Tag Archives: Cloudflare Radar

Measuring the Internet’s pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

Post Syndicated from Sabina Zejnilovic original http://blog.cloudflare.com/radar-trending-domains/

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

In 2022, we launched the Radar Domain Rankings, with top lists of the most popular domains based on how people use the Internet globally. The lists are calculated using a machine learning model that uses aggregated 1.1.1.1 resolver data that is anonymized in accordance with our privacy commitments. While the top 100 list is updated daily for each location, typically the first results of that list are stable over time, with the big names such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft and TikTok leading. Additionally, these global big names appear for the majority of locations.

Today, we are improving our Domain Rankings page and adding Trending Domains lists. The new data shows which domains are currently experiencing an increase in popularity. Hence, while with the top popular domains we aim to show domains of broad appeal and of interest to many Internet users, with the trending domains we want to show domains that are generating a surge in interest.

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

When we started looking at the best way to generate a list of trending domains, we needed to answer the following questions:

  • What type of popularity changes do we want to capture?
  • What should we use as a baseline to calculate the change?
  • And how do we quantify it?

We soon realized that we needed two lists. One reflecting sudden increased interest related to a particular event or a topic, showing spikes in popularity in domains that jump in the ranking from one day to the next, and another one reflecting steady growth in popularity, showing domains that are increasing their user base over a longer period.

For this reason, we are launching both the Trending Today and Trending This Week top 10 lists to capture the two different types of popularity increase.

To select the baseline for calculating the increase in popularity, we analyzed the volatility of the Radar Domain Ranking list for different top list sizes. The advantage of starting with the Radar Ranking lists is that they already incorporate a good popularity metric that quantifies the estimated relative size of the user population that accesses a domain over some period of time. You can read more about how we define popularity in our “Goodbye, Alexa. Hello, Cloudflare Radar Domain Rankings” blog.

As expected, smaller list sizes were more stable, meaning the percentage of domains in the top 100 that changed the ranking from one day to the next was much lower than the percentage of domains that changed in the top 10,000. Hence, to have a dynamic daily list of trending domains, we had to look beyond the top 100 most popular domains.

However, we did not want to go all the way to the long tail of the list, as we already know that the ranks there are based on “significantly smaller and hence less reliable numbers” (see the paper "A Long Way to the Top: Significance, Structure, and Stability of Internet Top Lists"). Hence, we selected an appropriate list size for each location, based on the distribution of the number of DNS queries per domain. For example, for the Worldwide trending list we analyzed the top 20,000 most popular domains, for Brazil we looked at the top 10,000, Angola 5,000 and for the Faroe Islands top 500.

We then evaluated how much the domains change rank from one day to the next.

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

We saw that on average, the biggest changes in the top lists, from one day to the next, happen from Fridays to Saturdays and from Sundays to Mondays, and hence on Saturdays and Mondays the lists have the least overlap with the lists of the previous day. We also compared the rank changes from one day to the next corresponding weekday, say from one Monday to the next and saw that on average, rankings on Mondays typically have more overlap with the rankings of the previous Mondays, than with the rankings of Sunday. From this we decided that in order to capture which domains are trending due to the weekend effect, we needed to compare the domain's daily rank to the rank of the previous day(s), and not of the corresponding weekday.

However, we also did not want to show as trending those domains that highly oscillate in the rankings, jumping up and down from one day to the next, showing up as trending every few days. Hence, we could not simply compare the daily rank with the rank from the day before. Instead, as a compromise between capturing the most recent trends, including the weekend trends, but still filtering out the domains whose ranking oscillates over a short period of time, we decided to compare the domain's daily rank with its best rank of the previous four days.

Then, to calculate the increase in popularity, we simply calculate the percentage change in the current rank compared to the best rank of the previous four days.

For calculating the domains steadily growing over the week, we used a slightly different approach.

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

We want to highlight domains that keep improving their rank day by day and especially those that have been really trending in the most recent days. Therefore, we decided not to directly compare the current rank with the best rank during the previous week. Instead, we looked at the weighted average per day rank improvement and compared it with the best rank of the previous six days, with more recent days being given more weight.

What do these lists look like at the end? We compiled the lists for the eventful days of June 21 to 24.

On June 22, nba.com was trending in 28 locations, shown in the table below, the United States, as expected, but also Austria, Australia and Japan, to name a few, reflecting the interest in the events of NBA Draft 2023.

Trending Today data from Friday, June 23, 2023:

Location Trending rank Domain
Albania 5 nba.com
Argentina 9 nba.com
Australia 1 nba.com
Austria 9 nba.com
Belgium 5 nba.com
Canada 5 nba.com
Chile 6 nba.com
Colombia 3 nba.com
Dominican Republic 5 nba.com
Greece 2 nba.com
Honduras 6 nba.com
Hong Kong 1 nba.com
India 7 nba.com
Indonesia 4 nba.com
Ireland 3 nba.com
Japan 9 nba.com
Mexico 2 nba.com
New Zealand 1 nba.com
Norway 1 nba.com
Philippines 1 nba.com
Poland 9 nba.com
Serbia 2 nba.com
South Korea 3 nba.com
Taiwan 1 nba.com
Thailand 1 nba.com
Ukraine 1 nba.com
United States 6 nba.com
Venezuela 4 nba.com

Two domains trending in multiple locations on Saturday, June 24, were: rt.com, a Russian news site in English, and liveuamap.com, a site with interactive map of Ukraine. These are probably the effects of the events related to the Wagner group on June 23 and 24. Related to the same events, domain jetphotos.com was trending on the same day in Russia, Norway and Albania.

Trending Today data from Saturday, June 24, 2023:

Location Trending rank Domain
Armenia 4 rt.com
Australia 5 rt.com
Belgium 2 rt.com
Bulgaria 9 rt.com
Canada 6 rt.com
Denmark 6 rt.com
Greece 6 rt.com
Italy 2 rt.com
Kazakhstan 8 rt.com
Lebanon 4 rt.com
Netherlands 8 rt.com
Papua New Guinea 9 rt.com
Singapore 2 rt.com
Spain 6 rt.com
Turkey 4 rt.com
United Kingdom 5 rt.com
United States 3 rt.com
Uzbekistan 2 rt.com

Other domains trending in various locations on Friday and Saturday were different Gaming and Video Streaming domains such as roblox.com, twitch.tv and callofduty.com, showing an increased interest in gaming activities as the weekend approaches.

Yet another interesting effect of the weekend was the presence of five weather forecast sites on the top 10 trending sites on Friday, in Croatia, showing preoccupation with the summer weekend plans.

Trending Today in Croatia (data from Friday, June 23, 2023)

Trending rank Domain Category
1 lightningmaps.org Weather; Education
2 freemeteo.com.hr Weather
3 Vrijeme.hr
(Croatian Meteorological and Hydrological Service)
Politics, Advocacy, and Government-Related
4 arso.gov.si
5 rain-alarm.com Weather; News & Media
6 sorbs.net Information Security
7 neverin.hr Information Technology
8 meteo.hr
(Croatian Meteorological and Hydrological Service)
Business
9 gamespot.com Gaming; Video Streaming
10 grad.hr Business

These were all examples of daily trending domains, but what domains have steadily grown in popularity that week?

In multiple countries we had travel sites trending that week, sites such as booking.com, rentcars.com and amadeus.com, as many people were making their summer vacation plans. Weather forecast, specifically windy.com domain, was also trending the whole week in locations such as the Dominican Republic, Saint Lucia and Reunion, which was not surprising as the hurricane season began.

Trending This Week (Week June 17 -23, 2023)

Dominican Republic Reunion Saint Lucia
cecomsa.com atera.com adition.com
blur.io sharethis.com windy.com
pxfuel.com windy.com bbc.co.uk
windy.com baidu.com ampproject.org
mihoyo.com inmobi.com aniview.com

Final words

Both Trending Today and Trending This Week top 10 lists are now available on Radar starting today and on Radar API. Feel free to explore them and see what is trending on the Internet.

Measuring the Internet's pulse: trending domains now on Cloudflare Radar

Visit Cloudflare Radar for additional insights around (Internet disruptions, routing issues, Internet traffic trends, attacks, Internet quality, etc.). Follow us on social media at @CloudflareRadar (Twitter), cloudflare.social/@radar (Mastodon), and radar.cloudflare.com (Bluesky), or contact us via e-mail.

Popular domains are domains of broad appeal based on how people use the Internet. Trending domains are domains that are generating a surge in interest.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

Post Syndicated from Omer Yoachimik original http://blog.cloudflare.com/ddos-threat-report-2023-q2/

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

Welcome to the second DDoS threat report of 2023. DDoS attacks, or distributed denial-of-service attacks, are a type of cyber attack that aims to disrupt websites (and other types of Internet properties) to make them unavailable for legitimate users by overwhelming them with more traffic than they can handle — similar to a driver stuck in a traffic jam on the way to the grocery store.

We see a lot of DDoS attacks of all types and sizes and our network is one of the largest in the world spanning more than 300 cities in over 100 countries. Through this network we serve over 63 million HTTP requests per second at peak and over 2 billion DNS queries every day. This colossal amount of data gives us a unique vantage point to provide the community access to insightful DDoS trends.

For our regular readers, you might notice a change in the layout of this report. We used to follow a set pattern to share our insights and trends about DDoS attacks. But with the landscape of DDoS threats changing as DDoS attacks have become more powerful and sophisticated, we felt it's time for a change in how we present our findings. So, we'll kick things off with a quick global overview, and then dig into the major shifts we're seeing in the world of DDoS attacks.

Reminder: an interactive version of this report is also available on Cloudflare Radar. Furthermore, we’ve also added a new interactive component that will allow you to dive deeper into attack activity in each country or region.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
New interactive Radar graph to shed light on local DDoS activity

The DDoS landscape: a look at global patterns

The second quarter of 2023 was characterized by thought-out, tailored and persistent waves of DDoS attack campaigns on various fronts, including:

  1. Multiple DDoS offensives orchestrated by pro-Russian hacktivist groups REvil, Killnet and Anonymous Sudan against Western interest websites.
  2. An increase in deliberately engineered and targeted DNS attacks alongside a 532% surge in DDoS attacks exploiting the Mitel vulnerability (CVE-2022-26143). Cloudflare contributed to disclosing this zero-day vulnerability last year.
  3. Attacks targeting Cryptocurrency companies increased by 600%, as a broader 15% increase in HTTP DDoS attacks was observed. Of these, we’ve noticed an alarming escalation in attack sophistication which we will cover more in depth.

Additionally, one of the largest attacks we’ve seen this quarter was an ACK flood DDoS attack which originated from a Mirai-variant botnet comprising approximately 11K IP addresses. The attack targeted an American Internet Service Provider. It peaked at 1.4 terabit per seconds (Tbps) and was automatically detected and mitigated by Cloudflare’s systems.

Despite general figures indicating an increase in overall attack durations, most of the attacks are short-lived and so was this one. This attack lasted only two minutes. However, more broadly, we’ve seen that attacks exceeding 3 hours have increased by 103% QoQ.

Now having set the stage, let’s dive deeper into these shifts we’re seeing in the DDoS landscape.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Mirai botnet attacks an American Service Provider, peaks at 1.4 Tbps

Hacktivist alliance dubbed “Darknet Parliament” aims at Western banks and SWIFT network

On June 14, Pro-Russian hacktivist groups Killnet, a resurgence of REvil and Anonymous Sudan announced that they have joined forces to execute “massive” cyber attacks on the Western financial system including European and US banks, and the US Federal Reserve System. The collective, dubbed “Darknet Parliament”, declared its first objective was to paralyze SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). A successful DDoS attack on SWIFT could have dire consequences because it's the main service used by financial institutions to conduct global financial transactions.

Beyond a handful of publicized events such as the Microsoft outage which was reported by the media, we haven’t observed any novel DDoS attacks or disruptions targeting our customers. Our systems have been automatically detecting and mitigating attacks associated with this campaign. Over the past weeks, as many as 10,000 of these DDoS attacks were launched by the Darknet Parliament against Cloudflare-protected websites (see graph below).

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
REvil, Killnet and Anonymous Sudan attacks

Despite the hacktivists’ statements, Banking and Financial Services websites were only the ninth most attacked industry — based on attacks we’ve seen against our customers as part of this campaign.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries attacked by the REvil, Killnet and Anonymous Sudan attack campaign

The most attacked industries were Computer Software, Gambling & Casinos and Gaming. Telecommunications and Media outlets came in fourth and fifth, respectively. Overall, the largest attack we witnessed in this campaign peaked at 1.7 million requests per second (rps) and the average was 65,000 rps.

For perspective, earlier this year we mitigated the largest attack in recorded history peaking at 71 million rps. So these attacks were very small compared to Cloudflare scale, but not necessarily for an average website. Therefore, we shouldn’t underestimate the damage potential on unprotected or suboptimally configured websites.

Sophisticated HTTP DDoS attacks

An HTTP DDoS attack is a DDoS attack over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). It targets HTTP Internet properties such as websites and API gateways. Over the past quarter, HTTP DDoS attacks increased by 15% quarter-over-quarter (QoQ) despite a 35% decrease year-over-year (YoY).

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Illustration of an HTTP DDoS attack

Additionally, we've observed an alarming uptick in highly-randomized and sophisticated HTTP DDoS attacks over the past few months. It appears as though the threat actors behind these attacks have deliberately engineered the attacks to try and overcome mitigation systems by adeptly imitating browser behavior very accurately, in some cases, by introducing a high degree of randomization on various properties such as user agents and JA3 fingerprints to name a few. An example of such an attack is provided below. Each different color represents a different randomization feature.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Example of a highly randomized HTTP DDoS attack

Furthermore, in many of these attacks, it seems that the threat actors try to keep their attack rates-per-second relatively low to try and avoid detection and hide amongst the legitimate traffic.

This level of sophistication has previously been associated with state-level and state-sponsored threat actors, and it seems these capabilities are now at the disposal of cyber criminals. Their operations have already targeted prominent businesses such as a large VoIP provider, a leading semiconductor company, and a major payment & credit card provider to name a few.

Protecting websites against sophisticated HTTP DDoS attacks requires intelligent protection that is automated and fast, that leverages threat intelligence, traffic profiling and Machine Learning/statistical analysis to differentiate between attack traffic and user traffic. Moreover, even increasing caching where applicable can help reduce the risk of attack traffic impacting your origin. Read more about DDoS protection best practices here.

DNS Laundering DDoS attacks

The Domain Name System, or DNS, serves as the phone book of the Internet. DNS helps translate the human-friendly website address (e.g. www.cloudflare.com) to a machine-friendly IP address (e.g. 104.16.124.96). By disrupting DNS servers, attackers impact the machines’ ability to connect to a website, and by doing so making websites unavailable to users.

Over the past quarter, the most common attack vector was DNS-based DDoS attacks — 32% of all DDoS attacks were over the DNS protocol. Amongst these, one of the more concerning attack types we’ve seen increasing is the DNS Laundering attack which can pose severe challenges to organizations that operate their own authoritative DNS servers.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top DDoS attack vectors in 2023 Q2

The term “Laundering” in the DNS Laundering attack name refers to the analogy of money laundering, the devious process of making illegally-gained proceeds, often referred to as "dirty money," appear legal. Similarly, in the DDoS world, a DNS Laundering attack is the process of making bad, malicious traffic appear as good, legitimate traffic by laundering it via reputable recursive DNS resolvers.

In a DNS Laundering attack, the threat actor will query subdomains of a domain that is managed by the victim’s DNS server. The prefix that defines the subdomain is randomized and is never used more than once or twice in such an attack. Due to the randomization element, recursive DNS servers will never have a cached response and will need to forward the query to the victim’s authoritative DNS server. The authoritative DNS server is then bombarded by so many queries until it cannot serve legitimate queries or even crashes all together.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Illustration of a DNS Laundering DDoS attack

From the protection point of view, the DNS administrators can’t block the attack source because the source includes reputable recursive DNS servers like Google’s 8.8.8.8 and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1. The administrators also cannot block all queries to the attacked domain because it is a valid domain that they want to preserve access to legitimate queries.

The above factors make it very challenging to distinguish legitimate queries from malicious ones. A large Asian financial institution and a North American DNS provider are amongst recent victims of such attacks. An example of such an attack is provided below.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Example of a DNS Laundering DDoS attack

Similar to the protection strategies outlined for HTTP applications, protecting DNS servers also requires a precise, fast, and automated approach. Leveraging a managed DNS service or a DNS reverse proxy such as Cloudflare’s can help absorb and mitigate the attack traffic. For those more sophisticated DNS attacks, a more intelligent solution is required that leverages statistical analysis of historical data to be able to differentiate between legitimate queries and attack queries.

The rise of the Virtual Machine Botnets

As we’ve previously disclosed, we are witnessing an evolution in botnet DNA. The era of VM-based DDoS botnets has arrived and with it hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks. These botnets are comprised of Virtual Machines (VMs, or Virtual Private Servers, VPS) rather than Internet of Things (IoT) devices which makes them so much more powerful, up to 5,000 times stronger.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Illustration of an IoT botnet compared with a VM Botnet

Because of the computational and bandwidth resources that are at the disposal of these VM-based botnets, they’re able to generate hyper-volumetric attacks with a much smaller fleet size compared to IoT-based botnets.

These botnets have executed one largest recorded DDoS attacks including the 71 million request per second DDoS attack. Multiple organizations including an industry-leading gaming platform provider have already been targeted by this new generation of botnets.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

Cloudflare has proactively collaborated with prominent cloud computing providers to combat these new botnets. Through the quick and dedicated actions of these providers, significant components of these botnets have been neutralized. Since this intervention, we have not observed any further hyper-volumetric attacks yet, a testament to the efficacy of our collaboration.

While we already enjoy a fruitful alliance with the cybersecurity community in countering botnets when we identify large-scale attacks, our goal is to streamline and automate this process further. We extend an invitation to cloud computing providers, hosting providers, and other general service providers to join Cloudflare’s free Botnet Threat Feed. This would provide visibility into attacks originating within their networks, contributing to our collective efforts to dismantle botnets.

“Startblast”: Exploiting Mitel vulnerabilities for DDoS attacks

In March 2023, we disclosed a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2022-26143), named TP240PhoneHome, which was identified in the Mitel MiCollab business phone system, exposing the system to UDP amplification DDoS attacks.

This exploit operates by reflecting traffic off vulnerable servers, amplifying it in the process, with a factor as high as 220 billion percent. The vulnerability stems from an unauthenticated UDP port exposed to the public Internet, which could allow malicious actors to issue a 'startblast' debugging command, simulating a flurry of calls to test the system.

As a result, for each test call, two UDP packets are sent to the issuer, enabling an attacker to direct this traffic to any IP and port number to amplify a DDoS attack. Despite the vulnerability, only a few thousand of these devices are exposed, limiting the potential scale of attack, and attacks must run serially, meaning each device can only launch one attack at a time.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries targeted by Startblast DDoS attacks

Overall, in the past quarter, we’ve seen additional emerging threats such as DDoS attacks abusing the TeamSpeak3 protocol. This attack vector increased by a staggering 403% this quarter.

TeamSpeak, a proprietary voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) that runs over UDP to help gamers talk with other gamers in real time. Talking instead of just chatting can significantly improve a gaming team’s efficiency and help them win. DDoS attacks that target TeamSpeak servers may be launched by rival groups in an attempt to disrupt their communication path during real-time multiplayer games and thus impact their team’s performance.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

DDoS hotspots: The origins of attacks

Overall, HTTP DDoS attacks increased by 15% QoQ despite a 35% decrease YoY. Additionally, network-layer DDoS attacks decreased this quarter by approximately 14%.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
HTTP DDoS attack requests by quarter

In terms of total volume of attack traffic, the US was the largest source of HTTP DDoS attacks. Three out of every thousand requests we saw were part of HTTP DDoS attacks originating from the US. China came in second place and Germany in third place.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top source countries of HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic worldwide)

Some countries naturally receive more traffic due to various factors such as market size, and therefore more attacks. So while it’s interesting to understand the total amount of attack traffic originating from a given country, it is also helpful to remove that bias by normalizing the attack traffic by all traffic to a given country.

When doing so, we see a different pattern. The US doesn’t even make it into the top ten. Instead, Mozambique, Egypt and Finland take the lead as the source countries of the most HTTP DDoS attack traffic relative to all of their traffic. Almost a fifth of all HTTP traffic originating from Mozambique IP addresses were part of DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top source countries of HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country)

Using the same calculation methodology but for bytes, Vietnam remains the largest source of network-layer DDoS attacks (aka L3/4 DDoS attacks) for the second consecutive quarter — and the amount even increased by 58% QoQ. Over 41% of all bytes that were ingested in Cloudflare’s Vietnam data centers were part of L3/4 DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top source countries of L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country)

Industries under attack: examining DDoS attack targets

When examining HTTP DDoS attack activity in Q2, Cryptocurrency websites were targeted with the largest amount of HTTP DDoS attack traffic. Six out of every ten thousand HTTP requests towards Cryptocurrency websites behind Cloudflare were part of these attacks. This represents a 600% increase compared to the previous quarter.

After Crypto, Gaming and Gambling websites came in second place as their attack share increased by 19% QoQ. Marketing and Advertising websites not far behind in third place with little change in their share of attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic for all industries)

However, when we look at the amount of attack traffic relative to all traffic for any given industry, the numbers paint a different picture. Last quarter, Non-profit organizations were attacked the most — 12% of traffic to Non-profits were HTTP DDoS attacks. Cloudflare protects more than 2,271 Non-profit organizations in 111 countries as part of Project Galileo which celebrated its ninth anniversary this year. Over the past months, an average of 67.7 million cyber attacks targeted Non-profits on a daily basis.

Overall, the amount of DDoS attacks on Non-profits increased by 46% bringing the percentage of attack traffic to 17.6%. However, despite this growth, the Management Consulting industry jumped to the first place with 18.4% of its traffic being DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per industry)

When descending the layers of the OSI model, the Internet networks that were most targeted belonged to the Information Technology and Services industry. Almost every third byte routed to them were part of L3/4 DDoS attacks.

Surprisingly enough, companies operating in the Music industry were the second most targeted industry, followed by Broadcast Media and Aviation & Aerospace.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries targeted by L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per industry)

Top attacked industries: a regional perspective

Cryptocurrency websites experienced the highest number of attacks worldwide, while Management Consulting and Non-profit sectors were the most targeted considering their total traffic. However, when we look at individual regions, the situation is a bit different.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks by region

Africa

The Telecommunications industry remains the most attacked industry in Africa for the second consecutive quarter. The Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) industry follows as the second most attacked. The majority of the attack traffic originated from Asia (35%) and Europe (25%).

Asia

For the past two quarters, the Gaming and Gambling industry was the most targeted industry in Asia. In Q2, however, the Gaming and Gambling industry dropped to second place and Cryptocurrency took the lead as the most attacked industry (~50%). Substantial portions of the attack traffic originated from Asia itself (30%) and North America (30%).

Europe

For the third consecutive quarter, the Gaming & Gambling industry remains the most attacked industry in Europe. The Hospitality and Broadcast Media industries follow not too far behind as the second and third most attacked. Most of the attack traffic came from within Europe itself (40%) and from Asia (20%).

Latin America

Surprisingly, half of all attack traffic targeting Latin America was aimed at the Sporting Goods industry. In the previous quarter, the BFSI was the most attacked industry. Approximately 35% of the attack traffic originated from Asia, and another 25% originated from Europe.

Middle East

The Media & Newspaper industries were the most attacked in the Middle East. The vast majority of attack traffic originated from Europe (74%).

North America

For the second consecutive quarter, Marketing & Advertising companies were the most attacked in North America (approximately 35%). Manufacturing and Computer Software companies came in second and third places, respectively. The main sources of the attack traffic were Europe (42%) and the US itself (35%).

Oceania

This quarter, the Biotechnology industry was the most attacked. Previously, it was the Health & Wellness industry. Most of the attack traffic originated from Asia (38%) and Europe (25%).

Countries and regions under attack: examining DDoS attack targets

When examining the total volume of attack traffic, last quarter, Israel leaped to the front as the most attacked country. This quarter, attacks targeting Israeli websites decreased by 33% bringing it to the fourth place. The US takes the lead again as the most attacked country, followed by Canada and Singapore.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top countries and regions targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic for all countries and regions)

If we normalize the data per country and region and divide the attack traffic by the total traffic, we get a different picture. Palestine jumps to the first place as the most attacked country. Almost 12% of all traffic to Palestinian websites were HTTP DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top countries and regions targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country and region)

Last quarter, we observed a striking deviation at the network layer, with Finnish networks under Cloudflare's shield emerging as the primary target. This surge was likely correlated with the diplomatic talks that precipitated Finland's formal integration into NATO. Roughly 83% of all incoming traffic to Finland comprised cyberattacks, with China a close second at 68% attack traffic.

This quarter, however, paints a very different picture. Finland has receded from the top ten, and Chinese Internet networks behind Cloudflare have ascended to the first place. Almost two-thirds of the byte streams towards Chinese networks protected by Cloudflare were malicious. Following China, Switzerland saw half of its inbound traffic constituting attacks, and Turkey came third, with a quarter of its incoming traffic identified as hostile.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
Top countries and regions targeted by L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country and region)

Ransom DDoS attacks

Occasionally, DDoS attacks are carried out to extort ransom payments. We’ve been surveying Cloudflare customers over three years now, and have been tracking the occurrence of Ransom DDoS attack events.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2
High level comparison of Ransomware and Ransom DDoS attacks

Unlike Ransomware attacks, where victims typically fall prey to downloading a malicious file or clicking on a compromised email link which locks, deletes or leaks their files until a ransom is paid, Ransom DDoS attacks can be much simpler for threat actors to execute. Ransom DDoS attacks bypass the need for deceptive tactics such as luring victims into opening dubious emails or clicking on fraudulent links, and they don't necessitate a breach into the network or access to corporate resources.

Over the past quarter, reports of Ransom DDoS attacks decreased. One out of ten respondents reported being threatened or subject to Ransom DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q2

Wrapping up: the ever-evolving DDoS threat landscape

In recent months, there's been an alarming escalation in the sophistication of DDoS attacks. And even the largest and most sophisticated attacks that we’ve seen may only last a few minutes or even seconds — which doesn’t give a human sufficient time to respond. Before the PagerDuty alert is even sent, the attack may be over and the damage is done. Recovering from a DDoS attack can last much longer than the attack itself — just as a boxer might need a while to recover from a punch to the face that only lasts a fraction of a second.

Security is not one single product or a click of a button, but rather a process involving multiple layers of defense to reduce the risk of impact. Cloudflare's automated DDoS defense systems consistently safeguard our clients from DDoS attacks, freeing them up to focus on their core business operations. These systems are complemented by the vast breadth of Cloudflare capabilities such as firewall, bot detection, API protection and even caching which can all contribute to reducing the risk of impact.

The DDoS threat landscape is evolving and increasingly complex, demanding more than just quick fixes. Thankfully, with Cloudflare's multi-layered defenses and automatic DDoS protections, our clients are equipped to navigate these challenges confidently. Our mission is to help build a better Internet, and so we continue to stand guard, ensuring a safer and more reliable digital realm for all.

Methodologies

How we calculate Ransom DDoS attack insights

Cloudflare’s systems constantly analyze traffic and automatically apply mitigation when DDoS attacks are detected. Each attacked customer is prompted with an automated survey to help us better understand the nature of the attack and the success of the mitigation. For over two years, Cloudflare has been surveying attacked customers. One of the questions in the survey asks the respondents if they received a threat or a ransom note. Over the past two years, on average, we collected 164 responses per quarter. The responses of this survey are used to calculate the percentage of Ransom DDoS attacks.

How we calculate geographical and industry insights

Source country
At the application-layer, we use the attacking IP addresses to understand the origin country of the attacks. That is because at that layer, IP addresses cannot be spoofed (i.e., altered). However, at the network layer, source IP addresses can be spoofed. So, instead of relying on IP addresses to understand the source, we instead use the location of our data centers where the attack packets were ingested. We’re able to get geographical accuracy due to our large global coverage in over 285 locations around the world.

Target country
For both application-layer and network-layer DDoS attacks, we group attacks and traffic by our customers’ billing country. This lets us understand which countries are subject to more attacks.

Target industry
For both application-layer and network-layer DDoS attacks, we group attacks and traffic by our customers’ industry according to our customer relations management system. This lets us understand which industries are subject to more attacks.

Total volume vs. percentage
For both source and target insights, we look at the total volume of attack traffic compared to all traffic as one data point. Additionally, we also look at the percentage of attack traffic towards or from a specific country, to a specific country or to a specific industry. This gives us an “attack activity rate” for a given country/industry which is normalized by their total traffic levels. This helps us remove biases of a country or industry that normally receives a lot of traffic and therefore a lot of attack traffic as well.

How we calculate attack characteristics
To calculate the attack size, duration, attack vectors and emerging threats, we bucket attacks and then provide the share of each bucket out of the total amount for each dimension. On the new Radar component, these trends are calculated by number of bytes instead.  Since attacks may vary greatly in number of bytes from one another, this could lead to trends differing between the reports and the Radar component.

General disclaimer and clarification

When we describe ‘top countries’ as the source or target of attacks, it does not necessarily mean that that country was attacked as a country, but rather that organizations that use that country as their billing country were targeted by attacks. Similarly, attacks originating from a country does not mean that that country launched the attacks, but rather that the attack was launched from IP addresses that have been mapped to that country. Threat actors operate global botnets with nodes all over the world, and in many cases also use Virtual Private Networks and proxies to obfuscate their true location. So if anything, the source country could indicate the presence of exit nodes or botnet nodes within that country.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Post Syndicated from David Belson original http://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-radar-internet-quality-page/

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Internet connections are most often marketed and sold on the basis of "speed", with providers touting the number of megabits or gigabits per second that their various service tiers are supposed to provide. This marketing has largely been successful, as most subscribers believe that "more is better”. Furthermore, many national broadband plans in countries around the world include specific target connection speeds. However, even with a high speed connection, gamers may encounter sluggish performance, while video conference participants may experience frozen video or audio dropouts. Speeds alone don't tell the whole story when it comes to Internet connection quality.

Additional factors like latency, jitter, and packet loss can significantly impact end user experience, potentially leading to situations where higher speed connections actually deliver a worse user experience than lower speed connections. Connection performance and quality can also vary based on usage – measured average speed will differ from peak available capacity, and latency varies under loaded and idle conditions.

The new Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality page

A little more than three years ago, as residential Internet connections were strained because of the shift towards working and learning from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Cloudflare announced the speed.cloudflare.com speed test tool, which enabled users to test the performance and quality of their Internet connection. Within the tool, users can download the results of their individual test as a CSV, or share the results on social media. However, there was no aggregated insight into Cloudflare speed test results at a network or country level to provide a perspective on connectivity characteristics across a larger population.

Today, we are launching these long-missing aggregated connection performance and quality insights on Cloudflare Radar. The new Internet Quality page provides both country and network (autonomous system) level insight into Internet connection performance (bandwidth) and quality (latency, jitter) over time. (Your Internet service provider is likely an autonomous system with its own autonomous system number (ASN), and many large companies, online platforms, and educational institutions also have their own autonomous systems and associated ASNs.) The insights we are providing are presented across two sections: the Internet Quality Index (IQI), which estimates average Internet quality based on aggregated measurements against a set of Cloudflare & third-party targets, and Connection Quality, which presents peak/best case connection characteristics based on speed.cloudflare.com test results aggregated over the previous 90 days. (Details on our approach to the analysis of this data are presented below.)

Users may note that individual speed test results, as well as the aggregate speed test results presented on the Internet Quality page will likely differ from those presented by other speed test tools. This can be due to a number of factors including differences in test endpoint locations (considering both geographic and network distance), test content selection, the impact of “rate boosting” by some ISPs, and testing over a single connection vs. multiple parallel connections. Infrequent testing (on any speed test tool) by users seeking to confirm perceived poor performance or validate purchased speeds will also contribute to the differences seen in the results published by the various speed test platforms.

