Tag Archives: Uncategorized

Friday Squid Blogging: Do Squid Have Emotions?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/friday-squid-blogging-do-squid-have-emotions.html

Scientists are now debating whether octopuses, squid, and crabs have emotions. Short answer: we don’t know, but can’t rule it out.

There may be a point when humans can no longer assume that crayfish, shrimp, and other invertebrates don’t feel pain and other emotions.

“If they can no longer be considered immune to felt pain, invertebrate experiences will need to become part of our species’ moral landscape,” she says. “But pain is just one morally relevant emotion. Invertebrates such as octopuses may experience other emotions such as curiosity in exploration, affection for individuals, or excitement in anticipation of a future reward.”

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Read my blog posting guidelines here.

AirTags Are Used for Stalking Far More than Previously Reported

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/airtags-are-used-for-stalking-far-more-than-previously-reported.html

Ever since Apple introduced AirTags, security people have warned that they could be used for stalking. But while there have been a bunch of anecdotal stories, this is the first vaguely scientific survey:

Motherboard requested records mentioning AirTags in a recent eight month period from dozens of the country’s largest police departments. We obtained records from eight police departments.

Of the 150 total police reports mentioning AirTags, in 50 cases women called the police because they started getting notifications that their whereabouts were being tracked by an AirTag they didn’t own. Of those, 25 could identify a man in their lives — ex-partners, husbands, bosses — who they strongly suspected planted the AirTags on their cars in order to follow and harass them. Those women reported that current and former intimate partners­ — the most likely people to harm women overall — ­are using AirTags to stalk and harass them.

Eight police departments over eight months yielded fifty cases. And that’s only where the victim (1) realized they were being tracked by someone else’s AirTag, and (2) contacted the police. That’s going to multiply out to a lot of AirTag stalking in the country, and the world.

EDITED TO ADD (4/13): AirTags are being used by Ukrainians to track goods stolen by Russians and, as a nice side effect, to track the movements of Russian troops.

US Disrupts Russian Botnet

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/us-disrupts-russian-botnet.html

The Justice Department announced the disruption of a Russian GRU-controlled botnet:

The Justice Department today announced a court-authorized operation, conducted in March 2022, to disrupt a two-tiered global botnet of thousands of infected network hardware devices under the control of a threat actor known to security researchers as Sandworm, which the U.S. government has previously attributed to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (the GRU). The operation copied and removed malware from vulnerable internet-connected firewall devices that Sandworm used for command and control (C2) of the underlying botnet. Although the operation did not involve access to the Sandworm malware on the thousands of underlying victim devices worldwide, referred to as “bots,” the disabling of the C2 mechanism severed those bots from the Sandworm C2 devices’ control.

The botnet “targets network devices manufactured by WatchGuard Technologies Inc. (WatchGuard) and ASUSTek Computer Inc. (ASUS).” And note that only the command-and-control mechanism was disrupted. Those devices are still vulnerable.

The Justice Department made a point that they did this before the botnet was used for anything offensive.

Four more news articles. Slashdot post.

EDITED TO ADD (4/13): WatchGuard knew and fixed it nearly a year ago, but tried to keep it hidden. The patches were reverse-engineered.

Hackers Using Fake Police Data Requests against Tech Companies

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/hackers-using-fake-police-data-requests-against-tech-companies.html

Brian Krebs has a detailed post about hackers using fake police data requests to trick companies into handing over data.

Virtually all major technology companies serving large numbers of users online have departments that routinely review and process such requests, which are typically granted as long as the proper documents are provided and the request appears to come from an email address connected to an actual police department domain name.

But in certain circumstances ­– such as a case involving imminent harm or death –­ an investigating authority may make what’s known as an Emergency Data Request (EDR), which largely bypasses any official review and does not require the requestor to supply any court-approved documents.

It is now clear that some hackers have figured out there is no quick and easy way for a company that receives one of these EDRs to know whether it is legitimate. Using their illicit access to police email systems, the hackers will send a fake EDR along with an attestation that innocent people will likely suffer greatly or die unless the requested data is provided immediately.

In this scenario, the receiving company finds itself caught between two unsavory outcomes: Failing to immediately comply with an EDR -­- and potentially having someone’s blood on their hands -­- or possibly leaking a customer record to the wrong person.

Another article claims that both Apple and Facebook (or Meta, or whatever they want to be called now) fell for this scam.

We allude to this kind of risk in our 2015 “Keys Under Doormats” paper:

Third, exceptional access would create concentrated targets that could attract bad actors. Security credentials that unlock the data would have to be retained by the platform provider, law enforcement agencies, or some other trusted third party. If law enforcement’s keys guaranteed access to everything, an attacker who gained access to these keys would enjoy the same privilege. Moreover, law enforcement’s stated need for rapid access to data would make it impractical to store keys offline or split keys among multiple keyholders, as security engineers would normally do with extremely high-value credentials.

The “credentials” are even more insecure than we could have imagined: access to an email address. And the data, of course, isn’t very secure. But imagine how this kind of thing could be abused with a law enforcement encryption backdoor.

Wyze Camera Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/wyze-camera-vulnerability.html

Wyze ignored a vulnerability in its home security cameras for three years. Bitdefender, who discovered the vulnerability, let the company get away with it.

In case you’re wondering, no, that is not normal in the security community. While experts tell me that the concept of a “responsible disclosure timeline” is a little outdated and heavily depends on the situation, we’re generally measuring in days, not years. “The majority of researchers have policies where if they make a good faith effort to reach a vendor and don’t get a response, that they publicly disclose in 30 days,” Alex Stamos, director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and former chief security officer at Facebook, tells me.

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Migration and Climate Change

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/friday-squid-blogging-squid-migration-and-climate-change.html

New research on the changing migration of the Doryteuthis opalescens as a result of climate change.

News article:

Stanford researchers have solved a mystery about why a species of squid native to California has been found thriving in the Gulf of Alaska about 1,800 miles north of its expected range: climate change.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Read my blog posting guidelines here.

