Tag Archives: firewall

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks

Post Syndicated from Maxime Guerreiro original https://blog.cloudflare.com/protecting-galileo-websites/

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks

Yesterday, we celebrated the fifth anniversary of Project Galileo. More than 550 websites are part of this program, and they have something in common: each and every one of them has been subject to attacks in the last month. In this blog post, we will look at the security events we observed between the 23 April 2019 and 23 May 2019.

Project Galileo sites are protected by the Cloudflare Firewall and Advanced DDoS Protection which contain a number of features that can be used to detect and mitigate different types of attack and suspicious traffic. The following table shows how each of these features contributed to the protection of sites on Project Galileo.

Firewall Feature

Requests Mitigated

Distinct originating IPs

Sites Affected (approx.)

Firewall
Rules

78.7M

396.5K

~ 30

Security
Level

41.7M

1.8M

~ 520

Access
Rules

24.0M

386.9K

~ 200

Browser
Integrity Check

9.4M

32.2K

~ 500

WAF

4.5M

163.8K

~ 200

User-Agent
Blocking

2.3M

1.3K

~ 15

Hotlink
Protection

2.0M

686.7K

~ 40

HTTP
DoS

1.6M

360

1

Rate
Limit

623.5K

6.6K

~ 15

Zone
Lockdown

9.7K

2.8K

~ 10

WAF (Web Application Firewall)

Although not the most impressive in terms of blocked requests, the WAF is the most interesting as it identifies and blocks malicious requests, based on heuristics and rules that are the result of seeing attacks across all of our customers and learning from those. The WAF is available to all of our paying customers, protecting them against 0-days, SQL/XSS exploits and more. For the Project Galileo customers the WAF rules blocked more than 4.5 million requests in the month that we looked at, matching over 130 WAF rules and approximately 150k requests per day.

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks
Heat map showing the attacks seen on customer sites (rows) per day (columns)

This heat map may initially appear confusing but reading one is easy once you know what to expect so bear with us! It is a table where each line is a website on Project Galileo and each column is a day. The color represents the number of requests triggering WAF rules – on a scale from 0 (white) to a lot (dark red). The darker the cell, the more requests were blocked on this day.

We observe malicious traffic on a daily basis for most websites we protect. The average Project Galileo site saw malicious traffic for 27 days in the 1 month observed, and for almost 60% of the sites we noticed daily events.

Fortunately, the vast majority of websites only receive a few malicious requests per day, likely from automated scanners. In some cases, we notice a net increase in attacks against some websites – and a few websites are under a constant influx of attacks.

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks
Heat map showing the attacks blocked for each WAF rule (rows) per day (columns)

This heat map shows the WAF rules that blocked requests by day. At first, it seems some rules are useless as they never match malicious requests, but this plot makes it obvious that some attack vectors become active all of a sudden (isolated dark cells). This is especially true for 0-days, malicious traffic starts once an exploit is published and is very active on the first few days. The dark active lines are the most common malicious requests, and these WAF rules protect against things like XSS and SQL injection attacks.

DoS (Denial of Service)

A DoS attack prevents legitimate visitors from accessing a website by flooding it with bad traffic.  Due to the way Cloudflare works, websites protected by Cloudflare are immune to many DoS vectors, out of the box. We block layer 3 and 4 attacks, which includes SYN floods and UDP amplifications. DNS nameservers, often described as the Internet’s phone book, are fully managed by Cloudflare, and protected – visitors know how to reach the websites.

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks
Line plot – requests per second to a website under DoS attack

Can you spot the attack?

As for layer 7 attacks (for instance, HTTP floods), we rely on Gatebot, an automated tool to detect, analyse and block DoS attacks, so you can sleep. The graph shows the requests per second we received on a zone, and whether or not it reached the origin server. As you can see, the bad traffic was identified automatically by Gatebot, and more than 1.6 million requests were blocked as a result.

Firewall Rules

For websites with specific requirements we provide tools to allow customers to block traffic to precisely fit their needs. Customers can easily implement complex logic using Firewall Rules to filter out specific chunks of traffic, block IPs / Networks / Countries using Access Rules and Project Galileo sites have done just that. Let’s see a few examples.

Firewall Rules allows website owners to challenge or block as much or as little traffic as they desire, and this can be done as a surgical tool “block just this request” or as a general tool “challenge every request”.

For instance, a well-known website used Firewall Rules to prevent twenty IPs from fetching specific pages. 3 of these IPs were then used to send a total of 4.5 million requests over a short period of time, and the following chart shows the requests seen for this website. When this happened Cloudflare, mitigated the traffic ensuring that the website remains available.

Protecting Project Galileo websites from HTTP attacks
Cumulative line plot. Requests per second to a website

Another website, built with WordPress, is using Cloudflare to cache their webpages. As POST requests are not cacheable, they always hit the origin machine and increase load on the origin server – that’s why this website is using firewall rules to block POST requests, except on their administration backend. Smart!

Website owners can also deny or challenge requests based on the visitor’s IP address, Autonomous System Number (ASN) or Country. Dubbed Access Rules, it is enforced on all pages of a website – hassle-free.

For example, a news website is using Cloudflare’s Access Rules to challenge visitors from countries outside of their geographic region who are accessing their website. We enforce the rules globally even for cached resources, and take care of GeoIP database updates for them, so they don’t have to.