And as we announced in April, Cloudflare has partnered with Measurement Lab (M-Lab) to create a publicly-available, queryable repository for speed test results. M-Lab is a non-profit third-party organization dedicated to providing a representative picture of Internet quality around the world. M-Lab produces and hosts the Network Diagnostic Tool, which is a very popular network quality test that records millions of samples a day. Given their mission to provide a publicly viewable, representative picture of Internet quality, we chose to partner with them to provide an accurate view of your Internet experience and the experience of others around the world using openly available data.

Connection speed & quality data is important

While most advertisements for fixed broadband and mobile connectivity tend to focus on download speeds (and peak speeds at that), there’s more to an Internet connection, and the user’s experience with that Internet connection, than that single metric. In addition to download speeds, users should also understand the upload speeds that their connection is capable of, as well as the quality of the connection, as expressed through metrics known as latency and jitter. Getting insight into all of these metrics provides a more well-rounded view of a given Internet connection, or in aggregate, the state of Internet connectivity across a geography or network.

The concept of download speeds are fairly well understood as a measure of performance. However, it is important to note that the average download speeds experienced by a user during common Web browsing activities, which often involves the parallel retrieval of multiple smaller files from multiple hosts, can differ significantly from peak download speeds, where the user is downloading a single large file (such as a video or software update), which allows the connection to reach maximum performance. The bandwidth (speed) available for upload is sometimes mentioned in ISP advertisements, but doesn’t receive much attention. (And depending on the type of Internet connection, there’s often a significant difference between the available upload and download speeds.) However, the importance of upload came to the forefront in 2020 as video conferencing tools saw a surge in usage as both work meetings and school classes shifted to the Internet during the COVID-19 pandemic. To share your audio and video with other participants, you need sufficient upload bandwidth, and this issue was often compounded by multiple people sharing a single residential Internet connection.

Latency is the time it takes data to move through the Internet, and is measured in the number of milliseconds that it takes a packet of data to go from a client (such as your computer or mobile device) to a server, and then back to the client. In contrast to speed metrics, lower latency is preferable. This is especially true for use cases like online gaming where latency can make a difference between a character’s life and death in the game, as well as video conferencing, where higher latency can cause choppy audio and video experiences, but it also impacts web page performance. The latency metric can be further broken down into loaded and idle latency. The former measures latency on a loaded connection, where bandwidth is actively being consumed, while the latter measures latency on an “idle” connection, when there is no other network traffic present. (These specific loaded and idle definitions are from the device’s perspective, and more specifically, from the speed test application’s perspective. Unless the speed test is being performed directly from a router, the device/application doesn't have insight into traffic on the rest of the network.) Jitter is the average variation found in consecutive latency measurements, and can be measured on both idle and loaded connections. A lower number means that the latency measurements are more consistent. As with latency, Internet connections should have minimal jitter, which helps provide more consistent performance.

Our approach to data analysis

The Internet Quality Index (IQI) and Connection Quality sections get their data from two different sources, providing two different (albeit related) perspectives. Under the hood they share some common principles, though.

IQI builds upon the mechanism we already use to regularly benchmark ourselves against other industry players. It is based on end user measurements against a set of Cloudflare and third-party targets, meant to represent a pattern that has become very common in the modern Internet, where most content is served from distribution networks with points of presence spread throughout the world. For this reason, and by design, IQI will show worse results for regions and Internet providers that rely on international (rather than peering) links for most content.

IQI is also designed to reflect the traffic load most commonly associated with web browsing, rather than more intensive use. This, and the chosen set of measurement targets, effectively biases the numbers towards what end users experience in practice (where latency plays an important role in how fast things can go).

For each metric covered by IQI, and for each ASN, we calculate the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile at 15 minute intervals. At the country level and above, the three calculated numbers for each ASN visible from that region are independently aggregated. This aggregation takes the estimated user population of each ASN into account, biasing the numbers away from networks that source a lot of automated traffic but have few end users.

The Connection Quality section gets its data from the Cloudflare Speed Test tool, which exercises a user's connection in order to see how well it is able to perform. It measures against the closest Cloudflare location, providing a good balance of realistic results and network proximity to the end user. We have a presence in 285 cities around the world, allowing us to be pretty close to most users.

Similar to the IQI, we calculate the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile for each ASN. But here these three numbers are immediately combined using an operation called the trimean — a single number meant to balance the best connection quality that most users have, with the best quality available from that ASN (users may not subscribe to the best available plan for a number of reasons).

Because users may choose to run a speed test for different motives at different times, and also because we take privacy very seriously and don’t record any personally identifiable information along with test results, we aggregate at 90-day intervals to capture as much variability as we can.

At the country level and above, the calculated trimean for each ASN in that region is aggregated. This, again, takes the estimated user population of each ASN into account, biasing the numbers away from networks that have few end users but which may still have technicians using the Cloudflare Speed Test to assess the performance of their network.

The new Internet Quality page includes three views: Global, country-level, and autonomous system (AS). In line with the other pages on Cloudflare Radar, the country-level and AS pages show the same data sets, differing only in their level of aggregation. Below, we highlight the various components of the Internet Quality page.

Global

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

The top section of the global (worldwide) view includes time series graphs of the Internet Quality Index metrics aggregated at a continent level. The time frame shown in the graphs is governed by the selection made in the time frame drop down at the upper right of the page, and at launch, data for only the last three months is available. For users interested in examining a specific continent, clicking on the other continent names in the legend removes them from the graph. Although continent-level aggregation is still rather coarse, it still provides some insight into regional Internet quality around the world.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Further down the page, the Connection Quality section presents a choropleth map, with countries shaded according to the values of the speed, latency, or jitter metric selected from the drop-down menu. Hovering over a country displays a label with the country’s name and metric value, and clicking on the country takes you to the country’s Internet Quality page. Note that in contrast to the IQI section, the Connection Quality section always displays data aggregated over the previous 90 days.

Country-level

Within the country-level page (using Canada as an example in the figures below), the country’s IQI metrics over the selected time frame are displayed. These time series graphs show the median bandwidth, latency, and DNS response time within a shaded band bounded at the 25th and 75th percentile and represent the average expected user experience across the country, as discussed in the Our approach to data analysis section above.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page
Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page
Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Below that is the Connection Quality section, which provides a summary view of the country’s measured upload and download speeds, as well as latency and jitter, over the previous 90 days. The colored wedges in the Performance Summary graph are intended to illustrate aggregate connection quality at a glance, with an “ideal” connection having larger upload and download wedges and smaller latency and jitter wedges. Hovering over the wedges displays the metric’s value, which is also shown in the table to the right of the graph.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Below that, the Bandwidth and Latency/Jitter histograms illustrate the bucketed distribution of upload and download speeds, and latency and jitter measurements. In some cases, the speed histograms may show a noticeable bar at 1 Gbps, or 1000 ms (1 second) on the latency/jitter histograms. The presence of such a bar indicates that there is a set of measurements with values greater than the 1 Gbps/1000 ms maximum histogram values.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Autonomous system level

Within the upper-right section of the country-level page, a list of the top five autonomous systems within the country is shown. Clicking on an ASN takes you to the Performance page for that autonomous system. For others not displayed in the top five list, you can use the search bar at the top of the page to search by autonomous system name or number. The graphs shown within the AS level view are identical to those shown at a country level, but obviously at a different level of aggregation. You can find the ASN that you are connected to from the My Connection page on Cloudflare Radar.

Exploring connection performance & quality data

Digging into the IQI and Connection Quality visualizations can surface some interesting observations, including characterizing Internet connections, and the impact of Internet disruptions, including shutdowns and network issues. We explore some examples below.

Characterizing Internet connections

Verizon FiOS is a residential fiber-based Internet service available to customers in the United States. Fiber-based Internet services (as opposed to cable-based, DSL, dial-up, or satellite) will generally offer symmetric upload and download speeds, and the FiOS plans page shows this to be the case, offering 300 Mbps (upload & download), 500 Mbps (upload & download), and “1 Gig” (Verizon claims average wired speeds between 750-940 Mbps download / 750-880 Mbps upload) plans. Verizon carries FiOS traffic on AS701 (labeled UUNET due to a historical acquisition), and in looking at the bandwidth histogram for AS701, several things stand out. The first is a rough symmetry in upload and download speeds. (A cable-based Internet service provider, in contrast, would generally show a wide spread of download speeds, but have upload speeds clustered at the lower end of the range.) Another is the peaks around 300 Mbps and 750 Mbps, suggesting that the 300 Mbps and “1 Gig” plans may be more popular than the 500 Mbps plan. It is also clear that there are a significant number of test results with speeds below 300 Mbps. This is due to several factors: one is that Verizon also carries lower speed non-FiOS traffic on AS701, while another is that erratic nature of in-home WiFi often means that the speeds achieved on a test will be lower than the purchased service level.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Traffic shifts drive latency shifts

On May 9, 2023, the government of Pakistan ordered the shutdown of mobile network services in the wake of protests following the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Our blog post covering this shutdown looked at the impact from a traffic perspective. Within the post, we noted that autonomous systems associated with fixed broadband networks saw significant increases in traffic when the mobile networks were shut down – that is, some users shifted to using fixed networks (home broadband) when mobile networks were unavailable.

Examining IQI data after the blog post was published, we found that the impact of this traffic shift was also visible in our latency data. As can be seen in the shaded area of the graph below, the shutdown of the mobile networks resulted in the median latency dropping about 25% as usage shifted from higher latency mobile networks to lower latency fixed broadband networks. An increase in latency is visible in the graph when mobile connectivity was restored on May 12.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Bandwidth shifts as a potential early warning sign

On April 4, UK mobile operator Virgin Media suffered several brief outages. In examining the IQI bandwidth graph for AS5089, the ASN used by Virgin Media (formerly branded as NTL), indications of a potential problem are visible several days before the outages occurred, as median bandwidth dropped by about a third, from around 35 Mbps to around 23 Mbps. The outages are visible in the circled area in the graph below. Published reports indicate that the problems lasted into April 5, in line with the lower median bandwidth measured through mid-day.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Submarine cable issues cause slower browsing

On June 5, Philippine Internet provider PLDT Tweeted an advisory that noted “One of our submarine cable partners confirms a loss in some of its internet bandwidth capacity, and thus causing slower Internet browsing.” IQI latency and bandwidth graphs for AS9299, a primary ASN used by PLDT, shows clear shifts starting around 06:45 UTC (14:45 local time). Median bandwidth dropped by half, from 17 Mbps to 8 Mbps, while median latency increased by 75% from 37 ms to around 65 ms. 75th percentile latency also saw a significant increase, nearly tripling from 63 ms to 180 ms coincident with the reported submarine cable issue.

Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page
Introducing the Cloudflare Radar Internet Quality Page

Conclusion

Making network performance and quality insights available on Cloudflare Radar supports Cloudflare’s mission to help build a better Internet. However, we’re not done yet – we have more enhancements planned. These include making data available at a more granular geographical level (such as state and possibly city), incorporating AIM scores to help assess Internet quality for specific types of use cases, and embedding the Cloudflare speed test directly on Radar using the open source JavaScript module.

In the meantime, we invite you to use speed.cloudflare.com to test the performance and quality of your Internet connection, share any country or AS-level insights you discover on social media (tag @CloudflareRadar on Twitter or @[email protected] on Mastodon), and explore the underlying data through the M-Lab repository or the Radar API.

Exam-related Internet shutdowns in Iraq and Algeria put connectivity to the test

Post Syndicated from David Belson original http://blog.cloudflare.com/exam-internet-shutdowns-iraq-algeria/

Exam-related Internet shutdowns in Iraq and Algeria put connectivity to the test

Exam-related Internet shutdowns in Iraq and Algeria put connectivity to the test

Over the last several years, governments in a number of countries in the Middle East/Northern Africa (MENA) region have taken to implementing widespread nationwide shutdowns in an effort to prevent cheating on nationwide academic exams. Although it is unclear whether such shutdowns are actually successful in curbing cheating, it is clear that they take a financial toll on the impacted countries, with estimated losses in the millions of US dollars.

During the first two weeks of June 2023, we’ve seen Iraq implementing a series of multi-hour shutdowns that will reportedly occur through mid-July, as well as Algeria taking similar actions to prevent cheating on baccalaureate exams. Shutdowns in Syria were reported to begin on June 7, but there’s been no indication of them in traffic data as of this writing (June 13). These actions echo those taken in Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria in 2022 and in Syria and Sudan in 2021.

(Note: The interactive graphs below have been embedded directly into the blog post using a new Cloudflare Radar feature. This post is best viewed in landscape mode when on a mobile device.)

Iraq

Iraq had reportedly committed on May 15 to not implementing Internet shutdowns during the 2023 exam season, with a now unavailable page on the Iraqi Ministry of Communications web site (although captured in the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine) noting (via Google Translate) “Her Excellency the Minister of Communications, Dr. Hayam Al-Yasiri: We rejected a request to cut off the internet service during the ministerial exams.” However, that commitment was apparently short-lived, as the first shutdown was implemented just a couple of weeks later, on June 1. The shutdowns observed across Iraq thus far have impacted networks and localities nationwide, with the exception of the autonomous Kurdistan region. However, networks in that region have experienced their own set of connectivity restrictions due to local exams.

In Iraq, the impact of the shutdowns between 04:00 – 08:00 local time (01:00 – 05:00 UTC) is clearly visible at a country level, as seen in the figure below.

The impact is, of course, also visible in the network-level graphs shown below, with traffic dropping to or near zero during each of the four-hour shutdown windows.

The shutdowns are also visible in the BGP announcement activity from the impacted networks, with spikes in announcement volume clearly visible around the shutdown windows each day that they have occurred. The announcement activity represents withdrawals ahead of the shutdown, removing routes to prefixes within the network, effectively cutting them off from the Internet, and updates after the shutdown period has ended, restoring the previously withdrawn routes, effectively reconnecting the prefixes to the Internet. (Additional announcement activity may also be visible for periods outside of the scheduled shutdowns, and is likely unrelated.)

While the shutdowns discussed above didn’t impact the Kurdistan region of Iraq, that region has also chosen to implement their own shutdowns. In the Kurdistan region, exams started June 3, we saw shorter traffic disruptions across three local network providers on June 3, 6, 10, and 13. The disruptions lasted from 06:30 – 07:30 local time (03:30 to 04:30 UTC) on the 3rd, and 06:40 – 08:30 local time (03:30 to 05:30 UTC) on the 6th, 10th, and 13th). Impacted regions include Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok.

BGP announcement activity for the impacted networks in the Kurdistan region did not show the same patterns as those observed on the other Iraqi network providers discussed above.

Both sets of shutdowns in Iraq are also visible in traffic to Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver, although they highlight a difference in usage between the autonomous Kurdistan region and the rest of the country. The “totalTcpUdp” graph (blue line) below shows requests made to the resolver over UDP or TCP on port 53, the standard port used for DNS requests. The “totalDoHDoT” graph (orange line) below shows requests made to the resolver using DNS-over-HTTPS or DNS-over-TLS using port 443 or 853 respectively.

In the “totalTcpUdp” graph, we can see noticeable drops in traffic that align with the dates and times where we observed the traffic disruptions across Kurdistani networks. This drop in DNS traffic, combined with the lack of BGP announcement activity, suggests that the Internet disruptions in the Kurdistan region may be implemented as widespread blocking of Internet traffic, rather than routing-based shutdowns.

Exam-related Internet shutdowns in Iraq and Algeria put connectivity to the test

In the “totalDoHDoT” graph below, we can see noticeable drops in traffic that align with the dates and times where we observed the traffic disruptions in the rest of Iraq.

Exam-related Internet shutdowns in Iraq and Algeria put connectivity to the test

It isn’t immediately clear why there is a difference in the use of 1.1.1.1 between the two parts of the country.

Algeria

In Algeria, it appears that the country is following a similar pattern as that seen in 2021 and 2022, with two multi-hour Internet disruptions each day. Also similar to last year, it appears that they are pursuing a content blocking-based approach, instead of the wide-scale Internet shutdowns implemented in 2021, as impacted networks are not experiencing complete outages, nor do they show patterns of BGP announcement activity.

A published report indicates that two Internet disruptions will be implemented each day between June 11 and June 15. The first takes place between 08:00 – 12:00 local time (07:00 – 11:00 UTC), with the second occurring between 14:00 – 17:00 local time (13:00 – 16:00 UTC). These disruptions are visible in the shaded areas of the network-level graphs below as two distinct drops in traffic each day.

Conclusion

In cooperation with the Internet Society and Lebanese digital rights organization SMEX, digital rights organization Access Now is coordinating a #NoExamShutdown campaign across social media platforms. The campaign calls on MENA governments to end the practice of Internet shutdowns during exams, and aims to highlight how these shutdowns undermine human rights and disrupt essential social, political, economic, and cultural activities. Cloudflare Radar will continue to bring visibility to these, and other similar Internet disruptions, as they occur. You can follow them through the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center, or by following Cloudflare Radar on Twitter or Mastodon.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Post Syndicated from David Belson original http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflares-view-of-internet-disruptions-in-pakistan/

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

On Tuesday, May 9, Imran Khan, former Prime Minister of Pakistan was arrested on corruption charges. Following the arrest, violent protests erupted in several cities, leading the government of Pakistan to order the shutdown of mobile Internet services, as well as the blocking of several social media platforms. Below, we examine the impact of these shutdowns at a national and local level, as seen through Cloudflare traffic data. In addition, we illustrate how Pakistanis appear to be turning to Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 resolver in an attempt to maintain access to the open Internet.

Since Tuesday, May 9, peak traffic levels aggregated at a country level (as measured by HTTP request volume) have been declining, down nearly 30% during the first several days of the mobile Internet shutdowns. The lowest traffic levels (nadirs of the graph) have also declined, dropping by as much as one-third as well. In the sections below, we drill down into this traffic loss, looking at outages at a network level, and the impact of those outages at an administrative unit and city level.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

The mobile network shutdowns have also impacted the profile of traffic that Cloudflare sees from Pakistan. In analyzing traffic from desktop devices vs. mobile devices, we observed a 60% drop in request volume from mobile devices, while desktop traffic request volume remained fairly consistent. Peak mobile device traffic share dropped from 70% to 43%.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Cloudflare uses a bot score assigned to each request to indicate how likely it is that the request came from a bot or a human user. Since these shutdowns began, peak human request volume has dropped by 40%, while bot traffic has remained relatively consistent.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Mobile network shutdowns

On Wednesday, May 10, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) announced that Internet services would remain suspended across the country for an “indefinite” period, responding to a directive from the Ministry of the Interior to block mobile broadband services. As a result of the shutdowns associated with this directive, Cloudflare observed outages on the four major mobile providers within the country:

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Although Pakistan has high mobile Internet usage, it appears that fixed broadband Internet connections are readily used as a backup when mobile connectivity becomes unavailable. Autonomous systems associated with fixed broadband networks saw significant increases in traffic when the mobile networks were shut down.

Nationwide providers PTCL (AS17557) and Cybernet (AS9541) saw higher peak traffic volumes as compared to a week prior starting at 17:00 UTC (22:00 local time) on May 9.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Smaller local providers Nayatel (AS23674) and Wateen Telecom (AS38264) also saw higher peak traffic levels starting around 16:00 UTC (21:00 local time) on May 9.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Interestingly, median latency within Pakistan also dropped slightly after mobile networks were shut down. Prior to the shutdown, median latency (as observed to Cloudflare and a set of other providers) was in the 90-100ms range, while afterwards, it has averaged closer to 75ms. This may be a result of users shifting to lower latency fixed broadband connections, as discussed above.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Administrative unit-level disruptions

Because the mobile network providers that were affected by the shutdown directive provide services nationwide, we also observed an impact to traffic across multiple administrative units within the country. None of these locations has experienced a complete outage, but peak traffic levels have clearly been declining in comparison to previous days.

Gilgit-Baltistan experienced the largest loss, where peak traffic has fallen nearly 60%. In Sindh, peak traffic is down around 35%, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it is down 30%. Islamabad and Azad Jammu and Kashmir have seen peak traffic declines of ~20%.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

City-level disruptions

The impact of the mobile network shutdowns is also visible at a more local level, with lower peak traffic levels clearly visible in four cities. The significant traffic loss has been in Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), which has dropped nearly 55% from prior days. Faisalabad (Punjab), Karachi (Sindh), and Multan (Punjab) have all seen peak traffic drop approximately 40%.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Content blocking

In addition to the government-directed mobile network shutdowns, Pakistan’s authorities have also ordered Internet service providers to block access to social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. Testing by the Open Observatory for Network Interference (OONI), an Internet censorship measurement organization, suggests that this blocking is using a combination of TLS-level interference and DNS-based blocking. When the latter occurs in a country, Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver often sees an increase in request volume from the country as users seek ways to continue to access the open Internet.

Over the last several days, as expected, 1.1.1.1 request volume from Pakistan has increased, up approximately 40%. Peak request volume for the blocked social media platforms has also increased. Traffic for facebook.com saw a significant increase starting around 14:00 UTC (19:00 local time) on May 9, with peak request volume more than doubling. Request volume for instagram.com, also owned by Facebook parent Meta, also began to increase around the same time, and has grown nearly 50%. Requests for twitter.com began to spike around 08:00 UTC (13:00 local time) on May 9, growing as much as 150% that afternoon. Request volume for youtube.com also spiked on May 9, increasing by approximately 40%. And like twitter.com, request volume on May 10 was higher than earlier in the week, but lower than the spike seen the previous day.

Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan
Cloudflare’s view of Internet disruptions in Pakistan

Conclusion

Because of the ubiquity of Internet connectivity and social media tools in everyday life, Internet shutdowns and website blocking ultimately come with a significant human and financial cost. The mobile network shutdowns in Pakistan have impacted tens of thousands of “gig workers” and freelancers that depend on mobile connectivity. Many point-of-sale terminals in the country also depend on mobile connectivity, with transactions through Pakistan’s main digital payment systems fell by around 50% after the shutdowns were put into place. Telecommunications operators within Pakistan have estimated the extent of the financial damage thus far to be Rs. 820 million (approximately $2.8 million USD).

Use Cloudflare Radar to monitor the impact of such government-directed Internet disruptions, and follow @CloudflareRadar on Twitter for updates on Internet disruptions as they occur.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

Post Syndicated from João Tomé original http://blog.cloudflare.com/how-the-coronation-of-king-charles-iii-affected-internet-traffic/

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

When major events in a country happen Internet traffic patterns are often impacted, depending on the type of event. But what about the coronation of a king or queen? There’s no similar precedent, with a worldwide impact, in the Internet age, except maybe the coronation of the king of Thailand, in 2019. The last time it happened in the United Kingdom was 70 years ago (June 2, 1953), with Queen Elizabeth II; it was the first British coronation to be fully televised. Neither the Internet nor ARPANET were around at the time.

Imagine a grand royal event (if you saw the broadcast or the news, there’s no need), filled with pomp and pageantry, that's so captivating it impacts Internet traffic. That's what happened during the coronation of Charles III and Camilla, the newly crowned king and queen of the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth realms. As the coronation ceremony unfolded, on Saturday morning, May 6, 2023, there were clear spikes and dips in traffic, each coinciding with key moments of the ceremony.

Then came Sunday, and with it, the Coronation Big Lunch event. As the nation sat down to enjoy a communal meal throughout the country, Internet traffic took a significant nosedive, dropping by as much as 18%. The Sunday trends didn't stop there. As night fell and Prince William took to the stage to deliver a speech during the Coronation Concert, there was a clear drop in Internet traffic. Monday, May 8, was a bank holiday in the UK in honor of the coronation, and after a weekend of outdoor coronation events, Internet traffic was buzzing, noticeably higher than usual.

In the past, we’ve seen Internet traffic drop when a national televised event is happening — last year, we saw it, including in the UK, during the Eurovision, although traffic does increase when results are in. Different types of events and broadcasts yield different Internet patterns.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

Coronation day: a rollercoaster of Internet traffic

Let's take a closer look at coronation day, May 6, 2023, when Internet traffic in the UK had its own peaks and valleys. There were moments when the digital realm seemed to hold its breath, with traffic dipping to its lowest points. The arrival of the royals and their guests marked one such moment. As the anticipation built and all eyes turned to the grand entrances, Internet traffic dipped to a notable 7% lower than the previous week.

Here's a play-by-play of the day's traffic trends, compared to the previous week. We’re using a 15-minute granularity, and aligning with key events as reported live by the BBC:

Traffic decreases (Saturday, May 6, 2023)

Rank by drop (compared with previous week) Coronation events (from the BBC)
#1 — 10:45-11:00 local time (-7% in traffic) When the royals and guests were arriving at Westminster Abbey. The King and Queen arrived at 11:00.
#2 — 12:00 (-2%) When King Charles III (12:02) was crowned.
#3 — 13:00 (-3%) When King Charles and Queen Camilla left Westminster Abbey. The Coronation Procession started.

On Saturday, May 6, 2023, a downward trend in traffic began after 06:15, with traffic 5% lower than the previous week. This trend shifted to a traffic increase after 11:15 (+6%), coinciding with the ongoing ceremony. The exceptions were the previously mentioned traffic dips. The following table illustrates clear traffic spikes after significant moments, some of which are represented in the previous table. Here's a list of periods with higher growth:

Traffic increases (Saturday, May 6, 2023)

Rank by increase (compared with previous week) Coronation events (from the BBC)
#1 — 14:45 local time (+14% in traffic) This happened after the military flypast (14:35), when the royals were on the balcony of Buckingham Palace.
#2 — 12:30 (+13.7%) After King Charles III was crowned at 12:02 (at which time traffic dropped 2%) and after Queen Camilla (12:16) was crowned, when a choir was singing Agnus Dei (12:30).
#3 — 15:30-16:15 (+13%) During the highlights of the event and reactions from royal fans.
#4 — 14:00 (+13%). When the UK’s national anthem was played in the gardens of Buckingham Palace.
#5 — 11:30 (+11%). Just after the coronation oath and during the choir’s singing.

As guests and royals arrived and during moments like the king's crowning, Internet traffic noticeably dropped. However, during parts of the ceremony such as the choir singing, Internet traffic seemed to increase. That was also clear after the military flypast, over the Buckingham Palace balcony.

The following chart illustrates UK Internet traffic during the weekend, with the purple dotted line representing the previous weekend.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

On a daily basis, daily traffic was 4% higher on Saturday, May 6, compared to the previous Saturday.

The Big Lunch and Prince William’s speech

Another trend from the coronation weekend relates to the events that took place on Sunday, May 7. Internet trends here align with what we observed almost a year ago during Queen Elizabeth II's Platinum Jubilee. Sunday was a day of celebration with both the Coronation Big Lunch (where neighbors and communities were invited to share food and fun together across the country) and the Coronation Concert taking place.

Next, we present the percentages of increase/decrease in requests during this past weekend, compared with the previous week (a slightly different perspective from the previous chart):

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

On Sunday, May 7, it's clear that UK traffic was lower than usual right after 07:00 local time (-2% in traffic), but it dropped the most after 12:00 (-5%), compared to the previous week. The moment with the biggest drop in traffic, compared to the previous week, was between 14:15 and 15:30, when traffic was around 18% lower. That was still Big Lunch time, given that it’s a multiple hour event full of “food and fun” — there were more than 65,000 Coronation Big Lunch events around the UK. During last year's Queen Elizabeth II's Platinum Jubilee, traffic dropped as much as 25% on Sunday, June 5, 2022, at 15:00.

At night, the Coronation Concert took center stage, broadcast live from Windsor Castle on the BBC after 20:00. The lineup included musical guests such as Take That, Lionel Richie, Katy Perry, and Andrea Bocelli. However, the star of the event, at least in terms of when Internet traffic was at its lowest that evening, was William, Prince of Wales. Cloudflare observed another significant drop in traffic, compared to the previous week, around 21:15-21:30, when traffic was 7% lower than the previous week. At that time, Lionel Richie had just performed, and Prince William was on stage for a special address to the king.

In terms of daily traffic, if on Coronation Saturday we saw an increase (4%), on Coronation Sunday there was a 6% drop compared to the previous week. On Monday, the coronation bank holiday, there weren't any major coronation events, and traffic was 4% higher than the previous week (May 1, also a bank holiday in the UK).

Coronation, a mobile devices day

Zooming in on the distribution of traffic from mobile devices, we find that Saturday, May 6, stands out in 2023. On this day, mobile traffic accounted for 61% of total traffic, a figure only matched by April 15 and January 1, 2023. Similarly, Sunday, May 7, was one of the Sundays with the highest percentage of mobile traffic, at 60%. This percentage was only surpassed by Easter Sunday, April 9 (60.4%), and, unsurprisingly, January 1, 2023 (61%).

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

Wales sees the largest Sunday drop in Internet traffic

Which UK countries were more impacted? Looking at both coronation weekend days, we saw a similar pattern (growth in traffic at around the time of the coronation ceremony on Saturday, and decrease on Sunday) in all of them. Looking at the Sunday drop, England had as much as 16% in traffic at 15:30; Scotland had as much as a 17% drop at around 13:30; Wales had as much as a 19% drop at around 15:00; and Northern Ireland had as much as an 18% drop in traffic, compared to the previous week, at the same time. Wales had the biggest drop.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

From Canada to Australia

Last year, in early June, we observed the impact of Queen Elizabeth II’s Platinum Jubilee on the Internet in the UK. This event, which celebrated the first British monarch to reach a 70th anniversary on the throne, caused a significant drop in traffic, as much as 25% (on Sunday, June 5, 2022). This trend was also noticeable in other Commonwealth countries.

Several Commonwealth countries also held notable events to celebrate both the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee and the recent coronation. In Canada, events and activities related to the coronation mirrored those for the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee. Whether related or not, we observed on Saturday, May 6, as much as an ~8% drop in Internet traffic compared to the previous week, between 09:30 and 16:30 Toronto time. On Sunday, the drop was even larger, with about 10% less traffic between 10:30 and 12:00.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

In Australia, the difference in traffic wasn't as pronounced as in Canada. However, traffic was 7% lower than the previous week at 20:00 Sydney time (10:00 UTC), when the coronation ceremony began on May 6. This was the only period over the past weekend when traffic was lower than the previous one.

And what about the impact on DNS traffic to our 1.1.1.1 resolver from UK users? Social media apps certainly felt the ripple. Domains linked to social media platforms, which typically surge in popularity during major events, such as Twitter, experienced a notable uptick. We saw a 33% increase in DNS traffic in those around 14:00 local time on Saturday, May 6, compared to the previous week. By 18:00 on May 7, traffic had soared to 64% higher, and it remained elevated during the Coronation Concert: at 22:00, it was 36% higher.

Meanwhile, video-centric social media platforms, like TikTok, hit their peak at around 20:00 on May 7, when the Coronation Concert was starting, with a whopping 57% surge in DNS traffic.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

During the coronation weekend, the peak period for DNS traffic to domains related to the royal family fell between 11:00 and 12:00 local time. In this hour, traffic was an impressive forty times higher than the same time the previous weekend (that growth is higher, more than 40x, when using a May 2022 baseline, as is seen in the next chart).

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

If we broaden our view to the past 12 months, we see that the domains associated with the royal family hit their highest point on the day Queen Elizabeth II passed away, September 8. Around 18:00 local time, DNS traffic was 12x higher than the previous week. This was followed by the day of Her Majesty's funeral, September 19, when around 11:00, DNS traffic was 6x higher than usual.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

A similar impact was seen, related to the Queen's death, on British news organizations, in the past 12 months. September 8, around 18:00, was the peak of the whole year in terms of DNS traffic to news organizations, according to our data. At that time, DNS traffic was 263% higher than at the same time in the previous week. During the September 19 funeral, at 11:00, DNS traffic was 24% higher than before.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

During the recent coronation weekend, DNS traffic to UK news organizations on Saturday, May 6, was higher than usual during the morning by as much as 47%, at 11:00, and continued higher than before mostly during that day.