Bypassing Two-Factor Authentication

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/04/bypassing-two-factor-authentication.html

These techniques are not new, but they’re increasingly popular:

…some forms of MFA are stronger than others, and recent events show that these weaker forms aren’t much of a hurdle for some hackers to clear. In the past few months, suspected script kiddies like the Lapsus$ data extortion gang and elite Russian-state threat actors (like Cozy Bear, the group behind the SolarWinds hack) have both successfully defeated the protection.

[…]

Methods include:

  • Sending a bunch of MFA requests and hoping the target finally accepts one to make the noise stop.
  • Sending one or two prompts per day. This method often attracts less attention, but “there is still a good chance the target will accept the MFA request.”
  • Calling the target, pretending to be part of the company, and telling the target they need to send an MFA request as part of a company process.

FIDO2 multi-factor authentication systems are not susceptible to these attacks, because they are tied to a physical computer.

And even though there are attacks against these two-factor systems, they’re much more secure than not having them at all. If nothing else, they block pretty much all automated attacks.

Chrome Zero-Day from North Korea

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/chrome-zero-day-from-north-korea.html

North Korean hackers have been exploiting a zero-day in Chrome.

The flaw, tracked as CVE-2022-0609, was exploited by two separate North Korean hacking groups. Both groups deployed the same exploit kit on websites that either belonged to legitimate organizations and were hacked or were set up for the express purpose of serving attack code on unsuspecting visitors. One group was dubbed Operation Dream Job, and it targeted more than 250 people working for 10 different companies. The other group, known as AppleJeus, targeted 85 users.

Details:

The attackers made use of an exploit kit that contained multiple stages and components in order to exploit targeted users. The attackers placed links to the exploit kit within hidden iframes, which they embedded on both websites they owned as well as some websites they compromised.

The kit initially serves some heavily obfuscated javascript used to fingerprint the target system. This script collected all available client information such as the user-agent, resolution, etc. and then sent it back to the exploitation server. If a set of unknown requirements were met, the client would be served a Chrome RCE exploit and some additional javascript. If the RCE was successful, the javascript would request the next stage referenced within the script as “SBX”, a common acronym for Sandbox Escape. We unfortunately were unable to recover any of the stages that followed the initial RCE.

Careful to protect their exploits, the attackers deployed multiple safeguards to make it difficult for security teams to recover any of the stages. These safeguards included:

  • Only serving the iframe at specific times, presumably when they knew an intended target would be visiting the site.
  • On some email campaigns the targets received links with unique IDs. This was potentially used to enforce a one-time-click policy for each link and allow the exploit kit to only be served once.
  • The exploit kit would AES encrypt each stage, including the clients’ responses with a session-specific key.
  • Additional stages were not served if the previous stage failed.

Although we recovered a Chrome RCE, we also found evidence where the attackers specifically checked for visitors using Safari on MacOS or Firefox (on any OS), and directed them to specific links on known exploitation servers. We did not recover any responses from those URLs.

If you’re a Chrome user, patch your system now.

Stalking with an Apple Watch

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/stalking-with-an-apple-watch.html

The malicious uses of these technologies are scary:

Police reportedly arrived on the scene last week and found the man crouched beside the woman’s passenger side door. According to the police, the man had, at some point, wrapped his Apple Watch across the spokes of the woman’s passenger side front car wheel and then used the Watch to track her movements. When police eventually confronted him, he admitted the Watch was his. Now, he’s reportedly being charged with attaching an electronic tracking device to the woman’s vehicle.

A Detailed Look at the Conti Ransomware Gang

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/a-detailed-look-at-the-conti-ransomware-gang.html

Based on two years of leaked messages, 60,000 in all:

The Conti ransomware gang runs like any number of businesses around the world. It has multiple departments, from HR and administrators to coders and researchers. It has policies on how its hackers should process their code, and shares best practices to keep the group’s members hidden from law enforcement.

Friday Squid Blogging: Unexpectedly Low Squid Population in the Arctic

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/friday-squid-blogging-unexpectedly-low-squid-population-in-the-arctic.html

Research:

Abstract: The retreating ice cover of the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fuels speculations on future fisheries. However, very little is known about the existence of harvestable fish stocks in this 3.3 million­–square kilometer ecosystem around the North Pole. Crossing the Eurasian Basin, we documented an uninterrupted 3170-kilometer-long deep scattering layer (DSL) with zooplankton and small fish in the Atlantic water layer at 100- to 500-meter depth. Diel vertical migration of this central Arctic DSL was lacking most of the year when daily light variation was absent. Unexpectedly, the DSL also contained low abundances of Atlantic cod, along with lanternfish, armhook squid, and Arctic endemic ice cod. The Atlantic cod originated from Norwegian spawning grounds and had lived in Arctic water temperature for up to 6 years. The potential fish abundance was far below commercially sustainable levels and is expected to remain so because of the low productivity of the CAO.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Read my blog posting guidelines here.

Gus Simmons’s Memoir

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/gus-simmonss-memoir.html

Gus Simmons is an early pioneer in cryptography and computer security. I know him best for his work on authentication and covert channels, specifically as related to nuclear treaty verification. His work is cited extensively in Applied Cryptography.

He has written a memoir of growing up dirt-poor in 1930s rural West Virginia. I’m in the middle of reading it, and it’s fascinating.

More blog posts.

NASA’s Insider Threat Program

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/nasas-insider-threat-program.html

The Office of Inspector General has audited NASA’s insider threat program:

While NASA has a fully operational insider threat program for its classified systems, the vast majority of the Agency’s information technology (IT) systems — including many containing high-value assets or critical infrastructure — are unclassified and are therefore not covered by its current insider threat program. Consequently, the Agency may be facing a higher-than-necessary risk to its unclassified systems and data. While NASA’s exclusion of unclassified systems from its insider threat program is common among federal agencies, adding those systems to a multi-faceted security program could provide an additional level of maturity to the program and better protect agency resources. According to Agency officials, expanding the insider threat program to unclassified systems would benefit the Agency’s cybersecurity posture if incremental improvements, such as focusing on IT systems and people at the most risk, were implemented. However, on-going concerns including staffing challenges, technology resource limitations, and lack of funding to support such an expansion would need to be addressed prior to enhancing the existing program.

