Tag Archives: Uncategorized

Friday Squid Blogging: Regulating Squid Fishing in the South Pacific

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/friday-squid-blogging-regulating-squid-fishing-in-the-south-pacific.html

The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO) needs to regulate squid fishing in the South Pacific.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Blog moderation policy.

CISA Security Leak

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/cisa-security-leak.html

Crazy story:

Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history.

News article.

On AI Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/on-ai-security.html

Good report:

Executive Summary: Let’s say you wanted to make sure that your AI is secure. Can you just maximize the security and privacy benchmark and call it a day? Nope, because benchmarks don’t actually work for measuring AI capabilities (even when they are NOT emergent systemic properties like security). So let’s take a step back: how do you measure security in the first place? Good question. Over the last 30 years, security engineering for software evolved from black box penetration testing, through whitebox code analysis and architectural risk analysis to de facto process-driven standards like the Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM). Software had a very deep impact on business operations, and it appears that AI is going to have an even deeper impact. Will a software security-like measurement move work for AI? Probably. In the meantime we can make real progress in AI security by cleaning up our WHAT piles and managing risk by identifying and applying good assurance processes. (Spoiler alert: no matter what we do, we still don’t get a security meter for AI, so we need to be extra vigilant about security.)

Automate root cause analysis across Datadog and Elasticsearch with AWS DevOps Agent

Post Syndicated from Bhuvan Jain original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/automate-root-cause-analysis-across-datadog-and-elasticsearch-with-aws-devops-agent/

Modern distributed systems route business transactions through dozens of microservices, message queues, and event streams. When a message fails to process or processing exceeds SLA thresholds, troubleshooting requires correlating logs from tools like Elasticsearch, metrics from Datadog, and infrastructure change events in AWS CloudTrail. Correlating these signals manually across heterogeneous backends, each with different query languages, schemas, and time granularities, can take hours per incident and demands deep institutional knowledge of the system topology.

This post shows how AWS DevOps Agent, combined with a custom Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Elasticsearch and native Datadog integration, automates end-to-end root cause analysis. When a Datadog alert fires, AWS DevOps Agent automatically initiates an investigation, correlates signals across all observability backends, and delivers root cause findings in minutes, without manual intervention.

In this post, we walk through the architecture, configuration steps, and a real-world scenario demonstrating how AWS DevOps Agent dramatically reduces mean time to identify (MTTI) for distributed system failures. DevOps engineers, site reliability engineers (SREs), and operations leaders managing containerized workloads will learn how to implement alert-triggered automated investigations that eliminate manual correlation and accelerate root cause identification in their own environments.

Challenges in correlating telemetry signals at scale

At scale, correlating telemetry signals across distributed systems is a key challenge. A platform processing billions of communications for regulated industries must track every message through its full lifecycle — ingestion, transformation, policy evaluation, archival, and retrieval — across dozens of production clusters, thousands of worker nodes, and terabytes of daily telemetry spread across multiple observability backends. A single message ID can generate log entries across multiple indices, correlated metrics in monitoring systems, and change events in audit trails. When a message goes missing or processing stalls, the operations team must pinpoint which cluster processed it, which log store holds the evidence, whether a recent deployment preceded the failure, and whether the issue is isolated or systemic — all while context-switching across tools with different query languages and data schemas. Before AWS DevOps Agent, this process routinely took hours per incident, and longer for complex multi-service failures.

The core difficulty is not the volume of data. It is the correlation of signals across heterogeneous systems that use different identifiers, different time granularities, and different data schemas. A message ID in Elasticsearch logs must be correlated to:

  • A trace ID in application performance monitoring (APM) systems
  • A pod name and namespace in Kubernetes event logs
  • A container image tag in Amazon Elastic Container Registry (ECR) push events
  • Metric anomalies (error rate spikes, pod restarts, CPU/memory deviations) in Datadog
  • Deployment events captured in AWS CloudTrail logs

Manual correlation requires engineers to maintain mental models of these relationships while executing queries across multiple systems. It is error-prone, non-repeatable, and heavily dependent on institutional knowledge. When the engineer with the deepest system familiarity is unavailable, resolution times increases.

Prerequisites

Complete the following prerequisites before configuring the integrations:

  1. The AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) version 2. For installation instructions, see installing or updating to the latest version of the AWS CLI.
  2. Helm – the Kubernetes package manager used to deploy the sample application.
  3. Kubectl – the Kubernetes command-line tool used to deploy Filebeat and manage cluster resources.
  4. An EKS cluster with Control plane logs enabled.
  5. AWS DevOps Agent Agentspace. For installation instructions, refer to Creating an Agent Space.
  6. Elasticsearch cluster deployed and accessible (EC2-hosted, Amazon OpenSearch Service, or self-managed). Filebeat configured as a DaemonSet to collect pod logs and forward to Elasticsearch.
  7. Datadog account with API key and application key. To create, see API & Applications key.

Solution Architecture

The solution presented in this post combines three integrated components to deliver automated end-to-end message ID traceability:

  • AWS DevOps Agent as the intelligent investigation orchestrator
  • A custom ELK MCP Server providing structured access to Elasticsearch log data
  • Native Datadog integration for metrics, events, and alert-triggered investigations

Together, these components form an autonomous investigation pipeline that activates when an alert fires, correlates signals across all observability sources, builds a topological understanding of the affected services, and delivers a structured root cause analysis, without manual intervention.

In our implementation, application pods are instrumented to emit custom metrics to Datadog, including per-message-ID processing status, trace ID labels, and endpoint-level error counters. This instrumentation provides AWS DevOps Agent with the ability to correlate a specific message ID from an alert payload to its corresponding trace ID in application performance data, a correlation that previously required manual cross-referencing.

Webhook-Based Alert Triggering

A critical aspect of the architecture is the automated triggering of investigations when alerts fire. Rather than requiring manual investigation initiation, the solution configures Datadog alerting webhooks to invoke AWS DevOps Agent directly.

When a Datadog monitor enters an alert state, it fires a webhook to the AWS DevOps Agent endpoint, including:

  • The message ID associated with the processing failure
  • The trace ID for APM correlation
  • The alert timestamp and alert condition
  • The triggering monitor name and severity

AWS DevOps Agent authenticates the webhook using a bearer token and immediately initiates an investigation in the configured Agent Space. The Datadog webhook payload serves as the investigation’s initial context, seeding the agent with the specific identifiers it needs to perform targeted queries rather than broad searches across the full data volume.

Architecture Diagram

Architecture diagram showing the automated root cause analysis pipeline. A Datadog alert fires a webhook to AWS DevOps Agent, which queries three sources: an ELK MCP Server connected to Elasticsearch for log data, native Datadog integration for metrics, and AWS CloudTrail for deployment events. Results flow back to the Agent Space for correlated root cause analysis.
Figure 1:
Automated root cause analysis pipeline — from Datadog alert to AWS DevOps Agent investigation across Elasticsearch, Datadog, and AWS CloudTrail

Implementation Walkthrough

The following walkthrough describes the end-to-end setup required to replicate the message ID traceability solution in your own environment.

Step 1: Configure EKS Cluster Access for AWS DevOps Agent

AWS DevOps Agent requires an access entry in each EKS cluster it will investigate. This enables the agent to describe Kubernetes objects, retrieve pod logs, and access cluster events.

  1. In the AWS DevOps Agent console, navigate to your Agent Space and select the Capabilities tab.
  2. Under the Cloud section, select the primary source and choose Edit. Note the Role Name shown in the Role Name field, this is the IAM role that requires EKS access.
  3. In the Amazon EKS console, select each cluster and open the Access tab.
  4. Under IAM Access Entries, choose Create to add a new access entry.
  5. Set the IAM Principal ARN to the Agent Space role noted in step 2.
  6. Under Access Policies, select AmazonAIOpsAssistantPolicy with Cluster scope. Choose Add Policy, then Next.
  7. Review and create the access entry.

At scale: For environments with 50+ clusters, use the AWS CLI, Terraform, or a GitOps pipeline to automate access entry creation across all clusters. The following CLI command creates an access entry for a single cluster:

aws eks create-access-entry --cluster-name <CLUSTER_NAME> --principal-arn <AGENTSPACE_ROLE_ARN> --region <REGION>
aws eks associate-access-policy --cluster-name <CLUSTER_NAME> --principal-arn <AGENTSPACE_ROLE_ARN> --policy-arn arn:aws:eks::aws:cluster-access-policy/AmazonAIOpsAssistantPolicy --access-scope type=cluster --region <REGION>

Step 2: Configure Datadog Integration in AWS DevOps Agent

AWS DevOps Agent includes native Datadog integration. Configuration requires your Datadog API credentials and designates the integration as a data source in the Agent Space. In the AWS DevOps Agent console, navigate to Integrations and choose Add Integration and follow the steps.