September 8, 2022: The end of a 70-year reign

We already mentioned domain trends related to when Queen Elizabeth II passed away on September 8, 2022. But what about the impact on Internet traffic? We saw a 7% decrease in Internet traffic in the UK on that day at around 18:30 local time compared to the previous week, coinciding with the announcement of her death.

The following weekend, on Saturday, September 10, 2022, traffic was as much as 17% lower at 15:00. This was the day Charles was proclaimed the new king and people flocked to the royal palaces to pay their respects — Prince William and Kate, and Prince Harry and Meghan, paused outside Windsor Castle to read messages left by mourners.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

Internet traffic dropped even further compared to the previous week during Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral: on September 19, 2022, traffic was 27% lower at 10:45. According to Wikipedia, this was when the Queen's coffin was transported from Westminster Hall to Westminster Abbey on the State Gun Carriage of the Royal Navy.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

Old traditions in a recent medium

In this blog post, we've seen how a very old tradition, like the British coronation, can impact a very recent innovation, the Internet. Almost 70 years ago, Queen Elizabeth II's coronation was the first ever to be televised, at a time when television in the UK was less than 20 years old. The event, which took place at Westminster Abbey in London (the site of coronations since 1066), was watched by 27 million people in the UK alone and millions more around the world.

This time around, King Charles III's coronation could be viewed through that now old medium called television, or online, via streaming services. The Internet is much younger than Britain’s former monarch's reign or even Sir Tim Berners-Lee (born in 1955), and it was only 30 years ago that the World Wide Web protocol and code were made available royalty-free, enabling the web's widespread use.

Streaming media events online, on the other hand, at least on a large scale, are a more recent development — YouTube was launched in 2005. Looking at video platforms trends in the UK, we could see how DNS traffic was 13% higher at around 12:00, during the coronation ceremony, on May 6 — it was broadcast on YouTube.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

British broadcasters, such as the BBC, also included a streaming version of the event. There, the increase in DNS traffic was even higher. Between 11:00 and 12:00, on May 6, DNS traffic was 197% higher than in the previous week.

How the coronation of King Charles III affected Internet traffic

The difference in DNS traffic to UK's streaming services was even more pronounced when Queen Elizabeth II passed away on September 8, with a 470% increase in DNS traffic around 18:00 compared to the previous week. During the Queen's funeral on September 19, DNS traffic was 150% higher around 11:00 compared to the previous week.

You can check Internet trends related to events such as Easter, Ramadan, an ongoing civil war or a relevant UK outage here in our blog. You can also monitor changes in Internet patterns as they occur on Cloudflare Radar or using the Radar API. On social media, we’re at @CloudflareRadar on Twitter or cloudflare.social/@radar on Mastodon.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Post Syndicated from João Tomé original http://blog.cloudflare.com/sudan-armed-conflict-impact-on-the-internet-since-april-15-2023/

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, an armed conflict between rival factions of the military government of Sudan began. Cloudflare observed a disruption in Internet traffic on that Saturday, starting at 08:00 UTC, which deepened on Sunday. Since then, the conflict has continued, and different ISPs have been affected, in some cases with a 90% drop in traffic. On May 2, Internet traffic is still ~30% lower than pre-conflict levels. This blog post will show what we’ve been seeing in terms of Internet disruption there.

On the day that clashes broke out, our data shows that traffic in the country dropped as much as 60% on Saturday, after 08:00 UTC, with a partial recovery on Sunday around 14:00, but it has consistently been lower than before. Although we saw outages and disruptions on major local Internet providers, the general drop in traffic could also be related to different human usage patterns because of the conflict, with people trying to leave the country. In Ukraine, we saw a clear drop in traffic, not always related to ISP outages, after the war started, when people were leaving the country.

Here’s the hourly perspective of Sudan’s Internet traffic over the past weeks as seen on Cloudflare Radar, with the orange shading highlighting the disruption since April 15.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

The next chart of daily traffic in Sudan (that is dominated by mobile device traffic — more on that below) clearly shows a daily drop in traffic after April 15. On that Saturday, traffic was 27% lower than on the previous Saturday, and it was a 43% decrease on Sunday, April 16, compared to the previous week.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Frequent outages on different ISPs

On April 23 and 24, there was a more significant outage affecting multiple ISPs (and their ASNs or autonomous systems) that brought Internet traffic in the country, as the previous chart clearly shows, even lower. There was no official reason given for those major disruptions that had a nationwide impact. That said, the disruptions were also felt in neighbor country Chad in several ISPs, given that Sudan’s Sudatel (AS15706) seems to be an upstream provider.

Cloudflare saw a 74% decrease in traffic on Sunday, April 23, compared to Sunday, April 9, before the conflict, and a 70% drop on Monday, April 24, compared with Monday, April 10. In some ISPs, the impact was bigger.

In the news, ISP MTN (AS36972) reportedly blocked Internet services on April 16, and, according to Reuters, was told by the authorities to restore it a few hours after. We saw a clear outage in that ASN, an almost 90% drop in traffic compared with previous weeks for about 10 hours, after 00:00 UTC on April 16, and it mostly recovered after 10:00 UTC.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

The most impacted ISPs were Sudatel (AS15706), Zain (AS36998), and Canar (AS33788) with almost complete outages. Canar was the outage that lasted the longest, with 83 hours, from April 21 to 25. Next, it was the main ISP in the country, Sudatel, with 40 hours of almost complete Internet blackout, followed by Zain, with 10 hours on April 24.

The return of traffic coincided with the time a nationwide ceasefire of 72 hours was agreed upon on April 24.

BGP or Border Gateway Protocol is a mechanism to exchange routing information between networks on the Internet, and a crucial part that enables the existence of the network of networks (the Internet). BGP announcements or updates can signal disruption in connectivity or outages, as we saw in Canada in 2022 with Rogers ISP or in the UK in 2023 with Virgin Media, for example. In this case, highlighted in the next chart, BGP updates biggest spikes from Sudatel (AS15706) are consistent with both the start of the outage, and the return to traffic.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Mobile device traffic percentage grew after April 15

Sudan is typically one of the countries with the highest percentage of mobile device traffic in the world. We’ve written about this in the past (see the 2021 mobile device traffic blog post), and at the time the average was 83%. Observing data from the past week, as seen on our Cloudflare Radar traffic worldwide page, Sudan leads our ranking with 88% of traffic coming from mobile devices.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Looking at the past few weeks, we can see mobile device traffic growing as a percentage of all Internet traffic in Sudan. The April 3 week showed a lower percentage than it is now, with 77% (23% was desktop traffic percentage). In the April 10 week, which includes April 15 and 16, mobile device traffic rose to 80%. In the week of April 17, it was 85%, and the week of April 24, it’s 88%.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

How is Internet traffic holding up more recently in Sudan? Looking at a week-over-week hourly comparison, traffic last Friday was still around 55% lower than before April 15, and on May 2, traffic is still around 30% lower than pre-conflict levels (April 11).

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

In the previous chart, there’s a regular drop in traffic observed at around 16:00 UTC, ~18:00 local time. It’s more evident before April 15, but it generally continues after that. That drop in traffic is consistent with Ramadan trends we discussed recently in a blog post. It is related to the Iftar, the first meal after sunset that breaks the fast and often serves as a family or community event — sunset in Khartoum, Sudan, is at 18:07.

As of this Tuesday, Internet traffic data (from a linear perspective) shows that traffic continues to be much lower than before, and this morning at 08:00 UTC it is ~30% lower than it was three weeks ago (pre-conflict), at the same time, showing some recovery in the past couple of days.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

According to the BBC, reporting from Sudan, the Internet continues to be impacted, an observation that is consistent with our data.

Looking more closely at Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, where most people live and the conflict began, traffic was impacted after April 15 (the blue line in the next chart). On April 27, Internet traffic was around 76% lower than it was on the same pre-conflict weekday (April 13). The next chart also shows the typical drop around 18:00, for Ramadan’s Iftar, the first meal after sunset.

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Looking at DNS queries (from Cloudflare’s resolver) to websites or domains in Sudan, we saw a clear shift from the use of WhatsApp-related domains for messaging to Signal ones after April 15 — the drop in DNS traffic to WhatsApp was similar to the increase in DNS traffic to Signal domains.

Social media platforms such as LinkedIn, but also TikTok or YouTube, had a clear decrease since April 15. On the other hand, Facebook and Twitter saw an increase, especially on April 15 and 16, with some disruptions (possibly related to Internet access), but with bigger spikes than before, usually at night, since then. Here’s the aggregated view to social media platforms:

Effects of the conflict in Sudan on Internet patterns

Conclusion: ongoing impact

The conflict in Sudan continues, and so does its Internet traffic impact. We will continue to monitor the Internet situation on Cloudflare Radar, where you can check Sudan’s country page and the Outage Center.

On social media, we’re at @CloudflareRadar on Twitter or cloudflare.social/@radar on Mastodon.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Post Syndicated from David Belson original https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2023-internet-disruption-summary/

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Cloudflare operates in more than 285 cities in over 100 countries, where we interconnect with over 11,500 network providers in order to provide a broad range of services to millions of customers. The breadth of both our network and our customer base provides us with a unique perspective on Internet resilience, enabling us to observe the impact of Internet disruptions.

We entered 2023 with Internet disruptions due to causes that ran the gamut, including several government-directed Internet shutdowns, cyclones, a massive earthquake, power outages, cable cuts, cyberattacks, technical problems, and military action. As we have noted in the past, this post is intended as a summary overview of observed disruptions, and is not an exhaustive or complete list of issues that have occurred during the quarter.

Government directed

Iran

Over the last six-plus months, government-directed Internet shutdowns in Iran have largely been in response to protests over the death of Mahsa Amini while in police custody. While these shutdowns are still occurring in a limited fashion, a notable shutdown observed in January was intended to prevent cheating on academic exams. Internet shutdowns with a similar purpose have been observed across a number of other countries, and have also occurred in Iran in the past. Access was restricted across AS44244 (Irancell) and AS197207 (MCCI), with lower traffic levels observed in Alborz Province, Fars, Khuzestan, and Razavi Khorasan between 08:00 to 11:30 local time (04:30 to 08:00 UTC) on January 19.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Mauritania

On March 6, Internet traffic across the three major mobile network providers in Mauritania was disrupted amid a search for four jihadist prisoners that escaped from prison. Starting around 10:00 local time (10:00 UTC), a drop in traffic was observed at AS37541 (Chinguitel), AS29544 (Mauritel), and AS37508 (Mattel), as well as at a country level. The Internet disruption lasted for multiple days, with traffic starting to recover around 13:45 local time (13:45 UTC) on March 12, after Mauritanian authorities reported that three of the escapees had been killed, with the fourth detained after a shootout.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Punjab, India

A shutdown of mobile Internet connectivity in Punjab, India began on March 19, ordered by the local government amid concerns of protest-related violence. Although the initial shutdown was ordered to take place between March 18, 12:00 local time and March 19, 12:00 local time, it was extended several times, ultimately lasting for three days. Traffic for AS38266 (Vodafone India), AS45271 (Idea Cellular Limited), AS45609 (Bharti Mobility), and AS55836 (Reliance Jio Infocomm) began to fall around 12:30 local time (07:00 UTC) on March 18, recovering around 12:30 local time (07:00 UTC) on March 21. However, it was subsequently reported that connectivity remained shut down in some districts until March 23 or 24.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Cable cuts

Bolivia

Bolivian ISP Cometco (AS27839) reported on January 12 that problems with international fiber links were causing degradation of Internet service. Traffic from the network dropped by approximately 80% starting around 16:00 local time (20:00 UTC) before returning to normal approximately eight hours later. It isn’t clear whether the referenced international fiber links were terrestrial connections to neighboring countries, or issues with submarine cables several network hops upstream. As a landlocked country, Bolivia is not directly connected to any submarine cables.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Anguilla

On February 18, a Facebook post from the Government of Anguilla noted that there was a “Telecommunications Outage affecting both service providers, FLOW & DIGICEL.” The accompanying graphic noted that the outage was due to a “subsea fiber break”. Although not confirmed, the break likely occurred on the Eastern Caribbean Fiber System (ECFS), as this is the only submarine cable system that Anguilla is connected to. The figures below show a clear drop in traffic around 09:00 local time (13:00 UTC) in Anguilla and at AS2740 (Caribbean Cable Communications, acquired by Digicel) and to a lesser extent at AS11139 (Cable & Wireless, parent company of Flow Anguilla). The disruption lasted for over two days, with traffic returning to normal levels around 15:00 local time (19:00 UTC) on February 20, corroborated by a follow-on Facebook post from the Government of Anguilla.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Bangladesh

A brief connectivity disruption was observed on Bangladeshi provider Grameenphone on February 23, between 11:45-14:00 local time (05:45-08:00 UTC). According to a Facebook post from Grameenphone, the outage was caused by fiber cuts due to road maintenance.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Venezuela

Venezuela, and more specifically, AS8048 (CANTV), are no stranger to Internet disruptions, seeing several (Q1, Q2) during 2022, as well as others in previous years. During the last couple of days in February, a few small outages were observed on CANTV’s network in several Venezuelan states. However, a more significant near-complete outage occurred on February 28, starting around midnight local time (04:00 UTC), and lasting for the better part of the day, with traffic recovering at 17:30 local time (21:30 UTC). A Tweet posted the morning of February 28 by CANTV referenced an outage in their fiber optic network, which was presumably the cause.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Power outages

Pakistan

A country-wide power outage in Pakistan on January 23 impacted more than 220 million people, and resulted in a significant drop in Internet traffic being observed in the country. The power outage began at 07:34 local time (02:34 UTC), with Internet traffic starting to drop almost immediately. The figure below shows that traffic volumes dropped as much as 50% from normal levels before recovering around 04:15 local time on January 24 (23:15 UTC on January 23). This power outage was reportedly due to a “sudden drop in the frequency of the power transmission system”, which led to a “widespread breakdown”. Nationwide power outages have also occurred in Pakistan in January 2021, May 2018, and January 2015.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Bermuda

BELCO, the power company servicing the island of Bermuda, tweeted about a mass power outage affecting the island on February 3, and linked to their outage map so that customers could track restoration efforts. BELCO’s tweet was posted at 16:10 local time (20:10 UTC), approximately one hour after a significant drop was observed in Bermuda’s Internet traffic. The power outage, and subsequent Internet disruption, lasted over five hours, as BELCO later tweeted that “As of 9.45 pm [00:45 UTC, February 4], all circuits have been restored.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Argentina

Soaring temperatures in Argentina triggered a large-scale power outage across the country that resulted in multi-hour Internet disruption on March 1. Internet traffic dropped by approximately one-third during the disruption, which lasted from 16:30 to 19:30 local time (19:30 to 22:30 UTC). Cities that experienced visible impacts to Internet traffic during the power outage included Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza, and Tucuman.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Kenya

Just a few days later on March 4, Kenya Power issued a Customer Alert at 18:25 local time (15:25 UTC) regarding a nationwide power outage, noting that it had “lost bulk power supply to various parts of the country due to a system disturbance.” The alert came approximately an hour after the country’s Internet traffic dropped significantly. A subsequent tweet dated midnight local time (21:00 UTC) claimed that “electricity supply has been restored to all areas countrywide” and the figure below shows that traffic levels returned to normal levels shortly thereafter.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Earthquake

Turkey

On February 5, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake occurred 23 km east of Nurdağı, Turkey, leaving many thousands dead and injured. The quake, which occurred at 04:17 local time (01:17 UTC), was believed to be the strongest to hit Turkey since 1939. The widespread damage and destruction resulted in significant disruptions to Internet connectivity in multiple areas of the country, as shown in the figures below. Although Internet traffic volumes were relatively low because it was so early in the morning, the graphs show it dropping even further at or around the time of the earthquake. Nearly half a day later, traffic volumes in selected locations were between 63-94% lower than at the same time the previous week. A month later, after several aftershocks, traffic volumes had mostly recovered, although some regions were still struggling to recover.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Weather

New Zealand

Called the “country’s biggest weather event in a century”, Cyclone Gabrielle wreaked havoc on northern New Zealand, including infrastructure damage and power outages impacting tens of thousands of homes. As a result, regions including Gisborne and Hawkes Bay experienced Internet disruptions that lasted several days, starting at 00:00 local time on February 14 (11:00 UTC on February 13). The figures below show that in both regions, peak traffic volume returned to pre-cyclone levels around February 19.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Vanuatu

Later in February, Cyclone Judy hit the South Pacific Ocean nation of Vanuatu, the South Pacific Ocean nation made up of roughly 80 islands that stretch 1,300 kilometers. The Category 4 cyclone damaged homes and caused power outages, resulting in a significant drop in the country’s Internet traffic. On February 28, Vanuatu’s traffic dropped by nearly 80% as the cyclone struck, and as seen in the figure below, it took nearly two weeks for traffic to recover to the levels seen earlier in February.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Malawi

Cyclone Freddy, said to be the longest-lasting, most powerful cyclone on record, hit Malawi during the weekend of March 11-12, and into Monday, March 13. The resulting damage disrupted Internet connectivity in the east African country, with traffic dropping around 11:00 local time (09:00 UTC) on March 13. The disruption lasted for over two days, with traffic levels recovering around 21:00 local time (19:00 UTC) on March 15.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Technical problems

South Africa

Just before 07:00 local time (05:00 UTC) on February 1, South African service provider RSAWEB initially tweeted about a problem that they said was impacting their cloud and VOIP platforms. However, in several subsequent tweets, they noted that the problem was also impacting internal systems, as well as fiber and mobile connectivity. The figure below shows traffic for RSAWEB dropping at 06:30 local time (04:30 UTC), a point at which it would normally be starting to increase for the day. Just before 16:00 local time (14:00 UTC), RSAWEB tweeted “…engineers are actively working on restoring services post the major incident. Customers who experienced no connectivity may see some services restoring.” The figure below shows a sharp increase in traffic around that time with gradual growth through the evening. However, full restoration of services across all of RSAWEB’s impacted platforms took a full week, according to a February 8 tweet.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Italy

An unspecified “international interconnectivity problem” impacting Telecom Italia caused a multi-hour Internet disruption in Italy on February 5. At a country level, a nominal drop in traffic is visible in the figure below starting around 11:45 local time (10:45 UTC) with some volatility visible in the lower traffic through 17:15 local time (16:15 UTC). However, the impact of the problem is more obvious in the traffic graphs for AS3269 and AS16232, both owned by Telecom Italia. Both graphs show a more significant loss of traffic, as well as greater volatility through the five-plus hour disruption.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Myanmar

A fire at an exchange office of MPT (Myanma Posts and Telecommunications) on February 7 disrupted Internet connectivity for customers of the Myanmar service provider. A Facebook post from MPT informed customers that “We are currently experiencing disruptions to our MPT’s services including MPT’s call centre, fiber internet, mobile internet and mobile and telephone communications.” The figure below shows the impact of this disruption on MPT-owned AS9988 and AS45558, with traffic dropping significantly at 10:00 local time (03:30 UTC). Significant recovery was seen by 22:00 local time (15:30 local time).

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)

Congo Telecom tweeted a “COMMUNIQUÉ” on March 15, alerting users to a service disruption due to a “network incident”. The impact of this disruption is clearly visible at a country level, with traffic dropping sharply at 00:45 local time (23:45 on March 14 UTC), driven by complete outages at MTN Congo and Congo Telecom, as seen in the graphs below. While traffic at MTN Congo began to recover around 08:00 local time (07:00 UTC), Congo Telecom’s recovery took longer, with traffic beginning to increase around 17:00 local time (16:00 UTC). Congo Telecom tweeted on March 16 that the nationwide Internet outage had been resolved. MTN Congo did not acknowledge the disruption on social media, and neither company provided more specific information about the reported “network incident”.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Lebanon

Closing out March, disruptions observed at AS39010 (Terranet) and AS42334 (Mobi) in Lebanon may have been related to a strike at upstream provider Ogero Telecom, common to both networks. A published report quoted the Chairman of Ogero commenting on the strike, “We are heading to a catastrophe if a deal is not found with the government: the network will completely stop working as our generators will gradually run out of fuel. Lebanon completely relies on Ogero for its bandwidth, leaving no one exempt from a blackout.” Traffic at both Terranet and Mobi dropped around 05:00 local time (03:00 UTC) on March 29, with the disruption lasting approximately 4.5 hours, as traffic recovered at 09:30 local time (07:30 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Cyberattacks

South Korea

On January 29, South Korean Internet provider LG Uplus suffered two brief Internet disruptions which were reportedly caused by possible DDoS attacks. The first disruption occurred at 03:00 local time (18:00 UTC on January 28), and the second occurred at 18:15 local time (09:15 UTC). The disruptions impacted traffic on AS17858 and AS3786, both owned by LG. The company was reportedly hit by a second pair of DDoS attacks on February 4.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Guam

In a March 17 tweet posted at 11:30 local time (01:30 UTC), Docomo Pacific reported an outage affecting multiple services, with a subsequent tweet noting that “Early this morning, a cyber security incident occurred and some of our servers were attacked”. This outage is visible at a country level in Guam, seen as a significant drop in traffic starting around 10:00 local time (00:00 UTC) in the figure below. However, in the graph below for AS3605 (ERX-KUENTOS/Guam Cablevision/Docomo Pacific), the cited outage results in a near-complete loss of traffic starting around 05:00 local time (19:00 on March 16 UTC). Traffic returned to normal levels by 18:00 local time on March 18 (08:00 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Ukraine/Military Action

In February, the conflict in Ukraine entered its second year, and over this past year, we have tracked its impact on the Internet, highlighting traffic shifts, attacks, routing changes, and connectivity disruptions. In the fourth quarter of 2022, a number of disruptions were related to attacks on electrical infrastructure, and this pattern continued into the first quarter of 2023.

One such disruption occurred in Odessa on January 27, amid news of Russian airstrikes on local energy infrastructure. As seen in the figure below, Internet traffic in Odessa usually begins to climb just before 08:00 local time (06:00 UTC), but failed to do so that morning after several energy infrastructure facilities near Odessa were hit and damaged. Traffic remained lower than levels seen the previous week for approximately 18 hours.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Power outages resulting from Russian attacks on energy generation and distribution facilities on March 9 resulted in disruptions to Internet connectivity in multiple locations around Ukraine. As seen in the figures below, traffic dropped below normal levels after 02:00 local time (00:00 UTC) on March 9. Traffic in Kharkiv fell over 50% as compared to previous week, while in Odessa, traffic fell as much as 60%. In Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kirovohrad Oblast, traffic recovered by around 08:00 local time (06:00 UTC), while in Kharkiv, the disruption lasted nearly two days, returning to normal levels around 23:45 local time (21:45 UTC) on Friday, March 10.

Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023
Internet disruptions overview for Q1 2023

Conclusion

The first quarter of 2023 seemed to be particularly active from an Internet disruption perspective, but hopefully it is not a harbinger of things to come through the rest of the year. This is especially true of government-directed shutdowns, which occurred fairly regularly through 2022. To that end, civil society organization Access Now recently published their Internet shutdowns in 2022 report, finding that In 2022, governments and other actors disrupted the internet at least 187 times across 35 countries. Cloudflare Radar is proud to support Access Now’s #KeepItOn initiative, using our data to help illustrate the impact of Internet shutdowns and other disruptions.

To follow Internet disruptions as they occur, check the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center (CROC) or the Radar API. On social media, follow @CloudflareRadar on Twitter or cloudflare.social/@radar on Mastodon.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

Post Syndicated from Omer Yoachimik original https://blog.cloudflare.com/ddos-threat-report-2023-q1/

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

Welcome to the first DDoS threat report of 2023. DDoS attacks, or distributed denial-of-service attacks, are a type of cyber attack that aim to overwhelm Internet services such as websites with more traffic than they can handle, in order to disrupt them and make them unavailable to legitimate users. In this report, we cover the latest insights and trends about the DDoS attack landscape as we observed across our global network.

Kicking off 2023 with a bang

Threat actors kicked off 2023 with a bang. The start of the year was characterized by a series of hacktivist campaigns against Western targets including banking, airports, healthcare and universities — mainly by the pro-Russian Telegram-organized groups Killnet and more recently by AnonymousSudan.

While Killnet-led and AnonymousSudan-led cyberattacks stole the spotlight, we haven’t witnessed any novel or exceedingly large attacks by them.

Hyper-volumetric attacks

We did see, however, an increase of hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks launched by other threat actors — with the largest one peaking above 71 million requests per second (rps) — exceeding Google’s previous world record of 46M rps by 55%.

Back to Killnet and AnonymousSudan, while no noteworthy attacks were reported, we shouldn’t underestimate the potential risks. Unprotected Internet properties can still be, and have been, taken down by Killnet-led or AnonymousSudan-led cyber campaigns. Organizations should take proactive defensive measures to reduce the risks.

Business as usual for South American Telco targeted by terabit-strong attacks thanks to Cloudflare

Another large attack we saw in Q1 was a 1.3 Tbps (terabits per second) DDoS attack that targeted a South American Telecommunications provider. The attack lasted only a minute. It was a multi-vector attack involving DNS and UDP attack traffic. The attack was part of a broader campaign which included multiple Terbit-strong attacks originating from a 20,000-strong Mirai-variant botnet. Most of the attack traffic originated from the US, Brazil, Japan, Hong Kong, and India. Cloudflare systems automatically detected and mitigated it without any impact to the customer’s networks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Cloudflare auto-mitigates a 1.3 Tbps Mirai DDoS attack

High-performance botnets

Hyper-volumetric attacks leverage a new generation of botnets that are comprised of Virtual Private Servers (VPS) instead of Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

Historically, large botnets relied on exploitable IoT devices such as smart security cameras to orchestrate their attacks. Despite the limited throughput of each IoT device, together — usually numbering in the hundreds of thousands or millions — they generated enough traffic to disrupt their targets.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

The new generation of botnets uses a fraction of the amount of devices, but each device is substantially stronger. Cloud computing providers offer virtual private servers to allow start ups and businesses to create performant applications. The downside is that it also allows attackers to create high-performance botnets that can be as much as 5,000x stronger. Attackers gain access to virtual private servers by compromising unpatched servers and hacking into management consoles using leaked API credentials.

Cloudflare has been working with key cloud computing providers to crack down on these VPS-based botnets. Substantial portions of such botnets have been disabled thanks to the cloud computing providers’ rapid response and diligence. Since then, we have yet to see additional hyper-volumetric attacks — a testament to the fruitful collaboration.

We have excellent collaboration with the cyber-security community to take down botnets once we detect such large-scale attacks, but we want to make this process even simpler and more automated.

We invite Cloud computing providers, hosting providers and general service providers to sign up for Cloudflare’s free Botnet Threat Feed to gain visibility on attacks launching from within their networks — and help us dismantle botnets.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

Key highlights from this quarter

  1. In Q1, 16% of surveyed customers reported a Ransom DDoS attack — remains steady compared to the previous quarter but represents a 60% increase YoY.
  2. Non-profit organizations and Broadcast Media were two of the most targeted industries. Finland was the largest source of HTTP DDoS attacks in terms of percentage of attack traffic, and the main target of network-layer DDoS attacks. Israel was the top most attacked country worldwide by HTTP DDoS attacks.
  3. Large scale volumetric DDoS attacks — attacks above 100 Gbps — increased by 6% QoQ. DNS-based attacks became the most popular vector. Similarly, we observed surges in SPSS-bas in ed DDoS attacks, DNS amplification attacks, and GRE-based DDoS attacks.

Ransom DDoS attacks

Often, DDoS attacks are carried out to extort ransom payments. We continue to survey Cloudflare customers and track the ratio of DDoS events where the target received a ransom note. This number has been steadily rising through 2022 and currently stands at 16% – the same as in Q4 2022.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Percent of users reporting a Ransom DDoS attack or threat, per quarter

As opposed to Ransomware attacks, where usually the victim is tricked into downloading a file or clicking on an email link that encrypts and locks their computer files until they pay a ransom fee, Ransom DDoS attacks can be much easier for attackers to execute. Ransom DDoS attacks don’t require tricking the victim into opening an email or clicking a link, nor do they require a network intrusion or a foothold into the corporate assets.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

In a Ransom DDoS attack, the attacker doesn’t need access to the victim’s computer but rather just needs to bombard them with a sufficiently large amount of traffic to take down their websites, DNS servers, and any other type of Internet-connected property to make it unavailable or with poor performance to users. The attacker will demand a ransom payment, usually in the form of Bitcoin, to stop and/or avoid further attacks.

The months of January 2023 and March 2023 were the second highest in terms of Ransom DDoS activity as reported by our users. The highest month thus far remains November 2022 — the month of Black Friday, Thanksgiving, and Singles Day in China — a lucrative month for threat actors.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Percent of users reporting a Ransom DDoS attack or threat, per month

Who and what are being attacked?

Top targeted countries

Perhaps related to the judicial reform and opposing protests, in Q1, Israel jumps to the first place as the country targeted by the most HTTP DDoS attack traffic — even above the United States of America. This is an astonishing figure. Just short of a single percent of all HTTP traffic that Cloudflare processed in the first quarter of the year, was part of HTTP DDoS attacks that targeted Israeli websites. Following closely behind Israel are the US, Canada, and Turkey.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top countries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic worldwide)

In terms of the percentage of attack traffic compared to all traffic to a given country, Slovenia and Georgia came at the top. Approximately 20% of all traffic to Slovenian and Georgian websites were HTTP DDoS attacks. Next in line were the small Caribbean dual-island nation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Turkey. While Israel was the top in the previous graph, here it has found its placement as the ninth most attacked country — above Russia. Still high compared to previous quarters.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top countries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country)

Looking at the total amount of network-layer DDoS attack traffic, China came in first place. Almost 18% of all network-layer DDoS attack traffic came from China. Closely in second, Singapore came in second place with a 17% share. The US came in third, followed by Finland.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top countries targeted by network-layer DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the all DDoS traffic worldwide)

When we normalize attacks to a country by all traffic to that country, Finland jumps to the first place, perhaps due to its newly approved NATO membership. Nearly 83% of all traffic to Finland was network-layer attack traffic. China followed closely with 68% and Singapore again with 49%.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top countries targeted by network-layer DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the all traffic per country)

Top targeted industries

In terms of overall bandwidth, globally, Internet companies saw the largest amount of HTTP DDoS attack traffic. Afterwards, it was the Marketing and Advertising industry, Computer Software industry, Gaming / Gambling and Telecommunications.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic for all industries)

By percentage of attack traffic out of total traffic to an industry, Non-profits were the most targeted in the first quarter of the year, followed by Accounting firms. Despite the uptick of attacks on healthcare, it didn’t make it into the top ten. Also up there in the top were Chemicals, Government, and Energy Utilities & Waste industries. Looking at the US, almost 2% of all traffic to US Federal websites were part of DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per industry)

On a regional scale, the Gaming & Gambling industry was the most targeted in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. In South and Central America, the Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) industry was the most targeted. In North America it was the Marketing & Advertising industry followed by Telecommunications — which was also the most attacked industry in Africa. Last by not least, in Oceania, the Health, Wellness and Fitness industry was the most targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1

Diving lower in the OSI stack, based on the total volume of L3/4 attack traffic, the most targeted industries were Information Technology and Services, Gaming / Gambling, and Telecommunications.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top industries targeted by L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total DDoS traffic for all industries)

When comparing the attack traffic to the total traffic per industry, we see a different picture. Almost every second byte transmitted to Broadcast Media companies was L3/4 DDoS attack traffic.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top industries targeted by L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per industry)

Where attacks are coming from

Top source countries

In the first quarter of 2023, Finland was the largest source of HTTP DDoS attacks in terms of the percentage of attack traffic out of all traffic per country. Closely after Finland, the British Virgin Islands came in second place, followed by Libya and Barbados.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top source countries of HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country)

In terms of absolute volumes, the most HTTP DDoS attack traffic came from US IP addresses. China came in second, followed by Germany, Indonesia, Brazil, and Finland.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top source countries of HTTP DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic worldwide)

On the L3/4 side of things, Vietnam was the largest source of L3/4 DDoS attack traffic. Almost a third of all L3/4 traffic we ingested in our Vietnam data centers was attack traffic. Following Vietnam were Paraguay, Moldova, and Jamaica.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top source countries of L3/4 DDoS attacks (percentage of attack traffic out of the total traffic per country)

What attack types and sizes we see

Attack size and duration

When looking at the types of attacks that are launched against our customers and our own network and applications, we can see that the majority of attacks are short and small; 86% of network-layer DDoS attacks end within 10 minutes, and 91% of attacks never exceed 500 Mbps.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Network-layer DDoS attacks by duration

Only one out of every fifty attacks ever exceeds 10 Gbps, and only one out of every thousand attacks exceeds 100 Gbps.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Network-layer DDoS attacks by bitrate

Having said that, larger attacks are slowly increasing in quantity and frequency. Last quarter, attacks exceeding 100 Gbps saw a 67% increase QoQ in their quantity. This quarter, the growth has slowed down a bit to 6%, but it’s still growing. In fact, there was an increase in all volumetric attacks excluding the ‘small’ bucket where the majority fall into — as visualized in the graph below. The largest growth was in the 10-100 Gbps range; an 89% increase QoQ.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Network-layer DDoS attacks by size: quarter-over-quarter change

Attack vectors

This quarter we saw a tectonic shift. With a 22% share, SYN floods scooched to the second place, making DNS-based DDoS attacks the most popular attack vector (30%). Almost a third of all L3/4 DDoS attacks were DNS-based; either DNS floods or DNS amplification/reflection attacks. Not far behind, UDP-based attacks came in third with a 21% share.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top DDoS attack vectors

Emerging threats

Every quarter we see the reemergence of old and sometimes even ancient attack vectors. What this tells us is that even decade-old vulnerabilities are still being exploited to launch attacks. Threat actors are recycling and reusing old methods — perhaps hoping that organizations have dropped those protections against older methods.