The Zone Lockdown utility restricts a specific URL to specific IP addresses. This is useful to protect an internal but public path being accessed by external IP addresses. A non-profit based in the United Kingdom is using Zone Lockdown to restrict access to their WordPress’ admin panel and login page, hardening their website without relying on non official plugins. Although it does not prevent very sophisticated attacks, it shields them against automated attacks and phishing attempts – as even if their credentials are stolen, they can’t be used as easily.

Rate Limiting

Cloudflare acts as a CDN, caching resources and happily serving them, reducing bandwidth used by the origin server … and indirectly the costs. Unfortunately, not all requests can be cached and some requests are very expensive to handle. Malicious users may abuse this to increase load on the server, and website owners can rely on our Rate Limit to help them: they define thresholds, expressed in requests over a time span, and we make sure to enforce this threshold. A non-profit fighting against poverty relies on rate limits to protect their donation page, and we are glad to help!

Security Level

Last but not least, one of Cloudflare’s greatest assets is our threat intelligence. With such a wide lens of the threat landscape, Cloudflare uses our Firewall data, combined with machine learning to curate our IP Reputation databases. This data is provided to all Cloudflare customers, and is configured through our Security Level feature. Customers then may define their threshold sensitivity, ranging  from Essentially Off to I’m Under Attack. For every incoming request, we ask visitors to complete a challenge if the score is above a customer defined threshold. This system alone is responsible for 25% of the requests we mitigated: it’s extremely easy to use, and it constantly learns from the other protections.

Conclusion

When taken together, the Cloudflare Firewall features provide our Project Galileo customers comprehensive and effective security that enables them to ensure their important work is available. The majority of security events were handled automatically, and this is our strength – security that is always on, always available, always learning.

[$] Bpfilter (and user-mode blobs) for 4.18

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/755919/rss

In February, the bpfilter mechanism was
first posted to the mailing lists. Bpfilter is meant to be a replacement
for the current in-kernel firewall/packet-filtering code. It provides
little functionality itself; instead, it creates a set of hooks that can
run BPF programs to make the packet-filtering decisions. A version of that patch set has been merged
into the net-next tree for 4.18. It will not be replacing any existing
packet filters in its current form, but it does feature a significant
change to one of its more controversial features: the new user-mode helper
mechanism.

Protecting your API using Amazon API Gateway and AWS WAF — Part I

Post Syndicated from Chris Munns original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/protecting-your-api-using-amazon-api-gateway-and-aws-waf-part-i/

This post courtesy of Thiago Morais, AWS Solutions Architect

When you build web applications or expose any data externally, you probably look for a platform where you can build highly scalable, secure, and robust REST APIs. As APIs are publicly exposed, there are a number of best practices for providing a secure mechanism to consumers using your API.

Amazon API Gateway handles all the tasks involved in accepting and processing up to hundreds of thousands of concurrent API calls, including traffic management, authorization and access control, monitoring, and API version management.

In this post, I show you how to take advantage of the regional API endpoint feature in API Gateway, so that you can create your own Amazon CloudFront distribution and secure your API using AWS WAF.

AWS WAF is a web application firewall that helps protect your web applications from common web exploits that could affect application availability, compromise security, or consume excessive resources.

As you make your APIs publicly available, you are exposed to attackers trying to exploit your services in several ways. The AWS security team published a whitepaper solution using AWS WAF, How to Mitigate OWASP’s Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities.

Regional API endpoints

Edge-optimized APIs are endpoints that are accessed through a CloudFront distribution created and managed by API Gateway. Before the launch of regional API endpoints, this was the default option when creating APIs using API Gateway. It primarily helped to reduce latency for API consumers that were located in different geographical locations than your API.

When API requests predominantly originate from an Amazon EC2 instance or other services within the same AWS Region as the API is deployed, a regional API endpoint typically lowers the latency of connections. It is recommended for such scenarios.

For better control around caching strategies, customers can use their own CloudFront distribution for regional APIs. They also have the ability to use AWS WAF protection, as I describe in this post.

Edge-optimized API endpoint

The following diagram is an illustrated example of the edge-optimized API endpoint where your API clients access your API through a CloudFront distribution created and managed by API Gateway.

Regional API endpoint

For the regional API endpoint, your customers access your API from the same Region in which your REST API is deployed. This helps you to reduce request latency and particularly allows you to add your own content delivery network, as needed.

Walkthrough

In this section, you implement the following steps:

  • Create a regional API using the PetStore sample API.
  • Create a CloudFront distribution for the API.
  • Test the CloudFront distribution.
  • Set up AWS WAF and create a web ACL.
  • Attach the web ACL to the CloudFront distribution.
  • Test AWS WAF protection.

Create the regional API

For this walkthrough, use an existing PetStore API. All new APIs launch by default as the regional endpoint type. To change the endpoint type for your existing API, choose the cog icon on the top right corner:

After you have created the PetStore API on your account, deploy a stage called “prod” for the PetStore API.

On the API Gateway console, select the PetStore API and choose Actions, Deploy API.

For Stage name, type prod and add a stage description.

Choose Deploy and the new API stage is created.