Further amplifying the complexities of insider threats are the cross-discipline challenges surrounding cybersecurity expertise. At NASA, responsibilities for unclassified systems are largely shared between the Office of Protective Services and the Office of the Chief Information Officer. In addition, Agency contracts are managed by the Office of Procurement while grants and cooperative agreements are managed by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Nonetheless, in our view, mitigating the risk of an insider threat is a team sport in which a comprehensive insider threat risk assessment would allow the Agency to gather key information on weak spots or gaps in administrative processes and cybersecurity. At a time when there is growing concern about the continuing threats of foreign influence, taking the proactive step to conduct a risk assessment to evaluate NASA’s unclassified systems ensures that gaps cannot be exploited in ways that undermine the Agency’s ability to carry out its mission.

Automate the Creation of On-Demand Capacity Reservations for running EC2 instances

Post Syndicated from sbbusser original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/automate-the-creation-of-on-demand-capacity-reservations-for-running-ec2-instances/

This post is written by Ballu Singh a Principal Solutions Architect at AWS, Neha Joshi a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS, and Naveen Jagathesan a Technical Account Manager at AWS.

Customers have asked how they can “create On-Demand Capacity Reservations (ODCRs) for their existing instances during events, such as the holiday season, Black Friday, marketing campaigns, or others?”

ODCRs let you reserve compute capacity for your your Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances. ODCRs further make sure that you always have EC2 capacity access when required, and for as long as you need it. Customers who want to make sure that any instances that are stopped/started during the critical event and are available when needed should be covered by ODCRs.

ODCRs let you reserve compute capacity for your Amazon EC2 instances in a specific availability zone for any duration. This means that you can create and manage capacity reservations independently from the billing discounts offered by Savings Plans or Regional Reserved Instances. You can create ODCR at any time, without entering into a one-year or three-year term commitment, and the capacity is available immediately. Billing starts as soon as the ODCR enters the active state. When you no longer need it, cancel the ODCR to stop incurring charges.

At the time of this blog publication, if you need to create ODCR for existing running instances, you must manually identify your running instances configuration with matching attributes, such as instance type, platform, and Availability Zone. This is a time and resource consuming process.

In this post, we provide an automated way to manage ODCR operations. This includes creating, modifying, and cancelling ODCRs for the running instances across regions in an account, all without requiring any manual intervention of specifying instance configuration attributes. Additionally, it creates an Amazon CloudWatch Alarm for InstanceUtilization and an Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) topic with topic name ODCRAlarmNotificationTopic to notify when the threshold breaches.

Note: This will not create cluster placement group ODCRs. For details on capacity reservations in cluster placement groups, refer here.

Getting started

Before you create Capacity Reservations, note the limitations and restrictions here.

To get started, download the scripts for registering, modifying, and canceling ODCRs and associated requirements.txt, as well as AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy from the GitHub link here.

Pre-requisites

To implement these scripts, you need the following prerequisites:

  1. Access to AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface (CLI),or AWS SDK for ODCR.
  2. The following IAM role permissions for IAM users using the solution as provided in ODCR_IAM.json.
  3. Amazon EC2 instance having supported platform for capacity reservation. Capacity Reservations support the following platforms listed here for Linux and Windows.
  4. Refer to the above GitHub link for the code, and save the requirements.txt file in the same directory with other python scripts. You may want to run the requirements.txt file if you don’t have appropriate dependency to run the rest of the python scripts. You can run this using the following command:
pip3 install -r requirements.txt

Implementation Details

To create ODCR capacity reservation

The following instructions will guide you through creating a capacity reservation of running instances across all of the Regions within an AWS account.
Input variables needed from users:

  • EndDateType (String) – Indicates how the Capacity Reservation ends. A Capacity Reservation can have one of the following end types:
      • unlimited – The Capacity Reservation remains active until you explicitly cancel it. Don’t provide an EndDate if the EndDateType is unlimited.
      • limited – The Capacity Reservation expires automatically at a specified date and time. You must provide an EndDate value if the EndDateType value is limited.
  • EndDate (datetime) – The date and time when the Capacity Reservation expires. When a Capacity Reservation expires, the reserved capacity is released and you can no longer launch instances into it. The Capacity Reservation’s state changes to expired when it reaches its end date and time.

You must provide EndDateType as ‘limited’ and the EndDate in standard UTC format to secure instances for a limited period. Command to execute register ODCR script with limited period:

You must provide EndDateType as ‘unlimited’ to secure instances for unlimited period. Command to execute register ODCR script with unlimited period:

registerODCR.py '<EndDateType>' '<EndDate>'
    Example- registerODCR.py 'limited' '2022-01-31 14:30:00'
  • You must provide EndDateType as ‘unlimited’ to secure instances for unlimited period. Command to execute register ODCR script with unlimited period:
registerODCR.py 'EndDateType'
    Example- registerODCR.py 'unlimited'

This registerODCR.py script does following four things:

1. Describe instances cross-region in an account. It checks for the instance that has:

    • No Capacity reservation
    • State of the instance is running
    • Tenancy is default
    • InstanceLifecycle is None indicates whether this is a Spot Instance or a Scheduled Instance

Note: Describe instances API call is counted toward your account API limit. Therefore, it is advisable to run the script during non-peak hours or before the short-term scaling event begins. Work with AWS Support team if you run into API throttling.

2. Aggregates instances with similar attributes, such as InstanceType, AvailabilityZone, Tenancy, and Platform.

3. Describe reserved instances cross-region in an account. It checks for instance(s) that have Zonal Reservation Instances (ZRIs) and compares them with aggregated instances with similar attributes.

4. Finally,

    • Reserves ODCR(s) for existing running instances with matching attributes for which ZRIs do not exist.

Note: If you have one or more ZRIs in an account, then the script compares them with the existing instances with matching characteristics – Instance Type, AZ, and Platform – and does NOT create ODCR for the ZRIs to avoid incurring redundant charges. If there are more running instances than ZRIs, then the script creates an ODCR for just the delta.