In the first quarter of 2023, there was a massive surge in SPSS-based DDoS attacks, DNS amplification attacks and GRE-based DDoS attacks.

DDoS threat report for 2023 Q1
Top DDoS emerging threats

SPSS-based DDoS attacks increased by 1,565% QoQ

The Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) is an IBM-developed software suite for use cases such as data management, business intelligence, and criminal investigation. The Sentinel RMS License Manager server is used to manage licensing for software products such as the IBM SPSS system. Back in 2021, two vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-22713 and CVE-2021-38153) were identified in the Sentinel RMS License Manager server which can be used to launch reflection DDoS attacks. Attackers can send large amounts of specially crafted license requests to the server, causing it to generate a response that is much larger than the original request. This response is sent back to the victim’s IP address, effectively amplifying the size of the attack and overwhelming the victim’s network with traffic. This type of attack is known as a reflection DDoS attack, and it can cause significant disruption to the availability of software products that rely on the Sentinel RMS License Manager, such as IBM SPSS Statistics. Applying the available patches to the license manager is essential to prevent these vulnerabilities from being exploited and to protect against reflection DDoS attacks.

DNS amplification DDoS attacks increased by 958% QoQ

DNS amplification attacks are a type of DDoS attack that involves exploiting vulnerabilities in the Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure to generate large amounts of traffic directed at a victim’s network. Attackers send DNS requests to open DNS resolvers that have been misconfigured to allow recursive queries from any source, and use these requests to generate responses that are much larger than the original query. The attackers then spoof the victim’s IP address, causing the large responses to be directed at the victim’s network, overwhelming it with traffic and causing a denial of service. The challenge of mitigating DNS amplification attacks is that the attack traffic can be difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic, making it difficult to block at the network level. To mitigate DNS amplification attacks, organizations can take steps such as properly configuring DNS resolvers, implementing rate-limiting techniques, and using traffic filtering tools to block traffic from known attack sources.

GRE-based DDoS attacks increased by 835% QoQ

GRE-based DDoS attacks involve using the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol to flood a victim’s network with large amounts of traffic. Attackers create multiple GRE tunnels between compromised hosts to send traffic to the victim’s network. These attacks are difficult to detect and filter, as the traffic appears as legitimate traffic on the victim’s network. Attackers can also use source IP address spoofing to make it appear that the traffic is coming from legitimate sources, making it difficult to block at the network level. GRE-based DDoS attacks pose several risks to targeted organizations, including downtime, disruption of business operations, and potential data theft or network infiltration. Mitigating these attacks requires the use of advanced traffic filtering tools that can detect and block attack traffic based on its characteristics, as well as techniques such as rate limiting and source IP address filtering to block traffic from known attack sources.

The DDoS threat landscape

In recent months, there has been an increase in longer and larger DDoS attacks across various industries, with volumetric attacks being particularly prominent. Non-profit and Broadcast Media companies were some of the top targeted industries. DNS DDoS attacks also became increasingly prevalent.

As DDoS attacks are typically carried out by bots, automated detection and mitigation are crucial for effective defense. Cloudflare’s automated systems provide constant protection against DDoS attacks for our customers, allowing them to focus on other aspects of their business. We believe that DDoS protection should be easily accessible to organizations of all sizes, and have been offering free and unlimited protection since 2017.

At Cloudflare, our mission is to help build a better Internet — one that is more secure and faster Internet for all.

We invite you to join our DDoS Trends Webinar to learn more about emerging threats and effective defense strategies.

A note about methodologies

How we calculate Ransom DDoS attack insights
Cloudflare’s systems constantly analyze traffic and automatically apply mitigation when DDoS attacks are detected. Each attacked customer is prompted with an automated survey to help us better understand the nature of the attack and the success of the mitigation. For over two years, Cloudflare has been surveying attacked customers. One of the questions in the survey asks the respondents if they received a threat or a ransom note. Over the past two years, on average, we collected 164 responses per quarter. The responses of this survey are used to calculate the percentage of Ransom DDoS attacks.

How we calculate geographical and industry insights
Source country
At the application-layer, we use the attacking IP addresses to understand the origin country of the attacks. That is because at that layer, IP addresses cannot be spoofed (i.e., altered). However, at the network layer, source IP addresses can be spoofed. So, instead of relying on IP addresses to understand the source, we instead use the location of our data centers where the attack packets were ingested. We’re able to get geographical accuracy due to our large global coverage in over 285 locations around the world.

Target country
For both application-layer and network-layer DDoS attacks, we group attacks and traffic by our customers’ billing country. This lets us understand which countries are subject to more attacks.

Target industry
For both application-layer and network-layer DDoS attacks, we group attacks and traffic by our customers’ industry according to our customer relations management system. This lets us understand which industries are subject to more attacks.

Total volume vs. percentage
For both source and target insights, we look at the total volume of attack traffic compared to all traffic as one data point. Additionally, we also look at the percentage of attack traffic towards or from a specific country, to a specific country or to a specific industry. This gives us an “attack activity rate” for a given country/industry which is normalized by their total traffic levels. This helps us remove biases of a country or industry that normally receives a lot of traffic and therefore a lot of attack traffic as well.

How we calculate attack characteristics
To calculate the attack size, duration, attack vectors and emerging threats, we bucket attacks and then provide the share of each bucket out of the total amount for each dimension.

General disclaimer and clarification
When we describe ‘top countries’ as the source or target of attacks, it does not necessarily mean that that country was attacked as a country, but rather that organizations that use that country as their billing country were targeted by attacks. Similarly, attacks originating from a country does not mean that that country launched the attacks, but rather that the attack was launched from IP addresses that have been mapped to that country. Threat actors operate global botnets with nodes all over the world, and in many cases also use Virtual Private Networks and proxies to obfuscate their true location. So if anything, the source country could indicate the presence of exit nodes or botnet nodes within that country.

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

Post Syndicated from David Belson original https://blog.cloudflare.com/virgin-media-outage-april-4-2023/

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

Just after midnight (UTC) on April 4, subscribers to UK ISP Virgin Media (AS5089) began experiencing an Internet outage, with subscriber complaints multiplying rapidly on platforms including Twitter and Reddit.

Cloudflare Radar data shows Virgin Media traffic dropping to near-zero around 00:30 UTC, as seen in the figure below. Connectivity showed some signs of recovery around 02:30 UTC, but fell again an hour later. Further nominal recovery was seen around 04:45 UTC, before again experiencing another complete outage between around 05:45-06:45 UTC, after which traffic began to recover, reaching expected levels around 07:30 UTC.

After the initial set of early-morning disruptions, Virgin Media experienced another round of issues in the afternoon. Cloudflare observed instability in traffic from Virgin Media’s network (called an autonomous system in Internet jargon) AS5089 starting around 15:00 UTC, with a significant drop just before 16:00 UTC. However in this case, it did not appear to be a complete outage, with traffic recovering approximately a half hour later.

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

Virgin Media’s Twitter account acknowledged the early morning disruption several hours after it began, posting responses stating “We’re aware of an issue that is affecting broadband services for Virgin Media customers as well as our contact centres. Our teams are currently working to identify and fix the problem as quickly as possible and we apologise to those customers affected.” Further responses after service restoration noted “We’ve restored broadband services for customers but are closely monitoring the situation as our engineers continue to investigate. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.”

However, the second disruption was acknowledged on Virgin Media’s Twitter account much more rapidly, with a post at 16:25 UTC stating “Unfortunately we have seen a repeat of an earlier issue which is causing intermittent broadband connectivity problems for some Virgin Media customers. We apologise again to those impacted, our teams are continuing to work flat out to find the root cause of the problem and fix it.”

At the time of the outages, www.virginmedia.com, which includes the provider’s status page, was unavailable. As seen in the figure below, a DNS lookup for the hostname resulted in a SERVFAIL error, indicating that the lookup failed to return a response. This is because the authoritative nameservers for virginmedia.com are listed as ns{1-4}.virginmedia.net, and these nameservers are all hosted within Virgin Media’s network (AS5089) and thus are not accessible during the outage.

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

Although Virgin Media has not publicly released a root cause for the series of disruptions that its network has experienced, looking at BGP activity can be instructive.

BGP is a mechanism to exchange routing information between networks on the Internet. The big routers that make the Internet work have huge, constantly updated lists of the possible routes that can be used to deliver each network packet to its final destination. Without BGP, the Internet routers wouldn’t know what to do, and the Internet wouldn’t exist.

The Internet is literally a network of networks, or for math fans, a graph, with each individual network a node in it, and the edges representing the interconnections. All of this is bound together by BGP, which allows one network (Virgin Media, for instance) to advertise its presence to other networks that form the Internet. When Virgin Media is not advertising its presence, other networks can’t find its network and it becomes effectively unavailable.

BGP announcements inform a router of changes made to the routing of a prefix (a group of IP addresses) or entirely withdraws the prefix, removing it from the routing table. The figure below shows aggregate BGP announcement activity from AS5089 with spikes that align with the decreases and increases seen in the traffic graph above, suggesting that the underlying cause may in fact be BGP-related, or related to problems with core network infrastructure.

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

We can drill down further to break out the observed activity between BGP announcements (dark blue) and withdrawals (light blue) seen in the figure below, with key activity coincident with the loss and return of traffic. An initial set of withdrawals are seen just after midnight, effectively removing Virgin Media from the Internet resulting in the initial outage.

A set of announcements occurred just before 03:00 UTC, aligning with the nominal increase in traffic noted above, but those were followed quickly by another set of withdrawals. A similar announcement/withdrawal exchange was observed at 05:00 and 05:30 UTC respectively, before a final set of announcements restored connectivity at 07:00 UTC.

Things remained relatively stable through the morning into the afternoon, before another set of withdrawals presaged the afternoon’s connectivity problems, with a spike of withdrawals at 15:00 UTC, followed by additional withdrawal/announcement exchanges over the next several hours.

Cloudflare’s view of the Virgin Media outage in the UK

Conclusion

Track ongoing traffic trends for Virgin Media on Cloudflare Radar, and follow us on Twitter and Mastodon for regular updates.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

Post Syndicated from Stanley Chiang original https://blog.cloudflare.com/radar-url-scanner-early-access/

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

One of the first steps in an information security investigation is to gather as much context as possible. But compiling that information can become a sprawling task.

Cloudflare is excited to announce early access to a new, free tool — the Radar URL Scanner. Provide us a URL, and our scanner will compile a report containing a myriad of technical details: a phishing scan, SSL certificate data, HTTP request and response data, page performance data, DNS records, whether cookies are set to secure and HttpOnly, what technologies and libraries the page uses, and more.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

Let’s walk through a report on John Graham-Cumming’s blog as an example. Conveniently, all reports generated will be publicly accessible.

The first page is the summary tab, and you’ll see we’ve broken all the available data into the following categories: Security, Cookies, Network, Technology, DOM, and Performance. It’s a lot of content so we will jump through some highlights.

In the Summary tab itself, you’ll notice the submitted URL was https://blog.jgc.org. If we had received a URL short link, the scanner would have followed the redirects and generated a report for the final URL.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The Security tab presents information to help determine whether a page is safe to visit with a phishing and certificates section. In our blog example, the report confirms the link we provided is not a phishing link, but there could easily be phishing scams trying to harvest personal information. We’re excited to enable wider access to our security infrastructure with this free tool.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The Cookies tab can indicate how privacy friendly a website is to its users. We show all the cookies set and their attribute values to do this. In this report, the blog loaded 2 cookies. There’s the Secure flag. You’ll want that set to true as often as possible because this means the cookie may only be transmitted over HTTPS, preventing it from being observed by unauthorized parties. Additionally, cookies set to HttpOnly will be inaccessible to the JavaScript API, potentially mitigating XSS attacks from third-party scripts.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The Technology tab enumerates the technologies, frameworks, libraries, etc that are used to power the page being scanned. Understanding the technology stack of a page can be very useful for when there are outages in a particular service, when exploits in popular libraries are discovered, or simply to understand what tools are most popular in the industry. John’s blog appears to use 7 different technologies including Google AdSense, Blogger, and Cloudflare.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The Network tab shows all the HTTP transactions that occur on the page as well as the hostname’s associated DNS records. HTTP transactions are the requests and responses the page makes to load all its content. This tells engineers where the website is going to load its content. Our report of John’s blog shows a total of 82 requests.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The tab also contains DNS records which are a great way to understand more about the fundamentals of the page. And of course, we at Cloudflare are big advocates for enabling DNSSEC.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The DOM (Document Object Model) tab conveniently collates common information you may be looking for from within the page. We grouped together lists of all hyperlinks and global JavaScript variables. Additionally, we provide the raw HTML of the page for you to further analyze. Our report shows the blog’s landing page has 104 hyperlinks going off to other websites.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

The Performance tab presents a breakdown of the time it takes for the website to load. It’s not enough for a page to be secure for users. It must also be usable, and load speeds are a big factor in the overall experience. That’s why we’ve also included Performance Navigation Timing metrics alongside our more security and privacy oriented tabs.

Analyze any URL safely using the Cloudflare Radar URL Scanner

Under the hood, one of the great things about this tool is that the underlying scanning technology uses Cloudflare’s homegrown Workers Browser Rendering API to run all our headless scans. You can follow that link to join the waitlist and try it out for yourself.

In the future, we envision adding features to our scanner to complement the ones from this launch: API endpoints so you don’t need to rely on a GUI, private scans for more sensitive or recurring reports, and also security recommendations with integrations with the Cloudflare Security Center. And since this is a Radar product, not only can users expect the data generated to further enhance our security threat modeling, they can also look forward to us providing back insights and visualizations from the aggregate trends we observe.

The Radar URL Scanner tool’s journey to helping make the Internet more transparent and secure has only just begun, but we’re excited for you all to try it out here. If you have any questions or would like to discuss enterprise level features on your wishlist, feel free to reach out via Twitter at @CloudflareRadar or email us at [email protected].

The state of application security in 2023

Post Syndicated from Michael Tremante original https://blog.cloudflare.com/application-security-2023/

The state of application security in 2023

The state of application security in 2023

One year ago we published our first Application Security Report. For Security Week 2023, we are providing updated insights and trends around mitigated traffic, bot and API traffic, and account takeover attacks.

Cloudflare has grown significantly over the last year. In February 2023, Netcraft noted that Cloudflare had become the most commonly used web server vendor within the top million sites at the start of 2023, and continues to grow, reaching a 21.71% market share, up from 19.4% in February 2022.

This continued growth now equates to Cloudflare handling over 45 million HTTP requests/second on average (up from 32 million last year), with more than 61 million HTTP requests/second at peak. DNS queries handled by the network are also growing and stand at approximately 24.6 million queries/second. All of this traffic flow gives us an unprecedented view into Internet trends.

Before we dive in, we need to define our terms.

Definitions

Throughout this report, we will refer to the following terms:

  • Mitigated traffic: any eyeball HTTP* request that had a “terminating” action applied to it by the Cloudflare platform. These include the following actions: BLOCK, CHALLENGE, JS_CHALLENGE and MANAGED_CHALLENGE. This does not include requests that had the following actions applied: LOG, SKIP, ALLOW. In contrast to last year, we now exclude requests that had CONNECTION_CLOSE and FORCE_CONNECTION_CLOSE actions applied by our DDoS mitigation system, as these technically only slow down connection initiation. They also accounted for a relatively small percentage of requests. Additionally, we improved our calculation regarding the CHALLENGE type actions to ensure that only unsolved challenges are counted as mitigated. A detailed description of actions can be found in our developer documentation.
  • Bot traffic/automated traffic: any HTTP* request identified by Cloudflare’s Bot Management system as being generated by a bot. This includes requests with a bot score between 1 and 29 inclusive. This has not changed from last year’s report.
  • API traffic: any HTTP* request with a response content type of XML or JSON. Where the response content type is not available, such as for mitigated requests, the equivalent Accept content type (specified by the user agent) is used instead. In this latter case, API traffic won’t be fully accounted for, but it still provides a good representation for the purposes of gaining insights.

Unless otherwise stated, the time frame evaluated in this post is the 12 month period from March 2022 through February 2023 inclusive.

Finally, please note that the data is calculated based only on traffic observed across the Cloudflare network and does not necessarily represent overall HTTP traffic patterns across the Internet.

*When referring to HTTP traffic we mean both HTTP and HTTPS.

Global traffic insights

6% of daily HTTP requests are mitigated on average

In looking at all HTTP requests proxied by the Cloudflare network, we find that the share of requests that are mitigated has dropped to 6%, down two percentage points compared to last year. Looking at 2023 to date, we see that mitigated request share has fallen even further, to between 4-5%. Large spikes visible in the chart below, such as those seen in June and October, often correlate with large DDoS attacks mitigated by Cloudflare. It is interesting to note that although the percentage of mitigated traffic has decreased over time, the total mitigated request volume has been relatively stable as shown in the second chart below, indicating an increase in overall clean traffic globally rather than an absolute decrease in malicious traffic.

The state of application security in 2023
The state of application security in 2023

81% of mitigated HTTP requests were outright BLOCKed, with mitigations for the remaining set split across the various CHALLENGE type actions.

DDoS mitigation accounts for more than 50% of all mitigated traffic

Cloudflare provides various security features that customers can configure to keep their applications safe. Unsurprisingly, DDoS mitigation is still the largest contributor to mitigated layer 7 (application layer) HTTP requests. Just last month (February 2023), we reported the largest known mitigated DDoS attack by HTTP requests/second volume (This particular attack is not visible in the graphs above because they are aggregated at a daily level, and the attack only lasted for ~5 minutes).

Compared to last year, however, mitigation by the Cloudflare WAF has grown significantly, and now accounts for nearly 41% of mitigated requests. This can be partially attributed to advances in our WAF technology that enables it to detect and block a larger range of attacks.

The state of application security in 2023

Tabular format for reference:

Source Percentage %
DDoS Mitigation 52%
WAF 41%
IP reputation 4%
Access Rules 2%
Other 1%

Please note that in the table above, in contrast to last year, we are now grouping our products to match our marketing materials and the groupings used in the 2022 Radar Year in Review. This mostly affects our WAF product that comprises the combination of WAF Custom Rules, WAF Rate Limiting Rules, and WAF Managed Rules. In last year’s report, these three features accounted for an aggregate 31% of mitigations.

To understand the growth in WAF mitigated requests over time, we can look one level deeper where it becomes clear that Cloudflare customers are increasingly relying on WAF Custom Rules (historically referred to as Firewall Rules) to mitigate malicious traffic or implement business logic blocks. Observe how the orange line (firewallrules) in the chart below shows a gradual increase over time while the blue line (l7ddos) clearly trends lower.

The state of application security in 2023

HTTP Anomaly is the most frequent layer 7 attack vector mitigated by the WAF

Contributing 30% of WAF Managed Rules mitigated traffic overall in March 2023, HTTP Anomaly’s share has decreased by nearly 25 percentage points as compared to the same time last year. Examples of HTTP anomalies include malformed method names, null byte characters in headers, non-standard ports or content length of zero with a POST request. This can be attributed to botnets matching HTTP anomaly signatures slowly changing their traffic patterns.

The state of application security in 2023

Removing the HTTP anomaly line from the graph, we can see that in early 2023, the attack vector distribution looks a lot more balanced.

The state of application security in 2023

Tabular format for reference (top 10 categories):

Source Percentage % (last 12 months)
HTTP Anomaly 30%
Directory Traversal 16%
SQLi 14%
File Inclusion 12%
Software Specific 10%
XSS 9%
Broken Authentication 3%
Command Injection 3%
Common Attack 1%
CVE 1%

Of particular note is the orange line spike seen towards the end of February 2023 (CVE category). The spike relates to a sudden increase of two of our WAF Managed Rules:

  • Drupal – Anomaly:Header:X-Forwarded-For (id: d6f6d394cb01400284cfb7971e7aed1e)
  • Drupal – Anomaly:Header:X-Forwarded-Host (id: d9aeff22f1024655937e5b033a61fbc5)

These two rules are also tagged against CVE-2018-14774, indicating that even relatively old and known vulnerabilities are still often targeted in an effort to exploit potentially unpatched software.

Bot traffic insights

Cloudflare’s Bot Management solution has seen significant investment over the last twelve months. New features such as configurable heuristics, hardened JavaScript detections, automatic machine learning model updates, and Turnstile, Cloudflare’s free CAPTCHA replacement, make our classification of human vs. bot traffic improve daily.

Our confidence in the classification output is very high. If we plot the bot scores across the traffic from the last week of February 2023, we find a very clear distribution, with most requests either being classified as definitely bot (less than 30) or definitely human (greater than 80) with most requests actually scoring less than 2 or greater than 95.

The state of application security in 2023

30% of HTTP traffic is automated

Over the last week of February 2023, 30% of Cloudflare HTTP traffic was classified as automated, equivalent to about 13 million HTTP requests/second on the Cloudflare network. This is 8 percentage points less than at the same time last year.

Looking at bot traffic only, we find that only 8% is generated by verified bots, comprising 2% of total traffic. Cloudflare maintains a list of known good (verified) bots to allow customers to easily distinguish between well-behaved bot providers like Google and Facebook and potentially lesser known or unwanted bots. There are currently 171 bots in the list.

The state of application security in 2023

16% of non-verified bot HTTP traffic is mitigated

Non-verified bot traffic often includes vulnerability scanners that are constantly looking for exploits on the web, and as a result, nearly one-sixth of this traffic is mitigated because some customers prefer to restrict the insights such tools can potentially gain.

Although verified bots like googlebot and bingbot are generally seen as beneficial and most customers want to allow them, we also see a small percentage (1.5%) of verified bot traffic being mitigated. This is because some site administrators don’t want portions of their site to be crawled, and customers often rely on WAF Custom Rules to enforce this business logic.

The most common action used by customers is to BLOCK these requests (13%), although we do have some customers configuring CHALLENGE actions (3%) to ensure any human false positives can still complete the request if necessary.

On a similar note, it is also interesting that nearly 80% of all mitigated traffic is classified as a bot, as illustrated in the figure below. Some may note that 20% of mitigated traffic being classified as human is still extremely high, but most mitigations of human traffic are generated by WAF Custom Rules, and are frequently due to customers implementing country-level or other related legal blocks on their applications. This is common, for example, in the context of US-based companies blocking access to European users for GDPR compliance reasons.

The state of application security in 2023

API traffic insights

Just like our Bot Management solution, we are also investing heavily in tools to protect API endpoints. This is because a lot of HTTP traffic is API related. In fact, if you count only HTTP requests that reach the origin and are not cacheable, up to 55% of traffic is API related, as per the definition stated earlier. This is the same methodology used in last year’s report, and the 55% figure remains unchanged year-over-year.

If we look at cached HTTP requests only (those with a cache status of HIT, UPDATING, REVALIDATED and EXPIRED) we find that, maybe surprisingly, nearly 7% is API related. Modern API endpoint implementations and proxy systems, including our own API Gateway/caching feature set, in fact, allow for very flexible cache logic allowing both caching on custom keys as well as quick cache revalidation (as often as every second) allowing developers to reduce load on back end endpoints.

Including cacheable assets and other requests in the total count, such as redirects, the number goes down, but is still 25% of traffic. In the graph below we provide both perspectives on API traffic:

  • Yellow line: % of API traffic against all HTTP requests. This will include redirects, cached assets and all other HTTP requests in the total count;
  • Blue line: % of API traffic against dynamic traffic returning HTTP 200 OK response code only;
The state of application security in 2023

65% of global API traffic is generated by browsers

A growing number of web applications nowadays are built “API first”. This means that the initial HTML page load only provides the skeleton layout, and most dynamic components and data are loaded via separate API calls (for example, via AJAX). This is the case for Cloudflare’s own dashboard. This growing implementation paradigm is visible when analyzing the bot scores for API traffic. We can see in the figure below that a large amount of API traffic is generated by user-driven browsers classified as “human” by our system, with nearly two-thirds of it clustered at the high end of the “human” range.

The state of application security in 2023

Calculating mitigated API traffic is challenging, as we don’t forward the request to origin servers, and therefore cannot rely on the response content type. Applying the same calculation that was used last year, a little more than 2% of API traffic is mitigated, down from 10.2% last year.

HTTP Anomaly surpasses SQLi as most common attack vector on API endpoints

Compared to last year, HTTP anomalies now surpass SQLi as the most popular attack vector attempted against API endpoints (note the blue line being higher at the start of the graph just when last year’s report was published). Attack vectors on API traffic are not consistent throughout the year and show more variation as compared to global HTTP traffic. For example, note the spike in file inclusion attack attempts in early 2023.

The state of application security in 2023

Exploring account takeover attacks

Since March 2021, Cloudflare has provided a leaked credential check feature as part of its WAF. This allows customers to be notified (via an HTTP request header) whenever an authentication request is detected with a username/password pair that is known to be leaked. This tends to be an extremely effective signal at detecting botnets performing account takeover brute force attacks.

Customers also use this signal, on valid username/password pair login attempts, to issue two factor authentication, password reset, or in some cases, increased logging in the event the user is not the legitimate owner of the credentials.

Brute force account takeover attacks are increasing

If we look at the trend of matched requests over the past 12 months, an increase is noticeable starting in the latter half of 2022, indicating growing fraudulent activity against login endpoints. During large brute force attacks we have observed matches against HTTP requests with leaked credentials at a rate higher than 12k per minute.

The state of application security in 2023

Our leaked credential check feature has rules matching authentication requests for the following systems:

  • Drupal
  • Ghost
  • Joomla
  • Magento
  • Plone
  • WordPress
  • Microsoft Exchange
  • Generic rules matching common authentication endpoint formats

This allows us to compare activity from malicious actors, normally in the form of botnets, attempting to “break into” potentially compromised accounts.

Microsoft Exchange is attacked more than WordPress

Mostly due to its popularity, you might expect WordPress to be the application most at risk and/or observing most brute force account takeover traffic. However, looking at rule matches from the supported systems listed above, we find that after our generic signatures, the Microsoft Exchange signature is the most frequent match.

Most applications experiencing brute force attacks tend to be high value assets, and Exchange accounts being the most likely targeted according to our data reflects this trend.

If we look at leaked credential match traffic by source country, the United States leads by a fair margin. Potentially notable is the absence of China in top contenders given network size. The only exception is Ukraine leading during the first half of 2022 towards the start of the war — the yellow line seen in the figure below.

The state of application security in 2023

Looking forward

Given the amount of web traffic carried by Cloudflare, we observe a broad spectrum of attacks. From HTTP anomalies, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting (XSS) to account takeover attempts and malicious bots, the threat landscape is constantly changing. As such, it is critical that any business operating online is investing in visibility, detection, and mitigation technologies so that they can ensure their applications, and more importantly, their end user’s data, remains safe.

We hope that you found the findings in this report interesting, and at the very least, gave you an appreciation on the state of application security on the Internet. There are a lot of bad actors online, and there is no indication that Internet security is getting easier.

We are already planning an update to this report including additional data and insights across our product portfolio. Keep an eye on Cloudflare Radar for more frequent application security reports and insights.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Post Syndicated from João Tomé original https://blog.cloudflare.com/one-year-of-war-in-ukraine/

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

The Internet has become a significant factor in geopolitical conflicts, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine. Tomorrow marks one year since the Russian invasion of that country. This post reports on Internet insights and discusses how Ukraine’s Internet remained resilient in spite of dozens of disruptions in three different stages of the conflict.

Key takeaways:

  • Internet traffic shifts in Ukraine are clearly visible from east to west as Ukrainians fled the war, with country-wide traffic dropping as much as 33% after February 24, 2022.
  • Air strikes on energy infrastructure starting in October led to widespread Internet disruptions that continue in 2023.
  • Application-layer cyber attacks in Ukraine rose 1,300% in early March 2022 compared to pre-war levels.
  • Government administration, financial services, and the media saw the most attacks targeting Ukraine.
  • Traffic from a number of networks in Kherson was re-routed through Russia between June and October, subjecting traffic to Russia’s restrictions and limitations, including content filtering. Even after traffic ceased to reroute through Russia, those Ukrainian networks saw major outages through at least the end of the year, while two networks remain offline.
  • Through efforts on the ground to repair damaged fiber optics and restore electrical power, Ukraine’s networks have remained resilient from both an infrastructure and routing perspective. This is partly due to Ukraine’s widespread connectivity to networks outside the country and large number of IXPs.
  • Starlink traffic in Ukraine grew over 500% between mid-March and mid-May, and continued to grow from mid-May through mid-November, increasing nearly 300% over that six-month period. For the full period from mid-March (two weeks after it was made available) to mid-December, it was over a 1,600% increase, dropping a bit after that.

Internet changes and disruptions

An Internet shock after February 24, 2022

In Ukraine, human Internet traffic dropped as much as 33% in the weeks following February 24. The following chart shows Cloudflare’s perspective on daily traffic (by number of requests).

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Internet traffic levels recovered over the next few months, including strong growth seen in September and October, when many Ukrainian refugees returned to the country. That said, there were also country-wide outages, mostly after October, that are discussed below.

14% of total traffic from Ukraine (including traffic from Crimea and other occupied regions) was mitigated as potential attacks, while 10% of total traffic to Ukraine was mitigated as potential attacks in the last 12 months.

Before February 24, 2022, typical weekday Internet traffic in Ukraine initially peaked after lunch, around 15:00 local time, dropped between 17:00 and 18:00 (consistent with people leaving work), and reached the biggest peak of the day at around 21:00 (possibly after dinner for mobile and streaming use).

After the invasion started, we observed less variation during the day in a clear change in the usual pattern given the reported disruption and “exodus” from the country​. During the first few days after the invasion began, peak traffic occurred around 19:00, at a time when nights for many in cities such as Kyiv were spent in improvised underground bunkers. By late March, the 21:00 peak had returned, but the early evening drop in traffic did not return until May.