Use the following AWS CLI command to update your API from edge-optimized to regional:

aws apigateway update-rest-api \
--rest-api-id {rest-api-id} \
--patch-operations op=replace,path=/endpointConfiguration/types/EDGE,value=REGIONAL

A successful response looks like the following:

{
    "description": "Your first API with Amazon API Gateway. This is a sample API that integrates via HTTP with your demo Pet Store endpoints", 
    "createdDate": 1511525626, 
    "endpointConfiguration": {
        "types": [
            "REGIONAL"
        ]
    }, 
    "id": "{api-id}", 
    "name": "PetStore"
}

After you change your API endpoint to regional, you can now assign your own CloudFront distribution to this API.

Create a CloudFront distribution

To make things easier, I have provided an AWS CloudFormation template to deploy a CloudFront distribution pointing to the API that you just created. Click the button to deploy the template in the us-east-1 Region.

For Stack name, enter RegionalAPI. For APIGWEndpoint, enter your API FQDN in the following format:

{api-id}.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com

After you fill out the parameters, choose Next to continue the stack deployment. It takes a couple of minutes to finish the deployment. After it finishes, the Output tab lists the following items:

  • A CloudFront domain URL
  • An S3 bucket for CloudFront access logs
Output from CloudFormation

Output from CloudFormation

Test the CloudFront distribution

To see if the CloudFront distribution was configured correctly, use a web browser and enter the URL from your distribution, with the following parameters:

https://{your-distribution-url}.cloudfront.net/{api-stage}/pets

You should get the following output:

[
  {
    "id": 1,
    "type": "dog",
    "price": 249.99
  },
  {
    "id": 2,
    "type": "cat",
    "price": 124.99
  },
  {
    "id": 3,
    "type": "fish",
    "price": 0.99
  }
]

Set up AWS WAF and create a web ACL

With the new CloudFront distribution in place, you can now start setting up AWS WAF to protect your API.

For this demo, you deploy the AWS WAF Security Automations solution, which provides fine-grained control over the requests attempting to access your API.

For more information about deployment, see Automated Deployment. If you prefer, you can launch the solution directly into your account using the following button.

For CloudFront Access Log Bucket Name, add the name of the bucket created during the deployment of the CloudFormation stack for your CloudFront distribution.

The solution allows you to adjust thresholds and also choose which automations to enable to protect your API. After you finish configuring these settings, choose Next.

To start the deployment process in your account, follow the creation wizard and choose Create. It takes a few minutes do finish the deployment. You can follow the creation process through the CloudFormation console.

After the deployment finishes, you can see the new web ACL deployed on the AWS WAF console, AWSWAFSecurityAutomations.

Attach the AWS WAF web ACL to the CloudFront distribution

With the solution deployed, you can now attach the AWS WAF web ACL to the CloudFront distribution that you created earlier.

To assign the newly created AWS WAF web ACL, go back to your CloudFront distribution. After you open your distribution for editing, choose General, Edit.

Select the new AWS WAF web ACL that you created earlier, AWSWAFSecurityAutomations.

Save the changes to your CloudFront distribution and wait for the deployment to finish.

Test AWS WAF protection

To validate the AWS WAF Web ACL setup, use Artillery to load test your API and see AWS WAF in action.

To install Artillery on your machine, run the following command:

$ npm install -g artillery

After the installation completes, you can check if Artillery installed successfully by running the following command:

$ artillery -V
$ 1.6.0-12

As the time of publication, Artillery is on version 1.6.0-12.

One of the WAF web ACL rules that you have set up is a rate-based rule. By default, it is set up to block any requesters that exceed 2000 requests under 5 minutes. Try this out.

First, use cURL to query your distribution and see the API output:

$ curl -s https://{distribution-name}.cloudfront.net/prod/pets
[
  {
    "id": 1,
    "type": "dog",
    "price": 249.99
  },
  {
    "id": 2,
    "type": "cat",
    "price": 124.99
  },
  {
    "id": 3,
    "type": "fish",
    "price": 0.99
  }
]

Based on the test above, the result looks good. But what if you max out the 2000 requests in under 5 minutes?

Run the following Artillery command:

artillery quick -n 2000 --count 10  https://{distribution-name}.cloudfront.net/prod/pets

What you are doing is firing 2000 requests to your API from 10 concurrent users. For brevity, I am not posting the Artillery output here.

After Artillery finishes its execution, try to run the cURL request again and see what happens:

 

$ curl -s https://{distribution-name}.cloudfront.net/prod/pets

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<HTML><HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<TITLE>ERROR: The request could not be satisfied</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>ERROR</H1>
<H2>The request could not be satisfied.</H2>
<HR noshade size="1px">
Request blocked.
<BR clear="all">
<HR noshade size="1px">
<PRE>
Generated by cloudfront (CloudFront)
Request ID: [removed]
</PRE>
<ADDRESS>
</ADDRESS>
</BODY></HTML>

As you can see from the output above, the request was blocked by AWS WAF. Your IP address is removed from the blocked list after it falls below the request limit rate.

Conclusion

In this first part, you saw how to use the new API Gateway regional API endpoint together with Amazon CloudFront and AWS WAF to secure your API from a series of attacks.

In the second part, I will demonstrate some other techniques to protect your API using API keys and Amazon CloudFront custom headers.

masscan, macOS, and firewall

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/05/masscan-macos-and-firewall.html

One of the more useful features of masscan is the “–banners” check, which connects to the TCP port, sends some request, and gets a basic response back. However, since masscan has it’s own TCP stack, it’ll interfere with the operating system’s TCP stack if they are sharing the same IPv4 address. The operating system will reply with a RST packet before the TCP connection can be established.