    • Creates an SNS topic with the topic name – ODCRAlarmNotificationTopic in the region where you’re registering ODCR, if it doesn’t already exist.
    • Creates CloudWatch alarm for InstanceUtilization using the best practices, which can be found here.

Note: You must subscribe and confirm to the SNS topic, if you haven’t already, to receive notifications.

The CloudWatch alarm is also created on your behalf in the region for each ODCR. This alarm monitors your ODCR metric- InstanceUtilization. Whenever it breaches threshold (50% in this case), it enters the alarm state and sends an SNS notification using the topic that was created for you if you subscribed to it.

Note: You can change the alarm threshold based on your specific needs.

  • You will receive an email notification when CloudWatch Alarm State changes to Alarm with:
    • SNS Subject (Assuming CW alarms triggers in US East region).
ALARM: "ODCRAlarm-cr-009969c7abf4daxxx" in US East (N. Virginia)
    • SNS Body will have the details
      • CW alarm, region, link to view the alarm, alarm details, and state change actions.

With this, if your ODCR InstanceUtilization drops, then you will be notified in near-real time to help you optimize the capacity and stop unnecessary payments for unused capacity.

To modify ODCR capacity reservation

To modify the attributes of an active capacity reservation after you have created it, adhere to the following instructions.

Note: When modifying a Capacity Reservation, you can only increase or decrease the quantity and change how it is released. You can’t change the instance type, EBS optimization, instance store settings, platform, Availability Zone, or instance eligibility of a Capacity Reservation. If you must modify any of these attributes, then we recommend that you cancel the reservation, and then create a new one with the required attributes. You can’t modify a Capacity Reservation after it has expired or after you have explicitly canceled it.

  • Input variables needed from users:
    • CapacityReservationID – The ID of the Capacity Reservation that you want to modify.
    • InstanceCount (integer) – The number of instances for which to reserve capacity. The number of instances can’t be increased or decreased by more than 1000 in a single request.
    • EndDateType (String) – Indicates how the Capacity Reservation ends. A Capacity Reservation can have one of the following end types:
      • unlimited – The Capacity Reservation remains active until you explicitly cancel it. Don’t provide an EndDate if the EndDateType is unlimited.
      • limited – The Capacity Reservation expires automatically at a specified date and time. You must provide an EndDate value if the EndDateType value is limited.
    • EndDate (datetime) – The date and time of when the Capacity Reservation expires. When a Capacity Reservation expires, the reserved capacity is released, and you can no longer launch
    • instances into it. The Capacity Reservation’s state changes to expired when it reaches its end date and time.
      Example to run the modify ODCR script for ‘limited’ period:
    • You must provide EndDateType as ‘unlimited’ to modify instances for an unlimited period. Command to the run modify ODCR script with unlimited period:
  • Command to execute modify ODCR script:
    modifyODCR.py <CapacityReservationId> <InstanceCount> <EndDateType> <EndDate> 
  • Example to execute the modify ODCR script for limited period:
modifyODCR.py 'cr-05e6a94b99915xxxx' '1' 'limited' '2022-01-31 14:30:00'

Note: EndDate is in the standard UTC time.

  • You must provide EndDateType as ‘unlimited’ to modify instances for unlimited period. Command to execute modify ODCR script with unlimited period:
modifyODCR.py <CapacityReservationId> <InstanceCount> <EndDateType>
  • Example to execute the modify ODCR script for unlimited period:
modifyODCR.py 'cr-05e6a94b99915xxxx' '1' 'unlimited'

To cancel ODCR capacity reservation

To cancel the ODCR that are in the “Active” state, follow these instructions:

Note: Once the cancellation request succeeds, the reservation status will be marked as “cancelled”.

  • Input variables needed from users:
    • CapacityReservationID – The ID of the Capacity Reservation to cancel.
  • You must provide one parameter while executing the cancellation script.
  • Command to execute cancel ODCR script:
cancelODCR.py <CapacityReservationId> 
  • Example to execute the cancel ODCR script:
Example - cancelODCR.py 'cr-05e6a94b99915xxxx'

Monitoring

CloudWatch metrics let you monitor the unused capacity in your Capacity Reservations to optimize the ODCR. ODCRs send metric data to CloudWatch every five minutes. Although Capacity Reservation usage metrics are UsedInstanceCount, AvailableInstanceCount, TotalInstanceCount, and InstanceUtilization, for this solution we will be using the InstanceUtilization metric. This shows the percentage of reserved capacity instances that are currently in use. This will be useful for monitoring and optimizing ODCR consumption.

For example, if your On-Demand Capacity Reservation is for four instances and with matching criteria only one EC2 instance is currently running, then the InstanceUtilization metric will be 25% for your respective capacity reservation.

Let’s look at the steps to create the CloudWatch monitoring dashboard for your On-Demand Capacity Reservation solution:

  1. Open the CloudWatch console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch/.
  2. If necessary, change the Region. From the navigation bar, select the Region where your Capacity Reservation resides. For more information, see Regions and Endpoints.
  3. In the navigation pane, choose Metrics.

Amazon CloudWatch Dashboard

For All metrics, choose EC2 Capacity Reservations.

Amazon CloudWatch Dashboard: Metrics

4. Choose the metric dimension By Capacity Reservation. Metrics will be grouped by

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics: Capacity Reservation Ids

5. Select the dropdown arrow for InstanceUtilization, and select Search for this only.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics Filter

Once we see the InstanceUtilization metric in the filter list, select Graph Search.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics: Graph Search

This displays the InstanceUtilization metrics for the selected period.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics Duration

OPTIONAL: To display the Capacity Reservation IDs for active metrics only:

    • Navigate to Graphed metrics.

Amazon CloudWatch: Graphed Metrics

    • Under Details column, select Edit math expression.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics: Math Expression

    • Edit the math expression with the following, and select Apply:
REMOVE_EMPTY(SEARCH('{AWS/EC2CapacityReservations,CapacityReservationId} MetricName="InstanceUtilization"', 'Average', 300))

Amazon CloudWatch Graphed Metrics: Math Expression Apply

This displays the Capacity Reservation IDs for active metrics only.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics: Active Capacity Reservation Ids

With this configuration, whenever new Capacity Reservations are created, the InstanceUtilization metric for respective Capacity Reservation IDs will be populated.