When looking at Ukraine Internet requests by type of traffic in the chart below (from February 10, 2022, through February 2023), we observe that while traffic from both mobile and desktop devices dropped after the invasion, request volume from mobile devices has remained higher over the past year. Pre-war, mobile devices accounted for around 53% of traffic, and grew to around 60% during the first weeks of the invasion. By late April, it had returned to typical pre-war levels, falling back to around 54% of traffic. There’s also a noticeable December drop/outage that we’ll go over below.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Millions moving from east to west in Ukraine

The invasion brought attacks and failing infrastructure across a number of cities, but the target in the early days wasn’t the country’s energy infrastructure, as it was in October 2022. In the first weeks of the war, Internet traffic changes were largely driven by people evacuating conflict zones with their families. Over eight million Ukrainians left the country in the first three months, and many more relocated internally to safer cities, although many returned during the summer of 2022. The Internet played a critical role during this refugee crisis, supporting communications and access to real-time information that could save lives, as well as apps providing services, among others.

There was also an increase in traffic in the western part of Ukraine, in areas such as Lviv (further away from the conflict areas), and a decrease in the east, in areas like Kharkiv, where the Russian military was arriving and attacks were a constant threat. The figure below provides a view of how Internet traffic across Ukraine changed in the week after the war began (a darker pink means a drop in traffic — as much as 60% — while a darker green indicates an increase in Internet traffic — as much as 50%).

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience
Source: https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/dsUSJ/2/

The biggest drops in Internet traffic observed in Ukraine in the first days of the war were in Kharkiv Oblast in the east, and Chernihiv in the north, both with a 60% decrease, followed by Kyiv Oblast, with traffic 40% lower on March 2, 2022, as compared with February 23.

In western Ukraine, traffic surged. The regions with the highest observed traffic growth included Rivne (50%), Volyn (30%), Lviv (28%), Chernivtsi (25%), and Zakarpattia (15%).

At the city level, analysis of Internet traffic in Ukraine gives us some insight into usage of the Internet and availability of Internet access in those first weeks, with noticeable outages in places where direct conflict was going on or that was already occupied by Russian soldiers.

North of Kyiv, the city of Chernihiv had a significant drop in traffic the first week of the war and residual traffic by mid-March, with traffic picking up only after the Russians retreated in early April.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In the capital city of Kyiv, there is a clear disruption in Internet traffic right after the war started, possibly caused by people leaving, attacks and use of underground shelters.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Near Kyiv, we observed a clear outage in early March in Bucha. After April 1, when the Russians withdrew, Internet traffic started to come back a few weeks later.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In Irpin, just outside Kyiv, close to the Hostomel airport and Bucha, a similar outage pattern to Bucha was observed. Traffic only began to come back more clearly in late May.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In the east, in the city of Kharkiv, traffic dropped 50% on March 3, with a similar scenario seen not far away in Sumy. The disruption was related to people leaving and also by power outages affecting some networks.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Other cities in the south of Ukraine, like Berdyansk, had outages. This graph shows Enerhodar, the small city where Europe’s largest nuclear plant, Zaporizhzhya NPP, is located, with residual traffic compared to before.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In the cities located in the south of Ukraine, there were clear Internet disruptions. The Russians laid siege to Mariupol on February 24. Energy infrastructure strikes and shutdowns had an impact on local networks and Internet traffic, which fell to minimal levels by March 1. Estimates indicate that 95% of the buildings in the city were destroyed, and by mid-May, the city was fully under Russian control. While there was some increase in traffic by the end of April, it reached only ~22% of what it was before the war’s start.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

When looking at Ukrainian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or the autonomous systems (ASNs) they use, we observed more localized disruptions in certain regions during the first months of the war, but recovery was almost always swift. AS6849 (Ukrtel) experienced problems with very short-term outages in mid-March. AS13188 (Triolan), which services Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv, was another provider experiencing problems (they reported a cyberattack on March 9), as could be observed in the next chart:

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

We did not observe a clear national outage in Ukraine’s main ISP, AS15895 (Kyivstar) until the October-November attacks on energy infrastructure, which also shows some early resilience of Ukrainian networks.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive and its Internet impact

As Russian troops retreated from the northern front in Ukraine, they shifted their efforts to gain ground in the east (Battle of Donbas) and south (occupation of the Kherson region) after late April. This resulted in Internet disruptions and traffic shifts, which are discussed in more detail in a section below. However, Internet traffic in the Kherson region was intermittent and included outages after May, given the battle for Internet control. News reports in June revealed that ISP workers damaged their own equipment to thwart Russia’s efforts to control the Ukrainian Internet.

Before the September Ukrainian counteroffensive, another example of the war’s impact on a city’s Internet traffic occurred during the summer, when Russian troops seized Lysychansk in eastern Ukraine in early July after what became known as the Battle of Lysychansk. Internet traffic in Lysychansk clearly decreased after the war started. That slide continues during the intense fighting that took place after April, which led to most of the city’s population leaving. By May, traffic was almost residual (with a mid-May few days short term increase).

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In early September the Ukrainian counteroffensive took off in the east, although the media initially reported a south offensive in Kherson Oblast that was a “deception” move. The Kherson offensive only came to fruition in late October and early November. Ukraine was able to retake in September over 500 settlements and 12,000 square kilometers of territory in the Kharkiv region. At that time, there were Internet outages in several of those settlements.

In response to the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russian airstrikes caused power outages and Internet disruptions in the region. That was the case in Kharkiv on September 11, 12, and 13. The figure below shows a 12-hour near-complete outage on September 11, followed by two other periods of drop in traffic.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

When nuclear inspectors arrive, so do Internet outages

In the Zaporizhzhia region, there were also outages. On September 1, 2022, the day the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors arrived at the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Enerhodar, there were Internet outages in two local ASNs that service the area: AS199560 (Engrup) and AS197002 (OOO Tenor). Those outages lasted until September 10, as shown in the charts below.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

More broadly, the city of Enerhodar, where the nuclear power plant is located, experienced a four-day outage after September 6.

Mid-September traffic drop in Crimea

In mid-September, following Ukraine’s counteroffensive, there were questions as to when Crimea might be targeted by Ukrainian forces, with news reports indicating that there was an evacuation of the Russian population from Crimea around September 13. We saw a clear drop in traffic on that Tuesday, compared with the previous day, as seen in the map of Crimea below (red is decrease in traffic, green is increase).

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

October brings energy infrastructure attacks and country-wide disruptions

As we have seen, the Russian air strikes targeting critical energy infrastructure began in September as a retaliation to Ukraine’s counteroffensive. The following month, the Crimean Bridge explosion on Saturday, October 8 (when a truck-borne bomb destroyed part of the bridge) led to more air strikes that affected networks and Internet traffic across Ukraine.

On Monday, October 10, Ukraine woke up to air strikes on energy infrastructure and experienced severe electricity and Internet outages. At 07:35 UTC, traffic in the country was 35% below its usual level compared with the previous week and only fully recovered more than 24 hours later. The impact was particularly significant in regions like Kharkiv, where traffic was down by around 80%, and Lviv, where it dropped by about 60%. The graph below shows how new air strikes in Lviv Oblast the following day affected Internet traffic.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

There were clear disruptions in Internet connectivity in several regions on October 17, but also on October 20, when the destruction of several power stations in Kyiv resulted in a 25% drop in Internet traffic from Kyiv City as compared to the two previous weeks. It lasted 12 hours, and was followed the next day by a shorter partial outage as seen in the graph below.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In late October, according to Ukrainian officials, 30% of Ukraine’s power stations were destroyed. Self-imposed power limitations because of this destruction resulted in drops in Internet traffic observed in places like Kyiv and the surrounding region.

The start of a multi-week Internet disruption in Kherson Oblast can be seen in the graph below, showing ~70% lower traffic than in previous weeks. The disruption began on Saturday, October 22, when Ukrainians were gaining ground in the Kherson region.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Traffic began to return after Ukrainian forces took Kherson city on November 11, 2022. The graph below shows a week-over-week comparison for Kherson Oblast for the weeks of November 7, November 28, and December 19 for better visualization in the chart while showing the evolution through a seven-week period.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Ongoing strikes and Internet disruptions

Throughout the rest of the year and into 2023, Ukraine has continued to face intermittent Internet disruptions. On November 23, 2022, the country experienced widespread power outages after Russian strikes, causing a nearly 50% decrease in Internet traffic in Ukraine. This disruption lasted for almost a day and a half, further emphasizing the ongoing impact of the conflict on Ukraine’s infrastructure.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Although there was a recovery after that late November outage, only a few days later traffic seemed closer to normal levels. Below is a chart of the week-over-week evolution of Internet traffic in Ukraine at both a national and local level during that time:

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In Kyiv Oblast:

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In the Odessa region:

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

And Kharkiv (where a December 16 outage is also clear — in the green line):

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

On December 16, there was another country-level Internet disruption caused by air strikes targeting energy infrastructure. Traffic at a national level dropped as much as 13% compared with the previous week, but Ukrainian networks were even more affected. AS13188 (Triolan) had a 70% drop in traffic, and AS15895 (Kyivstar) a 40% drop, both shown in the figures below.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In January 2023, air strikes caused additional Internet disruptions. One such recent event was in Odessa, where traffic dropped as low as 54% compared with the previous week during an 18-hour disruption.

A cyber war with global impact

“Shields Up” on cyber attacks

The US government and the FBI issued warnings in March to all citizens, businesses, and organizations in the country, as well as allies and partners, to be aware of the need to “enhance cybersecurity.” The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) launched the Shields Up initiative, noting that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could impact organizations both within and beyond the region.” The UK and Japan, among others, also issued warnings.

Below, we discuss Web Application Firewall (WAF) mitigations and DDoS attacks. A WAF helps protect web applications by filtering and monitoring HTTP traffic between a web application and the Internet. A WAF is a protocol layer 7 defense (in the OSI model), and is not designed to defend against all types of attacks. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are cyber attacks that aim to take down Internet properties and make them unavailable for users.

Cyber attacks rose 1,300% in Ukraine by early March

The charts below are based on normalized data, and show threats mitigated by our WAF.

Mitigated application-layer threats blocked by our WAF skyrocketed after the war started on February 24. Mitigated requests were 105% higher on Monday, February 28 than in the previous (pre-war) Monday, and peaked on March 8, reaching 1,300% higher than pre-war levels.

Between February 2022 and February 2023, an average of 10% of all traffic to Ukraine was mitigations of potential attacks.

The graph below shows the daily percentage of application layer traffic to Ukraine that Cloudflare mitigated as potential attacks. In early March, 30% of all traffic was mitigated. This fell in April, and remained low for several months, but it picked up in early September around the time of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in east and south Ukraine. The peak was reached on October 29 when DDoS attack traffic constituted 39% of total traffic to Cloudflare’s Ukrainian customer websites.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

This trend is more evident when looking at all traffic to sites on the “.ua” top-level domain (from Cloudflare’s perspective). The chart below shows that DDoS attack traffic accounted for over 80% of all traffic by early March 2022. The first clear spikes occurred on February 16 and 19, with around 25% of traffic mitigated. There was no moment of rest after the war started, except towards the end of November and December, but the attacks resumed just before Christmas. An average of 13% of all traffic to “.ua”, between February 2022 and February 2023 was mitigations of potential attacks. The following graph provides a comprehensive view of DDoS application layer attacks on “.ua” sites:

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Moving on to types of mitigations of product groups that were used (related to “.ua” sites), as seen in the next chart, around 57% were done by the ruleset which automatically detects and mitigates HTTP DDoS attacks (DDoS Mitigation), 31% were being mitigated by firewall rules put in place (WAF), and 10% were blocking requests based on our IP threat reputation database (IP Reputation).

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

It’s important to note that WAF rules in the graph above are also associated with custom firewall rules created by customers to provide a more tailored protection. “DDoS Mitigation” (application layer DDoS protection) and “Access Rules” (rate limiting) are specifically used for DDoS protection.

In contrast to the first graph shown in this section, which looked at mitigated attack traffic targeting Ukraine, we can also look at mitigated attack traffic originating in Ukraine. The graph below also shows that the share of mitigated traffic from Ukraine also increased considerably after the invasion started.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Top attacked industries: from government to news media

The industries sectors that had a higher share of WAF mitigations were government administration, financial services, and the media, representing almost half of all WAF mitigations targeting Ukraine during 2022.

Looking at DDoS attacks, there was a surge in attacks on media and publishing companies during 2022 in Ukraine. Entities targeting Ukrainian companies appeared to be focused on information-related websites. The top five most attacked industries in the Ukraine in the first two quarters of 2022 were all in broadcasting, Internet, online media, and publishing, accounting for almost 80% of all DDoS attacks targeting Ukraine.

In a more focused look at the type of websites Cloudflare has protected throughout the war, the next two graphs provide a view of mitigated application layer attacks by the type of “.ua” sites we helped to protect. In the first days of the war, mitigation spikes were observed at a news service, a TV channel, a government website, and a bank.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In July, spikes in mitigations we observed across other types of “.ua” websites, including food delivery, e-commerce, auto parts, news, and government.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

More recently, in February 2023, the spikes in mitigations were somewhat similar to what we saw one year ago, including electronics, e-commerce, IT, and education websites.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

12.6% of network-layer traffic was DDoS activity in Q1 2022

Network-layer (layer 3 and 4) traffic is harder to attribute to a specific domain or target because IP addresses are shared across different customers. Looking at network-level DDoS traffic hitting our Kyiv data center, we saw peaks of DDoS traffic higher than before the war in early March, but they were much higher in June and August.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In our Q1 2022 DDoS report, we also noted that 12.6% of Ukraine’s traffic was DDoS activity, compared with 1% in the previous quarter, a 1,160% quarter-over-quarter increase.

Several of our quarterly DDoS reports from 2022 include attack trends related to the war in Ukraine, with quarter over quarter interactive comparisons.

Network re-routing in Kherson

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast region. The city of Kherson was captured on March 2, as the first major city and only regional capital to be captured by Russian forces during the initial invasion. The Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast continued until Ukrainian forces resumed control on November 11, after launching a counteroffensive at the end of August.

On May 4, 2022, we published Tracking shifts in Internet connectivity in Kherson, Ukraine, a blog post that explored a re-routing event that impacted AS47598 (Khersontelecom), a telecommunications provider in Kherson Oblast. Below, we summarize this event, and explore similar activity across other providers in Kherson that has taken place since then.

On May 1, 2022, we observed a shift in routing for the IPv4 prefix announced by Ukrainian network AS47598 (Khersontelecom). During April, it reached the Internet through several other Ukrainian network providers, including AS12883 (Vega Telecom) and AS3326 (Datagroup). However, after the shift, its routing path now showed a Russian network, AS201776 (Miranda-Media), as the sole upstream provider. With traffic from KhersonTelecom passing through a Russian network, it was subject to the restrictions and limitations imposed on any traffic transiting Russian networks, including content filtering.

The flow of traffic from Khersontelecom before and after May 1, with rerouting through Russian network provider Miranda-Media, is illustrated in the chart below. This particular re-routing event was short-lived, as a routing update for AS47598 on May 4 saw it return to reaching the Internet through other Ukrainian providers.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

As a basis for our analysis, we started with a list of 15 Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) belonging to networks in Kherson Oblast. Using that list, we analyzed routing information collected by route-views2 over the past year, from February 1, 2022, to February 15, 2023. route-views2 is a BGP route collector run by the University of Oregon Route Views Project. Note that with respect to the discussions of ASNs in this and the following section, we are treating them equally, and have not specifically factored estimated user population into these analyses.

The figure below illustrates the result of this analysis, showing that re-routing of Kherson network providers (listed along the y-axis) through Russian upstream networks was fairly widespread, and for some networks, has continued into 2023. During the analysis time frame, there were three primary Russian networks that appeared as upstream providers: AS201776 (Miranda-Media), AS52091 (Level-MSK Ltd.), and AS8492 (OBIT Ltd.).

Within the graph, black bars indicate periods when the ASN effectively disappeared from the Internet; white segments indicate the ASN was dependent on other Ukraine networks as immediate upstreams; and red indicates the presence of Russian networks in the set of upstream providers. The intensity of the red shading corresponds to the percentage of announced prefixes for which a Russian network provider is present in the routing path as observed from networks outside Ukraine. Bright red shading, equivalent to “1” in the legend, indicates the presence of a Russian provider in all routing paths for announced prefixes.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In the blog post linked above, we referenced an outage that began on April 30. This is clearly visible in the figure as a black bar that runs for several days across all the listed ASNs. In this instance, AS47598 (KhersonTelecom) recovered a day later, but was sending traffic through AS201776 (Miranda-Media), a Russian provider, as discussed above.

Another Ukrainian network, AS49168 (Brok-X), recovered from the outage on May 2, and was also sending traffic through Miranda-Media. By May 4, most of the other Kherson networks recovered from the outage, and both AS47598 and AS49168 returned to using Ukrainian networks as immediate upstream providers. Routing remained “normal” until May 30. Then, a more widespread shift to routing traffic through Russian providers began, although it appears that this shift was preceded by a brief outage for a few networks. For the most part, this re-routing lasted through the summer and into October. Some networks saw a brief outage on October 17, but most stopped routing directly through Russia by October 22.

However, this shift away from Russia was followed by periods of extended outages. KhersonTelecom suffered such an outage, and has remained offline since October, except for the first week of November when all of its traffic routed through Russia. Many other networks rejoined the Internet in early December, relying mostly on other Ukrainian providers for Internet connectivity. However, since early December, AS204485 (PE Berislav Cable Television), AS56359 (CHP Melnikov Roman Sergeevich), and AS49465 (Teleradiocompany RubinTelecom Ltd.) have continued to use Miranda-Media as an upstream provider, in addition to experiencing several brief outages. In addition, over the last several months, AS25082 (Viner Telecom) has used both a Ukrainian network and Miranda-Media as upstream providers.

Internet resilience in Ukraine

In the context of the Internet, “resilience” refers to the ability of a network to operate continuously in a manner that is highly resistant to disruption. This includes the ability of a network to: (1) operate in a degraded mode if damaged, (2) rapidly recover if failure does occur, and (3) scale to meet rapid or unpredictable demands. Throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, media coverage (VICE, Bloomberg, Washington Post) has highlighted the work done in Ukraine to repair damaged fiber-optic cables and mobile network infrastructure to keep the country online. This work has been critically important to maintaining the resilience of Ukrainian Internet infrastructure.

According to PeeringDB, as of February 2023, there are 25 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in Ukraine and 50 interconnection facilities. (An IXP may span multiple physical facilities.) Within this set of IXPs, Autonomous Systems (ASes) belonging to international providers are currently present in over half of them. The number of facilities, IXPs, and international ASes present in Ukraine points to a resilient interconnection fabric, with multiple locations for both domestic and international providers to exchange traffic.

To better understand these international interconnections, we first analyze the connectivity of ASes in Ukraine, and we classify the links to domestic networks (links where both ASes are registered in Ukraine) and international networks (links between ASes in Ukraine and ASes outside Ukraine). To determine which ASes are domestic in Ukraine, we can use information from the extended delegation reports from the Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), the Regional Internet Registry that covers Ukraine. We also parsed collected BGP data to extract the AS-level links between Ukrainian ASes and ASes registered in a different country, and we consider these the international connectivity of the domestic ASes.

A March 2022 article in The Economist noted that “For one thing, Ukraine boasts an unusually large number of internet-service providers—by one reckoning the country has the world’s fourth-least-concentrated Internet market. This means the network has few choke points, so is hard to disable.” As of the writing of this blog post, there are 2,190 ASes registered in Ukraine (UA ASes), and 1,574 of those ASes appear in the BGP routing table as active. These counts support the article’s characterization, and below we discuss several additional observations that reinforce Ukraine’s Internet resilience.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

The figure above is a cumulative distribution function showing the fraction of domestic Ukrainian ASes that have direct connections to international networks. In February 2023, approximately 50% had more than one (100) international link, while approximately 10% had more than 10, and approximately 2% had 100 or more. Although these numbers have dropped slightly over the last year, they underscore the lack of centralized choke points in the Ukrainian Internet.

For the networks with international connectivity, we can also look at the distribution of “next-hop” countries – countries with which those international networks are associated. (Note that some networks may have a global footprint, and for these, the associated country is the one recorded in their autonomous system registration.) Comparing the choropleth maps below illustrates how this set of countries, and their fraction of international paths, have changed between February 2022 and February 2023. The data underlying these maps shows that international connectivity from Ukraine is distributed across 18 countries — unsurprisingly, mostly in Europe.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

In February 2022, these countries/locations accounted for 77% of Ukraine’s next-hop international paths. The top four all had 7.8% each. However, in February 2023, the top 10 next-hop countries/locations dropped slightly to 76% of international paths. While just a slight change from the previous year, the set of countries/locations and many of their respective fractions saw considerable change.

February 2022 February 2023
1 Germany 7.85% Russia 11.62%
2 Netherlands 7.85% Germany 11.43%
3 United Kingdom 7.83% Hong Kong 8.38%
4 Hong Kong 7.81% Poland 7.93%
5 Sweden 7.77% Italy 7.75%
6 Romania 7.72% Turkey 6.86%
7 Russia 7.67% Bulgaria 6.20%
8 Italy 7.64% Netherlands 5.31%
9 Poland 7.60% United Kingdom 5.30%
10 Hungary 7.54% Sweden 5.26%

Russia’s share grew by 50% year to 11.6%, giving it the biggest share of next-hop ASes. Germany also grew to account for more than 11% of paths.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Satellite Internet connectivity

Cloudflare observed a rapid growth in Starlink’s ASN (AS14593) traffic to Ukraine during 2022 and into 2023. Between mid-March and mid-May, Starlink’s traffic in the country grew over 530%, and continued to grow from mid-May up until mid-November, increasing nearly 300% over that six-month period — from mid-March to mid-December the growth percentage was over 1600%. After that, traffic stabilized and even dropped a bit during January 2023.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Our data shows that between November and December 2022, Starlink represented between 0.22% and 0.3% of traffic from Ukraine, but that number is now lower than 0.2%.

One year of war in Ukraine: Internet trends, attacks, and resilience

Conclusion

One year in, the war in Ukraine has taken an unimaginable humanitarian toll. The Internet in Ukraine has also become a battleground, suffering attacks, re-routing, and disruptions. But it has proven to be exceptionally resilient, recovering time and time again from each setback.

We know that the need for a secure and reliable Internet there is more critical than ever. At Cloudflare, we’re committed to continue providing tools that protect Internet services from cyber attack, improve security for those operating in the region, and share information about Internet connectivity and routing inside Ukraine.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Post Syndicated from David Belson original https://blog.cloudflare.com/super-bowl-lvii/

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

The Super Bowl has been happening since the end of the 1966 season, the same year that the ARPANET project, which gave birth to the Internet, was initiated. Around 20 years ago, 50% of the US population were Internet users, and that number is now around 92%. So, it’s no surprise that interest in an event like Super Bowl LVII resulted in a noticeable dip in Internet traffic in the United States at the time of the game’s kickoff, dropping to around 5% lower than the previous Sunday. During the game, Rihanna’s halftime show also caused a significant drop in Internet traffic across most states, with Pennsylvania and New York feeling the biggest impact, but messaging and video platforms saw a surge of traffic right after her show ended.

In this blog post, we will dive into who the biggest winners were among Super Bowl advertisers, as well as examine how traffic to food delivery services, social media and sports and betting websites changed during the game. In addition, we look at traffic trends seen at city and state levels during the game, as well as email threat volume across related categories in the weeks ahead of the game.

Cloudflare Radar uses a variety of sources to provide aggregate information about Internet traffic and attack trends. In this blog post, as we did last year and the year before, we use DNS name resolution data from our 1.1.1.1 resolver to estimate traffic to websites. We can’t see who visited the websites mentioned, or what anyone did on the websites, but DNS can give us an estimate of the interest generated by the ads or across a set of sites in the categories listed above.

Ads: are URLs no longer cool?

In contrast to Super Bowl commercials of the past 25 years, many of this year’s advertisements didn’t include a URL, possibly suggesting strong confidence by brands in their search engine results placement, or an assumption that the viewer would engage with the brand through an app on their phone, rather than a website. To that end, several ads did include an app store-related call to action, encouraging the viewer to download the associated mobile app. And possibly in an effort to capitalize on the success of Coinbase’s QR code commercial during Super Bowl LVI, a number of brands, including Toyota, Michelob Ultra, and Mr. Peanut included QR codes as a way for viewers to get additional information or see more.

As we did last year, we again tracked DNS request traffic to our 1.1.1.1 resolver in United States data centers for domains associated with the advertised products or brands. Traffic growth is plotted against a baseline calculated as the mean request volume for the associated domains between 1200-1500 EST on Sunday, February 12 (Super Bowl Sunday.) Although over 50 brands advertised during the game, the brands highlighted below were chosen because their advertisements drove some of the largest percentage traffic spikes, as well as one interesting tale.

BlueMoon

Although the commercial initially seemed to be for sibling beer brands Coors Light and Miller Lite, there was a twist at the end, This twist was only fitting, as the ad was actually for Blue Moon, which is often served with a twist of orange on the rim of the glass. Although beer ads don’t usually drive significant traffic spikes, this one did, reaching 76,400% above baseline for Blue Moon’s site. Coors Light saw a 275% bump in DNS traffic coincident with the ad, while Miller Lite grew 120%. However, traffic for Coors and Miller was fairly volatile at other times during the game.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

LimitBreak

Although last year’s advertisements included a number of cryptocurrency-related brands, they were all but absent from this year’s slate of ads. The closest we got during this year’s game was a commercial from LimitBreak, which describes itself as “bringing the free-to-play gaming experience to Web3 and beyond”, in which it promoted a giveaway of thousands of its Dragon series NFTs. This ad featured a QR code and a URL, and given the nearly 54,000% increase in DNS traffic observed, both were effective means of driving traffic to the LimitBreak website.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Temu

Upstart mobile shopping app Temu purchased multiple Super Bowl ad slots to promote its “shop like a billionaire” campaign, urging viewers to download its mobile app. As seen in the graph below, these advertisements drove spikes in traffic, and continued engagement, each time they ran. The first airing at 19:16 EST drove a 222% spike over baseline in DNS traffic. However, the second airing at 21:12 EST apparently resulted in significantly more interest, driving a 475% traffic increase. A third airing at 22:20 EST reached 169% over baseline, with another one just after that reaching over 200%.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Dunkin’

In early January, Boston-area media blew up with the news that local celebrity Ben Affleck was spotted working the drive-through window at one of the coffee chain’s Medford locations, raising some speculation that he was filming a Super Bowl commercial. That speculation turned out to be true, as the commercial aired at 18:53 EST. But the commercial had a side effect: DNS traffic for dunkin.com, associated with DunkinWorks (a small personal coaching and training business), spiked 8,000% when the commercial aired, as shown in the graph below. (It isn’t clear what drove the later three spikes for dunkin.com, as the advertisement didn’t air again nationally during the remainder of the game.) We can only hope that the dunkin.com system administrators were fueled with plenty of coffee and donuts as they dealt with the rapid growth in traffic.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Site categories: touchdowns bring attention

As we saw last year, there are two factors that bring a surge of traffic to the websites of Super Bowl participants: touchdowns and winning. However, nothing is more impactful than the sweet taste of victory. Both the Kansas City Chiefs’ and Philadelphia Eagles’ websites experienced a surge in DNS traffic just before the game started, as compared to a baseline calculated as the mean request volume for the associated domains between 12:00-15:00 EST on Sunday, February 12 (Super Bowl Sunday.). The Eagles website had its peak just around the time of the kickoff, with 828% growth over baseline, and continued to grow more rapidly than traffic to the Chiefs’ website until 20:55 EST, when traffic to chiefs.com began to pull ahead.

What happened at that time? That was the moment of the Chiefs’ third touchdown of the game, when DNS traffic to the team’s website had its first peak of the evening, at 514% above baseline. There was a clear spike during another Chiefs touchdown at 21:42 EST, at 454% above baseline, but that was nothing compared to the end of the game, when the Kansas City Chiefs were once again, after their 2019 victory, the winners. At 22:15 EST, when the game ended, DNS traffic to the Chiefs’ website was 871% higher, and peaked 10 minutes later at 890%, as compared to the baseline. At this same time, DNS traffic for the Eagles’ website dropped significantly. As we saw last year as well, winning the Super Bowl clearly drives increased traffic to the victor’s website.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Sports websites trends also followed the in-game events. There was a clear spike to approximately 90% above baseline when the game started at 18:30 EST, with further growth to 120% over baseline at 19:00 EST during the Kansas City Chiefs’ first touchdown. There were also clear spikes at 21:30 and 21:40 EST coinciding with the two more Chiefs touchdowns. The Super Bowl peak for these websites was reached during the final break at 22:00 EST, reaching 145% above baseline, just before the Chiefs’ game-winning field goal. After a brief drop as the game ended, there was an additional spike to 134%.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Rihanna’s impact on messaging and social media sites

What happened following Rihanna’s performance during the Super Bowl halftime show? As the game resumed, we saw a clear increase in traffic for messaging websites, with a first peak right after the end of the show at around 20:45 EST, 22% over baseline. The biggest peak, however, was when the game ended. At 22:15 EST, DNS traffic for messaging sites was 30% higher than the earlier baseline.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Rihanna’s announcement of her second pregnancy, which made news after her performance, also impacted traffic to social media platforms. After a small increase when halftime started, there was a clear drop during Rihanna’s show, followed by a jump from 6% below baseline back to 0% right after the show. An additional 3% of traffic growth was reached during the final break at 22:00 EST, just before the Kansas City Chiefs’ winning field goal. After a brief drop, traffic reached 2% above baseline as the game ended.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Is halftime also a time for rewatching ads?

The arrival of halftime at 20:21 EST also brought a surge in DNS traffic for video platforms. The first peak was reached at 18:00 EST, before the game started, at 12% above baseline. The peak during halftime was reached at 20:25 EST with 13% growth above baseline, suggesting that viewers may have been looking at that time to Super Bowl related videos or just using the time to browse those platforms.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Food delivery websites saw flat to lower DNS traffic just before the game as compared to the earlier baseline, suggesting that food orders were placed/scheduled earlier in the afternoon, hours before the game. At kickoff, traffic was 19% below baseline, but there was a clear spike at the time of the first break and right after the first Kansas City touchdown at 18:55 EST. After falling again during the game, there was a small increase in traffic observed just after the game ended.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

What about betting sites? They expected a big day during the Super Bowl, given that more states have recently legalized gambling on sports. The peak was reached at 19:00 EST, as DNS traffic reached 295% over baseline, when the Chiefs had their first touchdown, The first Eagles touchdown, minutes before, resulted in a 233% spike. The lowest traffic for betting sites during the Super Bowl was during the halftime show. In the second half of the game, two other clear spikes in traffic are visible. The first was at 20:55 EST at 167% above baseline when the Chiefs pulled ahead with a touchdown, and then a jump to 278% over baseline when the game ended.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Rihanna runs this town city

While the so-called NFL cities across the country are loyal to their local teams, looking at traffic trends across cities from both conferences makes it clear that fans everywhere find joy, not division, in the unknown pleasures of a good halftime show. The drop visible in both graphs below between 20:30-20:50 EST coincides with Rihanna’s return to live performance, as she last performed live in January 2018. Based on the observed drop in traffic, viewers apparently turned away from their computers and devices, giving their attention to Rihanna, or at least stopped their general Internet surfing during the halftime show. As the graphs show, traffic recovered as soon as halftime was over.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII
A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Zooming in to individual cities, we examined the traffic patterns observed in both Philadelphia and Kansas City. While both teams have fans across the country, we can use their home cities as a proxy. In this case, we compared normalized Internet traffic levels between 17:00-22:30 EST on Super Bowl Sunday (February 12) with the same time frame on the prior Sunday (February 5).