After configuration, AWS DevOps Agent can query Datadog metrics, monitors, and events during investigations. Custom application metrics (message throughput, error rates, processing status per message ID) are automatically accessible once the integration is active.

Step 3: Deploy and Configure the Custom ELK MCP Server

The Elasticsearch MCP server bridges AWS DevOps Agent to your self-managed Elasticsearch deployment. The MCP server is deployed as a publicly accessible endpoint with TLS authentication, enabling AWS DevOps Agent to call Elasticsearch APIs securely without requiring direct network access to the actual Elasticsearch/Kibana instances.

Note: For basic Elasticsearch integration, the official Elasticsearch MCP server provides a ready-to-use option. For this use case, we built a custom Python MCP server using FastMCP to expose investigation-specific tools — trace ID correlation, time-window log retrieval, and latency analysis — tailored to our message traceability workflow.

The custom server implementation provides the thirteen tools required for log search, index discovery, and aggregation.

Table: ELK MCP Server tools access by AWS DevOps Agent during investigations
MCP Tool Description
search_logs Search by Lucene query string, time range, and log level
get_error_summary Top recurring errors within a time window
get_recent_logs Fetch most recent log entries from an index
get_logs_by_service Filter logs by service or application name
count_logs_by_level Breakdown of log counts by level (ERROR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG)
get_slow_requests Find requests exceeding a latency threshold
get_logs_around_time Fetch logs within ±N minutes of a specific timestamp
search_by_trace_id Find all logs for a specific trace, request, or correlation ID
get_unique_errors Get distinct error messages in a time window
list_indices List all available Elasticsearch indices with doc counts and health
get_index_stats Get size, document count, and health of a specific index
get_logs_by_host Filter logs by the hostname that sent them via Filebeat
get_logs_by_file Filter logs by the source log file path
  1. Launch an Ubuntu instance (t4g.medium or larger) with a security group allowing inbound TCP 443 from AWS DevOps Agent service endpoints.Note: The single-instance deployment described here is intended for demonstration purposes and does not provide high availability. For production workloads requiring managed infrastructure, automatic scaling, and built-in resilience for your MCP servers, consider using Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime.
  2. Install dependencies and obtain a TLS certificate:
    sudo apt update &&sudo apt install -y python3 python3-venv certbot
    python3 -m venv ~/elk-mcp-venv
    source ~/elk-mcp-venv/bin/activate
    pip install mcp elasticsearch uvicorn starlette
    sudo certbot certonly --standalone -d elk-mcp.yourcompany.com
  3. Create the MCP server. The key architectural decisions are: FastMCP for the Streamable HTTP transport, Starlette middleware for API key authentication, and environment variables for configuration:
    import json, os
    from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
    from elasticsearch import Elasticsearch
    from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
    from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
    
    ES_HOST = os.environ.get("ES_HOST", "http://localhost:9200")
    API_KEY = os.environ.get("MCP_API_KEY", "YOUR_API_KEY")
    es = Elasticsearch(hosts=[ES_HOST])
    mcp = FastMCP("elk-logs", host="elk-mcp.yourcompany.com")
    
    # API key authentication middleware
    class APIKeyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
        async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
            if request.headers.get("x-api-key") != API_KEY:
                return JSONResponse({"error": "Unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
            return await call_next(request)
    
    # Example: trace ID correlation tool
    @mcp.tool
    def search_by_trace_id(trace_id: str, index: str, size: int = 100) -> str:
        """Find all logs for a specific request or trace ID."""
        result = es.search(index=index, body={
            "query": {"multi_match": {
                "query": trace_id,
                "fields": ["trace_id", "request_id", "correlation_id", "traceId"]
            }},
            "sort": [{"@timestamp": "asc"}],
            "size": size
        })
        return json.dumps([h["_source"] for h in result["hits"]["hits"]], indent=2)
    
    # ... additional tools follow the same pattern
    
    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
    app.add_middleware(APIKeyMiddleware)
    
    if __name__ == "__main__":
        import uvicorn
        uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=443,
            ssl_keyfile="/etc/letsencrypt/live/elk-mcp.yourcompany.com/privkey.pem",
            ssl_certfile="/etc/letsencrypt/live/elk-mcp.yourcompany.com/fullchain.pem")
  4. Start the server:
    sudo -E ES_HOST=http://<ELASTICSEARCH_IP>:9200 MCP_API_KEY=<YOUR_API_KEY> nohup ~/elk-mcp-venv/bin/python ~/elk_mcp_server.py > ~/mcp.log 2>&1 &
  5. Register in AWS DevOps Agent:
    1. In the AWS DevOps Agent console, navigate to Integrations -> Add MCP Integration.
    2. Enter the endpoint URL: https://elk-mcp.yourcompany.com:443/mcp
    3. Enter the API key for authentication.
    4. Verify the integration shows all available tools in the integration detail view.
    5. Add the MCP integration to your Agent Space under the Integrations tab.

Note: The MCP server must be publicly accessible over HTTPS. If your Elasticsearch cluster is in a private VPC, deploy the MCP server with network access to the cluster (e.g., in the same VPC or a peered VPC) while exposing only the MCP server endpoint publicly. Use security group rules to restrict access to AWS DevOps Agent’s known egress IP ranges where possible.

Step 4: Deploy the Application and Configure Filebeat on EKS

Filebeat runs as a Kubernetes DaemonSet on each EKS cluster, collecting pod logs and enriching them with Kubernetes metadata before forwarding to Elasticsearch. The following pipeline configuration ensures that message IDs and trace IDs are preserved as indexed fields, enabling efficient targeted queries during investigations.

  1. Clone the Repository and Build the Container Image:
    # Clone the DevOps agent sample repository
    git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/Amazon-prometheus-bedrock-agent-example.git
    
    # Navigate to the smart demo directory
    cd devops-agent/smart-demo-main/
    
    # Authenticate Docker to your ECR registry
    aws ecr get-login-password --region us-west-2 | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin <your-account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
    
    # Build the container image
    docker build -t sample-app .
    
    # Tag the image for ECR
    docker tag sample-app:latest <your-account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/smart-demp:latest
    
    # Push the image to ECR
    docker push <your-account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/smart-demp:latest
  2. Deploy the Application to EKS:
    # Deploy the sample application to EKS using Helm
    helm install sample-app ./helm --set image.repository=<your-account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/smart-demp --set image.tag=latest
  3. Deploy Filebeat as DaemonSet:
    # Navigate to the Filebeat directory
    cd filebeat
    
    # Apply the Filebeat ConfigMap (autodiscovery, JSON parsing, K8s metadata enrichment, Logstash output)
    kubectl apply -f filebeat-configmap.yaml
    
    # Deploy Filebeat as a DaemonSet on every node in the cluster
    kubectl apply -f filebeat-ds.yaml

Step 5: Configure Datadog Webhook for Automatic Investigation Triggering

We will automatically trigger AWS DevOps Agent investigations when Datadog alerts fire. This eliminates the human latency between alert detection and investigation initiation.

Retrieve the AWS DevOps Agent webhook URL and secret:

  1. In the AWS DevOps Agent console, navigate to your Agent Space and open the Capabilities tab.
  2. Under the Webhook section, choose Configure, then Generate webhook.
  3. Save the webhook URL and HMAC secret. These credentials are used to authenticate webhook requests from Datadog.

In Datadog, configure a webhook integration:

  1. Navigate to Integrations -> Webhooks and create a new webhook.
  2. Set the URL to the AWS DevOps Agent webhook endpoint.
  3. Add the Authorization header with the bearer token from step 3.
  4. Configure the payload to include the message ID, trace ID, and alert context:
    {
    "title": "Message Processing Failure - $EVENT_TITLE",
    "description": "$EVENT_MSG",
    "alert_id": "$ALERT_ID",
    "alert_status": "$ALERT_STATUS",
    "timestamp": "$TIMESTAMP",
    "message_id": "$tags.message_id",
    "trace_id": "$tags.trace_id",
    "service": "$tags.service",
    "cluster": "$tags.cluster_name",
    "severity": "$ALERT_PRIORITY"
    }
  5. Associate the webhook with the Datadog monitors that detect message processing failures by adding @webhook-webhook-name to the monitor notification message.

