <groupId>software.amazon.awssdk</groupId>
        <artifactId>aws-crt-client</artifactId>
        <version>2.14.13-PREVIEW</version>
    </dependency>
    

  2. You then must configure the new SDK and cipher suite in the existing initialization code of your application:
    if(!TLS_CIPHER_PREF_KMS_PQ_TLSv1_0_2020_07.isSupported()){
        throw new RuntimeException("Post Quantum Ciphers not supported on this Platform");
    }
    
    SdkAsyncHttpClient awsCrtHttpClient = AwsCrtAsyncHttpClient.builder()
              .tlsCipherPreference(TLS_CIPHER_PREF_KMS_PQ_TLSv1_0_2020_07)
              .build();
              
    KmsAsyncClient kms = KmsAsyncClient.builder()
             .httpClient(awsCrtHttpClient)
             .build();
             
    ListKeysResponse response = kms.listKeys().get();
    

Now, all connections made to AWS KMS in supported Regions will use the new hybrid post-quantum cipher suites! To see a complete example of everything set up, check out the example application here.

Things to try

Here are some ideas about how to use this post-quantum-enabled client:

  • Run load tests and benchmarks. These new cipher suites perform differently than traditional key exchange algorithms. You might need to adjust your connection timeouts to allow for the longer handshake times or, if you’re running inside an AWS Lambda function, extend the execution timeout setting.
  • Try connecting from different locations. Depending on the network path your request takes, you might discover that intermediate hosts, proxies, or firewalls with deep packet inspection (DPI) block the request. This could be due to the new cipher suites in the ClientHello or the larger key exchange messages. If this is the case, you might need to work with your security team or IT administrators to update the relevant configuration to unblock the new TLS cipher suites. We’d like to hear from you about how your infrastructure interacts with this new variant of TLS traffic. If you have questions or feedback, please start a new thread on the AWS KMS discussion forum.

Conclusion

In this blog post, I announced support for Round 2 hybrid post-quantum algorithms in AWS KMS, and showed you how to begin experimenting with hybrid post-quantum key exchange algorithms for TLS when connecting to AWS KMS endpoints.

More info

If you’d like to learn more about post-quantum cryptography check out:

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

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Author

Alex Weibel

Alex is a Senior Software Engineer on the AWS Crypto Algorithms team. He’s one of the maintainers for Amazon’s TLS Library s2n. Previously, Alex worked on TLS termination and request proxying for S3 and the Elastic Load Balancing Service developing new features for customers. Alex holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science from the University of Texas at Austin.

OpenSSL Key and IV Padding

Post Syndicated from Bozho original https://techblog.bozho.net/openssl-key-and-iv-padding/

OpenSSL is an omnipresent tool when it comes to encryption. While in Java we are used to the native Java implementations of cryptographic primitives, most other languages rely on OpenSSL.

Yesterday I was investigating the encryption used by one open source tool written in C, and two things looked strange: they were using a 192 bit key for AES 256, and they were using a 64-bit IV (initialization vector) instead of the required 128 bits (in fact, it was even a 56-bit IV).

But somehow, magically, OpenSSL didn’t complain the way my Java implementation did, and encryption worked. So, I figured, OpenSSL is doing some padding of the key and IV. But what? Is it prepending zeroes, is it appending zeroes, is it doing PKCS padding or ISO/IEC 7816-4 padding, or any of the other alternatives. I had to know if I wanted to make my Java counterpart supply the correct key and IV.

It was straightforward to test with the following commands:

# First generate the ciphertext by encrypting input.dat which contains "testtesttesttesttesttest"
$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -e -a -A -in input.dat -K '7c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c76' -iv 'FEDCBA987654321' -out input-test.enc

# Then test decryption with the same key and IV
$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -d -a -A -in input-test.enc -K '7c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c76' -iv 'FEDCBA987654321'
testtesttesttesttesttest

# Then test decryption with different paddings
$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -d -a -A -in input-test.enc -K '7c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c76' -iv 'FEDCBA9876543210'
testtesttesttesttesttest

$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -d -a -A -in input-test.enc -K '7c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c760' -iv 'FEDCBA987654321'
testtesttesttesttesttest

$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -d -a -A -in input-test.enc -K '7c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c76000' -iv 'FEDCBA987654321'
testtesttesttesttesttest

$ openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -nosalt -d -a -A -in input-test.enc -K '07c07f68ea8494b2f8b9fea297119350d78708afa69c1c76' -iv 'FEDCBA987654321'
bad decrypt

So, OpenSSL is padding keys and IVs with zeroes until they meet the expected size. Note that if -aes-192-cbc is used instead of -aes-256-cbc, decryption will fail, because OpenSSL will pad it with fewer zeroes and so the key will be different.

Not an unexpected behavaior, but I’d prefer it to report incorrect key sizes rather than “do magic”, especially when it’s not easy to find exactly what magic it’s doing. I couldn’t find it documented, and the comments to this SO question hint in the same direction. In fact, for plaintext padding, OpenSSL uses PKCS padding (which is documented), so it’s extra confusing that it’s using zero-padding here.

In any case, follow the advice from the stackoverflow answer and don’t rely on this padding – always provide the key and IV in the right size.

The post OpenSSL Key and IV Padding appeared first on Bozho's tech blog.

DiceKeys

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/08/dicekeys.html

DiceKeys is a physical mechanism for creating and storing a 192-bit key. The idea is that you roll a special set of twenty-five dice, put them into a plastic jig, and then use an app to convert those dice into a key. You can then use that key for a variety of purposes, and regenerate it from the dice if you need to.

This week Stuart Schechter, a computer scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, is launching DiceKeys, a simple kit for physically generating a single super-secure key that can serve as the basis for creating all the most important passwords in your life for years or even decades to come. With little more than a plastic contraption that looks a bit like a Boggle set and an accompanying web app to scan the resulting dice roll, DiceKeys creates a highly random, mathematically unguessable key. You can then use that key to derive master passwords for password managers, as the seed to create a U2F key for two-factor authentication, or even as the secret key for cryptocurrency wallets. Perhaps most importantly, the box of dice is designed to serve as a permanent, offline key to regenerate that master password, crypto key, or U2F token if it gets lost, forgotten, or broken.

[…]

Schechter is also building a separate app that will integrate with DiceKeys to allow users to write a DiceKeys-generated key to their U2F two-factor authentication token. Currently the app works only with the open-source SoloKey U2F token, but Schechter hopes to expand it to be compatible with more commonly used U2F tokens before DiceKeys ship out. The same API that allows that integration with his U2F token app will also allow cryptocurrency wallet developers to integrate their wallets with DiceKeys, so that with a compatible wallet app, DiceKeys can generate the cryptographic key that protects your crypto coins too.

Here’s the DiceKeys website and app. Here’s a short video demo. Here’s a longer SOUPS talk.

Preorder a set here.

Note: I am an adviser on the project.

Another news article. Slashdot thread. Hacker News thread. Reddit thread.