6. From the Actions drop-down menu, select Add to dashboard.

Amazon CloudWatch Metrics: Add to Dashboard

Select Create new to create a new dashboard for monitoring your ODCR metrics.

Amazon CloudWatch: Creat New Dashboard

Specify the new dashboard name, and select Add to dashboard.

Amazon CloudWatch: Create New Dashboard

7. These configuration steps will navigate you to your newly created CloudWatch dashboard under Dashboards.

Amazon CloudWatch Dashboard: ODCR Metrics

Once this is created, if you create new Capacity Reservations, or new instances get added to existing reservations, then those metrics will be automatically be added to your CloudWatch Dashboard.

Note: You may see a delay of approximately 5-10 minutes from the point when changes are made to your environment (ODCR operations or instances launch/termination activities) to those changes getting reflected on your CloudWatch Dashboard metrics.

Conclusion

In this post, we discussed a solution for automating ODCR operations for existing EC2 instances. This included creating capacity reservation, modifying capacity reservation, and cancelling capacity reservation operations that inherit your existing EC2 instances for attribute details. We also discussed monitoring aspects of ODCR metrics using CloudWatch. This solution allows you to automate some of the ODCR operations for existing instances, thereby optimizing and speeding up the entire process.

For more information, see Target a group of Amazon EC2 On-Demand Capacity Reservations blog and Capacity Reservations documentation.

If you have feedback or questions about this post, please submit your comments in the comments section or contact AWS Support.

White House Warns of Possible Russian Cyberattacks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/white-house-warns-of-possible-russian-cyberattacks.html

News:

The White House has issued its starkest warning that Russia may be planning cyberattacks against critical-sector U.S. companies amid the Ukraine invasion.

[…]

Context: The alert comes after Russia has lobbed a series of digital attacks at the Ukrainian government and critical industry sectors. But there’s been no sign so far of major disruptive hacks against U.S. targets even as the government has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions that have battered the Russian economy.

  • The public alert followed classified briefings government officials conducted last week for more than 100 companies in sectors at the highest risk of Russian hacks, Neuberger said. The briefing was prompted by “preparatory activity” by Russian hackers, she said.
  • U.S. analysts have detected scanning of some critical sectors’ computers by Russian government actors and other preparatory work, one U.S. official told my colleague Ellen Nakashima on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity. But whether that is a signal that there will be a cyberattack on a critical system is not clear, Neuberger said.
  • Neuberger declined to name specific industry sectors under threat but said they’re part of critical infrastructure ­– a government designation that includes industries deemed vital to the economy and national security, including energy, finance, transportation and pipelines.

President Biden’s statement. White House fact sheet. And here’s a video of the extended Q&A with deputy national security adviser Anne Neuberger.

EDITED TO ADD (3/23): Long — three hour — conference call with CISA.

How to use AWS Security Hub and Amazon OpenSearch Service for SIEM

Post Syndicated from Ely Kahn original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-aws-security-hub-and-amazon-opensearch-service-for-siem/

AWS Security Hub provides you with a consolidated view of your security posture in Amazon Web Services (AWS) and helps you check your environment against security standards and current AWS security recommendations. Although Security Hub has some similarities to security information and event management (SIEM) tools, it is not designed as standalone a SIEM replacement. For example, Security Hub only ingests AWS-related security findings and does not directly ingest higher volume event logs, such as AWS CloudTrail logs. If you have use cases to consolidate AWS findings with other types of findings from on-premises or other non-AWS workloads, or if you need to ingest higher volume event logs, we recommend that you use Security Hub in conjunction with a SIEM tool.

There are also other benefits to using Security Hub and a SIEM tool together. These include being able to store findings for longer periods of time than Security Hub, aggregating findings across multiple administrator accounts, and further correlating Security Hub findings with each other and other log sources. In this blog post, we will show you how you can use Amazon OpenSearch Service (successor to Amazon Elasticsearch Service) as a SIEM and integrate Security Hub with it to accomplish these three use cases. Amazon OpenSearch Service is a fully managed service that makes it easier to deploy, manage, and scale Elasticsearch and Kibana. OpenSearch Service is a distributed, RESTful search and analytics engine that is capable of addressing a growing number of use cases. You can expand OpenSearch Service with AWS services like Kinesis or Kinesis Data Firehose, by integrating with other AWS services, or by using traditional agents like Beats and Logstash for log ingestion, and Kibana for data visualization. Although the OpenSearch Service also is not a SIEM out-of-the-box tool, with some customization, you can use it for SIEM tool use cases.

Security Hub plus SIEM use cases

By enabling Security Hub within your AWS Organizations account structure, you immediately start receiving the benefits of viewing all of your security findings from across various AWS and partner services on a single screen. Some organizations want to go a step further and use Security Hub in conjunction with a SIEM tool for the following reasons:

  • Correlate Security Hub findings with each other and other log sources – This is the most popular reason customers choose to implement this solution. If you have various log sources outside of Security Hub findings (such as application logs, database logs, partner logs, and security tooling logs), then it makes sense to consolidate these log sources into a single SIEM solution. Then you can view both your Security Hub findings and miscellaneous logs in the same place and create alerts based on interesting correlations.
  • Store findings for longer than 90 days after the last update date – Some organizations want or need to store Security Hub findings for longer than 90 days after the last update date. They may want to do this for historical investigation, or for audit and compliance needs. Either way, this solution offers you the ability to store Security Hub findings in a private Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket, which is then consumed by Amazon OpenSearch Service.
  • Aggregate findings across multiple administrator accounts – Security Hub has a feature customers can use to designate an administrator account if they have enabled Security Hub in multiple accounts. A Security Hub administrator account can view data from and manage configuration for its member accounts. This allows customers to view and manage all their findings from multiple member accounts in one place. Sometimes customers have multiple Security Hub administrator accounts, because they have multiple organizations in AWS Organizations. In this situation, you can use this solution to consolidate all of the Security Hub administrator accounts into a single OpenSearch Service with Kibana SIEM implementation to have a single view across your environments. This related blog post walks through this use case in more detail, and shows how to centralize Security Hub findings across multiple AWS Regions and administrators. However, this blog post takes this approach further by introducing OpenSearch Service with Kibana to the use case, for a full SIEM experience.