Step 6: Configure Agent Space Skills (Optional but Recommended)

AWS DevOps Agent Skills provide a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) knowledge base that gives the agent organization-specific context during investigations. Even a brief skills document (2-3 paragraphs) that identifies your application’s purpose, its key components, and its observability backends can reduce AWS DevOps Agent investigation time by helping the agent understand context before executing its first queries.

In our implementation, the skills document described the sample message-processing application, identified Elasticsearch as the logging backend, and identified Datadog as the metrics backend.

Real-World Investigation: Message Processing Failure Diagnosed in 6 Minutes

The following walkthrough and the scenario represent a common class of incident in distributed systems: a silent functional regression introduced through a new container image deployment that causes specific message types to fail processing without immediately obvious symptoms.

The Scenario

The production EKS cluster runs a message-processing application (sample-app) with four HTTP endpoints:

  • /health – Application health check
  • /metrics – Prometheus metrics endpoint
  • /process – Core message processing endpoint
  • /alert – Alert notification endpoint (newly introduced in recent deployment)

A new container image was pushed to Amazon ECR with a new /alert endpoint. However, the endpoint implementation was incomplete when called; it returned an HTTP 404 response and silently dropped the associated message. The Filebeat DaemonSet collected pod logs and sent them into Elasticsearch. Datadog captured application metrics with message ID and trace ID labels. A Datadog monitor detected the elevated error rate and fired.

Phase 1: Alert Fires and Investigation Initiates (T+0:00)

At 14:52:57 UTC, a Datadog monitor detected an elevated rate of failed message processing requests on the /alert endpoint. The monitor fired a webhook to the AWS DevOps Agent endpoint with the alert payload context.

Within 10 seconds, the Agent read its investigation skills (sample-app-incident and triaging-3p-monitoring-alerts) and began planning the investigation approach.

Screenshot of AWS DevOps Agent console showing an investigation automatically initiated via Datadog webhook. The alert payload context includes message ID, trace ID, and alert timestamp. Investigation skills sample-app-incident and triaging-3p-monitoring-alerts are loaded
Figure 2: AWS DevOps Agent investigation initiated automatically via Datadog webhook, showing alert payload context and investigation skills loaded

Phase 2: Cross-Source Signal Correlation (T+0:10 – T+2:30)

AWS DevOps Agent began its investigation by using the message ID from the alert payload as its primary search key. It decided its investigation strategy: extract the trace_id from Elasticsearch using the message_id, get Datadog monitor details, and search for errors around the alert time.

Elasticsearch Log Search
The agent invoked the ELK MCP server to list available indices and identify the relevant log store for the message-processor application. It then executed a targeted search and identified the relevant Elasticsearch index (logs-2026.03.25):

Screenshot of AWS DevOps Agent querying the ELK MCP Server to correlate a message ID to a trace ID across Elasticsearch indices. The agent identifies the relevant log index logs and retrieves matching log entries
Figure 3: AWS DevOps Agent querying the ELK MCP Server to correlate message ID to trace ID across Elasticsearch indices

AWS DevOps Agent surfaced the Message ID to Trace ID correlation without any explicit cross-referencing instruction. It recognized the relationship from the log structure. At T+1:41, the DevOps Agent launched three parallel tasks simultaneously, rather than investigating sequentially.

Screenshot showing the trace ID successfully resolved from the Elasticsearch log structure, triggering three parallel investigation tasks: Datadog metrics correlation, EKS topology analysis, and CloudTrail event correlation.Figure 4: Trace ID successfully resolved from log structure, triggering three parallel investigation tasks

Datadog Metrics Correlation
Using the trace ID extracted from the Elasticsearch logs, the agent queried Datadog for correlated metrics. It retrieved CPU and memory utilization, pod count, restart metrics and enhanced metrics for request latency and errors.

Screenshot of Datadog metrics retrieved by AWS DevOps Agent using the extracted trace ID, showing CPU utilization, memory usage, pod restart counts, and request latency metrics for the affected service.
Figure 5: Datadog metrics correlation showing CPU, memory, pod restarts, and request latency retrieved using the extracted trace ID

AWS EKS Topology & CloudTrail Event Correlation
AWS DevOps Agent queried AWS CloudTrail for deployment and configuration change events in the time window preceding the alert.

Screenshot of AWS CloudTrail event correlation identifying deployment and configuration change events in the time window preceding the alert, including ECR image push and EKS rolling deployment events
Figure 6: AWS CloudTrail event correlation identifying deployment and configuration changes in the alert time window

With the initial timeline established, AWS DevOps Agent examined all endpoints and their response patterns. This revealed that the application was fundamentally healthy, with three of four endpoints returned consistent 200 responses. However, it also revealed the anomaly was isolated to the /alert endpoint, which had never successfully served a request in its observable history.

Screenshot of AWS DevOps Agent endpoint analysis showing three healthy endpoints returning HTTP 200 responses (health, metrics, process) and the alert endpoint returning consistent HTTP 404 failures, isolating the anomaly to the newly deployed alert endpoint.
Figure 7: AWS DevOps Agent endpoint analysis revealing isolated 404 failures on the /alert endpoint while other endpoints remain healthy

Phase 3: Observation Streaming from Parallel Tasks (T+2:30 – T+3:54)

As the three tasks ran simultaneously, observations streamed in chronologically:

T+2:58 – Observation: Anomalous CPU Behavior Signals Pod Disruption

The first sign of trouble came from pod tr8pl. Its CPU usage dropped sharply. Around the same time, two unfamiliar pods (85bx4, 7h4bd) briefly appeared with minimal CPU. Shortly after, three new pods (hclf9, b7bp2, g6gkc) spun up. This pattern of old pods dying, short-lived intermediaries, and fresh containers starting up pointed strongly toward a rolling deployment in progress.

T+3:04 – Observation: ECR Image Push Traced as the Trigger

With the deployment pattern established, the next question was: what initiated it? CloudTrail provided the answer. At 14:57:19 UTC, a user vik**** (via role nht-admin) pushed a new container image to ECR repository sm***demp:latest (ECR image tag). The timeline now made sense:

  1. ECR image push at 14:57:19 UTC
  2. Rolling deployment (pods replaced)
  3. /alert endpoint 404 errors begin
  4. Datadog alert fires

Screenshot showing parallel task observations streaming into AWS DevOps Agent. Anomalous CPU behavior indicates pod disruption from a rolling deployment, and CloudTrail evidence links an ECR image push by user vik at 14:57:19 UTC to the deployment that introduced the failing endpoint.
Figure 8: Parallel task observations streaming into AWS DevOps Agent – anomalous CPU behavior indicating pod disruption and CloudTrail evidence linking the ECR image push to the rolling deployment

Phase 4: Findings Documented – Causal Chain Established (T+3:55 – T+5:08)

At T+3:55, the Agent documented its first formal Finding (elevated from Observation):

Screenshot of AWS DevOps Agent documenting its formal finding, establishing the causal chain: ECR image push triggered rolling deployment, new container image contained incomplete alert endpoint implementation, endpoint returns 404 and drops messages.
Figure 9: AWS DevOps Agent formal finding documenting the causal chain from ECR image push to alert endpoint failure

Phase 5: Root Cause Confirmation and Infrastructure Validation (T+5:10 – T+5:30)

AWS DevOps Agent validated infrastructure health. The complete absence of infrastructure issues, combined with the timeline evidence from CloudTrail and the historical 404 pattern on the /alert endpoint, allowed AWS DevOps Agent to deliver a high-confidence root cause identification.

At 14:58:12 UTC, exactly 5 minutes and 14 seconds (under 6 minutes) after the investigation began, AWS DevOps Agent delivered its root cause analysis:

Screenshot of the final root cause analysis delivered by AWS DevOps Agent at 14:58:12 UTC, 5 minutes and 14 seconds after investigation began. Root cause identified as an incomplete alert endpoint in the newly deployed container image that returns HTTP 404 and silently drops associated messages.
Figure 10: Final root cause analysis delivered by AWS DevOps Agent, identifying the incomplete alert endpoint in the newly deployed container image

Clean-up

Step 1: Delete the AWS DevOps Agent AgentSpace

  1. In the AWS DevOps Agent console, navigate to Agent Spaces.
  2. Select the Agent Space you created for this walkthrough.
  3. Remove all integrations (Datadog, ELK MCP Server) from the Agent Space by navigating to the Capabilities tab and choosing Remove for each.
  4. Choose Delete Agent Space from Actions dropdown and confirm the deletion.