In Kansas City last Sunday, traffic volumes remained fairly consistent across the surveyed time period. However, on Super Bowl Sunday, traffic levels were initially similar, but by the start of the game were 84% lower than the same time the previous week. Slight drops in traffic are visible coincident with Chiefs touchdowns, but don’t stand out from the overall noisiness of the graph. The graph reached its nadir at 22:13 EST when the Chiefs broke the tie and kicked the game-winning field goal, with the significant drop in traffic likely due to an increased shift in focus towards the outcome of the game, even by those that hadn’t previously been paying close attention.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

As the graph below shows, last Sunday saw Internet traffic in Philadelphia gradually decline as the evening wore on. On Super Bowl Sunday, traffic started out slightly lower than the week prior, and also diverged as game time approached, reaching nearly 50% lower at kickoff. As the Eagles took an early lead, their first touchdown resulted in a noticeable drop in traffic from Philadelphia, seen at 18:52 EST, less than 10 minutes after the start of the game. Visible drops in traffic are also coincident with the Eagles’ other three touchdowns, although they don’t stand out against the volatility of the graph. Traffic began to drop towards the end of the game, as the tie score added tension, and reached its lowest point when it became clear that the Eagles were not going to emerge victorious in Super Bowl LVII.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

In addition to looking at traffic impacts at a city level, we can also zoom out to examine Internet traffic trends in the Super Bowl states. Arizona, which hosted the big game at State Farm Stadium in Glendale, saw a drop in state-level traffic starting around 13:00 EST. At the time of the kickoff, traffic was 25% lower than the previous Sunday, but the biggest impact was during the wildly popular halftime show by Rihanna. At 20:30 EST, traffic was 29% lower than the same time on the previous Sunday. After the game ended, traffic levels returned to normal around 23:30 EST.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

In Pennsylvania, home of the Philadelphia Eagles, traffic began to dip after 15:00 EST and reached its first low point around kickoff, when it was 28% lower than the previous Sunday. Just like in Arizona, the biggest difference was during Rihanna’s halftime show, when it was a whopping 33% lower than usual. However, just a few minutes after the game ended at 22:30 EST, traffic returned to normal.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

What about the winning team’s state of Missouri? There, traffic started to decrease only after 17:00 EST and was actually higher than the previous Sunday before that point. With the kickoff came a clear drop, resulting in 28% less traffic than the previous Sunday at the same time. Traffic increased a bit heading towards halftime, but dropped again during Rihanna’s show, when it was 30% lower than usual. The biggest drop in traffic, not surprisingly, was during the exciting moment of the Kansas City Chiefs’ winning field goal. At 22:15 EST, traffic was 33% lower than the previous Sunday. However, after 22:50 EST, Internet traffic in Missouri was back on the fast track, with traffic increasing to levels higher than the previous Sunday.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Rihanna’s halftime performance had a clear impact on Internet traffic at a state level, which dropped across all states with NFL teams at the time of her show. Below we take a closer look at the most populous states, among which Pennsylvania, New York and Arizona were winners, with the largest traffic declines. The impacts in Pennsylvania and Arizona are shown above, and the graph below shows the traffic trends seen in New York.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

California, Texas, Florida, and New York all had their fair share of Internet traffic dropping before and throughout the game, but it was during the halftime show when things really got interesting. At the time of Rihanna’s performance, Internet traffic in California was 24% lower than the previous Sunday, while in Texas it was 21% below a week earlier, and Florida also saw a 21% drop. Meanwhile, New York had a clear 30% decrease in traffic during the show and, as shown above, Pennsylvania took the cake with a 33% drop. Illinois, Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, and Michigan were close behind with 23%, 27%, 22%, 25%, and 22% drops respectively.

This seems to be a clear indication that the Super Bowl in general, but also the much-anticipated halftime shows, and the winning celebrations, all have a massive impact on the Internet, causing a noticeable dip in Internet traffic, especially in the state of the winning team.

Do email spammers and scammers take advantage of “The Big Game”?

Spammers and scammers will frequently try to take advantage of the popularity of major events when running their campaigns, hoping the tie-in will entice the user to open the message and click on a malicious link, or visit a malicious website where they give up a password or credit card number. Cloudflare Area 1 Email Security analyzed the subject lines of email messages processed by the service in the weeks leading up to the Super Bowl to identify malicious, suspicious, and spam messages across four topic areas: Super Bowl/football, sports gambling, sports media/websites, and food delivery.

As the “regular” season NFL games wrapped up, Super Bowl and football themed email threat volume remained relatively low. However, campaigns clearly picked up between January 23-29 as the message count grew sevenfold. However, campaigns kicked into high gear once the Chiefs and Eagles were headed to the Super Bowl, as the number of identified messages between January 30 and February 5 was nearly six times higher than the previous week. These campaigns quickly ended in the week before the big game, though, as Super Bowl and football themed suspicious, malicious, and spam email volume dropped by nearly 90%.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Overall, the number of sports gambling themed subject lines remained fairly low over the survey period. This is somewhat surprising, given that an increasing number of US states have recently legalized betting on sporting events. Interestingly, the trend was highest at the beginning of the year, although that first week was too late to capture potential interest in college football “bowl” games. However, the weeks ahead of the NFL conference championship games (January 23-29) and the Super Bowl (February 6-12) saw message volume increase to levels nearly 2.5x higher than previous weeks.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Sports media and website themed suspicious, malicious, and spam email messages apparently don’t draw the clicks, because the volume of such messages seen by Cloudflare Area 1 has remained extremely low since the start of the year, but peaked during the week of January 23-29. And although lower in volume, the observed trends were similar to those seen for sports gambling, with peaks during the same weeks.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

For many people, the Super Bowl is less about the football game than it is about the commercials and the food, and the growth of food delivery services over the last few years have made it easier to ensure that the snacks and libations never run out during the game. Scammers and spammers have apparently learned to take advantage of this hunger, as food delivery themed email messages saw the highest counts across the four categories reviewed here. Peak message counts were seen the weeks of January 2-8 and January 30-February 5. Message volume the weeks following these peaks fell by over 50% in both cases.

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVII

Conclusion

As we have seen time and again, advertising during the Super Bowl can drive significant traffic spikes, and apparently this holds true even if a URL isn’t included as a call to action within the commercial. In addition, the trends observed during the game remain a clear reminder that human behavior drives Internet traffic, especially when the halftime show features a popular singer that last performed live five years ago.

Visit Cloudflare Radar for up to date Internet traffic and attack trends, and follow the Cloudflare Radar Twitter and Mastodon accounts for regular insights on Internet events.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Post Syndicated from David Belson original https://blog.cloudflare.com/q4-2022-internet-disruption-summary/

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Cloudflare operates in more than 250 cities in over 100 countries, where we interconnect with over 10,000 network providers in order to provide a broad range of services to millions of customers. The breadth of both our network and our customer base provides us with a unique perspective on Internet resilience, enabling us to observe the impact of Internet disruptions.

While Internet disruptions are never convenient, online interest in the 2022 World Cup in mid-November and the growth in online holiday shopping in many areas during November and December meant that connectivity issues could be particularly disruptive. Having said that, the fourth quarter appeared to be a bit quieter from an Internet disruptions perspective, although Iran and Ukraine continued to be hotspots, as we discuss below.

Government directed

Multi-hour Internet shutdowns are frequently used by authoritarian governments in response to widespread protests as a means of limiting communications among protestors, as well preventing protestors from sharing information and video with the outside world. During the fourth quarter Cuba and Sudan again implemented such shutdowns, while Iran continued the series of “Internet curfews” across mobile networks it started in mid-September, in addition to implementing several other regional Internet shutdowns.

Cuba

In late September, Hurricane Ian knocked out power across Cuba. While officials worked to restore service as quickly as possible, some citizens responded to perceived delays with protests that were reportedly the largest since anti-government demonstrations over a year earlier. In response to these protests, the Cuban government reportedly cut off Internet access several times. A shutdown on September 29-30 was covered in the Internet disruptions overview for Q3 2022, and the impact of the shutdown that occurred on October 1 (UTC) is shown in the figure below. The timing of this one was similar to the previous one, taking place between 1900 on September 30 and 0245 on October 1 (0000-0745 UTC on October 1).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Sudan

October 25 marked the first anniversary of a coup in Sudan that derailed the country’s transition to civilian rule, and thousands of Sudanese citizens marked the anniversary by taking to the streets in protest. Sudan’s government has a multi-year history of shutting down Internet access during times of civil unrest, and once again implemented an Internet shutdown in response to these protests. The figure below shows a near complete loss of Internet traffic from Sudan on October 25 between 0945-1740 local time (0745 – 1540 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Iran

As we covered in last quarter’s blog post, the Iranian government implemented daily Internet “curfews”, generally taking place between 1600 and midnight local time (1230-2030 UTC) across three mobile network providers — AS44244 (Irancell), AS57218 (RighTel), and AS197207 (MCCI) — in response to protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini. These multi-hour Internet curfew shutdowns continued into early October, with additional similar outages also observed on October 8, 12 and 15 as seen in the figure below. (The graph’s line for AS57218 (Rightel), the smallest of the three mobile providers, suggests that the shutdowns on this network were not implemented after the end of September.)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

In addition to the mobile network shutdowns, several regional Internet disruptions were also observed in Iran during the fourth quarter, two of which we review below. The first was in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province on October 26, where a complete Internet shutdown was implemented in response to demonstrations marking the 40th day since the death of Mahsa Amini. The figure below shows a complete loss of traffic starting at 1030 local time (0700 UTC), with the outage lasting until 0805 local time on October 27 (0435 UTC). In December, a province-level Internet disruption was observed starting on December 18, lasting through December 25.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Kurdistan Province, Iran. (Source: Map data ©2023 Google, MapaGISrael)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

The Internet disruptions that have taken place in Iran over the last several months have had a significant economic impact on the country. A December post from Filterwatch shared concerns stated in a letter from mobile operator Rightel:

The letter, signed by the network’s Managing Director Yasser Rezakhah, states that “during the past few weeks, the company’s resources and income have significantly decreased during Internet shutdowns and other restrictions, such as limiting Internet bandwidth from 21 September. They have also caused a decrease in data use from subscribers, decreasing data traffic by around 50%.” The letter also states that the “continued lack of compensation for losses could lead to bankruptcy.”

The post also highlighted economic concerns shared by Iranian officials:

Some Iranian officials have expressed concern about the cost of Internet shutdowns, including Valiollah Bayati, MP for Tafresh and Ashtian in Markazi province. In a public session in Majles (parliament), he stated that continued Internet shutdowns have led to the closure of many jobs and people are worried, the government and the President must provide necessary measures.

Statistics in an article on news site enthkhab.ir provide a more tangible view of the local economic impact, stating (via Google Translate):

Since the 30th of Shahrivar month and with the beginning of the government disruption in the Internet, the country’s businesses have been damaged daily at least 50 million tomans and at most 500 million tomans. More than 41% of companies have lost 25-50% of their income during this period, and about 47% have had more than 50% reduction in sales. A review of the data of the research assistant of the country’s tax affairs organization shows that the Internet outage in Iran has caused 3000 billion tomans of damage per day. That is, the cost of 3 months of Internet outage in Iran is equal to 43% of one year’s oil revenue of the country ($25 billion).

Power outages

Bangladesh, October 4

Over 140 million people in Bangladesh were left without electricity on October 4 as the result of a reported grid failure caused by a failure by power distribution companies to follow instructions from the National Load Dispatch Centre to shed load. The resultant power outage resulted in an observed drop in Internet traffic from the country, starting at 1405 local time (0805 UTC), as shown in the figure below. The disruption lasted approximately seven hours, with traffic returning to expected levels around 1900 local time (1500 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Pakistan

Over a week later, a similar issue in Pakistan caused power outages across the southern part of the country, including Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan. The power outages were caused by a fault in the national grid’s southern transmission system, reportedly due to faulty equipment and sub-standard maintenance. As expected, the power outages resulted in disruptions to Internet connectivity, and the figure below illustrates the impact observed in Sindh, where traffic dropped nearly 30% as compared to the previous week starting at 0935 local time (0435 UTC) on October 6. The disruption lasted over 15 hours, with traffic returning to expected levels at 0100 on October 7 (2000 UTC on October 6).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Sindh, Pakistan (Source: Map data ©2023 Google)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Kenya

On November 24, a Tweet from Kenya Power at 1525 local time noted that they had “lost bulk power supply to various parts of the country due to a system disturbance”. A subsequent Tweet published just over six hours later at 2150 local time stated that “normal power supply has been restored to all parts of the country.” The time stamps on these notifications align with the loss of Internet traffic visible in the figure below, which lasted between 1500-2050 local time (1200-1750 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

United States (Moore County, North Carolina)

On December 3, two electrical substations in Moore County, North Carolina were targeted by gunfire, with the resultant damage causing localized power outages that took multiple days to resolve. The power outages reportedly began just after 1900 local time (0000 UTC on December 4), resulting in the concurrent loss of Internet traffic from communities within Moore County, as seen in the figure below.

Internet traffic within the community of West End appeared to return midday (UTC) on December 5, but that recovery was apparently short-lived, as it fell again during the afternoon of December 6. In Pinehurst, traffic began to slowly recover after about a day, but returned to more normal levels around 0800 local time (1300 UTC) on December 7.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
West End and Pinehurst, North Carolina. (Source: Map data ©2023 Google)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has been going on since February 24, and Cloudflare has covered the impact of the war on the country’s Internet connectivity in a number of blog posts across the year (March, March, April, May, June, July, October, December). Throughout the fourth quarter of 2022, Russian missile strikes caused widespread damage to electrical infrastructure, resulting in power outages and disruptions to Internet connectivity. Below, we highlight several examples of the Internet disruptions observed in Ukraine during the fourth quarter, but they are just a few of the many disruptions that occurred.

On October 20, the destruction of several power stations in Kyiv resulted in a 25% drop in Internet traffic from Kyiv City as compared to the two previous weeks. The disruption began around 0900 local time (0700 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Kviv City, Ukraine. (Source: Map data ©2023 Google)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

On November 23, widespread power outages after Russian strikes caused a nearly 50% decrease in Internet traffic in Ukraine, starting just after 1400 local time (1200 UTC). This disruption lasted for nearly a day and a half, with traffic returning to expected levels around 2345 local time on November 24 (2145 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

On December 16, power outages resulting from Russian air strikes targeting power infrastructure caused country-level Internet traffic to drop around 13% at 0915 local time (0715 UTC), with the disruption lasting until midnight local time (2200 UTC). However, at a network level, the impact was more significant, with AS13188 (Triolan) seeing a 70% drop in traffic, and AS15895 (Kyivstar) a 40% drop, both shown in the figures below.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Cable cuts

Shetland Islands, United Kingdom

The Shetland Islands are primarily dependent on the SHEFA-2 submarine cable system for Internet connectivity, connecting through the Scottish mainland. Late in the evening of October 19, damage to this cable knocked the Shetland Islands almost completely offline. At the time, there was heightened concern about the potential sabotage of submarine cables due to the reported sabotage of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines in late September, but authorities believed that this cable damage was due to errant fishing vessels, and not sabotage.

The figure below shows that the impact of the damage to the cable was relatively short-lived, compared to the multi-day Internet disruptions often associated with submarine cable cuts. Traffic dropped just after 2300 local time (2200 UTC) on October 19, and recovered 14.5 hours later, just after 1430 local time (1330 UTC) on October 20.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Shetland Islands, United Kingdom. (Source: Map data ©2023 GeoBasis-DE/BKG (©2009), Google)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Natural disasters

Solomon Islands

Earthquakes frequently cause infrastructure damage and power outages in affected areas, resulting in disruptions to Internet connectivity. We observed such a disruption in the Solomon Islands after a magnitude 7.0 earthquake occurred near there on November 22. The figure below shows Internet traffic from the country dropping significantly at 1300 local time (0200 UTC), and recovering 11 hours later at around 2000 local time (0900 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Technical problems

Kyrgyzstan

On October 24, a three-hour Internet disruption was observed in Kyrgyzstan lasting between 1100-1400 local time (0500-0800 UTC), as seen in the figure below. According to the country’s Ministry of Digital Development, the issue was caused by “an accident on one of the main lines that supply the Internet”, but no additional details were provided regarding the type of accident or where it had occurred.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Australia (Aussie Broadband)

Customers of Australian broadband Internet provider Aussie Broadband in Victoria and New South Wales suffered brief Internet disruptions on October 27. As shown in the figure below, AS4764 (Aussie Broadband) traffic from Victoria dropped by approximately 40% between 1505-1745 local time (0405-0645 UTC). A similar, but briefer, loss of traffic from New South Wales was also observed, lasting between 1515-1550 local time (0415-0450 UTC). A representative of Aussie Broadband provided insight into the underlying cause of the disruption, stating “A config change was made which was pushed out through automation to the DHCP servers in those states. … The change has been rolled back but getting the sessions back online is taking time for VIC, and we are now manually bringing areas up one at a time.”

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022
Victoria and New South Wales, Australia. (Source: Map data ©2023 Google)

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Haiti

In Haiti, customers of Internet service provider Access Haiti experienced disrupted service for more than half a day on November 9. The figure below shows that Internet traffic for AS27759 (Access Haiti) fell precipitously around midnight local time (0500 UTC), remaining depressed until 1430 local time (1930 UTC), at which time it recovered quickly. A Facebook post from Access Haiti explained to customers that “Due to an intermittent outage on one of our international circuits, our network is experiencing difficulties that cause your Internet service to slow down.” While Access Haiti didn’t provide additional details on which international circuit was experiencing an outage, submarinecablemap.com shows that two submarine cables provide international Internet connectivity to Haiti — the Bahamas Domestic Submarine Network (BDSNi), which connects Haiti to the Bahamas, and Fibralink, which connects Haiti to the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Unknown

Many Internet disruptions can be easily tied to an underlying cause, whether through coverage in the press, a concurrent weather or natural disaster event, or communication from an impacted provider. However, the causes of other observed disruptions remain unknown as the impacted providers remain silent about what caused the problem.

United States (Wide Open West)

On November 15, customers of Wide Open West, an Internet service provider with a multi-state footprint in the United States, experienced an Internet service disruption that lasted a little over an hour. The figure below illustrates the impact of the disruption in Alabama and Michigan on AS12083 (Wide Open West), with traffic dropping at 1150 local time (1650 UTC) and recovering just after 1300 local time (1800 UTC).

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Cuba

Cuba is no stranger to Internet disruptions, whether due to government-directed shutdowns (such as the one discussed above), fiber cuts, or power outages. However, no underlying cause was ever shared for the seven-hour disruption in the country’s Internet traffic observed between 2345 on November 25 and 0645 on November 26 local time (0445-1145 UTC on November 26). Traffic was down as much as 75% from previous levels during the disruption.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

As a provider of low earth orbit (LEO) satellite Internet connectivity services, disruptions to SpaceX Starlink’s service can have a global impact. On November 30, a disruption was observed on AS14593 (SPACEX-STARLINK) between 2050-2130 UTC, with traffic volume briefly dropping to near zero. Unfortunately, Starlink did not acknowledge the incident, nor did they provide any reason for the disruption.

Internet disruptions overview for Q4 2022

Conclusion

Looking back at the Internet disruptions observed during 2022, a number of common themes can be found. In countries with more authoritarian governments, the Internet is often weaponized as a means of limiting communication within the country and with the outside world through network-level, regional, or national Internet shutdowns. As noted above, this approach was used aggressively in Iran during the last few months of the year.

Internet connectivity quickly became a casualty of war in Ukraine. Early in the conflict, network-level outages were common, and some Ukrainian networks ultimately saw traffic re-routed through upstream Russian Internet service providers. Later in the year, as electrical power infrastructure was increasingly targeted by Russian attacks, widespread power outages resulted in multi-hour disruptions of Internet traffic across the country.

While the volcanic eruption in Tonga took the country offline for over a month due to its reliance on a single submarine cable for Internet connectivity, the damage caused by earthquakes in other countries throughout the year resulted in much shorter and more limited disruptions.

And while submarine cable issues can impact multiple countries along its route, the advent of services with an increasingly global footprint like SpaceX Starlink mean that service disruptions will ultimately have a much broader impact. (Starlink’s subscriber base is comparatively small at the moment, but it currently has a service footprint in over 30 countries around the world.)

To follow Internet disruptions as they occur, check the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center (CROC) and follow @CloudflareRadar on Twitter. To review those disruptions observed earlier in 2022, refer to the Q1, Q2, and Q3 Internet disruptions overview blog posts.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

Post Syndicated from Omer Yoachimik original https://blog.cloudflare.com/ddos-threat-report-2022-q4/

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

Welcome to our DDoS Threat Report for the fourth and final quarter of 2022. This report includes insights and trends about the DDoS threat landscape – as observed across Cloudflare’s global network.

In the last quarter of the year, as billions around the world celebrated holidays and events such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, Hanukkah, Black Friday, Singles’ Day, and New Year, DDoS attacks persisted and even increased in size, frequency, and sophistication whilst attempting to disrupt our way of life.

Cloudflare’s automated DDoS defenses stood firm and mitigated millions of attacks in the last quarter alone. We’ve taken all of those attacks, aggregated, analyzed, and prepared the bottom lines to help you better understand the threat landscape.

Global DDoS insights

In the last quarter of the year, despite a year-long decline, the amount of HTTP DDoS attack traffic still increased by 79% YoY. While most of these attacks were small, Cloudflare constantly saw terabit-strong attacks, DDoS attacks in the hundreds of millions of packets per second, and HTTP DDoS attacks peaking in the tens of millions of requests per second launched by sophisticated botnets.

  • Volumetric attacks surged; the number of attacks exceeding rates of 100 gigabits per second (Gbps) grew by 67% quarter-over-quarter (QoQ), and the number of attacks lasting more than three hours increased by 87% QoQ.
  • Ransom DDoS attacks steadily increased this year. In Q4, over 16% of respondents reported receiving a threat or ransom demand as part of the DDoS attack that targeted their Internet properties.

Industries most targeted by DDoS attacks

  • HTTP DDoS attacks constituted 35% of all traffic to Aviation and Aerospace Internet properties.
  • Similarly, over a third of all traffic to the Gaming/Gambling and Finance industries was network-layer DDoS attack traffic.
  • A whopping 92% of traffic to Education Management companies was part of network-layer DDoS attacks. Likewise, 73% of traffic to the Information Technology and Services and the Public Relations & Communications industries were also network-layer DDoS attacks.

Source and targets of DDoS attacks

  • In Q4, 93% of network-layer traffic to Chinese Internet properties behind Cloudflare were part of network-layer DDoS attacks. Similarly, over 86% of traffic to Cloudflare customers in Lithuania and 80% of traffic to Cloudflare customers in Finland was attack traffic.
  • On the application-layer, over 42% of all traffic to Georgian Internet properties behind Cloudflare was part of HTTP DDoS attacks, followed by Belize with 28%, and San Marino in third place with just below 20%. Almost 20% of all traffic from Libya that Cloudflare saw was application-layer DDoS attack traffic.
  • Over 52% of all traffic recorded in Cloudflare’s data centers in Botswana was network-layer DDoS attack traffic. Similarly, in Cloudflare’s data centers in Azerbaijan, Paraguay, and Palestine, network-layer DDoS attack traffic constituted approximately 40% of all traffic.

Quick note: this quarter, we’ve made a change to our algorithms to improve the accuracy of our data which means that some of these data points are incomparable to previous quarters. Read more about these changes in the next section Changes to the report methodologies.

To skip to the report, click here.

Sign up to the DDoS Trends Webinar to learn more about the emerging threats and how to defend against them.

Changes to the report methodologies

Since our first report in 2020, we’ve always used percentages to represent attack traffic, i.e., the percentage of attack traffic out of all traffic including legitimate/user traffic. We did this to normalize the data, avoid data biases, and be more flexible when it comes to incorporating new mitigation system data into the report.

In this report, we’ve introduced changes to the methods used to calculate some of those percentages when we bucket attacks by certain dimensions such as target country, source country, or target industry. In the application-layer sections, we previously divided the amount of attack HTTP/S requests to a given dimension by all the HTTP/S requests to all dimensions. In the network-layer section, specifically in Target industries and Target countries, we used to divide the amount of attack IP packets to a given dimension by the total attack packets to all dimensions.

From this report onwards, we now divide the attack requests (or packets) to a given dimension only by the total requests (or packets) to that given dimension. We made these changes in order to align our calculation methods throughout the report and improve the data accuracy so it better represents the attack landscape.

For example, the top industry attacked by application-layer DDoS attacks using the previous method was the Gaming and Gambling industry. The attack requests towards that industry accounted for 0.084% of all traffic (attack and non-attack) to all industries. Using that same old method, the Aviation and Aerospace industry came in 12th place. Attack traffic towards the Aviation and Aerospace industry accounted for 0.0065% of all traffic (attack and non-attack) to all industries. However, using the new method, the Aviation and Aerospace industry came in as the number one most attacked industry — attack traffic formed 35% of all traffic (attack and non-attack) towards that industry alone. Again using the new method, the Gaming and Gambling industry came in 14th place — 2.4% of its traffic was attack traffic.

The old calculation method used in previous reports to calculate the percentage of attack traffic for each dimension was the following:

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

The new calculation method used from this report onwards is the following:

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

The changes apply to the following metrics:

  1. Target industries of application-layer DDoS attacks
  2. Target countries of application-layer DDoS attacks
  3. Source of application-layer DDoS attacks
  4. Target industries of network-layer DDoS attacks
  5. Target countries of network-layer DDoS attacks

No other changes were made in the report. The Source of network-layer DDoS attacks metrics already use this method since the first report. Also, no changes were made to the Ransom DDoS attacks, DDoS attack rate, DDoS attack duration, DDoS attack vectors, and Top emerging threats sections. These metrics do not take legitimate traffic into consideration and no methodology alignment was needed.

With that in mind, let’s dive in deeper and explore these insights and trends. You can also view an interactive version of this report on Cloudflare Radar.

Ransom DDoS attacks

As opposed to Ransomware attacks, where the victim is tricked into downloading a file or clicking on an email link that encrypts and locks their computer files until they pay a ransom fee, Ransom DDoS attacks can be much easier for attackers to launch. Ransom DDoS attacks don’t require tricking the victim into opening an email or clicking a link, nor do they require a network intrusion or a foothold to be carried out.

In a Ransom DDoS attack, the attacker doesn’t need access to the victim’s computer but rather just floods them with enough traffic to negatively impact their Internet services. The attacker will demand a ransom payment, usually in the form of Bitcoin, to stop and/or avoid further attacks.

In the last quarter of 2022, 16% of Cloudflare customers that responded to our survey reported being targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks accompanied by a threat or a ransom note. This represents a 14% increase QoQ but a 16% decrease YoY in reported Ransom DDoS attacks.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Distribution of Ransom DDoS attacks over 2021 and 2022 by quarter (each column represents the percentage of users reporting a ransom attack)

How we calculate Ransom DDoS attack trends
Cloudflare’s systems constantly analyze traffic and automatically apply mitigation when DDoS attacks are detected. Each DDoS’d customer is prompted with an automated survey to help us better understand the nature of the attack and the success of the mitigation. For over two years, Cloudflare has been surveying attacked customers. One of the questions in the survey asks the respondents if they received a threat or a ransom note. Over the past two years, on average, we collected 187 responses per quarter. The responses of this survey are used to calculate the percentage of Ransom DDoS attacks.

Application-layer DDoS attack landscape

Application-layer DDoS attacks, specifically HTTP/S DDoS attacks, are cyber attacks that usually aim to disrupt web servers by making them unable to process legitimate user requests. If a server is bombarded with more requests than it can process, the server will drop legitimate requests and – in some cases – crash, resulting in degraded performance or an outage for legitimate users.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

When we look at the graph below, we can see a clear downward trend in attacks each quarter this year. However, despite the downward trend, HTTP DDoS attacks still increased by 79% when compared to the same quarter of previous year.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Distribution of HTTP DDoS attacks over the last year by quarter

Target industries of application-layer DDoS attacks

In the quarter where many people travel for the holidays, the Aviation and Aerospace was the most attacked industry. Approximately 35% of traffic to the industry was part of HTTP DDoS attacks. In second place, the Events Services industry saw over 16% of its traffic as HTTP DDoS attacks.

In the following places were the Media and Publishing, Wireless, Government Relations, and Non-profit industries. To learn more about how Cloudflare protects non-profit and human rights organizations, read our recent Impact Report.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

When we break it down regionally, and after excluding generic industry buckets like Internet and Software, we can see that in North America and Oceania the Telecommunications industry was the most targeted. In South America and Africa, the Hospitality industry was the most targeted. In Europe and Asia, Gaming & Gambling industries were the most targeted. And in the Middle East, the Education industry saw the most attacks.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4, by region

Target countries of application-layer DDoS attacks

Bucketing attacks by our customers’ billing address helps us understand which countries are more frequently attacked. In Q4, over 42% of all traffic to Georgian HTTP applications behind Cloudflare was DDoS attack traffic.

In second place, Belize-based companies saw almost a third of their traffic as DDoS attacks, followed by San Marino in third with just below 20% of its traffic being DDoS attack traffic.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top countries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

Source of application-layer DDoS attacks

Quick note before we dive in. If a country is found to be a major source of DDoS attacks, it doesn’t necessarily mean that it is that country that launches the attacks. Most often with DDoS attacks, attackers are launching attacks remotely in an attempt to hide their true location. Top source countries are more often indicators that there are botnet nodes operating from within that country, perhaps hijacked servers or IoT devices.

In Q4, almost 20% of all HTTP traffic originating from Libya was part of HTTP DDoS attacks. Similarly, 18% of traffic originating from Timor-Leste, an island country in Southeast Asia just north of Australia, was attack traffic. DDoS attack traffic also accounted for 17% of all traffic originating from the British Virgin Islands and 14% of all traffic originating from Afghanistan.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top source countries of HTTP DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

Network-layer DDoS attacks

While application-layer attacks target the application (Layer 7 of the OSI model) running the service that end users are trying to access (HTTP/S in our case), network-layer DDoS attacks aim to overwhelm network infrastructure, such as in-line routers and servers, and the Internet link itself.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4

After a year of steady increases in network-layer DDoS attacks, in the fourth and final quarter of the year, the amount of attacks actually decreased by 14% QoQ and 13% YoY.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Distribution of Network-layer DDoS attacks over the last year by quarter

Now let’s dive a little deeper to understand the various attack properties such as the attack volumetric rates, durations, attack vectors, and emerging threats.

DDoS attack rate
While the vast majority of attacks are relatively short and small, we did see a spike in longer and larger attacks this quarter. The amount of volumetric network-layer DDoS attacks with a rate exceeding 100 Gbps increased by 67% QoQ. Similarly, attacks in the range of 1-100 Gbps increased by ~20% QoQ, and attacks in the range of 500 Mbps to 1 Gbps increased by 108% QoQ.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
QoQ change in DDoS attack rates in 2022 Q4

Below is an example of one of those attacks exceeding 100 Gbps that took place the week after Thanksgiving. This was a 1 Tbps DDoS attack targeted at a Korean-based hosting provider. This particular attack was an ACK flood, and it lasted roughly one minute. Since the  hosting provider was using Magic Transit, Cloudflare’s L3 DDoS protection service, the attack was automatically detected and mitigated.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Graph of a 1 Tbps DDoS attack

While bit-intensive attacks usually aim to clog up the Internet connection to cause a denial of service event, packet-intensive attacks attempt to crash in-line devices. If an attack sends more packets than you can handle, the servers and other in-line appliances might not be able to process legitimate user traffic, or even crash altogether.

DDoS attack duration
In Q4, the amount of shorter attacks lasting less than 10 minutes decreased by 76% QoQ, and the amount of longer attacks increased. Most notably, attacks lasting 1-3 hours increased by 349% QoQ and the amount of attacks lasting more than three hours increased by 87% QoQ. Most of the attacks, over 67% of them, lasted 10-20 minutes.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
QoQ change in the duration of DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

DDoS attack vectors
The attack vector is a term used to describe the attack method. In Q4, SYN floods remained the attacker’s method of choice — in fact, almost half of all network-layer DDoS attacks were SYN floods.