The way to fix this is to use the built-in packet-filtering firewall to block those packets in the operating-system TCP/IP stack. The masscan program still sees everything before the packet-filter, but the operating system can’t see anything after the packet-filter.

Note that we are talking about the “packet-filter” firewall feature here. Remember that macOS, like most operating systems these days, has two separate firewalls: an application firewall and a packet-filter firewall. The application firewall is the one you see in System Settings labeled “Firewall”, and it controls things based upon the application’s identity rather than by which ports it uses. This is normally “on” by default. The packet-filter is normally “off” by default and is of little use to normal users.

Also note that macOS changed packet-filters around version 10.10.5 (“Yosemite”, October 2014). The older one is known as “ipfw“, which was the default firewall for FreeBSD (much of macOS is based on FreeBSD). The replacement is known as PF, which comes from OpenBSD. Whereas you used to use the old “ipfw” command on the command line, you now use the “pfctl” command, as well as the “/etc/pf.conf” configuration file.

What we need to filter is the source port of the packets that masscan will send, so that when replies are received, they won’t reach the operating-system stack, and just go to masscan instead. To do this, we need find a range of ports that won’t conflict with the operating system. Namely, when the operating system creates outgoing connections, it randomly chooses a source port within a certain range. We want to use masscan to use source ports in a different range.

To figure out the range macOS uses, we run the following command:

sysctl net.inet.ip.portrange.first net.inet.ip.portrange.last

On my laptop, which is probably the default for macOS, I get the following range. Sniffing with Wireshark confirms this is the range used for source ports for outgoing connections.

net.inet.ip.portrange.first: 49152
net.inet.ip.portrange.last: 65535

So this means I shouldn’t use source ports anywhere in the range 49152 to 65535. On my laptop, I’ve decided to use for masscan the ports 40000 to 41023. The range masscan uses must be a power of 2, so here I’m using 1024 (two to the tenth power).

To configure masscan, I can either type the parameter “–source-port 40000-41023” every time I run the program, or I can add the following line to /etc/masscan/masscan.conf. Remember that by default, masscan will look in that configuration file for any configuration parameters, so you don’t have to keep retyping them on the command line.

source-port = 40000-41023

Next, I need to add the following firewall rule to the bottom of /etc/pf.conf:

block in proto tcp from any to any port 40000 >< 41024

However, we aren’t done yet. By default, the packet-filter firewall is off on some versions of macOS. Therefore, every time you reboot your computer, you need to enable it. The simple way to do this is on the command line run:

pfctl -e

Or, if that doesn’t work, try:

pfctl -E

If the firewall is already running, then you’ll need to load the file explicitly (or reboot):

pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf

You can check to see if the rule is active:

pfctl -s rules

Supply-Chain Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/supply-chain_se.html

Earlier this month, the Pentagon stopped selling phones made by the Chinese companies ZTE and Huawei on military bases because they might be used to spy on their users.

It’s a legitimate fear, and perhaps a prudent action. But it’s just one instance of the much larger issue of securing our supply chains.

All of our computerized systems are deeply international, and we have no choice but to trust the companies and governments that touch those systems. And while we can ban a few specific products, services or companies, no country can isolate itself from potential foreign interference.

In this specific case, the Pentagon is concerned that the Chinese government demanded that ZTE and Huawei add “backdoors” to their phones that could be surreptitiously turned on by government spies or cause them to fail during some future political conflict. This tampering is possible because the software in these phones is incredibly complex. It’s relatively easy for programmers to hide these capabilities, and correspondingly difficult to detect them.

This isn’t the first time the United States has taken action against foreign software suspected to contain hidden features that can be used against us. Last December, President Trump signed into law a bill banning software from the Russian company Kaspersky from being used within the US government. In 2012, the focus was on Chinese-made Internet routers. Then, the House Intelligence Committee concluded: “Based on available classified and unclassified information, Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems.”

Nor is the United States the only country worried about these threats. In 2014, China reportedly banned antivirus products from both Kaspersky and the US company Symantec, based on similar fears. In 2017, the Indian government identified 42 smartphone apps that China subverted. Back in 1997, the Israeli company Check Point was dogged by rumors that its government added backdoors into its products; other of that country’s tech companies have been suspected of the same thing. Even al-Qaeda was concerned; ten years ago, a sympathizer released the encryption software Mujahedeen Secrets, claimed to be free of Western influence and backdoors. If a country doesn’t trust another country, then it can’t trust that country’s computer products.

But this trust isn’t limited to the country where the company is based. We have to trust the country where the software is written — and the countries where all the components are manufactured. In 2016, researchers discovered that many different models of cheap Android phones were sending information back to China. The phones might be American-made, but the software was from China. In 2016, researchers demonstrated an even more devious technique, where a backdoor could be added at the computer chip level in the factory that made the chips ­ without the knowledge of, and undetectable by, the engineers who designed the chips in the first place. Pretty much every US technology company manufactures its hardware in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Taiwan.

We also have to trust the programmers. Today’s large software programs are written by teams of hundreds of programmers scattered around the globe. Backdoors, put there by we-have-no-idea-who, have been discovered in Juniper firewalls and D-Link routers, both of which are US companies. In 2003, someone almost slipped a very clever backdoor into Linux. Think of how many countries’ citizens are writing software for Apple or Microsoft or Google.