Step 2: Terminate the Microservices and Delete the EKS Cluster

First, remove the application workloads and Filebeat DaemonSet deployed on the cluster:

# Uninstall the sample application Helm release
helm uninstall sample-app

# Delete the Filebeat DaemonSet and ConfigMap
kubectl delete -f filebeat/filebeat-ds.yaml
kubectl delete -f filebeat/filebeat-configmap.yaml

Once the workloads are removed, delete the EKS cluster.

Step 3: Terminate EC2 Instances

Terminate the EC2 instances hosting both the MCP server and the Elasticsearch cluster. You can do this from the AWS Management Console or the AWS CLI:

# Terminate the MCP server EC2 instance
aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids <MCP_SERVER_INSTANCE_ID> --region <REGION>

# Terminate the Elasticsearch EC2 instances
aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids <ELASTICSEARCH_INSTANCE_ID> --region <REGION>

Conclusion

Distributed systems have created a correlation problem that scales faster than the human capacity to solve it. As microservices architectures grow to span dozens of clusters, hundreds of services, and terabytes of daily telemetry, the manual investigation practices that worked at smaller scale become the primary obstacle in maintaining operational quality.

AWS DevOps Agent addresses this challenge at its root by automating the multi-source correlation that previously required experienced engineers working across multiple systems. The combination of native Datadog integration, custom ELK MCP server connectivity, and AWS CloudTrail access enables AWS DevOps Agent to build the complete picture of an incident: from the first metric anomaly, through the log evidence, to the deployment event that caused it. The scenario described in this post demonstrates that a message processing incident that previously consumed hours can be diagnosed to root cause in under six minutes automatically, without manual intervention, and with the full investigation documented for audit and learning purposes.

About the Authors

Bhuvan Jain

Bhuvan Jain

Bhuvan is a Senior Technical Account Manager at Amazon Web Services, supporting independent software vendor (ISV) customers. He is passionate about helping customers build Well-Architected solutions on AWS, with a focus on enterprise-scale networking. As a subject matter expert, Bhuvan offers guidance on designing network architectures that are highly available, resilient, and cost-effective. He holds a Master’s degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). In his free time, he enjoys playing basketball and volleyball, as well as watching movies and TV series.

Vikram Venkataraman

Vikram Venkataraman

Vikram Venkataraman is a Principal Specialist Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. He helps customers modernize, scale, and adopt best practices for containerized workloads on Amazon EKS. With the emergence of AI-powered automation, Vikram has been actively working with customers to leverage AWS AI/ML services to solve complex operational challenges, streamline monitoring workflows, and enhance incident response through intelligent automation. He designed and built the POC architecture described in this post and is a co-author of the EKS knowledge graphs blog.

Laurie Anderson Is Quoting Me

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/laurie-anderson-is-quoting-me.html

Not by name, but Laurie Anderson quotes me in one of the tracks of her new album:

My favorite quote is from a cryptologist who said “If you think technology will solve your problems, you don’t understand technology and you don’t understand your problems.”

Also in interviews:

“Of course, it’s ridiculous, outrageous, blah, blah, blah,” Anderson says about the ad. ‘But, I mean, my favorite quote on this is from a cryptologist who said, ‘If you think technology will solve your problems, you don’t understand technology ­ and you don’t understand your problems.’ And I think I’m completely on board with that.”

People are telling me that she has been reciting this quote in performances for years. (I lost track of her since college and her 1981 hit “”https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vkfpi2H8tOE”>O Superman.”)

The origins of the quote is from Roger Needham:

If you think cryptography can solve your problem, you don’t understand your problem and you don’t understand cryptography.

I modified the quote in the preface to my 2000 book Secrets and Lies:

A few years ago I heard a quotation, and I am going to modify it here: If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology.

I can’t tell you why me in 2000 didn’t credit Needham by name. I should have.

I have used the quote pretty consistently since then. Somewhere along the line I dropped “security” from the phrase, and now say it more like Anderson quotes me:

If you think technology will solve your problem, you don’t understand your problem and you don’t understand technology.

I sometimes use singular and sometimes use plural. Sometimes I say “the problem” and “the technology.” But I think the quote flows better ending with just the word “technology.”

Ensure Code Integrity for AWS Lambda Functions with Automated Code Signing Using Terraform

Post Syndicated from Sourav Kundu original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/ensure-code-integrity-for-aws-lambda-functions-with-automated-code-signing-using-terraform/

Authors: Sourav Kundu and Joyson Neville Lewis.

In today’s cloud-native landscape, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of your serverless functions is critical for maintaining security and compliance. Organizations face increasing challenges in preventing the execution of tampered or malicious code in their AWS Lambda functions. These challenges intensify as deployment pipelines become more complex and distributed.

AWS Lambda code signing provides a robust security mechanism that guarantees only trusted, unmodified code executes in your Lambda functions. By implementing digital signatures, you can verify code integrity and authenticate the source, creating a secure foundation for your serverless applications.

This post shows you how to implement AWS Lambda code signing using Terraform, creating an automated, end-to-end security framework that prevents unauthorized code execution while maintaining operational efficiency.

Solution overview

This solution creates a comprehensive code signing pipeline that automatically signs Lambda deployment packages and enforces signature validation at runtime. The implementation uses AWS Signer with the SHA384-ECDSA algorithm for cryptographic security, combined with Terraform automation for consistent deployments across environments.

Figure 1: Architecture diagram of AWS Lambda signing with AWS Signer

Figure 1: Architecture diagram of AWS Lambda signing with AWS Signer

The architecture includes:

AWS Signer: Creates signing profiles and jobs with strong cryptographic algorithms

Amazon S3: Stores original and signed Lambda code with versioning enabled

AWS Lambda: Deployed with code signing enforcement in a VPC environment

AWS KMS: Provides encryption for CloudWatch logs and SQS dead letter queue

VPC Configuration: Isolates Lambda execution in private subnets with VPC endpoints

Walkthrough

This walkthrough demonstrates how to deploy a secure Lambda function with code signing enabled using Terraform, a popular infrastructure as code.

The deployment process includes these key steps:

  1. Set up AWS Signer signing profile with cryptographic configuration
  2. Create S3 bucket with versioning for code storage
  3. Configure automated code signing jobs
  4. Secure Lambda deployment
  5. Implement security best practices including KMS encryption and VPC isolation
  6. Deploy the infrastructure with Terraform

Link to GitHub repository: AWS Lambda Code Signing with Terraform.

Prerequisites

For this walkthrough, you should have the following prerequisites:

– An AWS account with appropriate permissions for AWS Signer, Lambda, S3, and VPC services

Terraform >= 1.0 installed on your local machine

AWS CLI configured with credentials that have necessary service permissions

– Basic understanding of AWS Lambda, Terraform, and infrastructure as code concepts

1. Setup AWS Signer Signing Profile

The foundation of our code signing implementation starts with creating an AWS Signer signing profile. This profile is the identity that defines the cryptographic algorithm and signature validity period.

1.1 Define the signing profile resource in your Terraform configuration:

   resource "aws_signer_signing_profile" "lambda_signing_profile" {
     platform_id = "AWSLambda-SHA384-ECDSA"
     name        = "${replace(var.name, "-", "_")}_lambda_signing_profile_${random_string.suffix.result}"
     signature_validity_period {
       value = 135
       type  = "MONTHS"
     }
   }

We use the AWSLambda-SHA384-ECDSA platform, which provides strong cryptographic security with SHA-384 hashing and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm).

1.2 Configure the code signing configuration that enforces security policies:

   resource "aws_lambda_code_signing_config" "configuration" {
     allowed_publishers {
       signing_profile_version_arns = [aws_signer_signing_profile.lambda_signing_profile.version_arn]
     }
     policies {
       untrusted_artifact_on_deployment = "Enforce"
     }
     description = "Code signing configuration for ${var.name} Lambda function."
   }

The untrusted_artifact_on_deployment = "Enforce" policy ensures that Lambda rejects any unsigned or improperly signed code.