As a recap, SYN floods are a flood of SYN packets (TCP packets with the Synchronize flag turned on, i.e., the bit set to 1). SYN floods take advantage of the statefulness of the Three-way TCP handshake — which is the way to establish a connection between a server and a client.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
The Three-way TCP Handshake

The client starts off by sending a SYN packet, the server responds with a Synchronize-acknowledgement (SYN/ACK) packet and waits for the client’s Acknowledgement (ACK) packet. For every connection, a certain amount of memory is allocated. In the SYN flood, the source IP addresses may be spoofed (altered) by the attacker, causing the server to respond with the SYN/ACK packets to the spoofed IP addresses — which most likely ignore the packet. The server then naively waits for the never arriving ACK packets to complete the handshake. After a while, the server times out and releases those resources. However, given a sufficient amount of SYN packets in a short amount of time, they may be enough to drain the server’s resources and render it unable to handle legitimate user connections or even crash altogether.

After SYN floods, with a massive drop in share, DNS floods and amplification attacks came in second place, accounting for ~15% of all network-layer DDoS attacks. And in third UDP-based DDoS attacks and floods with a 9% share.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top attack vectors in 2022 Q4

Emerging DDoS threats
In Q4, Memcached-based DDoS attacks saw the highest growth — a 1,338% increase QoQ. Memcached is a database caching system for speeding up websites and networks. Memcached servers that support UDP can be abused to launch amplification/reflection DDoS attacks. In this case, the attacker would request content from the caching system and spoof the victim’s IP address as the source IP in the UDP packets. The victim will be flooded with the Memcache responses which can be amplified by a factor of up to 51,200x.

In second place, SNMP-based DDoS attacks increased by 709% QoQ. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a UDP-based protocol that is often used to discover and manage network devices such as printers, switches, routers, and firewalls of a home or enterprise network on UDP well-known port 161. In an SNMP reflection attack, the attacker sends out numerous SNMP queries while spoofing the source IP address in the packet as the targets to devices on the network that, in turn, reply to that target’s address. Numerous responses from the devices on the network results in the target network being DDoSed.

In third place, VxWorks-based DDoS attacks increased by 566% QoQ. VxWorks is a real-time operating system (RTOS) often used in embedded systems such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It also is used in networking and security devices, such as switches, routers, and firewalls. By default, it has a debug service enabled which not only allows anyone to do pretty much anything to those systems, but it can also be used for DDoS amplification attacks. This exploit (CVE-2010-2965) was exposed as early as 2010 and as we can see it is still being used in the wild to generate DDoS attacks.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top emerging threats in 2022 Q4

Target industries of network-layer DDoS attacks

In Q4, the Education Management industry saw the highest percentage of network-layer DDoS attack traffic — 92% of all traffic routed to the industry was network-layer DDoS attack traffic.

Not too far behind, in the second and third places, the Information Technology and Services alongside the Public Relations and Communications industries also saw a significant amount of network-layer DDoS attack traffic (~73%). With a high margin, the Finance, Gaming / Gambling, and Medical Practice industries came in next with approximately a third of their traffic flagged as attack traffic.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top industries targeted by network-layer DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

Target countries of network-layer DDoS attacks

Grouping attacks by our customers’ billing country lets us understand which countries are subject to more attacks. In Q4, a staggering 93% of traffic to Chinese Internet properties behind Cloudflare was network-layer DDoS attack traffic.

In second place, Lithuanian Internet properties behind Cloudflare saw 87% of their traffic belonging to network-layer DDoS attack traffic. Following were Finland, Singapore, and Taiwan with the highest percentage of attack traffic.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top countries targeted by network-layer DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4

Source of network-layer DDoS attacks

In the application-layer, we used the attacking IP addresses to understand the origin country of the attacks. That is because at that layer, IP addresses cannot be spoofed (i.e., altered). However, in the network layer, source IP addresses can be spoofed. So, instead of relying on IP addresses to understand the source, we instead use the location of our data centers where the attack packets were ingested. We’re able to get geographical accuracy due to our large global coverage in over 275+ locations around the world.

In Q4, over 52% of the traffic we ingested in our Botswana-based data center was attack traffic. Not too far behind, over 43% of traffic in Azerbaijan was attack traffic, followed by Paraguay, Palestine, Laos, and Nepal.

Cloudflare DDoS threat report for 2022 Q4
Top Cloudflare data center locations with the highest percentage of DDoS attack traffic in 2022 Q4

Please note: Internet Service Providers may sometimes route traffic differently which may skew results. For example, traffic from China may be hauled through California due to various operational considerations.

Understanding the DDoS threat landscape

This quarter, longer and larger attacks became more frequent. Attack durations increased across the board, volumetric attacks surged, and Ransom DDoS attacks continued to rise. During the 2022 holiday season, the top targeted industries for DDoS attacks at the application-layer were Aviation/Aerospace and Events Services. Network-layer DDoS attacks targeted Gaming/Gambling, Finance, and Education Management companies. We also saw a shift in the top emerging threats, with Memcashed-based DDoS attacks continuing to increase in prevalence.

Defending against DDoS attacks is critical for organizations of all sizes. While attacks may be initiated by humans, they are executed by bots — and to play to win, you must fight bots with bots. Detection and mitigation must be automated as much as possible, because relying solely on humans puts defenders at a disadvantage. Cloudflare’s automated systems constantly detect and mitigate DDoS attacks for our customers, so they don’t have to.

Over the years, it has become easier, cheaper, and more accessible for attackers and attackers-for-hire to launch DDoS attacks. But as easy as it has become for the attackers, we want to make sure that it is even easier – and free – for defenders of organizations of all sizes to protect themselves against DDoS attacks of all types. We’ve been providing unmetered and unlimited DDoS protection for free to all of our customers since 2017 — when we pioneered the concept. Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet. A better Internet is one that is more secure, faster, and reliable for everyone – even in the face of DDoS attacks.

Sign up to the DDoS Trends Webinar to learn more about the emerging threats and how to defend against them.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Post Syndicated from David Belson original https://blog.cloudflare.com/radar-2022-year-in-review/

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

In 2022, with nearly five billion people around the world (as well as an untold number of “bots”) using the Internet, analyzing aggregate data about this usage can uncover some very interesting trends. To that end, we’re excited to present the Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year In Review, featuring interactive charts, graphs, and maps you can use to explore notable Internet trends observed throughout this past year. The Year In Review website is part of Cloudflare Radar, which celebrated its second birthday in September with the launch of Radar 2.0.

We have organized the trends we observed around three different topic areas: Traffic, Adoption, and Security. The content covered within each of these areas is described in more detail in their respective sections below. Building on the 2021 Year In Review, we have incorporated several additional metrics this year, and have also improved the underlying methodology. (As such, the charts are not directly comparable to develop insights into year-over-year changes.)

Website visualizations shown at a weekly granularity cover the period from January 2 through November 26, 2022 (the start of the first full week of the year through the end of the last full week of November). We plan to update the underlying data sets through the end of the year in early 2023. Trends for nearly 200 locations are available on the website, with some smaller or less populated locations excluded due to insufficient data.

Before we jump in, we urge anyone who prefers to see the headline stats up front and to explore the data themselves to go ahead and visit the website. Anyone who wants a more lengthy, but curated set of observations should continue reading below. Regardless, we encourage you to consider how the trends presented within this post and the website’s various sections impact your business or organization, and to think about how these insights can inform actions that you can take to improve user experience or enhance your security posture.

Traffic

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Anyone following recent technology headlines might assume that the Internet’s decades-long trend of incredible growth would have finally begun to falter. In times like these, data is key. Our data indicates that global Internet traffic, which grew at 23% this year, is as robust as ever.

To determine the traffic trends over time, we first established a baseline, calculated as the average daily traffic volume (excluding bot traffic) over the second full calendar week (January 9-15) of 2022. We chose the second calendar week to allow time for people to get back into their “normal” routines (school, work, etc.) after the winter holidays and New Year’s Day. The percent change shown on the trend lines in our charts are calculated relative to the baseline value, and represents a seven-day trailing average — it does not represent absolute traffic volume for a location. The seven-day averaging is done to smooth the sharp changes seen with a daily granularity.

In addition to calculating traffic growth, our 1.1.1.1 public DNS resolver and broad global customer base enables us to have a unique view into online activity. This includes insights into the most popular types of Internet content and the most popular Internet services in general and across specific categories, as well as the impact of bots. Of course, none of this matters if connectivity is unavailable, so we also drill down into major Internet disruptions observed in 2022.

After an initial dip, worldwide Internet traffic saw nominal growth coinciding with the 2022 Olympic Winter Games in Beijing, but slipped again in the weeks after their conclusion. After a couple of months of slight growth, traffic again dipped below baseline heading into July. However, after reaching that nadir, Internet traffic experienced a fairly consistent rate of growth through the back part of the year. An upwards inflection at the end of November is visible in the worldwide traffic graph as well as the traffic graphs of a number of locations. Traffic analysis showed that this increase resulted from the convergence of early holiday shopping traffic (to e-commerce sites) with the run-up to and early days of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

The An Update on Cloudflare’s assistance to Ukraine blog post published during Impact Week looked at the conflict from an attack perspective. Viewing Ukraine through an Internet traffic lens provides unique insights into the impacts of the war’s damage and destruction to Internet connectivity within the country. After starting the year with some nominal traffic growth, that trend was quickly reversed once the Russian invasion began on February 24, with traffic quickly falling as infrastructure was damaged and the populace focused on finding safety and shelter. Although traffic started to grow again after that initial steep decline, drops in May and June appear to be correlated with significant outages observed by Cloudflare. After returning to growth during August, several additional disruptions were visible in September, October, and November coincident with widespread power outages across the country resulting from Russian attacks.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Reliable electric power is critical for reliable Internet connectivity, both for the core network infrastructure in data centers, as well as for last-mile infrastructure like cell towers and Wi-Fi routers, as well as laptops, cellphones, and other devices used to access the Internet. For several years, the residents of Puerto Rico have struggled to contend with an unreliable electric grid, resulting in frequent power outages and slow restoration times. In 2022, the island suffered two multi-day power outages that clearly impacted otherwise strong traffic growth. In April, a fire at a power plant caused an outage that lasted three days, disrupting Internet connectivity during that period. In September, widespread power outages resulting from damage from Hurricane Fiona resulted in a rapid drop in Internet traffic with the disruption lasting over a week until power restoration work and infrastructure repair was completed.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Top categories

Cloudflare’s global customer base spans a range of industry categories, including technology, e-commerce, and entertainment, among others. Analysis of the traffic to our customers’ websites and applications reveals which categories of content were most popular throughout the year, and can be broken out by user location. The domains associated with each customer zone have one or more associated categories — these can be viewed on Cloudflare Radar. To calculate the distribution of traffic across the set of categories for each location, we divided the number of requests for domains associated with a given category seen over the course of a week by the total number of requests mapped to a category seen over that week, filtering out bot traffic. If a domain is associated with multiple categories, then the associated request was included in the aggregate count for each category. The chart shows how the distribution of requests across the selected categories changes over the course of the year.

Globally, sites in the Technology category were the most popular, accounting for approximately one-third of traffic throughout the year. The next most popular category was Business & Economy, which drove approximately 15% of traffic. Shopping & Auctions also saw a bump in traffic in November, as consumers began their holiday shopping.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

In sharp contrast to other Asian countries, in South Korea, Internet Communication was consistently the second most popular category during the year. Elsewhere, Internet Communication was occasionally among the top five, but usually within the top 10. Internet Communication was followed closely by Entertainment and Business & Economy. The former saw multiple periods of increased traffic through the year, in contrast to other categories, which saw traffic share remain fairly consistent over time.

Traffic distribution in Turkey represented a rare departure from most other locations around the world. Although Technology started the year as the most popular category, its popularity waned during the back half of the year, ending below Shopping & Auctions and Society & Lifestyle. These latter two saw gradual growth starting in September, and posted larger increases in November. Business & Economy and Entertainment sites were comparatively less popular here, in contrast to many other locations.

Armenia’s traffic distribution also ran counter to that seen in most other locations. Entertainment was the most popular category for nearly the entire year, except for the final week of November. Technology was generally the second most popular category, although it was surpassed by Gambling several times throughout the year. However, Gambling saw its popularity fall significantly in November, as it was surpassed by the Shopping & Auctions and Business & Economy categories.

The luxury of being a popular Internet service is that the service’s brand becomes very recognizable, so it will be no surprise that Google was #1 in our General ranking.

Top 10 — General, late 2022 ranking
1. Google
2. Facebook
3. Apple, TikTok (tie)
5. YouTube
6. Microsoft
7. Amazon Web Services
8. Instagram
9. Amazon
10. iCloud, Netflix, Twitter, Yahoo (tie)

Last year TikTok was at the top of our ranking. However, the results between the two years aren’t comparable. As part of our launch of Radar 2.0, we introduced improvements to our domain ranking algorithms, and this year’s rankings are based on those new algorithms. In addition, this year we have grouped domains that all belong to a single Internet service. For example, Google operates google.com, google.pt, and mail.google.com among others, so we aggregated the popularity of each domain under a single “Google” Internet service for simplicity. However, while Meta operates both Facebook and Instagram, consumers typically perceive those brands as distinct, so we decided to group domains associated with those services separately.

Zooming out from our General top 10, the anonymized DNS query data from our 1.1.1.1 public DNS resolver reflects traffic from millions of users around the world, enabling us to offer category specific rankings as well. While you can view them all in the “Most popular Internet services” section of our Year in Review website, we’ve decided to highlight a few of our favorite observations below.

Cryptocurrencies always seem to have as much promise as they have controversy. We couldn’t help but be curious about which cryptocurrency services were the most popular. But before jumping into the Top 10, let’s double-click on one that fell out of the running: FTX. Known as the third largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world, our popularity ranking shows it hovered around 9th place for most of the year. That is, until it filed for bankruptcy in November. At that point, there is a precipitous drop, which also appears to coincide with reports that FTX disabled its users’ ability to make cryptocurrency withdrawals. Moving back to the Top 10, the two other major cryptocurrency exchanges, Binance and Coinbase, ranked #1 and #3 respectively and don’t appear to have been adversely impacted by FTX in our rankings.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

The universe has been the hottest place to be since the beginning of time, but some suggest that we’ll all soon be in the metaverse. If that’s true, then the question becomes “Whose metaverse?”. Last year, Facebook changed its name to Meta as it poured billions of dollars into the space, so we were curious about the impact of their efforts on the metaverse landscape one year later. With Meta’s Oculus offering their initial foray into the metaverse, our data indicates that while its popularity saw tangible improvements, rising from 10th to 5th in the back half of the year, Roblox is clearly the champion of the metaverse arena. It is fascinating to see this smaller challenger dominating Oculus, which is operated by Meta, a company ~18x larger in market capitalization. We are excited to check back at the end of 2023 to see whether Oculus’ ascent of the rankings topples Roblox, or if the smaller player retains the crown.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Facebook’s transition to Meta, however, does not appear to have impacted its popularity as a social media platform. Within our ranking of the top social media platforms, Facebook held the top position throughout the year. TikTok and Snapchat also held steady in their places among the top five. Instagram and Twitter traded places several times mid-year, but the photo and video sharing app ultimately knocked Twitter from 3rd place in August. More active volatility was seen in the bottom half of the top 10, as LinkedIn, Discord, and Reddit frequently shifted between sixth, seventh, and eighth position in the rankings.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

While those are the most popular sites today, over the last 20+ years, the landscape of social media platforms has been quite dynamic, with new players regularly emerging. Some gained a foothold and became successful, while others became a footnote of Internet history. Although it has actually been around since 2016, Mastodon emerged as the latest potential disruptor in the space. In a landscape where the top social media platforms operate closed-source, centralized platforms, Mastodon offers free, open source software to allow anyone to start their own social networking platform, built around a decentralized architecture, and easily federated with others.

Aggregating the domain names used by 400 top Mastodon instances, this cohort started the year hovering around the #200 rank of most popular services overall. Its position in the overall rankings steadily improved throughout the year, hitting an inflection point in November, moving up about 60 positions. This trend appears to be driven by a spike in interest and usage of Mastodon, which we elaborate on in the Adoption section below.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Bot traffic

Bot traffic describes any non-human traffic to a website or an app. Some bots are useful, such as those that monitor site and application availability or search engine bots that index content for search, and Cloudflare maintains a list of verified bots known to perform such services. However, visibility into other non-verified bot activity is just as, if not more, important as they may be used to perform malicious activities, such as breaking into user accounts or scanning the web for exposed vulnerabilities to exploit. To calculate bot traffic percentages, we used the bot score assigned to each request to identify those made by bots, and then divided the total number of daily requests from these bots by the total number of daily requests. These calculations were done both globally and on a per-location basis. The line shown in the trends graph represents a seven-day trailing average. For the top 10 chart, we calculated the average bot percentage on a monthly basis per location, and then ranked the locations by percentage. The chart illustrates the ranking by month, and how those rankings change across the year.

Globally, bots generally accounted for between 30-35% of traffic over the course of the year. Starting January at around 35%, the percentage of bot traffic dropped by nearly a quarter through the end of February, but then reclaimed some of that loss, staying just above 30% through October. A slight downward trend is evident at the start of November, due to human traffic increasing while bot traffic remained fairly consistent. Despite a couple of nominal spikes/drops, the global trend exhibited fairly low volatility overall throughout the year.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

While around one-third of global traffic was from bots, two locations stood out with bot traffic percentages double the global level. Except for two brief mid-year spikes, just under 70% of traffic from Ireland was classified as bot-driven. Similarly, in Singapore, bot traffic consistently ranged between 60-70% across the year. Bots account for the majority share of traffic from these locations due to the presence of local “regions” from multiple cloud platform providers in each. Because doing so is easily automated and free/inexpensive, attackers will frequently spin up ephemeral instances in these clouds in order to launch high volume attacks, such as we saw with the “Mantis” attack in June. (Internal traffic analysis indicates that a significant portion of traffic for these two geographies is from cloud provider networks and that the vast majority of traffic we see from these networks is classified as bot traffic.)

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

The top 10 list of locations with the highest percentage of bot traffic saw a fair amount of movement throughout the year, with four different locations holding the top slot at some point during the year, although Turkmenistan spent the most time at the top of the list. Overall, 17 locations held a spot among the top 10 at some point during 2022, with greater concentrations in Europe and Asia.

Internet outages

Although the metrics included in the 2022 Year In Review were ultimately driven by Internet traffic to Cloudflare from networks and locations around the world, there are, unfortunately, times when traffic is disrupted. These disruptions can have a number of potential causes, including natural disasters and extreme weather, fiber optic cable cuts, or power outages. However, they can also happen when authoritarian governments order Internet connectivity to be shutdown at a network, regional, or national level.

We saw examples of all of these types of Internet disruptions, and more, during 2022, and aggregated coverage of them in quarterly overview blog posts. With the launch of Radar 2.0 in September, we also began to catalog them on the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center. These disruptions are most often visible as drops in Cloudflare traffic from a given network, region, or country. The 2022 Year In Review website illustrates where these disruptions occurred throughout the year. Some notable outages observed during 2022 are highlighted below.

One of the most significant Internet disruptions of the year took place on AS812 (Rogers), one of Canada’s largest Internet service providers. During the morning of July 8, a near complete loss of traffic was observed, and it took nearly 24 hours for traffic volumes to return to normal levels. A Cloudflare blog post covered the Rogers outage in real-time as the provider attempted to restore connectivity. Data from APNIC estimates that as many as five million users were directly affected, while press coverage noted that the outage also impacted phone systems, retail point of sale systems, automatic teller machines, and online banking services. According to a notice posted by the Rogers CEO, the outage was attributed to “a network system failure following a maintenance update in our core network, which caused some of our routers to malfunction”.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

In late September, protests and demonstrations erupted across Iran in response to the death of Mahsa Amini. Amini was a 22-year-old woman from the Kurdistan Province of Iran, and was arrested on September 13 in Tehran by Iran’s “morality police”, a unit that enforces strict dress codes for women. She died on September 16 while in police custody. Iran’s government is no stranger to using Internet shutdowns as a means of limiting communication with the outside world, and in response to these protests and demonstrations, Internet connectivity across the country experienced multiple waves of disruptions.

Three of the major mobile network providers — AS44244 (Irancell), AS57218 (RighTel), and AS197207 (MCCI) — started implementing daily Internet “curfews” on September 21, generally taking place between 1600 and midnight local time (1230-2030 UTC), although the start times varied on several days. These regular shutdowns lasted into early October, with several more ad-hoc disruptions taking place through the middle of the month, as well as other more localized shutdowns of Internet connectivity. Over 75 million users were impacted by these shutdowns, based on subscriber figures for MCCI alone.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Cable cuts are also a frequent cause of Internet outages, with an old joke among network engineers that suggested that backhoes were the Internet’s natural enemy. While backhoes may be a threat to terrestrial fiber-optic cable, natural disasters can wreak havoc on submarine cables.

A prime example took Tonga offline earlier this year, when the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha’apai volcanic eruption damaged the submarine cable connecting Tonga to Fiji, resulting in a 38-day Internet outage. After the January 14 eruption, only minimal Internet traffic (via limited satellite services) was seen from Tonga. On February 22, Digicel announced that the main island was back online after initial submarine cable repairs were completed, but it was estimated that repairs to the domestic cable, connecting outlying islands, could take an additional six to nine months. We saw rapid growth in traffic from Tonga once the initial cable repairs were completed.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

The war in Ukraine is now ten months old, and throughout the time it has been going on, multiple networks across the country have experienced outages. In March, we observed outages in Mariupol and other cities where fighting was taking place. In late May, an extended Internet disruption began in Kherson, coincident with AS47598 (Khersontelecom) starting to route traffic through Russian network provider AS201776 (MIranda), rather than a Ukrainian upstream. And in October, widespread power outages disrupted Internet connectivity in Kharkiv, Lviv, Kyiv, Poltova Oblast, and Zhytomyr. These outages and others were covered in more detail in the quarterly Internet disruption overview blog posts, as well as several other Ukraine-specific blog posts.

Adoption

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Working with millions of websites and applications accessed by billions of people as well as providing an industry-leading DNS resolver service gives Cloudflare a unique perspective on the adoption of key technologies and platforms. SpaceX Starlink was frequently in the news this year, and we observed a 15x increase in traffic from the satellite Internet service provider. Social networking platform Mastodon was also in the news this year, and saw significant growth in interest as well.

IPv6 remains increasingly important as connected device growth over the last decade has exhausted available IPv4 address space, but global adoption remained around 35% across the year. And as the Internet-connected population continues to grow, many of those people are using mobile devices as their primary means of access. To that end, we also explore mobile device usage trends across the year.

Starlink adoption

Internet connectivity through satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) has been around for a number of years, but services have historically been hampered by high latency and slower speeds. However, the launch of SpaceX Starlink’s Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite Internet service in 2019 and subsequent expansion of the satellite constellation has made high performance Internet connections available in many locations that were previously unserved or underserved by traditional wired or wireless broadband. To track the growth in usage and availability of Starlink’s service, we analyzed aggregate Cloudflare traffic volumes associated with the service’s autonomous system (AS14593) throughout 2022. Although Starlink is not yet available globally, we did see traffic growth across a number of locations. The request volume shown on the trend line in the chart represents a seven-day trailing average.

Damage from the war in Ukraine has disrupted traditional wired and wireless Internet connectivity since the invasion started in late February. Starlink made headlines that month after the company activated service within the country, and the necessary satellite Internet terminals became more widely available. Within days, Cloudflare began to see Starlink traffic, with volume growing consistently throughout the year.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Latent interest in the service was also apparent in a number of locations where traffic grew quickly after Starlink announced availability. One such example is Romania, which was included in Starlink’s May announcement of an expanded service footprint, and which saw rapid traffic growth after the announcement.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

And in the United States, where Starlink has provided service since launch, traffic grew more than 10x through the end of November. Service enhancements announced during the year, like the ability to get Internet connectivity from moving vehicles, boats, and planes will likely drive additional traffic growth in the future.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Mastodon interest

Above, we showed that Mastodon hit an inflection point in its popularity during the last few months of 2022. To better understand how interest in Mastodon evolved during 2022, we analyzed aggregate 1.1.1.1 request volume data for the domain names associated with 400 top Mastodon instances, looking at aggregate request volume by location. The request volume shown on the trend line in the chart represents a seven-day trailing average.

Although interest in Mastodon clearly accelerated over the last few months of the year, this interest was unevenly distributed throughout the world as we saw little to no traffic across many locations. Graphs for those locations are not included within the Year In Review website. However, because Mastodon has been around since 2016, it built a base of early adopters over the last six years before being thrust into the spotlight in 2022.

Those early adopters are visible at a global level, as we see a steady volume of resolver traffic for the analyzed Mastodon instance domain names through the first nine months of the year, with the timing of the increase visible in late April aligning with the announcement that Elon Musk had reached a deal to acquire Twitter for $44 billion. The slope of the graph clearly shifted in October as it became increasingly clear that the acquisition would close shortly, with additional growth into November after the deal was completed. This growth is likely due to a combination of existing but dormant Mastodon accounts once again becoming active, and an influx of new users.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

The traffic pattern observed for the United States appears fairly similar to the global pattern, with traffic from an existing set of users seeing massive growth starting in late October as well.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Although the core Mastodon software was developed by a programmer living in Germany, and the associated organization is incorporated as a German not-for-profit, it didn’t appear to have any significant home field advantage. Query volume for Germany was relatively low throughout most of the year, and only started to rapidly increase at the end of October, similar to behavior observed in a number of other countries.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

IPv6 adoption

Although IPv6 has been around for nearly a quarter-century, adoption has been relatively slow over that time. However, with the exhaustion of available IPv4 address space and the growth in connected and mobile devices, IPv6 plays a critical role in the future of the Internet. Cloudflare has enabled customers to deliver content over IPv6 since our first birthday, back in 2011, and we have evolved support in several ways since that time. Analysis of traffic to the Cloudflare network provides us with insights into IPv6 adoption across the Internet.

On a global basis, IPv6 adoption hovered around the 35% mark throughout the year, with nominal growth evident in the trend line shown in the graph. While it is encouraging to see one of every three requests for dual stacked content being made over IPv6, this adoption rate demonstrates a clear opportunity for improvement.

To calculate IPv6 adoption for each location, we identified the set of customer zones that had IPv6 enabled (were “dual stacked”) during 2022, and then divided the daily request count for the zones over IPv6 by the daily sum of IPv4 and IPv6 requests for the zones, filtering out bot traffic in both cases. The line shown in the trends graph represents a seven-day trailing average. For the top 10 chart, we calculated the average IPv6 adoption level on a monthly basis per location, and then ranked the locations by percentage. The chart illustrates the ranking by month, and how those rankings change across the year.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

One location that has seized that opportunity is India, which recorded the highest IPv6 adoption rate throughout the year. After seeing more than 70% adoption through July, it began to drop slightly in late summer, losing a couple of percentage points over the subsequent months.

One key driver behind India’s leadership in this area is IPv6 support from Jio, India’s largest mobile network operator, as well as being a provider of fiber-to-the-home broadband connectivity. They aggressively started their IPv6 journey in late 2015, and now much of Jio’s core network infrastructure is IPv6-only, while customer-facing mobile and fiber connections are dual-stacked.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Also heading in the right direction are the more than 60 locations around the world that saw IP adoption rates more than double this year. One of the largest increases was seen in the European country of Georgia, which grew more than 3,500% to close out the year at 10% adoption thanks to rapid growth across February and March at Magticom, a leading Georgian telecommunications provider.

Many of the other locations in this set also experienced large gains over a short period of time, likely due to a local network provider enabling subscriber support for IPv6. While significant gains seen in over a quarter of the total surveyed locations is certainly a positive sign, it must be noted that over 50 are under 10% adoption, with more than half of those remaining well under 1%, even after seeing adoption more than double. Internet service providers around the world continue to add or improve IPv6 support for their subscribers, but many have low to non-existent adoption rates, presenting significant opportunity to improve in the future.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

As noted above, India had the highest level of IPv6 adoption through 2022. In looking at the remainder of the top 10 list, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia traded places several times during the year as the locations with the second and third-highest adoption rates, at just under 60% and around 55% respectively. The United States appeared towards the bottom of the top 10 list during the first quarter, but ranked lower for the remainder of the year. Belgium proved to be the most consistent, holding the fourth-place spot from March through November, with around 55% IPv6 adoption. Overall, a total of 14 locations appeared among the top 10 at some point during the year.

Mobile device usage

Each year, mobile devices become more and more powerful, and are increasingly being used as the primary onramp to the Internet in many places. In fact, in some parts of the world, so-called “desktop” devices (which includes laptop form factors) are the exception for Internet access, not the rule.

Analysis of the information included with each content request enables us to classify the type of device (mobile or desktop) used to make the request. To calculate the percentage of mobile device usage by location, we divided the number of requests made by mobile devices over the course of a week by the total number of requests seen that week, filtering out bot traffic in both cases. For the top 10 chart, we ranked the locations by the calculated percentage. The chart illustrates the ranking by month, and how those rankings change across the year.

In looking at the top 10 chart, we note that Iran and Sudan held the top two slots for much of the year, bookended by Yemen in January and Mauritania in November. Below the top two spots, however, significant volatility is clear throughout the year within the rest of the top 10. However, this movement was actually concentrated across a relatively small percentage range, with just five to ten percentage points separating the top and bottom ranked locations, depending on the week. The top ranked locations generally saw 80-85% of traffic from mobile devices, while the bottom ranked locations saw 75-80% of traffic from mobile devices.

This analysis reinforces the importance of mobile connectivity in Iran, and underscores why mobile network providers were targeted for Internet shutdowns in September and October, as discussed above. (And the shutdowns subsequently explain why Iran disappears from the top 10 list after September.)

Security

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Improving Internet security is a key part of Cloudflare’s drive to help build a better Internet. One way we do that is by protecting customer websites, applications, and network infrastructure from malicious traffic and attacks. Because malicious actors regularly use a variety of techniques and approaches in launching their attacks, we have a number of products within our security solution portfolio that provide customers with flexibility around how they handle these attacks. Below, we explore insights derived from the attack mitigation we do on behalf of customers, including how we are mitigating attacks, what kinds of websites and applications attacks are targeting, and where these attacks appear to be coming from. In addition, with the acquisition of Area 1 earlier in 2022, we are presenting insight into where malicious email originates from. Analysis of this data highlights that there is very much no “one size fits all” security solution, as attackers use a wide variety of techniques, frequently shifting between them. As such, having a broad but flexible portfolio of security solutions at the ready is critical for CISOs and CIOs.

Mitigation sources

Depending on the approach taken by an attacker, and the type of content being targeted, one attack mitigation technique may be preferable over another. Cloudflare refers to these techniques as “mitigation sources”, and they include popular tools and techniques like Web Application Firewall (WAF) and DDoS Mitigation (DDoS), but also lesser known ones like IP Reputation (IPR), Access Rules (AR), Bot Management (BM), and API Shield (APIS). Examining the distribution of mitigation sources applied by location can help us better understand the types of attacks originating from those locations. To calculate the percentage of mitigated traffic associated with each mitigation source by location, we divided the total number of daily mitigated requests for each source by the total number of mitigated requests seen that day. Bot traffic is included in these calculations, given that many attacks originate from bots. A single request can be mitigated by multiple techniques, and here we consider the last technique that mitigated the request.

Across many locations, IP Reputation, Bot Management, and Access Rules accounted for small amounts of mitigated traffic throughout the year, with the volumes varying by country. However, in other locations, IP Reputation and Access Rules were responsible for larger amounts of mitigated traffic, possibly indicating those places had more of their traffic being blocked outright. A number of countries saw a rapid and significant increase in DDoS mitigated traffic during January to the 80-90% range, followed by a rapid drop to the 10-20% range. In that vein, DDoS Mitigation and WAF percentage shifts were frequently very spiky, with only occasional sustained periods of relatively consistent percentages.