We can go even farther down the rabbit hole. We have to trust the distribution systems for our hardware and software. Documents disclosed by Edward Snowden showed the National Security Agency installing backdoors into Cisco routers being shipped to the Syrian telephone company. There are fake apps in the Google Play store that eavesdrop on you. Russian hackers subverted the update mechanism of a popular brand of Ukrainian accounting software to spread the NotPetya malware.

In 2017, researchers demonstrated that a smartphone can be subverted by installing a malicious replacement screen.

I could go on. Supply-chain security is an incredibly complex problem. US-only design and manufacturing isn’t an option; the tech world is far too internationally interdependent for that. We can’t trust anyone, yet we have no choice but to trust everyone. Our phones, computers, software and cloud systems are touched by citizens of dozens of different countries, any one of whom could subvert them at the demand of their government. And just as Russia is penetrating the US power grid so they have that capability in the event of hostilities, many countries are almost certainly doing the same thing at the consumer level.

We don’t know whether the risk of Huawei and ZTE equipment is great enough to warrant the ban. We don’t know what classified intelligence the United States has, and what it implies. But we do know that this is just a minor fix for a much larger problem. It’s doubtful that this ban will have any real effect. Members of the military, and everyone else, can still buy the phones. They just can’t buy them on US military bases. And while the US might block the occasional merger or acquisition, or ban the occasional hardware or software product, we’re largely ignoring that larger issue. Solving it borders on somewhere between incredibly expensive and realistically impossible.

Perhaps someday, global norms and international treaties will render this sort of device-level tampering off-limits. But until then, all we can do is hope that this particular arms race doesn’t get too far out of control.

This essay previously appeared in the Washington Post.

AWS Online Tech Talks – May and Early June 2018

Post Syndicated from Devin Watson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-online-tech-talks-may-and-early-june-2018/

AWS Online Tech Talks – May and Early June 2018  

Join us this month to learn about some of the exciting new services and solution best practices at AWS. We also have our first re:Invent 2018 webinar series, “How to re:Invent”. Sign up now to learn more, we look forward to seeing you.

Note – All sessions are free and in Pacific Time.

Tech talks featured this month:

Analytics & Big Data

May 21, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT Integrating Amazon Elasticsearch with your DevOps Tooling – Learn how you can easily integrate Amazon Elasticsearch Service into your DevOps tooling and gain valuable insight from your log data.

May 23, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTData Warehousing and Data Lake Analytics, Together – Learn how to query data across your data warehouse and data lake without moving data.

May 24, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTData Transformation Patterns in AWS – Discover how to perform common data transformations on the AWS Data Lake.

Compute

May 29, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Creating and Managing a WordPress Website with Amazon Lightsail – Learn about Amazon Lightsail and how you can create, run and manage your WordPress websites with Amazon’s simple compute platform.

May 30, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PTAccelerating Life Sciences with HPC on AWS – Learn how you can accelerate your Life Sciences research workloads by harnessing the power of high performance computing on AWS.

Containers

May 24, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Building Microservices with the 12 Factor App Pattern on AWS – Learn best practices for building containerized microservices on AWS, and how traditional software design patterns evolve in the context of containers.

Databases

May 21, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PTHow to Migrate from Cassandra to Amazon DynamoDB – Get the benefits, best practices and guides on how to migrate your Cassandra databases to Amazon DynamoDB.

May 23, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT5 Hacks for Optimizing MySQL in the Cloud – Learn how to optimize your MySQL databases for high availability, performance, and disaster resilience using RDS.

DevOps

May 23, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT.NET Serverless Development on AWS – Learn how to build a modern serverless application in .NET Core 2.0.

Enterprise & Hybrid

May 22, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTHybrid Cloud Customer Use Cases on AWS – Learn how customers are leveraging AWS hybrid cloud capabilities to easily extend their datacenter capacity, deliver new services and applications, and ensure business continuity and disaster recovery.

IoT

May 31, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTUsing AWS IoT for Industrial Applications – Discover how you can quickly onboard your fleet of connected devices, keep them secure, and build predictive analytics with AWS IoT.

Machine Learning

May 22, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PTUsing Apache Spark with Amazon SageMaker – Discover how to use Apache Spark with Amazon SageMaker for training jobs and application integration.

May 24, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PTIntroducing AWS DeepLens – Learn how AWS DeepLens provides a new way for developers to learn machine learning by pairing the physical device with a broad set of tutorials, examples, source code, and integration with familiar AWS services.

Management Tools

May 21, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PTGaining Better Observability of Your VMs with Amazon CloudWatch – Learn how CloudWatch Agent makes it easy for customers like Rackspace to monitor their VMs.

Mobile

May 29, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Deep Dive on Amazon Pinpoint Segmentation and Endpoint Management – See how segmentation and endpoint management with Amazon Pinpoint can help you target the right audience.

Networking

May 31, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PTMaking Private Connectivity the New Norm via AWS PrivateLink – See how PrivateLink enables service owners to offer private endpoints to customers outside their company.

Security, Identity, & Compliance

May 30, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – Introducing AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (CA) – Learn how AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) Private Certificate Authority (CA), a managed private CA service, helps you easily and securely manage the lifecycle of your private certificates.