2. Create S3 bucket with versioning for code storage

Before the code can be signed, it needs to be packaged and stored in a versioned S3 bucket. AWS Signer requires S3 versioning to uniquely identify the source artifact for each signing job.

2.1 Create the S3 bucket with versioning enabled:

resource "aws_s3_bucket" "lambda_source" {
  bucket        = "${var.name}-lambda-source-${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}"
  force_destroy = true
}

resource "aws_s3_bucket_versioning" "lambda_source" {
  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.lambda_source.id
  versioning_configuration {
    status = "Enabled"
  }
}

Versioning is not optional here — AWS Signer uses the S3 object version_id to reference the exact artifact to sign.

2.2 Package the Lambda function code and upload it to the bucket:

data "archive_file" "python_file" {
  type        = "zip"
  source_dir  = "${path.module}/lambda_function/"
  output_path = "${path.module}/lambda_function/lambda_function.zip"
}

resource "aws_s3_object" "lambda_zip" {
  bucket     = aws_s3_bucket.lambda_source.bucket
  key        = "lambda_function.zip"
  source     = data.archive_file.python_file.output_path
  etag       = filemd5(data.archive_file.python_file.output_path)
  depends_on = [aws_s3_bucket_versioning.lambda_source]
}

The archive_file data source zips the contents of the lambda_function/ directory, and the aws_s3_object uploads it to the versioned bucket. The depends_on ensures versioning is active before the upload, so the object gets a version_id that the signing job can reference.

3. Configure automated Code Signing jobs

The next step creates an automated signing job that processes your Lambda code and generates signed artifacts.

3.1 Upload your Lambda code and configure the signing job:

   resource "aws_signer_signing_job" "build_signing_job" {
     profile_name = aws_signer_signing_profile.lambda_signing_profile.name

     source {
       s3 {
         bucket  = aws_s3_bucket.lambda_source.bucket
         key     = aws_s3_object.lambda_zip.key
         version = aws_s3_object.lambda_zip.version_id
       }
     }

     destination {
       s3 {
         bucket = aws_s3_bucket.lambda_source.bucket
         prefix = "signed/"
       }
     }
   }

This signing job automatically processes the uploaded Lambda code, creating a signed version stored in the signed/ prefix of your S3 bucket.

4. Secure Lambda Deployment

The Lambda function is configured to use the signed code and enforce code signing.

4.1 Deploy the Lambda function using the signed artifact:

resource "aws_lambda_function" "lambda_run" {
  s3_bucket        = aws_signer_signing_job.build_signing_job.signed_object[0].s3[0].bucket
  s3_key           = aws_signer_signing_job.build_signing_job.signed_object[0].s3[0].key
  source_code_hash = data.archive_file.python_file.output_base64sha256
  function_name    = var.name
  role             = aws_iam_role.lambda_role.arn
  handler          = "handler.lambda_handler"
  runtime          = "python3.12"
  
  code_signing_config_arn = aws_lambda_code_signing_config.configuration.arn
  
  kms_key_arn = aws_kms_key.encryption.arn
  vpc_config {
    subnet_ids         = aws_subnet.private[*].id
    security_group_ids = [aws_security_group.lambda.id]
  }
  tracing_config {
    mode = "Active"
  }
  dead_letter_config {
    target_arn = aws_sqs_queue.dlq.arn
  }
}

The s3_bucket and s3_key reference the signed artifact produced by the signing job. Terraform resolves aws_signer_signing_job.build_signing_job.signed_object[0].s3[0] to the output location where AWS Signer wrote the signed package in step 3. This ensures Lambda always deploys the signed version, never the unsigned source.

The code_signing_config_arn ties the Lambda function to the code signing configuration from step 1. At deploy time, Lambda validates the artifact’s signature against the allowed publishers in that configuration. If the signature is missing, expired, or from an untrusted profile, the deployment is rejected.

5. Implement Security Best Practices

This implementation includes additional security layers beyond code signing to create a comprehensive security framework.

5.1 Create a KMS key with automatic key rotation and a least-privilege policy:

resource "aws_kms_key" "encryption" {
  enable_key_rotation     = true
  description             = "Key to encrypt all the cloud resources in ${var.name}."
  deletion_window_in_days = var.deletion_window_in_days
}

data "aws_iam_policy_document" "encryption_policy" {
  statement {
    sid    = "Enable IAM User Permissions"
    effect = "Allow"
    principals {
      type        = "AWS"
      identifiers = ["arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:root"]
    }
    actions = [
      "kms:Encrypt", "kms:Decrypt", "kms:ReEncrypt*",
      "kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:DescribeKey",
      "kms:Create*", "kms:Enable*", "kms:List*",
      "kms:Put*", "kms:Update*", "kms:Revoke*",
      "kms:Disable*", "kms:Get*", "kms:Delete*",
      "kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion", "kms:CancelKeyDeletion",
      "kms:TagResource", "kms:UntagResource"
    ]
    resources = [aws_kms_key.encryption.arn]
  }
  statement {
    sid    = "Allow CloudWatch to use the key"
    effect = "Allow"
    principals {
      type        = "Service"
      identifiers = ["logs.amazonaws.com"]
    }
    actions = [
      "kms:Encrypt", "kms:Decrypt", "kms:ReEncrypt*",
      "kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:DescribeKey", "kms:CreateGrant"
    ]
    resources = [aws_kms_key.encryption.arn]
    condition {
      test     = "ArnEquals"
      variable = "kms:EncryptionContext:aws:logs:arn"
      values   = [local.cloudwatch_log_group_arn]
    }
  }
  statement {
    sid    = "Allow Lambda to use the key"
    effect = "Allow"
    principals {
      type        = "Service"
      identifiers = ["lambda.amazonaws.com"]
    }
    actions = [
      "kms:Encrypt", "kms:Decrypt", "kms:ReEncrypt*",
      "kms:GenerateDataKey*", "kms:DescribeKey", "kms:CreateGrant"
    ]
    resources = [aws_kms_key.encryption.arn]
    condition {
      test     = "StringEquals"
      variable = "kms:EncryptionContext:LambdaFunctionName"
      values   = [var.name]
    }
    condition {
      test     = "StringEquals"
      variable = "aws:RequestedRegion"
      values   = [var.region]
    }
  }
}

resource "aws_kms_key_policy" "encryption" {
  key_id = aws_kms_key.encryption.id
  policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.encryption_policy.json
}

The enable_key_rotation = true setting enables automatic annual key rotation, a recommended security practice. The policy uses aws_iam_policy_document instead of inline JSON for better readability and validation. Each statement is scoped to a specific principal: the root account gets administrative access with enumerated actions (not kms:*), CloudWatch Logs can only use the key for the specific log group via the kms:EncryptionContext:aws:logs:arn condition, and Lambda access is constrained to the specific function name and region. This ensures no service can use the key beyond its intended scope.

5.2 Configure VPC with private subnets for Lambda isolation:

resource "aws_vpc" "main" {
  cidr_block           = var.vpc_cidr
  enable_dns_hostnames = true
  enable_dns_support   = true
}

resource "aws_subnet" "private" {
  count             = length(var.subnet_cidr_private)
  vpc_id            = aws_vpc.main.id
  cidr_block        = var.subnet_cidr_private[count.index]
  availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[count.index]
}

The enable_dns_hostnames and enable_dns_support settings are required for VPC endpoints to resolve via private DNS.

5.3 Add VPC endpoints so the Lambda function can reach CloudWatch Logs and SQS from the private subnets without internet access:

resource "aws_vpc_endpoint" "logs" {
  vpc_id              = aws_vpc.main.id
  service_name        = "com.amazonaws.${var.region}.logs"
  vpc_endpoint_type   = "Interface"
  subnet_ids          = aws_subnet.private[*].id
  security_group_ids  = [aws_security_group.endpoint_sg.id]
  private_dns_enabled = true
}

resource "aws_vpc_endpoint" "sqs" {
  vpc_id              = aws_vpc.main.id
  service_name        = "com.amazonaws.${var.region}.sqs"
  vpc_endpoint_type   = "Interface"
  subnet_ids          = aws_subnet.private[*].id
  security_group_ids  = [aws_security_group.endpoint_sg.id]
  private_dns_enabled = true
}

The Lambda function uses an SQS dead letter queue and hence requires the SQS endpoint. The private_dns_enabled setting allows the Lambda function to reach these services using their standard endpoints without any code changes. For the complete networking configuration including security groups and route tables, see the GitHub repository.