Solution architecture

Figure 1: SIEM implementation on Amazon OpenSearch Service

Figure 1: SIEM implementation on Amazon OpenSearch Service

The solution represented in Figure 1 shows the flexibility of integrations that are possible when you create a SIEM by using Amazon OpenSearch Service. The solution allows you to aggregate findings across multiple accounts, store findings in an S3 bucket indefinitely, and correlate multiple AWS and non-AWS services in one place for visualization. This post focuses on Security Hub’s integration with the solution, but the following AWS services are also able to integrate:

Each of these services has its own dedicated dashboard within the OpenSearch SIEM solution. This makes it possible for customers to view findings and data that are relevant to each service that the SIEM tool is ingesting. OpenSearch Service also allows the customer to create aggregated dashboards, consolidating multiple services within a single dashboard, if needed.

Prerequisites

We recommend that you enable Security Hub and AWS Config across all of your accounts and Regions. For more information about how to do this, see the documentation for Security Hub and AWS Config. We also recommend that you use Security Hub and AWS Config integration with AWS Organizations to simplify the setup and automatically enable these services in all current and future accounts in your organization.

Launch the solution

In order to launch this solution within your environment, you can either launch the solution by using an AWS CloudFormation template, or by following the steps presented later in this post to customize the deployment to support integrations with non-AWS services, multi-Organization deployments, or launch within your existing OpenSearch Service environment.

To launch the solution, follow the instructions for SIEM on Amazon OpenSearch Service on GitHub.

Use the solution

Before you start using the solution, we’ll show you how this solution appears in the Security Hub dashboard, as shown in Figure 2. Navigate here by following Step 3 from the GitHub README.

Figure 2: Pre-built dashboards within solution

Figure 2: Pre-built dashboards within solution

The Security Hub dashboard highlights all major components of the service within an OpenSearch Service dashboard environment. This includes supporting all of the service integrations that are available within Security Hub (such as GuardDuty, AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) Access Analyzer, Amazon Inspector, Amazon Macie, and AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager). The dashboard displays both findings and security standards, and you can filter by AWS account, finding type, security standard, or service integration. Figure 3 shows an overview of the visual dashboard experience when you deploy the solution.

Figure 3: Dashboard preview

Figure 3: Dashboard preview

Use case 1: Correlate Security Hub findings with each other and other log sources and create alerts

This solution uses OpenSearch Service and Kibana to allow you to search through both Security Hub findings and logs from any other AWS and non-AWS systems. You can then create alerts within Kibana based on interesting correlations between Security Hub and any other logged events. Although Security Hub supports ingesting a vast number of integrations and findings, it cannot create correlation rules like a SIEM tool can. However, you can create such rules using SIEM on OpenSearch Service. It’s important to take a closer look when multiple AWS security services generate findings for a single resource, because this potentially indicates elevated risk or multiple risk vectors. Depending on your environment, the initial number of findings in Security Hub may be high, so you may need to prioritize which findings require immediate action. Security Hub natively gives you the ability to filter findings by resource, account, severity, and many other details.

As part of the findings, you can send notifications through alerts that are generated by SIEM on OpenSearch Service in several ways: Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) by consuming messages in an appropriate tool or configuring recipient email addresses, Amazon Chime, Slack (using AWS Chatbot) or custom webhook to your organization’s ticketing system. You can then respond to these new security incident-oriented findings through ticketing, chat, or incident management systems.

Solution overview for use case 1

Figure 4: Solution overview diagram

Figure 4: Solution overview diagram

Figure 4 gives an overview of the solution for use case 1. This solution requires that you have Security Hub and GuardDuty enabled in your AWS account. Logs from AWS services, including Security Hub, are ingested into an S3 bucket, then are automatically extracted, transformed, and loaded (ETL) and populated into the SIEM system that is running on OpenSearch Service using AWS Lambda. After capturing the logs, you will be able to visualize them on the dashboard and analyze correlations of multiple logs. Within the SIEM on OpenSearch Service solution, you will create a rule to detect failures, such as CloudTrail authentication failures in logs. Then, you will configure the solution to publish alerts to Amazon SNS and send emails when logs match rules.

Implement the solution for use case 1

You will now set up this workflow to alert you by email when logs in OpenSearch match certain rules that you create.

Step 1: Create and visualize findings in OpenSearch Dashboards

Security Hub and other AWS services export findings to Amazon S3 in a centralized log bucket. You can ingest logs from CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and GuardDuty, which are often used in AWS security analytics. In this step, you import simulated security incident data in OpenSearch Dashboards, and use the dashboard to visualize the data in the logs.

To navigate OpenSearch Dashboards

  1. Generate pseudo-security incidents. You can simulate the results by generating sample findings in GuardDuty.
  2. In OpenSearch Dashboards, go to the Discover screen. The Discover screen is divided into three major sections: Search bar, index/display field list, and time-series display, as shown in Figure 5.
    Figure 5: OpenSearch Dashboards

    Figure 5: OpenSearch Dashboards

  3. In OpenSearch Dashboards, select log-aws-securityhub-* or log-aws-vpcflowlogs-* or log-aws-cloudtrail-* or any other index patterns and add event.module to the display field. event.module is a field that indicates where the log originates from. If you are collecting other threat information, such as Security Hub, @log-type is Security Hub, and event.module indicates where the log originated from (either Amazon Inspector or Amazon Macie for example). After you have added event.module, filter the desired Security Hub integrated service (for example, Amazon Inspector) to display. When testing the environment covered in this blog post outside a production context, you can use Kinesis Data Generator to generate sample user traffic. Other tools are also available.
  4. Select the following on the dashboard to see the visualized information:
    • CloudTrail Summary
    • VpcFlowLogs Summary
    • GuardDuty Summary
    • All – Threat Hunting

Step 2: Configure alerts to match log criteria

Next, you will configure alerts to match log criteria. First you need to set the destination for alerts, and then set what to monitor.