June 1, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PTIntroducing AWS Firewall Manager – Centrally configure and manage AWS WAF rules across your accounts and applications.

Serverless

May 22, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PTBuilding API-Driven Microservices with Amazon API Gateway – Learn how to build a secure, scalable API for your application in our tech talk about API-driven microservices.

Storage

May 30, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTAccelerate Productivity by Computing at the Edge – Learn how AWS Snowball Edge support for compute instances helps accelerate data transfers, execute custom applications, and reduce overall storage costs.

June 1, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PTLearn to Build a Cloud-Scale Website Powered by Amazon EFS – Technical deep dive where you’ll learn tips and tricks for integrating WordPress, Drupal and Magento with Amazon EFS.

 

 

 

 

ISP Sued For Breaching User Privacy After Blocking Pirate Sites

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/isp-sued-for-breaching-user-privacy-after-blocking-pirate-sites-180428/

After hinting at moves to curb online piracy last month, on April 13 the Japanese government announced
emergency measures to target websites hosting pirated manga, anime and other types of content.

In common with dozens of counterparts around the world, the government said it favored site-blocking as the first line of defense. However, with no specific legislation to fall back on, authorities asked local ISPs if they’d come along for the ride voluntarily. On Monday, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT) announced that it would.

“We have taken short-term emergency measures until legal systems on site-blocking are implemented,” NTT in a statement.

NTT Communications Corp., NTT Docomo Inc. and NTT Plala Inc., said they would target three sites highlighted by the government – Mangamura, AniTube! and MioMio – which together have a huge following in Japan.

The service providers added that at least in the short-term, they would prevent access to the sites using DNS blocking and would restrict access to other sites if requested to do so by the government. But, just a few days on, NTT is already facing problems.

Lawyer Yuichi Nakazawa has now launched legal action against NTT, demanding that the corporation immediately ends its site-blocking operations.

The complaint, filed at the Tokyo District Court, notes that the lawyer uses an Internet connection provided by NTT. Crucially, it also states that in order to block access to the sites in question, NTT would need to spy on customers’ Internet connections to find out if they’re trying to access the banned sites.

The lawyer informs TorrentFreak that the ISP’s decision prompted him into action.

“NTT’s decision was made arbitrarily on the site without any legal basis. No matter how legitimate the objective of copyright infringement is, it is very dangerous,” Nakazawa explains.

“I felt that ‘freedom,’ which is an important value of the Internet, was threatened. Actually, when the interruption of communications had begun, the company thought it would be impossible to reverse the situation, so I filed a lawsuit at this stage.”

Breaches of privacy could present a significant problem under Japanese law. The Telecommunications Business Act guarantees privacy of communications and prevents censorship, as does Article 21 of the Constitution.

“The secrecy of communications being handled by a telecommunications carrier shall not be violated,” the Telecommunications Business Act states, adding that “no communications being handled by a telecommunications carrier shall be censored.”

The Constitution is also clear, stating that “no censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.”

For his part, lawyer Yuichi Nakazawa is also concerned that his contract with the ISP is being breached.

“There is an Internet connection agreement between me and NTT. I am a customer of NTT. There is no provision in the contract between me and NTT to allow arbitrary interruption of communications,” he explains.

Nakazawa doesn’t appear to be against site-blocking per se, he’s just concerned that relevant laws and agreements are being broken.

“It is necessary to restrict sites of pirated publications but that does not mean you can do anything,” Nakazawa said, as quoted by Mainichi. “We should have sufficient discussions for an appropriate measure, including revising the law.”

The question of whether site-blocking does indeed represent an invasion of privacy will probably come down to how the ISP implements it and how that is interpreted by the courts.

A source familiar with the situation told TF that spying on user connections is clearly a problem but the deployment of an outer network firewall rule that simply prevents traffic passing through might be viewed differently.

Such a rule would provide no secret or private information that wasn’t already available to the ISP when the customer requested a banned site through a web browser, although it still falls foul of the “no censorship” requirements of both the Constitution and Telecommunications Business Act.

NTT Communications has declined to comment on the lawsuit but says it had no plans to backtrack on plans to block the sites. Earlier this week, SoftBank Corp., another ISP considering a blockade, expressed concerns that site-blocking has the potential to infringe secrecy of communications rules.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

OMG The Stupid It Burns

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/omg-stupid-it-burns.html

This article, pointed out by @TheGrugq, is stupid enough that it’s worth rebutting.