These security measures create defense in depth, combining code signing with encryption, network isolation, and secure communication channels.

6. Deploy the Infrastructure

With all the resources defined, initialize and deploy the complete infrastructure:

terraform init
terraform plan
terraform apply

The terraform init command downloads the required providers. The terraform plan command previews all the resources that will be created, and terraform apply provisions the entire stack — signing profile, S3 bucket, signing job, Lambda function, and all supporting infrastructure — in the correct dependency order.

Verification

After the deployment completes, verify that the signing profile, signing job, and Lambda code signing configuration are correctly set up.

Verify the signing profile is active:

aws signer list-signing-profiles --query "profiles[].{Name:profileName,Status:status}" --output table

Confirm the signing job completed successfully:

aws signer list-signing-jobs --status Succeeded --query "jobs[0].{JobId:jobId,Status:status,SignedObject:signedObject}" --output table

Verify the Lambda function has code signing enforced:

aws lambda get-function-code-signing-config --function-name <YOUR-FUNCTION-NAME> --query "{CodeSigningConfigArn:CodeSigningConfigArn}" --output table

Each command should return results confirming the resources are active and properly configured. If any command returns empty results, review the Terraform output for errors during deployment.

Cleaning Up

To avoid incurring future charges, delete the resources created in this walkthrough using the command:

terraform destroy

This command removes all resources including the Lambda function, S3 bucket, VPC components, and KMS keys. This command also deletes the signing profile and code signing configuration.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to implement AWS Lambda code signing using Terraform to create a secure, automated deployment pipeline. This solution ensures code integrity, prevents unauthorized modifications, and helps meet compliance requirements while maintaining operational efficiency through infrastructure as code.

The implementation demonstrates defense-in-depth security practices including cryptographic signing, encryption at rest, network isolation, and comprehensive monitoring. By automating the entire process with Terraform, you can consistently deploy secure Lambda functions across multiple environments and maintain security standards at scale.

For more information about AWS Lambda security best practices, see the AWS Lambda Developer Guide. To learn more about AWS Signer, visit the AWS Signer Developer Guide.


About the authors

Sourav Kundu

Sourav is a seasoned DevOps Consultant who specializes in helping organizations securely migrate to and efficiently build on the AWS cloud using modern software engineering practices. He believes that democratizing cloud knowledge is essential for driving innovation and is committed to helping others succeed in their cloud journey.

Joyson Neville Lewis

Joyson is a Sr. Conversational AI Architect with AWS Professional Services. Joyson worked as a Software/Data engineer before diving into the Conversational AI and Industrial IoT space. He assists AWS customers to materialize AI outcomes using Voice Assistant/Chatbot and IoT solutions.

Zero-Day Exploit Against Windows BitLocker

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/zero-day-exploit-against-windows-bitlocker.html

It’s nasty, but it requires physical access to the computer:

The exploit, named YellowKey, was published earlier this week by a researcher who goes by the alias Nightmare-Eclipse. It reliably bypasses default Windows 11 deployments of BitLocker, the full-volume encryption protection Microsoft provides to make disk contents off-limits to anyone without the decryption key, which is stored in a secured piece of hardware known as a trusted platform module (TPM). BitLocker is a mandatory protection for many organizations, including those that contract with governments.

Slashdot thread. And here’s Nightmare-Eclipse’s GitHub account.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/upcoming-speaking-engagements-56.html

This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:

The list is maintained on this page.

How Dangerous Is Anthropic’s Mythos AI?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/how-dangerous-is-anthropics-mythos-ai.html

Last month, Anthropic made a remarkable announcement about its new model, Claude Mythos Preview: it was so good at finding security vulnerabilities in software that the company would not release it to the general public. Instead, it would only be available to a select group of companies to scan and fix their own software.

The announcement requires context—but it contained an essential truth.

While Anthropic’s model is really good at finding software vulnerabilities, so are other models. The UK’s AI Security Institute found that OpenAI’s GPT-5.5, already generally available, is comparable in capability. The company Aisle reproduced Anthropic’s published results with smaller, cheaper models.

At the same time, Anthropic’s refusal to publicly release its new model makes a virtue out of necessity. Mythos is very expensive to run, and the company doesn’t appear to have the resources for a general release. What better way to juice the company’s valuation than to hint at capabilities but not prove them, and then have others parrot their claims?

Nonetheless, the truth is scary. Modern generative AI systems—not just Anthropic’s, but OpenAI’s and other, open-source models—are getting really good at finding and exploiting vulnerabilities in software. And that has important ramifications for cybersecurity: on both the offense and the defense.

Attackers will use these capabilities to find, and automatically hack, vulnerabilities in systems of all kinds. They will be able to break into critical systems around the world, sometimes to plant ransomware and make money, sometimes to steal data for espionage purposes, and sometimes to control systems in times of hostility. This will make the world a much more dangerous, and more volatile, place.

But at the same time, defenders will use these same capabilities to find, and then patch, many of those same systems. For example, Mozilla used Mythos to find 271 vulnerabilities in Firefox. Those vulnerabilities have been fixed, and will never again be available to attackers. In the future, AIs automatically finding and fixing vulnerabilities in all software will be a normal part of the development process, which will result in much more secure software.

Of course, it’s not that simple. We should expect a deluge of both attackers using newly found vulnerabilities to break into systems, and at the same time much more frequent software updates for every app and device we use. But lots of systems aren’t patchable, and many systems that are don’t get patched, meaning that many vulnerabilities will stick around. And it does seem that finding and exploiting is easier than finding and fixing. All of this points to a more dangerous short-term future. Organizations will need to adapt their security to this new reality.

But it’s the long term that we need to focus on. Mythos isn’t unique, but it’s more capable than many models that have come before. And it’s less capable than models that will come after. AIs are much better at writing software than they were just six months ago. There’s every reason to believe that they will continue to get better, which means that they will get better at writing more secure software. The endgame gives AI-enhanced defenders advantages over AI-enhanced attackers.

Even more interesting are the broader implications. The same searching, pattern-matching and reasoning capabilities that make these models so good at analyzing software almost certainly apply to similar systems. The tax code isn’t computer code, but it’s a series of algorithms with inputs and outputs. It has vulnerabilities; we call them tax loopholes. It has exploits; we call them tax avoidance strategies. And it has black hat hackers: attorneys and accountants.

Just as these models are finding hundreds of vulnerabilities in complex software systems, we should expect them to be equally effective at finding many new and undiscovered tax loopholes. I am confident that the major investment banks are working on this right now, in secret. They’ve fed AI the tax code of the US, or the UK, or maybe every industrialized country, and tasked the system with looking for money-saving strategies. How many tax loopholes will those AIs find? Ten? One hundred? One thousand? The Double Dutch Irish Sandwich is a tax loophole that involves multiple different tax jurisdictions. Can AIs find loopholes even more complex? We have no idea.

Sure, the AIs will come up with a bunch of tricks that won’t work, but that’s where those attorneys and accountants come in—to verify, and then justify, the loopholes. And then to market them to their wealthy clients.

As goes the tax code, so goes any other complex system of rules and strategies. These models could be tasked with finding loopholes in environmental rules, or food and safety rules—anywhere there are complex regulatory systems and powerful people who want to evade those rules.

The results will be much worse than insecure computers. Tax loopholes result in less revenue collected by governments, and regulatory loopholes allow the powerful to skirt the rules, both of which have all sorts of social ramifications. And while software vendors can patch their systems in days, it generally takes years for a country to amend its tax code. And that process is political, with lobbyists pressuring legislators not to patch. Just look at the carried interest loophole, a US tax dodge that has been exploited for decades. Various administrations have tried to close the vulnerability, but legislators just can’t seem to resist lobbyists long enough to patch it.

AI technologies are poised to remake much of society. Just as the industrial revolution gave humans the ability to consume calories outside of their bodies at scale, the AI revolution will give humans the ability to perform cognitive tasks outside of their bodies at scale. Our systems aren’t designed for that; they’re designed for more human paces of cognition. We’re seeing it right now in the deluge of software vulnerabilities that these models are finding and exploiting. And we will soon see it in a deluge of vulnerabilities in all sorts of other systems of rules. Adapting to this new reality will be hard, but we don’t have any choice.