To configure alerts

  1. In OpenSearch Dashboards, in the left menu, choose Alerting.
  2. To add the details of SNS, on the Destinations tab, choose Add destinations, and enter the following parameters:
    • Name: aes-siem-alert-destination
    • Type: Amazon SNS
    • SNS Alert: arn:aws:sns:<AWS-REGION>:<111111111111>:aes-siem-alert
      • Replace <111111111111> with your AWS account ID and correct the Region name
      • Replace <AWS-REGION> with the Region you are using, for example, eu-west-1
    • IAM Role ARN: arn:aws:iam::<111111111111>:role/aes-siem-sns-role
      • Replace &<111111111111> with your AWS account ID
  3. Choose Create to complete setting the alert destination.
    Figure 6: Edit alert destination

    Figure 6: Edit alert destination

  4. In OpenSearch Dashboards, in the left menu, select Alerting. You will now set what to monitor. Here you monitor a CloudTrail trail authentication failure. There are two normalized log times: @timestamp and event.ingested. The difference is between the log occurrence time (@timestamp) and the SIEM reception time (event.ingested). Use event.ingested for logs with a large time lag from occurrence to reception. You can specify flexible conditions by selecting Define using extraction query for the filter definition.
  5. On the Monitors tab, choose Create monitor.
  6. Enter the following parameters. If there is no description, use the default value.
    • Name: Authentication failed
    • Method of definition: Define using extraction query
    • Indices: log-aws-cloudtrail-* (manual input, not pull-down)
    • Define extraction query: Enter the following query.
      {
      	"query": {
      		"bool": {
      			"filter": [
      			{"term": {"eventSource": "signin.amazonaws.com"}},
      			{"term": {"event.outcome": "failure"}},
      			{"range": {
      				"event.ingested": {
      				"from": "{{period_end}}||-20m",
      				"to": "{{period_end}}"}}
      				}
      			]
      		}
      	}
      }
      

  7. Enter the following remaining parameters of the monitor:
    • Frequency: By interval
    • Monitor schedule: Every 3 minutes
  8. Choose Create to create the monitor.

Step 3: Set up trigger to send email via Amazon SNS

Now you will set the alert firing condition, known as the trigger. This is the setting for alerting when the monitored conditions (Monitors) are met. By default, the alert will be triggered if the number of hits is greater than 0. In this step , you will not change it, only give it a name.

To set up the trigger

  1. Select Create trigger and for Trigger name, enter Authentication failed trigger.
  2. Scroll down to Configure actions.
    Figure 7: Create trigger

    Figure 7: Create trigger

  3. Set what the trigger should do (action). In this case, you want to publish to SNS. Set the following parameters for the body of the email
    • Action name: Authentication failed action
    • Destination: Choose aes-siem-alert-destination – (Amazon SNS)
    • Message subject: (SIEM) Auth failure alert
    • Action throttling: Select Enable action throttling, and set throttle action to only trigger every 10 minutes.
    • Message: Copy and paste the following message into the text box. After pasting, choose Send test message at the bottom right of the screen to confirm that you can receive the test email.

      Monitor ctx.monitor.name just entered alert status. Please investigate the issue.

      Trigger: ctx.trigger.name

      Severity: ctx.trigger.severity

      @timestamp: ctx.results.0.hits.hits.0._source.@timestamp

      event.action: ctx.results.0.hits.hits.0._source.event.action

      error.message: ctx.results.0.hits.hits.0._source.error.message

      count: ctx.results.0.hits.total.value

      source.ip: ctx.results.0.hits.hits.0._source.source.ip

      source.geo.country_name: ctx.results.0.hits.hits.0._source.source.geo.country_name

    Figure 8: Configure actions

    Figure 8: Configure actions

  4. You will receive an alert email in a few minutes. You can check the occurrence status, including the history, by the following method:
    1. In OpenSearch Dashboards, on the left menu, choose Alerting.
    2. On the Monitors tab, choose Authentication failed.
    3. You can check the status of the alert in the History pane.
    Figure 9: Email alert

    Figure 9: Email alert

Use case 1 shows you how to correlate various Security Hub findings through this OpenSearch Service SIEM solution. However, you can take the solution a step further and build more complex correlation checks by following the procedure in the blog post Correlate security findings with AWS Security Hub and Amazon EventBridge. This information can then be ingested into this OpenSearch Service SIEM solution for viewing on a single screen.

Use case 2: Store findings for longer than 90 days after last update date

Security Hub has a maximum storage time of 90 days for events, but your organization might require data storage beyond that period, with flexibility to specify a custom retention period to meet your needs. The SIEM on Amazon OpenSearch Service solution creates a centralized S3 bucket where findings from Security Hub and various other services are collected and stored, and this bucket can be configured to store data as long as you require. The S3 bucket can persist data indefinitely, or you can create an S3 object lifecycle policy to set a custom retention timeframe. Lifecycle policies allow you to either transition objects between S3 storage classes or delete objects after a specified period. Alternatively, you can use S3 Intelligent-Tiering to allow the Amazon S3 service to move data between tiers, based on user access patterns.

Either lifecycle policies or S3 Intelligent-Tiering will allow you to optimize costs for data that is stored in S3, to keep data for archive or backup purposes when it is no longer available in Security Hub or OpenSearch Service. Within the solution, this centralized bucket is called aes-siem-xxxxxxxx-log and is configured to store data for OpenSearch Service to consume indefinitely. The Amazon S3 User Guide has instructions for configuring an S3 lifecycle policy that is explicitly defined by the user on the centralized bucket. Or you can follow the instructions for configuring intelligent tiering to allow the S3 service to manage which tier data is stored in automatically. After data is archived, you can use Amazon Athena to query the S3 bucket for historical information that has been removed from OpenSearch Service, because this S3 bucket acts as a centralized security event repository.