The article starts with the question “Why did the lessons of Stuxnet, Wannacry, Heartbleed and Shamoon go unheeded?“. It then proceeds to ignore the lessons of those things.
Some of the actual lessons should be things like how Stuxnet crossed air gaps, how Wannacry spread through flat Windows networking, how Heartbleed comes from technical debt, and how Shamoon furthers state aims by causing damage.
But this article doesn’t cover the technical lessons. Instead, it thinks the lesson should be the moral lesson, that we should take these things more seriously. But that’s stupid. It’s the sort of lesson people teach you that know nothing about the topic. When you have nothing of value to contribute to a topic you can always take the moral high road and criticize everyone for being morally weak for not taking it more seriously. Obviously, since doctors haven’t cured cancer yet, it’s because they don’t take the problem seriously.
The article continues to ignore the lesson of these cyber attacks and instead regales us with a list of military lessons from WW I and WW II. This makes the same flaw that many in the military make, trying to understand cyber through analogies with the real world. It’s not that such lessons could have no value, it’s that this article contains a poor list of them. It seems to consist of a random list of events that appeal to the author rather than events that have bearing on cybersecurity.
Then, in case we don’t get the point, the article bullies us with hyperbole, cliches, buzzwords, bombastic language, famous quotes, and citations. It’s hard to see how most of them actually apply to the text. Rather, it seems like they are included simply because he really really likes them.
The article invests much effort in discussing the buzzword “OODA loop”. Most attacks in cyberspace don’t have one. Instead, attackers flail around, trying lots of random things, overcoming defense with brute-force rather than an understanding of what’s going on. That’s obviously the case with Wannacry: it was an accident, with the perpetrator experimenting with what would happen if they added the ETERNALBLUE exploit to their existing ransomware code. The consequence was beyond anybody’s ability to predict.
You might claim that this is just the first stage, that they’ll loop around, observe Wannacry’s effects, orient themselves, decide, then act upon what they learned. Nope. Wannacry burned the exploit. It’s essentially removed any vulnerable systems from the public Internet, thereby making it impossible to use what they learned. It’s still active a year later, with infected systems behind firewalls busily scanning the Internet so that if you put a new system online that’s vulnerable, it’ll be taken offline within a few hours, before any other evildoer can take advantage of it.
See what I’m doing here? Learning the actual lessons of things like Wannacry? The thing the above article fails to do??
The article has a humorous paragraph on “defense in depth”, misunderstanding the term. To be fair, it’s the cybersecurity industry’s fault: they adopted then redefined the term. That’s why there’s two separate articles on Wikipedia: one for the old military term (as used in this article) and one for the new cybersecurity term.
As used in the cybersecurity industry, “defense in depth” means having multiple layers of security. Many organizations put all their defensive efforts on the perimeter, and none inside a network. The idea of “defense in depth” is to put more defenses inside the network. For example, instead of just one firewall at the edge of the network, put firewalls inside the network to segment different subnetworks from each other, so that a ransomware infection in the customer support computers doesn’t spread to sales and marketing computers.
The article talks about exploiting WiFi chips to bypass the defense in depth measures like browser sandboxes. This is conflating different types of attacks. A WiFi attack is usually considered a local attack, from somebody next to you in bar, rather than a remote attack from a server in Russia. Moreover, far from disproving “defense in depth” such WiFi attacks highlight the need for it. Namely, phones need to be designed so that successful exploitation of other microprocessors (namely, the WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular baseband chips) can’t directly compromise the host system. In other words, once exploited with “Broadpwn”, a hacker would need to extend the exploit chain with another vulnerability in the hosts Broadcom WiFi driver rather than immediately exploiting a DMA attack across PCIe. This suggests that if PCIe is used to interface to peripherals in the phone that an IOMMU be used, for “defense in depth”.
Cybersecurity is a young field. There are lots of useful things that outsider non-techies can teach us. Lessons from military history would be well-received.
But that’s not this story. Instead, this story is by an outsider telling us we don’t know what we are doing, that they do, and then proceeds to prove they don’t know what they are doing. Their argument is based on a moral suasion and bullying us with what appears on the surface to be intellectual rigor, but which is in fact devoid of anything smart.
My fear, here, is that I’m going to be in a meeting where somebody has read this pretentious garbage, explaining to me why “defense in depth” is wrong and how we need to OODA faster. I’d rather nip this in the bud, pointing out if you found anything interesting from that article, you are wrong.

Portspoof – Spoof All Ports Open & Emulate Valid Services

Post Syndicated from Darknet original https://www.darknet.org.uk/2018/04/portspoof-spoof-all-ports-open-emulate-valid-services/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=darknetfeed

Portspoof – Spoof All Ports Open & Emulate Valid Services

The primary goal of the Portspoof program is to enhance your system security through a set of new camouflage techniques which spoof all ports open and also emulate valid services on every port. As a result, any attackers port scan results will become fairly meaningless and will require hours of effort to accurately identify which ports have real services on and which do not.

The tool is meant to be a lightweight, fast, portable and secure addition to any firewall system or security system.

Read the rest of Portspoof – Spoof All Ports Open & Emulate Valid Services now! Only available at Darknet.

WannaCry after one year

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/03/wannacry-after-one-year.html

In the news, Boeing (an aircraft maker) has been “targeted by a WannaCry virus attack”. Phrased this way, it’s implausible. There are no new attacks targeting people with WannaCry. There is either no WannaCry, or it’s simply a continuation of the attack from a year ago.


It’s possible what happened is that an anti-virus product called a new virus “WannaCry”. Virus families are often related, and sometimes a distant relative gets called the same thing. I know this watching the way various anti-virus products label my own software, which isn’t a virus, but which virus writers often include with their own stuff. The Lazarus group, which is believed to be responsible for WannaCry, have whole virus families like this. Thus, just because an AV product claims you are infected with WannaCry doesn’t mean it’s the same thing that everyone else is calling WannaCry.

Famously, WannaCry was the first virus/ransomware/worm that used the NSA ETERNALBLUE exploit. Other viruses have since added the exploit, and of course, hackers use it when attacking systems. It may be that a network intrusion detection system detected ETERNALBLUE, which people then assumed was due to WannaCry. It may actually have been an nPetya infection instead (nPetya was the second major virus/worm/ransomware to use the exploit).