This essay originally appeared in The Guardian.

OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 is as Good as Mythos at Finding Security Vulnerabilities

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/openais-gpt-5-5-is-as-good-as-mythos-at-finding-security-vulnerabilities.html

The UK’s AI Security Institute evaluated GPT-5.5’s ability to find security vulnerabilities, and found that it is comparable to Claude Mythos. Note that the OpenAI model is generally available.

Here is the Institute’s evaluation of Mythos.

And here is an analysis of a smaller, cheaper model. It requires more scaffolding from the prompter, but it is also just as good.

Copy.Fail Linux Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/copy-fail-linux-vulnerability.html

This is the worst Linux vulnerability in years.

TL;DR

  • copy.fail is a Linux kernel local privilege escalation, not a browser or clipboard attack. Disclosed by Theori on 29 April 2026 with a working PoC.
  • It abuses the kernel crypto API (AF_ALG sockets) plus splice() to write four bytes at a time straight into the page cache of a file the attacker does not own.
  • The exploit works unmodified across Ubuntu, RHEL, Debian, SUSE, Amazon Linux, Fedora and most others. No race condition, no per-distro offsets.
  • The file on disk is never modified. AIDE, Tripwire and checksum-based monitoring see nothing.
  • Kubernetes Pod Security Standards (Restricted) and the default RuntimeDefault seccomp profile do not block the syscall used. A custom seccomp profile is needed.
  • The mainline fix landed on 1 April. Distros are rolling kernels out now. Patch.

“Local privilege escalation” sounds dry, so let me unpack it. It means: an attacker who already has some way to run code on the machine, even as the most boring unprivileged user, can promote themselves to root. From there they can read every file, install backdoors, watch every process, and pivot to other systems.

Why does that matter on shared infrastructure? Because “local” covers a lot of ground in 2026: every container on a shared Kubernetes node, every tenant on a shared hosting box, every CI/CD job that runs untrusted pull-request code, every WSL2 instance on a Windows laptop, every containerised AI agent given shell access. They all share one Linux kernel with their neighbours. A kernel LPE collapses that boundary.

News article.

Agentic application modernization at scale with Strands and Amazon Transform custom

Post Syndicated from Kanishk Mahajan original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/use-generative-ai-agents-for-application-modernization-at-scale-with-strands-amazon-transform-custom-and-amazon-bedrock-agentcore/

Introduction

Modernizing applications by upgrading language runtimes, migrating SDKs, and refactoring frameworks is important for cloud adoption but can be labor-intensive at scale. Each repository requires analysis of dependencies and transformation needs; custom transformation logic must be built and validated, and changes are often executed sequentially across codebases. If you have hundreds of applications, this stretches timelines from months to years, while introducing inconsistency across your teams.

To address this, Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides a composable set of building blocks. AWS Transform custom enables reusable, CLI-driven code transformations for upgrading runtimes, SDKs, and frameworks consistently across large portfolios. Strands Agents provides a framework for building multi-agent systems that coordinate complex transformation workflows. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore delivers the managed runtime, memory, and observability to operate these agents reliably in production. Together, they replace manual, sequential modernization with an intelligent, automated approach that scales.

In this post, we show you how to combine these services to build a generative AI–powered, agentic modernization system that can automatically analyze application repositories, determine required changes, create missing transformations, and execute them in parallel at scale.

Solution overview

The solution uses an agentic architecture that separates intelligent decision-making from deterministic execution, enabling automation at scale while maintaining consistency and control. In this post, you will build an AI-driven application modernization system that demonstrates how multi-agent workflows can be applied to large-scale code transformation scenarios. You interact with the system through a React-based frontend or API interface, submitting individual repositories or batch workloads via CSV inputs. Requests are processed asynchronously through an API layer that invokes an orchestrator agent running on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, which coordinates specialized agents to analyze codebases, identify transformation requirements, and manage execution workflows. Results are stored and surfaced through the interface, allowing users to track progress and review outputs in real time.The workflow begins with repository analysis, where the system inspects application codebases to identify languages, dependencies, and required upgrades such as runtime version changes or SDK migrations. Based on this analysis, the system maps each application to an existing transformation when available. If no suitable transformation exists, a creation agent dynamically generates one using natural language instructions and publishes it to a centralized registry for reuse, creating a continuously improving system where transformation coverage expands over time.

Once transformations are identified or created, an execution agent runs them at scale by invoking AWS Batch jobs that execute the AWS Transform custom CLI, enabling parallel processing across multiple repositories. The orchestrator coordinates all agents, maintains workflow state using Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Memory, and ensures reliable execution through structured task decomposition, tool invocation, and error handling. While the example focuses on application re-platforming, the same architectural pattern can be applied to other large-scale code analysis and automation workflows.

The following architecture diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the various components of our solution as outlined in this section:architecture diagram describing the multi agent strands and agentcore deployment

Figure 1: AWS Transform custom Agentic Orchestration Architecture using Strands agents and Amazon Bedrock AgentCore

Prerequisites

Complete the following prerequisites:

  1. Install the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI).
  2. Install the AWS SAM CLI v1.100.0+
  3. Install Docker v20.x+.
  4. Install Node.js v18.x+
  5. Install Python v3.11+
  6. Install the AWS CDK CLI
  7. Enable access to a Bedrock model for the orchestrator in your deployment region. The default model can be configured through the Amazon Bedrock model access console. To use a different model, set `BEDROCK_MODEL_ID` in `deployment/config.env` before Step 3 and enable access to that model instead. Model access approval can take a few minutes in some accounts, so complete this step before deploying.

Dependencies

The Strands Agents implementation has the following dependencies that are packaged in the DockerFile:

  1. Strands multi-agent framework: strands-agents
  2. Strands agent tools and utilities: strands-agents-tools
  3. HTTP library for API calls: requests
  4. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore SDK: bedrock-agentcore
  5. AWS SDK for Python: boto3

Deploy the solution

The solution is available for download on the GitHub repo. This post walks through the CDK + SAM deployment path (Option A in the repository README). The repository also includes a CDK-only option (Option B); see the repository README for details.

Step 1: Clone the repository

git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/aws-transform-custom-samples.git

cd aws-transform-custom-samples/agentic-atx-platform

Step 2: Configure AWS Credentials

# Configure AWS CLI

aws configure

# Verify credentials

aws sts get-caller-identity

Step 3: Deploy ATX CLI Container image and frontend using AWS CDK

# Copy configuration template (defaults work for most setups; edit only to change region or Bedrock model)

cd deployment

cp config.env.template config.env

# Authenticate with Amazon ECR Public (required for the Docker base image pull)

aws ecr-public get-login-password --region us-east-1 | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin public.ecr.aws

# Build the UI placeholder so CDK’s UI stack has ui/dist/ to deploy

cd ../ui && npm install && npx vite build

# Install CDK dependencies and bootstrap (run once per account/region)

cd ../cdk

npm install cdk bootstrap

# Build TypeScript and deploy the three stacks

npx tsc

CDK_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT=$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text)

cdk deploy AtxContainerStack AtxInfrastructureStack AtxUiStack --require-approval never

# Note for accounts without a default VPC , pass the VPC context flags to `cdk deploy`:

cdk deploy AtxContainerStack AtxInfrastructureStack AtxUiStack --require-approval never

cdk deploy AtxContainerStack AtxInfrastructureStack AtxUiStack --require-approval never -c existingVpcId=vpc-xxx -c existingSubnetIds=subnet-aaa,subnet-bbb -c existingSecurityGroupId=sg-ccc

# Subnets must be public (auto-assign public IP enabled) or private with a NAT gateway so Fargate tasks can reach Amazon ECR, Amazon S3, and Git repositories.