Overall, DDoS Mitigation and WAF were the two most frequently used techniques to address attacks. The former’s share on a global basis was highest in mid-January, growing to nearly 80%, while the latter’s peak was during February, when it accounted for almost 60% of mitigated traffic. A spike in the usage of Access Rules is clearly visible in August, related to similar spikes observed for the United States, United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Although Access Rules accounted for as much as 20% of mitigated traffic from the United States in August, it saw much lower usage throughout the balance of the year. DDoS Mitigation was the primary technique used to mitigate attack traffic coming from the United States, responsible for over 80% of such traffic during the first quarter, though it steadily declined through August. In a complimentary fashion, WAF drove only ~20% of mitigated traffic early in the year, but that volume steadily grew and had tripled through August. Interestingly, the growth in Access Rules usage followed rapid growth and then similarly rapid decline in WAF, possibly suggesting that more targeted rules were implemented to augment the managed rules applied by the Web Application Firewall against US-originated attacks.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Access Rules and IP Reputation were applied more frequently to mitigate attack traffic coming from Germany, with Bot Management also seeing increased usage in February, March, and June. However, except for periods in February and July, DDoS Mitigation drove the bulk of mitigated traffic, generally ranging between 60-80%. WAF mitigation was clearly most significant during February, with 70-80% of mitigated traffic, and July, at around 60%.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

In mitigating attacks coming from Japan, it is interesting to see a couple of notable spikes in Bot Management. In March, it was briefly responsible for upwards of 40% of mitigated traffic, with another spike that was half as big in June. Access Rules also maintained a consistent presence in the graph, with around 5% of mitigated traffic through August, but slightly less in the following months. In dealing with Japanese attack traffic, WAF & DDoS Mitigation frequently traded positions as the largest source of mitigated traffic, although there was no clear pattern or apparent cycle. Both reached as much as 90% of mitigated traffic at times throughout the year – WAF in February and DDoS Mitigation in March. DDoS Mitigation’s periods of “dominance” tended to be more sustained, lasting for several weeks, but were punctuated by brief WAF spikes.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

WAF rules

As noted above, Cloudflare’s WAF is frequently used to mitigate application layer attacks. There are hundreds of individually managed rules that can be applied by the WAF depending on the characteristics of the mitigated request, but these rules can be grouped into over a dozen types. Examining the distribution of WAF rules by location can help us better understand the techniques that attacks coming from that location are using. (For example, are attackers trying to inject SQL code into a form field, or exploit a published CVE?) To calculate the distribution of WAF mitigated traffic across the set of rule types for each location, we divided the number of requests mitigated by a particular type of WAF rule seen over the course of a week by the total number of WAF mitigated requests seen over that week. A single request can be mitigated by multiple rules and here we consider the last rule in a sequence that mitigated the request. The chart shows how the distribution of mitigated requests across the selected rule types changes over the course of the year. Bot traffic is included in these calculations.

At a worldwide level, during the first few months of the year, approximately half of HTTP requests blocked by our Managed WAF Rules contained HTTP anomalies, such as malformed method names, null byte characters in headers, non-standard ports, or content length of zero with a POST request. During that period, Directory Traversal and SQL Injection (SQLi) rules both accounted for just over 10% of mitigated requests as well. Attackers began to further vary their approach starting in May, as Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and File Inclusion both grew to over 10% of mitigations, while HTTP anomalies dropped to below 30%. Use of Software Specific rules grew above 10% in July, as attackers apparently ramped their efforts to exploit vendor-specific vulnerabilities. Broken Authentication and Command Injection rulesets also saw some growth in activity during the last several months, suggesting that attackers increased their efforts to find vulnerabilities in login/authentication systems or to execute commands on vulnerable systems in an attempt to gain access.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

Although HTTP Anomaly was the most frequently applied rule when mitigations are aggregated at a global level, there were a number of locations where it held the top spot only briefly, if at all, as discussed below.

Attacks originating in Australia were WAF-mitigated using a number of rulesets, with the most applied ruleset changing frequently during the first half of the year. In contrast to the global overview, HTTP Anomaly was the top ruleset for only a single week in February, when it accounted for just over 30% of mitigations. Otherwise, attacks were most frequently mitigated with Software Specific, Directory Traversal, File Inclusion, and SQLi rules, generally accounting for 25-35% of mitigations. This pattern shifted starting in July, though, as Directory Traversal attacks became the most common, staying that way through the balance of the year. After peaking in June, SQLi attacks became significantly less common, rapidly falling and staying below 10% of mitigations.

WAF mitigations of attacks originating in Canada also demonstrated a pattern that differed from the global one. Although the HTTP Anomaly ruleset started the year accounting for approximately two thirds of mitigated requests, it was half that by the end of January, and saw significant volatility throughout the balance of the year. SQLi mitigations of Australian traffic effectively saw an opposite pattern, starting the year below 10% of mitigations but growing rapidly, accounting for 60% or more of mitigated traffic at multiple times throughout the year. Interestingly, SQLi attacks from Canada appeared to come in multi-week waves, becoming the most applied ruleset during those waves, and then receding for a brief period.

For attacks originating in Switzerland, the HTTP Anomaly ruleset was never the most frequently invoked, although it remained among the top five throughout the year. Instead, Directory Traversal and XSS rules were most frequently used, accounting for as much as 40% of mitigations. Directory Traversal most consistently held the top spot, though XSS attacks were the most prevalent during August. SQLi attacks saw peaks in April, July/August, and then again at the end of November. The Software Specific ruleset also breakout growth in September to as much as 20% of mitigated requests.

Target categories

Above, we discussed how traffic distribution across a set of categories provides insights into the types of content that users are most interested in. By performing similar analysis through a mitigation lens, we can gain insights into the types of websites and applications that are being most frequently targeted by attackers. To calculate the distribution of mitigated traffic across the set of categories for each location, we divided the number of mitigated requests for domains associated with a given category seen over the course of a week by the total number of requests mapped to that category during that week. The chart shows how the distribution of mitigated requests across each category changes over the course of the year. (As such, percentages will not sum to 100%). Bot traffic is included in these calculations. The percentage of traffic that was mitigated as an attack varied widely across industries and originating locations. In some places, a nominal percentage of traffic across all categories was mitigated, while in others, multiple categories experienced spikes in mitigated traffic at multiple times during 2022.

When aggregated at a global level, there was significant variance over the course of the year in the industry categories that attracted the most attacks as a fraction of their overall traffic. Through January and February, Technology sites had the largest percentage of mitigated requests, ranging between 20-30%. After that, a variety of categories moved in and out of the top slot, with none holding it for more than a few weeks. The biggest spike in attacks was targeted at Travel sites in mid-April, when more than half of the category’s traffic was mitigated. Coincident with the start of the 2022 World Cup in the last week of November, Gambling and Entertainment sites saw the largest percentages of mitigated traffic.

Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year in Review

For attacks coming from the United Kingdom, Technology sites consistently saw around 20% of mitigated traffic through the year. During those times that it was not the most mitigated category, half a dozen other categories topped the list. Travel sites experienced two significant bursts of attacks, with nearly 60% of traffic mitigated in April, and nearly 50% in October. Other categories, including Government & Politics, Real Estate, Religion, and Education had the largest shares of mitigated traffic at various times throughout the year. UK-originated attacks on Entertainment sites jumped significantly in late November, with 40% of traffic mitigated at the end of the month.

Similar to the trends seen at the global level, Technology sites accounted for the largest percentage of mitigated attacks from the United States in January and February, clocking in between 30-40%. After that, attackers shifted their focus to target other industry categories. In mid-April, Travel sites had over 60% of requests mitigated as attacks. However, starting in May, Gambling sites most frequently had the highest percentage of traffic being mitigated, generally ranging between 20-40%, but spiking up to 70% in late October/early November.

In contrast, significantly smaller percentages of traffic across the surveyed categories from Japan was mitigated as attacks throughout 2022. Most categories saw mitigation shares of less than 10%, although there were a number of brief spikes observed at times. In late March, traffic to sites in the Government & Politics category briefly jumped to a nearly 80% mitigation share, while Travel sites spiked to nearly 70% of requests mitigated as attacks, similar to the behavior seen in other locations. In late June, Religion sites had a mitigation share of over 60%, and a couple of months later, Gambling sites experienced a rapid increase in mitigated traffic, reaching just over 40%. These attacks targeting Gambling sites then receded for a few months before starting to aggressively increase again in October.

Phishing email sources

Phishing emails are ultimately intended to trick users into providing attackers with login credentials for important websites and applications. At a consumer level, this could include an e-commerce site or banking application, while for businesses, this could include code repositories or employee information systems. For customers protected by Cloudflare Area 1 Email Security, we can identify the location that these phishing emails are being sent from. IP address geolocation is used to identify origination location, and the aggregate email counts apply to emails processed by Area 1 only. For the top 10 chart, we aggregated the number of phishing emails seen on a weekly basis per location, and then ranked the locations by phishing email volume. The chart illustrates the ranking by week, and how those rankings change across the year.

Reviewing the top 10 list, we find that the United States was the top source of phishing emails observed by Area 1 during 2022. It held the top spot for nearly the entire year, ceding it only once to Germany in November. The balance of the top 10 saw a significant amount of volatility over time, with a total of 23 locations holding a spot in the rankings for at least one month during the year. These locations were well-distributed geographically across the Americas, Europe, and Asia, highlighting that no one region of the world is a greater threat than others. Obviously, distrusting or rejecting all email originating from these locations is not a particularly practical response, but applying additional scrutiny can help keep your organization, and the Internet, safer.

Conclusion

Attempting to concisely summarize our “year in review” observations is challenging, especially as we only looked at trends in this blog post across a small fraction of the nearly 200 locations included in the website’s visualizations. Having said that, we will leave you with the following brief thoughts:

  • Attack traffic comes from everywhere, with constantly shifting targets, using widely varied techniques. Ensure that your security solutions provider offers a comprehensive portfolio of services to help keep your sites, applications, and infrastructure safe.
  • Internet service providers around the world need to improve support for IPv6 — it is no longer a “new” technology, and available IPv4 address space will become both increasingly scarce and increasingly expensive. Support for IPv6 needs to become the default going forward.
  • Internet shutdowns are being increasingly used by governments to limit communications within a country, as well as limiting communications with the rest of the world. As the United Nations stated in a May 2022 report, “Blanket shutdowns in particular inherently impose unacceptable consequences for human rights and should never be imposed.”

As we said in the introduction, we encourage you to visit the full Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year In Review website and explore the trends relevant to locations and industries of interest, and to consider how they impact your organization so that you are appropriately prepared for 2023.

If you have any questions, you can contact the Cloudflare Radar team at [email protected] or on Twitter at @CloudflareRadar.

Acknowledgements

It truly took a village to produce the Cloudflare Radar 2022 Year In Review, and we would be remiss if we didn’t acknowledge the contributions of colleagues that were instrumental in making this project possible. Thank you to: Sabina Zejnilovic, Carlos Azevedo, Jorge Pacheco (Data Science); Ricardo Baeta, Syeef Karim (Design); Nuno Pereira, Tiago Dias, Junior Dias de Oliveira (Front End Development); João Tomé (Most popular Internet services); and Davide Marques, Paula Tavares, Celso Martinho (Project/Engineering Management).

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Post Syndicated from Carlos Rodrigues original https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-updates-data/

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the glue that keeps the entire Internet together. However, despite its vital function, BGP wasn’t originally designed to protect against malicious actors or routing mishaps. It has since been updated to account for this shortcoming with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) framework, but can we declare it to be safe yet?

If the question needs asking, you might suspect we can’t. There is a shortage of reliable data on how much of the Internet is protected from preventable routing problems. Today, we’re releasing a new method to measure exactly that: what percentage of Internet users are protected by their Internet Service Provider from these issues. We find that there is a long way to go before the Internet is protected from routing problems, though it varies dramatically by country.

Why RPKI is necessary to secure Internet routing

The Internet is a network of independently-managed networks, called Autonomous Systems (ASes). To achieve global reachability, ASes interconnect with each other and determine the feasible paths to a given destination IP address by exchanging routing information using BGP. BGP enables routers with only local network visibility to construct end-to-end paths based on the arbitrary preferences of each administrative entity that operates that equipment. Typically, Internet traffic between a user and a destination traverses multiple AS networks using paths constructed by BGP routers.

BGP, however, lacks built-in security mechanisms to protect the integrity of the exchanged routing information and to provide authentication and authorization of the advertised IP address space. Because of this, AS operators must implicitly trust that the routing information exchanged through BGP is accurate. As a result, the Internet is vulnerable to the injection of bogus routing information, which cannot be mitigated by security measures at the client or server level of the network.

An adversary with access to a BGP router can inject fraudulent routes into the routing system, which can be used to execute an array of attacks, including:

  • Denial-of-Service (DoS) through traffic blackholing or redirection,
  • Impersonation attacks to eavesdrop on communications,
  • Machine-in-the-Middle exploits to modify the exchanged data, and subvert reputation-based filtering systems.

Additionally, local misconfigurations and fat-finger errors can be propagated well beyond the source of the error and cause major disruption across the Internet.

Such an incident happened on June 24, 2019. Millions of users were unable to access Cloudflare address space when a regional ISP in Pennsylvania accidentally advertised routes to Cloudflare through their capacity-limited network. This was effectively the Internet equivalent of routing an entire freeway through a neighborhood street.

Traffic misdirections like these, either unintentional or intentional, are not uncommon. The Internet Society’s MANRS (Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security) initiative estimated that in 2020 alone there were over 3,000 route leaks and hijacks, and new occurrences can be observed every day through Cloudflare Radar.

The most prominent proposals to secure BGP routing, standardized by the IETF focus on validating the origin of the advertised routes using Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and verifying the integrity of the paths with BGPsec. Specifically, RPKI (defined in RFC 7115) relies on a Public Key Infrastructure to validate that an AS advertising a route to a destination (an IP address space) is the legitimate owner of those IP addresses.

RPKI has been defined for a long time but lacks adoption. It requires network operators to cryptographically sign their prefixes, and routing networks to perform an RPKI Route Origin Validation (ROV) on their routers. This is a two-step operation that requires coordination and participation from many actors to be effective.

The two phases of RPKI adoption: signing origins and validating origins

RPKI has two phases of deployment: first, an AS that wants to protect its own IP prefixes can cryptographically sign Route Origin Authorization (ROA) records thereby attesting to be the legitimate origin of that signed IP space. Second, an AS can avoid selecting invalid routes by performing Route Origin Validation (ROV, defined in RFC 6483).

With ROV, a BGP route received by a neighbor is validated against the available RPKI records. A route that is valid or missing from RPKI is selected, while a route with RPKI records found to be invalid is typically rejected, thus preventing the use and propagation of hijacked and misconfigured routes.

One issue with RPKI is the fact that implementing ROA is meaningful only if other ASes implement ROV, and vice versa. Therefore, securing BGP routing requires a united effort and a lack of broader adoption disincentivizes ASes from commiting the resources to validate their own routes. Conversely, increasing RPKI adoption can lead to network effects and accelerate RPKI deployment. Projects like MANRS and Cloudflare’s isbgpsafeyet.com are promoting good Internet citizenship among network operators, and make the benefits of RPKI deployment known to the Internet. You can check whether your own ISP is being a good Internet citizen by testing it on isbgpsafeyet.com.

Measuring the extent to which both ROA (signing of addresses by the network that controls them) and ROV (filtering of invalid routes by ISPs) have been implemented is important to evaluating the impact of these initiatives, developing situational awareness, and predicting the impact of future misconfigurations or attacks.

Measuring ROAs is straightforward since ROA data is readily available from RPKI repositories. Querying RPKI repositories for publicly routed IP prefixes (e.g. prefixes visible in the RouteViews and RIPE RIS routing tables) allows us to estimate the percentage of addresses covered by ROA objects. Currently, there are 393,344 IPv4 and 86,306 IPv6 ROAs in the global RPKI system, covering about 40% of the globally routed prefix-AS origin pairs1.

Measuring ROV, however, is significantly more challenging given it is configured inside the BGP routers of each AS, not accessible by anyone other than each router’s administrator.

Measuring ROV deployment

Although we do not have direct access to the configuration of everyone’s BGP routers, it is possible to infer the use of ROV by comparing the reachability of RPKI-valid and RPKI-invalid prefixes from measurement points within an AS2.

Consider the following toy topology as an example, where an RPKI-invalid origin is advertised through AS0 to AS1 and AS2. If AS1 filters and rejects RPKI-invalid routes, a user behind AS1 would not be able to connect to that origin. By contrast, if AS2 does not reject RPKI invalids, a user behind AS2 would be able to connect to that origin.

While occasionally a user may be unable to access an origin due to transient network issues, if multiple users act as vantage points for a measurement system, we would be able to collect a large number of data points to infer which ASes deploy ROV.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

If, in the figure above, AS0 filters invalid RPKI routes, then vantage points in both AS1 and AS2 would be unable to connect to the RPKI-invalid origin, making it hard to distinguish if ROV is deployed at the ASes of our vantage points or in an AS along the path. One way to mitigate this limitation is to announce the RPKI-invalid origin from multiple locations from an anycast network taking advantage of its direct interconnections to the measurement vantage points as shown in the figure below. As a result, an AS that does not itself deploy ROV is less likely to observe the benefits of upstream ASes using ROV, and we would be able to accurately infer ROV deployment per AS3.

Note that it’s also important that the IP address of the RPKI-invalid origin should not be covered by a less specific prefix for which there is a valid or unknown RPKI route, otherwise even if an AS filters invalid RPKI routes its users would still be able to find a route to that IP.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

The measurement technique described here is the one implemented by Cloudflare’s isbgpsafeyet.com website, allowing end users to assess whether or not their ISPs have deployed BGP ROV.

The isbgpsafeyet.com website itself doesn’t submit any data back to Cloudflare, but recently we started measuring whether end users’ browsers can successfully connect to invalid RPKI origins when ROV is present. We use the same mechanism as is used for global performance data4. In particular, every measurement session (an individual end user at some point in time) attempts a request to both valid.rpki.cloudflare.com, which should always succeed as it’s RPKI-valid, and invalid.rpki.cloudflare.com, which is RPKI-invalid and should fail when the user’s ISP uses ROV.

This allows us to have continuous and up-to-date measurements from hundreds of thousands of browsers on a daily basis, and develop a greater understanding of the state of ROV deployment.

The state of global ROV deployment

The figure below shows the raw number of ROV probe requests per hour during October 2022 to valid.rpki.cloudflare.com and invalid.rpki.cloudflare.com. In total, we observed 69.7 million successful probes from 41,531 ASNs.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Based on APNIC’s estimates on the number of end users per ASN, our weighted5 analysis covers 96.5% of the world’s Internet population. As expected, the number of requests follow a diurnal pattern which reflects established user behavior in daily and weekly Internet activity6.

We can also see that the number of successful requests to valid.rpki.cloudflare.com (gray line) closely follows the number of sessions that issued at least one request (blue line), which works as a smoke test for the correctness of our measurements.

As we don’t store the IP addresses that contribute measurements, we don’t have any way to count individual clients and large spikes in the data may introduce unwanted bias. We account for that by capturing those instants and excluding them.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Overall, we estimate that out of the four billion Internet users, only 261 million (6.5%) are protected by BGP Route Origin Validation, but the true state of global ROV deployment is more subtle than this.

The following map shows the fraction of dropped RPKI-invalid requests from ASes with over 200 probes over the month of October. It depicts how far along each country is in adopting ROV but doesn’t necessarily represent the fraction of protected users in each country, as we will discover.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Sweden and Bolivia appear to be the countries with the highest level of adoption (over 80%), while only a few other countries have crossed the 50% mark (e.g. Finland, Denmark, Chad, Greece, the United States).

ROV adoption may be driven by a few ASes hosting large user populations, or by many ASes hosting small user populations. To understand such disparities, the map below plots the contrast between overall adoption in a country (as in the previous map) and median adoption over the individual ASes within that country. Countries with stronger reds have relatively few ASes deploying ROV with high impact, while countries with stronger blues have more ASes deploying ROV but with lower impact per AS.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

In the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, or the United States, adoption appears mostly driven by their larger ASes, while in Greece or Yemen it’s the smaller ones that are adopting ROV.

The following histogram summarizes the worldwide level of adoption for the 6,765 ASes covered by the previous two maps.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Most ASes either don’t validate at all, or have close to 100% adoption, which is what we’d intuitively expect. However, it’s interesting to observe that there are small numbers of ASes all across the scale. ASes that exhibit partial RPKI-invalid drop rate compared to total requests may either implement ROV partially (on some, but not all, of their BGP routers), or appear as dropping RPKI invalids due to ROV deployment by other ASes in their upstream path.

To estimate the number of users protected by ROV we only considered ASes with an observed adoption above 95%, as an AS with an incomplete deployment still leaves its users vulnerable to route leaks from its BGP peers.

If we take the previous histogram and summarize by the number of users behind each AS, the green bar on the right corresponds to the 261 million users currently protected by ROV according to the above criteria (686 ASes).

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

Looking back at the country adoption map one would perhaps expect the number of protected users to be larger. But worldwide ROV deployment is still mostly partial, lacking larger ASes, or both. This becomes even more clear when compared with the next map, plotting just the fraction of fully protected users.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

To wrap up our analysis, we look at two world economies chosen for their contrasting, almost symmetrical, stages of deployment: the United States and the European Union.

Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation
Helping build a safer Internet by measuring BGP RPKI Route Origin Validation

112 million Internet users are protected by 111 ASes from the United States with comprehensive ROV deployments. Conversely, more than twice as many ASes from countries making up the European Union have fully deployed ROV, but end up covering only half as many users. This can be reasonably explained by end user ASes being more likely to operate within a single country rather than span multiple countries.

Conclusion

Probe requests were performed from end user browsers and very few measurements were collected from transit providers (which have few end users, if any). Also, paths between end user ASes and Cloudflare are often very short (a nice outcome of our extensive peering) and don’t traverse upper-tier networks that they would otherwise use to reach the rest of the Internet.

In other words, the methodology used focuses on ROV adoption by end user networks (e.g. ISPs) and isn’t meant to reflect the eventual effect of indirect validation from (perhaps validating) upper-tier transit networks. While indirect validation may limit the “blast radius” of (malicious or accidental) route leaks, it still leaves non-validating ASes vulnerable to leaks coming from their peers.

As with indirect validation, an AS remains vulnerable until its ROV deployment reaches a sufficient level of completion. We chose to only consider AS deployments above 95% as truly comprehensive, and Cloudflare Radar will soon begin using this threshold to track ROV adoption worldwide, as part of our mission to help build a better Internet.

When considering only comprehensive ROV deployments, some countries such as Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Sweden, or Australia, already show an effective coverage above 50% of their respective Internet populations, with others like the Netherlands or the United States slightly above 40%, mostly driven by few large ASes rather than many smaller ones.

Worldwide we observe a very low effective coverage of just 6.5% over the measured ASes, corresponding to 261 million end users currently safe from (malicious and accidental) route leaks, which means there’s still a long way to go before we can declare BGP to be safe.

……
1https://rpki.cloudflare.com/
2Gilad, Yossi, Avichai Cohen, Amir Herzberg, Michael Schapira, and Haya Shulman. "Are we there yet? On RPKI’s deployment and security." Cryptology ePrint Archive (2016).
3Geoff Huston. “Measuring ROAs and ROV”. https://blog.apnic.net/2021/03/24/measuring-roas-and-rov/
4Measurements are issued stochastically when users encounter 1xxx error pages from default (non-customer) configurations.
5Probe requests are weighted by AS size as calculated from Cloudflare’s worldwide HTTP traffic.
6Quan, Lin, John Heidemann, and Yuri Pradkin. "When the Internet sleeps: Correlating diurnal networks with external factors." In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, pp. 87-100. 2014.

Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

Post Syndicated from Jocelyn Woolbright original https://blog.cloudflare.com/partnering-with-civil-society-to-track-shutdowns/

Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

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Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

Internet shutdowns have long been a tool in government toolboxes when it comes to silencing opposition and cutting off access from the outside world. The KeepItOn campaign by Access Now, a group that defends the digital rights of global Internet users, documented at least 182 Internet shutdowns in 34 countries in 2021. Many of these shutdowns occurred during public protests, elections, and wars as an extreme form of censorship in places like Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine, India, and Iran.

There are a range of ways governments block or slow communications, including throttling, IP blocking, DNS interference, mobile data shutoffs, and deep packet inspection, all with similar goals: exerting control over information.

Although Internet shutdowns are largely public, it is difficult to document and track the ways in which governments implement them. The shutdowns not only impact people’s ability to participate in civil and political life and the economy but also have grave consequences for trust in democratic institutions.

We have reported on these shutdowns in the past, and for Cloudflare Impact Week, we want to tell you more about how we work with civil society organizations to provide tools to track and document the scope of these disruptions. We want to support their critical work and provide the tools they need so they can demand accountability and condemn the use of shutdowns to silence dissent.

Radar Internet shutdown alerts for civil society

We launched Radar in 2020 to shine light on the Internet’s patterns, insights, threats, and trends based on aggregated data from our network. Once we launched Radar, we found that many civil society organizations and those who work in democracy-building use Radar to track trends in countries to better understand the rise and fall of Internet usage.

Internally, we had an alert system for potential Internet disruptions that we use as an early warning regarding shifts in network patterns and incidents. When we engaged with these organizations that use Radar to track Internet trends, we learned more about how our internal tool to identify traffic distributions could be useful for organizations that work with human rights defenders on the ground that are impacted by these shutdowns.

To determine the best way to provide a tool to alert organizations when Cloudflare has seen these disruptions, we spoke with organizations such as Access Now, Internews, The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute, Internet Society, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. After our conversations, we launched Radar Internet shutdown alerts in 2021 to provide alerts on when Cloudflare has detected significant drops in traffic with the hope that the information is used to document, track, and hold institutions accountable for these human rights violations.

Since 2021, we have been providing these alerts to civil society partners to track these shutdowns. As we have collected feedback to improve the alerts, we have seen many partners looking for more ways to integrate Radar and the alerts into their existing tracking mechanisms. With this, we announced Radar 2.0 with API access for free so academics, data sleuths, civil society, human rights organizations, and other web enthusiasts can analyze, visualize, and investigate Internet usage across the globe, based on data from our global network. In addition, we launched Cloudflare Radar Outage Center to archive Internet outages and make it easier for civil society organizations, journalists/news media, and impacted parties to track past shutdowns.

Highlighting the work of our civil society partners to track Internet shutdowns

We believe our job at Cloudflare is to build tools that improve privacy and security for a range of players on the Internet. With this, we want to highlight the work of our civil society partners. These organizations are pushing back against targeted shutdowns that inflict lasting damage to democracies around the world. Here are their stories.

Access Now

Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

Access Now’s #KeepItOn coalition was launched in 2016 to help unite and organize the efforts of activists and organizations across the world to end Internet shutdowns. It now represents more than 280 organizations from 105 countries across the globe. The goal of STOP Project (Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project) is ultimately to document and report shutdowns accurately, which requires diligent verification. Access Now regularly uses multiple sources to identify and understand the shutdown, the choice and combination of which depends on where and how the shutdown occurred.

The tracker uses both quantitative and qualitative data to record the number of Internet shutdowns in the world in a given year and to characterize the nature of the shutdowns, including their magnitude, scope, and causes.

Zach Rosson, #KeepItOn Data Analyst, Access Now, details, “Sometimes, we confirm an Internet shutdown through means such as technical measurement, while at other times we rely upon contextual information, such as news reports or personal accounts. We also work hard to document how a particular shutdown was ordered and how it impacted society, including why and how it happened.

On how Access Now’s #KeepItOn coalition uses Cloudflare Radar, Rosson says, We use Radar Internet shutdown alerts in both email and tweet form, as a trusted source to help verify a shutdown occurrence. These alerts and their underlying measurements are used as primary sources in our dataset when compiling shutdowns for our annual report, so they are used in an archival sense as well. Cloudflare Radar is sometimes the first place that we hear about a shutdown, which is quite useful in a rapid response context, since we can quickly mobilize to verify the shutdown and have strong evidence when advocating against it.

The recorded instances of shutdowns include events reported through local or international news sources that are included in the dataset, from local actors through Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline or the #KeepItOn Coalition email list, or directly from telecommunication and Internet companies.

Rosson notes, When it comes to Radar 2.0 and API, we plan to use these resources to speed up our response, verification, and publication of shutdown data as compiled from different sources. Thus, the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center (CROC) and related API endpoint will be very useful for us to access timely information on shutdowns, either through visual inspection of the CROC in the short term or through using the API to pull data into a centralized database in the long term.

Internet Society: ISOC

Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

On the Internet Society Pulse platform, Susannah Gray, Director, Communications, Internet Society, explains that they strive to curate meaningful information around a government-mandated Internet shutdown by using data from multiple trusted sources, and making it available to everyone, everywhere in an easy-to-understand manner. ISOC does this by monitoring Internet traffic using various tools, including Radar. When they see something that might indicate that an Internet shutdown is in progress, they check if the shutdown meets their  criteria. For a shutdown to appear on the Pulse Shutdowns Tracker it needs to meet all the following requirements. It must:

  • Be artificially induced, as evident from reputable sources, including government statements and orders.
  • Remove Internet access.
  • Affect access to a group of people.

Once ISOC is certain that a shutdown is the result of government action, and isn’t the result of technical errors, routing misconfigurations, or infrastructure failures, they prepare an incident page, collate related measurements from their trusted data partners, and then publish the information on the Pulse shutdowns tracker.

ISOC uses many resources to track shutdowns. Gray explains, Radar Internet shutdown alerts are incredibly useful for bringing incidents to our attention as they are happening. The easy access to the data provided helps us assess the nature of an outage. If an outage is established as a government-mandated shutdown, we often use screenshots of Radar charts on the Pulse shutdowns tracker incident page to help illustrate how traffic stopped flowing in and out of a country during the shutdown. We provide a link back to the Radar platform so that people interested in getting more in-depth data can find out more.

ISOC’s aim has never been to be the first to report a government-mandated shutdown: instead, their mission is to report accurate and meaningful information about the shutdown and explore its impact on the economy and society.

Gray adds, For Radar 2.0 and the API, we plan to use it as part of the data aggregation tool we are developing. This internal tool will combine several outage alert and monitoring tools and sources into one single system so that we are able to track incidents more efficiently.

Open Observatory of Network Interference: OONI

Partnering with civil society to track Internet shutdowns with Radar Alerts and API

OONI is a nonprofit that measures Internet censorship, including the blocking of websites, instant messaging apps, and circumvention tools. Cloudflare Radar is one of the main public data sources that they use when examining reported Internet connectivity shutdowns. For example, OONI relied on Radar data when reporting on shutdowns in Iran amid ongoing protests. In 2022, the team launched the Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT), which enables the public to track censorship worldwide and create their own charts based on real-time OONI data. OONI also forms partnerships with multiple digital rights organizations that use OONI tools and data to monitor and respond to censorship events in their regions.

Maria Xynou, OONI Research and Partnerships Director, explains Cloudflare Radar is one of the main public data sources that OONI has referred to when examining reported internet connectivity shutdowns. Specifically, OONI refers to Cloudflare Radar to check whether the platform provides signals of a reported internet connectivity shutdown; compare Cloudflare Radar signals with those visible in other, relevant public data sources (such as IODA, and Google traffic data).

Tracking the shutdowns of tomorrow

As we work with more organizations in the human rights space and learn how our global network can be used for good, we are eager to improve and create new tools to protect human rights in the digital age.

If you would like to be added to Radar Internet Shutdown alerts, please contact [email protected] and follow the Cloudflare Radar alert Twitter page and Cloudflare Radar Outage Center (CROC). For access to the Radar API, please visit Cloudflare Radar.