Use case 3: Aggregate findings across multiple administrator accounts

There are cases where you might have multiple Security Hub administrator accounts within one or multiple organizations. For these use cases, you can consolidate findings across these multiple Security Hub administrator accounts into a single S3 bucket for centralized storage, archive, backup, and querying. This gives you the ability to create a single SIEM on OpenSearch Service to minimize the number of monitoring tools you need. In order to do this, you can use S3 replication to automatically copy findings to a centralized S3 bucket. You can follow this detailed walkthrough on how to set up the correct bucket permissions in order to allow replication between the accounts. You can also follow this related blog post to configure cross-Region Security Hub findings that are centralized in a single S3 bucket, if cross-Region replication is appropriate for your security needs. With cross-account S3 replication set up for Security Hub archived event data, you can import data from the centralized S3 bucket into OpenSearch Service by using the Lambda function within the solution in this blog post. This Lambda function automatically normalizes and enriches the log data and imports it into OpenSearch Service, so that users only need to configure data storage in the S3 bucket, and the Lambda function will automatically import the data.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we showed how you can use Security Hub with a SIEM to store findings for longer than 90 days, aggregate findings across multiple administrator accounts, and correlate Security Hub findings with each other and other log sources. We used the solution to walk through building the SIEM and explained how Security Hub could be used within that solution to add greater flexibility. This post describes one solution to create your own SIEM using OpenSearch Service; however, we also recommend that you read the blog post Visualize AWS Security Hub Findings using Analytics and Business Intelligence Tools, in order to see a different method of consolidating and visualizing insights from Security Hub.

To learn more, you can also try out this solution through the new SIEM on AWS OpenSearch Service workshop.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this blog post, please start a new thread on the Security Hub forum or contact AWS Support.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Ely Kahn

Ely Kahn

Ely Kahn is the Principal Product Manager for AWS Security Hub. Before his time at AWS, Ely was a co-founder for Sqrrl, a security analytics startup that AWS acquired and is now Amazon Detective. Earlier, Ely served in a variety of positions in the federal government, including Director of Cybersecurity at the National Security Council in the White House.

Anthony Pasquariello

Anthony Pasquariello

Anthony Pasquariello is a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS based in New York City. He specializes in modernization and security for our advanced enterprise customers. Anthony enjoys writing and speaking about all things cloud. He’s pursuing an MBA, and received his MS and BS in Electrical & Computer Engineering.

Aashmeet Kalra

Aashmeet Kalra

Aashmeet Kalra is a Principal Solutions Architect working in the Global and Strategic team at AWS in San Francisco. Aashmeet has over 17 years of experience designing and developing innovative solutions for customers globally. She specializes in advanced analytics, machine learning and builder/developer experience.

Grant Joslyn

Grant Joslyn

Grant Joslyn is a solutions architect for the US state and local government public sector team at Amazon Web Services (AWS). He specializes in end user compute and cloud automation. He provides technical and architectural guidance to customers building secure solutions on AWS. He is a subject matter expert and thought leader for strategic initiatives that help customers embrace DevOps practices.

Akihiro Nakajima

Akihiro Nakajima

Akihiro Nakajima is a Senior Solutions Architect, Security Specialist at Amazon Web Services Japan. He has more than 20 years of experience in security, specifically focused on incident analysis and response, threat hunting, and digital forensics. He leads development of open-source software, “SIEM on Amazon OpenSearch Service”.

Developer Sabotages Open-Source Software Package

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/developer-sabotages-open-source-software-package.html

This is a big deal:

A developer has been caught adding malicious code to a popular open-source package that wiped files on computers located in Russia and Belarus as part of a protest that has enraged many users and raised concerns about the safety of free and open source software.

The application, node-ipc, adds remote interprocess communication and neural networking capabilities to other open source code libraries. As a dependency, node-ipc is automatically downloaded and incorporated into other libraries, including ones like Vue.js CLI, which has more than 1 million weekly downloads.

[…]

The node-ipc update is just one example of what some researchers are calling protestware. Experts have begun tracking other open source projects that are also releasing updates calling out the brutality of Russia’s war. This spreadsheet lists 21 separate packages that are affected.

One such package is es5-ext, which provides code for the ECMAScript 6 scripting language specification. A new dependency named postinstall.js, which the developer added on March 7, checks to see if the user’s computer has a Russian IP address, in which case the code broadcasts a “call for peace.”

It constantly surprises non-computer people how much critical software is dependent on the whims of random programmers who inconsistently maintain software libraries. Between log4j and this new protestware, it’s becoming a serious vulnerability. The White House tried to start addressing this problem last year, requiring a “software bill of materials” for government software:

…the term “Software Bill of Materials” or “SBOM” means a formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components used in building software. Software developers and vendors often create products by assembling existing open source and commercial software components. The SBOM enumerates these components in a product. It is analogous to a list of ingredients on food packaging. An SBOM is useful to those who develop or manufacture software, those who select or purchase software, and those who operate software. Developers often use available open source and third-party software components to create a product; an SBOM allows the builder to make sure those components are up to date and to respond quickly to new vulnerabilities. Buyers can use an SBOM to perform vulnerability or license analysis, both of which can be used to evaluate risk in a product. Those who operate software can use SBOMs to quickly and easily determine whether they are at potential risk of a newly discovered vulnerability. A widely used, machine-readable SBOM format allows for greater benefits through automation and tool integration. The SBOMs gain greater value when collectively stored in a repository that can be easily queried by other applications and systems. Understanding the supply chain of software, obtaining an SBOM, and using it to analyze known vulnerabilities are crucial in managing risk.

It’s not a solution, but it’s a start.

EDITED TO ADD (3/22): Brian Krebs on protestware.

Friday Squid Blogging: The Costs of Unregulated Squid Fishing

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/friday-squid-blogging-the-costs-of-unregulated-squid-fishing.html

Greenpeace has published a report, “Squids in the Spotlight,” on the extent and externalities of global squid fishing.

News article.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Read my blog posting guidelines here.