Step 4: Deploy Strands Agents to AgentCore runtime using AWS SAM

cd ../sam./deploy.sh

# Invoke the deploy Lambda to create the AgentCore Runtime via the bedrock-agentcore-control SDK (takes 2-5 minutes)

aws lambda invoke --function-name atx-deploy-agentcore \ --region us-east-1 \ --cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out \ --payload '{"action":"deploy"}' \ --cli-read-timeout 900 /tmp/deploy-output.jsoncat /tmp/deploy-output.json

Step 5: Wire the AgentCore runtime ARN into the async invoke Lambda

ACCOUNT_ID=$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text)

RUNTIME_ARN=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.loads(json.load(open('/tmp/deploy-output.json'))['body'])['runtime_arn'])")aws lambda update-function-configuration \ --function-name atx-async-invoke-agent \ --region us-east-1 \ --environment "Variables={AGENT_RUNTIME_ARN=${RUNTIME_ARN},RESULT_BUCKET=atx-custom-output-${ACCOUNT_ID},JOBS_TABLE=atx-transform-jobs}"

Step 6: Rebuild and deploy the frontend with AgentCore API endpoint

# Update the React application with the deployed API endpoint and redeploy it.

API_URL=$(aws cloudformation describe-stacks \ --stack-name AtxAgentCoreSAM \ --region us-east-1 \ --query 'Stacks[0].Outputs[?OutputKey==`ApiEndpoint`].OutputValue' \ --output text)

cd ../ui

VITE_API_ENDPOINT=$API_URL npx vite build./deploy-aws.sh

# This rebuilds the React application with the correct API endpoint, uploads it to Amazon S3, and invalidates the Amazon CloudFront distribution.

Step 7: Access the application

# After deployment completes, retrieve the CloudFront distribution URL from the AWS CloudFormation outputs and open it in your browser to access the application UI.

aws cloudformation describe-stacks \ --stack-name AtxUiStack \ --region us-east-1 \ --query 'Stacks[0].Outputs[?OutputKey==`WebsiteUrl`].OutputValue' \ --output text

Using the application

The UI exposes five tabs covering the complete modernization workflow: browsing available transformations, executing a transformation on a single repository, creating a new custom transformation with natural language, batch-processing a CSV of repositories, and tracking job status. This section walks through two of the most common flows.

Create a custom transformation from natural language

Open the Create Custom tab, describe the transformation in plain English (for example, “Upgrade Spring Boot 2 applications to Spring Boot 3”), and optionally provide a reference repository URL. The creation agent analyzes the source, generates a transformation definition, and publishes it to the ATX registry for reuse across the portfolio.

Describing a custom transformation in plain English. The form accepts a name, description, optional reference repository, and natural-language requirements.

Figure 2: Describing a custom transformation in plain English. The form accepts a name, description, optional reference repository, and natural-language requirements.After submitting, the orchestrator clones the reference repository, analyzes the source, and generates a transformation definition tailored to the actual code patterns found in the codebase. This takes 1–5 minutes depending on repository size. The generated definition is then shown for review in the Jobs tab, where it can be edited before publishing to the ATX registry.

Figure 3: The AI-generated transformation definition shown for review in the Jobs tab. The agent analyzed the Flask codebase and produced a detailed definition covering routes, request handling, response patterns, and Blueprint architecture. The user can edit the definition in-place and click Publish to Registry when ready.Once published, the new transformation appears in the Transformations tab alongside AWS-managed transformations and can be executed the same way on any repository.

Run a batch of repositories from a CSV

Open the CSV Batch tab and upload a CSV listing repository URLs and target transformations. A sample `sample-batch.csv` is included in the repository at `agentic-atx-platform/ui/sample-batch.csv`. The preview shows the parsed rows before submission. On Submit All, each row becomes a separate AWS Batch job running in parallel, and the Jobs tab shows live status as repositories complete.

Uploading a batch of repositories for parallel processing. The CSV lists a source repository URL, target transformation, optional validation commands, and additional plan context per row.

Figure 4: Uploading a batch of repositories for parallel processing. The CSV lists a source repository URL, target transformation, optional validation commands, and additional plan context per row. Each row becomes an independent AWS Batch job on submission.

Clean up

To avoid recurring charges, remove the resources after trying the solution.

Step 1: Delete the SAM Stack

sam delete --stack-name AtxAgentCoreSAM --region us-east-1 --no-prompts

Step 2: Delete the CDK Stacks

Remove the three CDK stacks in reverse order. The S3 buckets are configured with `autoDeleteObjects: true`, so CDK will empty them before deletion.

cd cdk

npx cdk destroy AtxUiStack AtxInfrastructureStack AtxContainerStack --force

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to build a generative AI–powered, agentic system for application modernization that can analyze application repositories, determine required code changes, create missing transformations, and execute those transformations at scale. By combining AWS Transform Custom for transformation execution with Amazon Bedrock AgentCore for orchestration, and Strands Agents for multi-agent coordination and AWS Transform container solution for parallel processing, this approach demonstrates how intelligent automation can be applied to large-scale code transformation workflows.

This solution directly addresses the challenges of traditional modernization approaches. It reduces manual effort by automating repository analysis and transformation mapping, eliminates gaps in transformation coverage by dynamically generating reusable transformations, and significantly improves scalability through parallel execution using AWS Batch.

By introducing a centralized, agent-driven workflow with built-in observability and state management, organizations can achieve faster, more consistent, and governed modernization across large application portfolios. To get started, deploy the solution in your AWS environment, test it with a sample repository or batch workload, and extend it by creating custom transformations tailored to your applications. You can further integrate this approach into your CI/CD pipelines to enable continuous modernization and accelerate your cloud migration initiatives.


About the authors

Kanishk Mahajan is Principal – AI/ML with AWS Professional Services. In this role, he leads GenAI and agentic transformations for some of AWS largest customers in Telco and Media & Entertaintment.

Sandeep Batchu is a Senior Security Architect at Amazon Web Services, with extensive experience in software engineering, solutions architecture, and cybersecurity. Passionate about bridging business outcomes with technological innovation, Sandeep guides customers through their cloud and generative AI journey, helping them design and implement secure, scalable, and resilient architectures in the era of AI-driven transformation.

Venugopalan Vasudeven (Venu) is a Principal Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS, where he leads Agentic AI initiatives focused on AWS Transform. He helps customers adopt and scale AI-powered developer and modernization solutions to accelerate innovation and business outcomes.

Insider Betting on Polymarket

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/insider-betting-on-polymarket.html

Insider trading is rife on Polymarket:

Analysis by the Anti-Corruption Data Collective, a non-profit research and advocacy group, found that long-shot bets—­defined as wagers of $2,500 or more at odds of 35 percent or less—­on the platform had an average win rate of around 52 percent in markets on military and defense actions.

That compares with a win rate of 25 percent across all politics-focused markets and just 14 percent for all markets on the platform as a whole.

It is absolutely insane that this is legal. We already know how insider betting warps sports. Insider betting warping politics—and military actions—is orders of magnitude worse.

Rowhammer Attack Against NVIDIA Chips

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/rowhammer-attack-against-nvidia-chips.html

A new rowhammer attack gives complete control of NVIDIA CPUs.

On Thursday, two research teams, working independently of each other, demonstrated attacks against two cards from Nvidia’s Ampere generation that take GPU rowhammering into new—­and potentially much more consequential—­territory: GDDR bitflips that give adversaries full control of CPU memory, resulting in full system compromise of the host machine. For the attack to work, IOMMU memory management must be disabled, as is the default in BIOS settings.

“Our work shows that Rowhammer, which is well-studied on CPUs, is a serious threat on GPUs as well,” said Andrew Kwong, co-author of one of the papers. “GDDRHammer: Greatly Disturbing DRAM Rows­Cross-Component Rowhammer Attacks from Modern GPUs.” “With our work, we… show how an attacker can induce bit flips on the GPU to gain arbitrary read/write access to all of the CPU’s memory, resulting in complete compromise of the machine.”

Update Friday, April 3: On Friday, researchers unveiled a third Rowhammer attack that also demonstrates Rowhammer attacks on the RTX A6000 that achieves privilege escalation to a root shell. Unlike the previous two, the researchers said, it works even when IOMMU is enabled.

The second paper is GeForge: Hammering GDDR Memory to Forge GPU Page Tables for Fun and Profit:

…does largely the same thing, except that instead of exploiting the last-level page table, as GDDRHammer does, it manipulates the last-level page directory. It was able to induce 1,171 bitflips against the RTX 3060 and 202 bitflips against the RTX 6000.

GeForge, too, uses novel hammering patterns and memory massaging to corrupt GPU page table mappings in GDDR6 memory to acquire read and write access to the GPU memory space. From there, it acquires the same privileges over host CPU memory. The GeForge proof-of-concept exploit against the RTX 3060 concludes by opening a root shell window that allows the attacker to issue commands that run unfettered privileges on the host machine. The researchers said that both GDDRHammer and GeForge could do the same thing against the RTC 6000.