Or it could be the real WannaCry, but it’s probably not a new “attack” that “targets” Boeing. Instead, it’s likely a continuation from WannaCry’s first appearance. WannaCry is a worm, which means it spreads automatically after it was launched, for years, without anybody in control. Infected machines still exist, unnoticed by their owners, attacking random machines on the Internet. If you plug in an unpatched computer onto the raw Internet, without the benefit of a firewall, it’ll get infected within an hour.

However, the Boeing manufacturing systems that were infected were not on the Internet, so what happened? The narrative from the news stories imply some nefarious hacker activity that “targeted” Boeing, but that’s unlikely.

We have now have over 15 years of experience with network worms getting into strange places disconnected and even “air gapped” from the Internet. The most common reason is laptops. Somebody takes their laptop to some place like an airport WiFi network, and gets infected. They put their laptop to sleep, then wake it again when they reach their destination, and plug it into the manufacturing network. At this point, the virus spreads and infects everything. This is especially the case with maintenance/support engineers, who often have specialized software they use to control manufacturing machines, for which they have a reason to connect to the local network even if it doesn’t have useful access to the Internet. A single engineer may act as a sort of Typhoid Mary, going from customer to customer, infecting each in turn whenever they open their laptop.

Another cause for infection is virtual machines. A common practice is to take “snapshots” of live machines and save them to backups. Should the virtual machine crash, instead of rebooting it, it’s simply restored from the backed up running image. If that backup image is infected, then bringing it out of sleep will allow the worm to start spreading.

Jake Williams claims he’s seen three other manufacturing networks infected with WannaCry. Why does manufacturing seem more susceptible? The reason appears to be the “killswitch” that stops WannaCry from running elsewhere. The killswitch uses a DNS lookup, stopping itself if it can resolve a certain domain. Manufacturing networks are largely disconnected from the Internet enough that such DNS lookups don’t work, so the domain can’t be found, so the killswitch doesn’t work. Thus, manufacturing systems are no more likely to get infected, but the lack of killswitch means the virus will continue to run, attacking more systems instead of immediately killing itself.

One solution to this would be to setup sinkhole DNS servers on the network that resolve all unknown DNS queries to a single server that logs all requests. This is trivially setup with most DNS servers. The logs will quickly identify problems on the network, as well as any hacker or virus activity. The side effect is that it would make this killswitch kill WannaCry. WannaCry isn’t sufficient reason to setup sinkhole servers, of course, but it’s something I’ve found generally useful in the past.

Conclusion

Something obviously happened to the Boeing plant, but the narrative is all wrong. Words like “targeted attack” imply things that likely didn’t happen. Facts are so loose in cybersecurity that it may not have even been WannaCry.

The real story is that the original WannaCry is still out there, still trying to spread. Simply put a computer on the raw Internet (without a firewall) and you’ll get attacked. That, somehow, isn’t news. Instead, what’s news is whenever that continued infection hits somewhere famous, like Boeing, even though (as Boeing claims) it had no important effect.

What’s New in Qubes 4 (Linux Journal)

Post Syndicated from jake original https://lwn.net/Articles/748450/rss

Linux Journal has a look at Qubes 4, which is due to be released in the next month or so. It has undergone a refactoring of sorts. “Another major change in Qubes 4 relates to the GUI VM manager. In past releases, this program provided a graphical way for you to start, stop and pause VMs. It also allowed you to change all your VM settings, firewall rules and even which applications appeared in the VM’s menu. It also provided a GUI way to back up and restore VMs. With Qubes 4, a lot has changed. The ultimate goal with Qubes 4 is to replace the VM manager with standalone tools that replicate most of the original functionality.

[$] BPF comes to firewalls

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/747551/rss

The Linux kernel currently supports two separate network packet-filtering
mechanisms: iptables and nftables. For the last few years, it has been
generally assumed that nftables would eventually replace the older iptables
implementation; few people expected that the kernel developers would,
instead, add a third packet filter. But that would appear to be what is
happening with the newly announced bpfilter
mechanism. Bpfilter may eventually replace both iptables and nftables, but
there are a lot of questions that will need to be answered first.

Article from a Former Chinese PLA General on Cyber Sovereignty

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/01/article_from_a_.html

Interesting article by Major General Hao Yeli, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ret.), a senior advisor at the China International Institute for Strategic Society, Vice President of China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy, and the Chair of the Guanchao Cyber Forum.

Against the background of globalization and the internet era, the emerging cyber sovereignty concept calls for breaking through the limitations of physical space and avoiding misunderstandings based on perceptions of binary opposition. Reinforcing a cyberspace community with a common destiny, it reconciles the tension between exclusivity and transferability, leading to a comprehensive perspective. China insists on its cyber sovereignty, meanwhile, it transfers segments of its cyber sovereignty reasonably. China rightly attaches importance to its national security, meanwhile, it promotes international cooperation and open development.

China has never been opposed to multi-party governance when appropriate, but rejects the denial of government’s proper role and responsibilities with respect to major issues. The multilateral and multiparty models are complementary rather than exclusive. Governments and multi-stakeholders can play different leading roles at the different levels of cyberspace.

In the internet era, the law of the jungle should give way to solidarity and shared responsibilities. Restricted connections should give way to openness and sharing. Intolerance should be replaced by understanding. And unilateral values should yield to respect for differences while recognizing the importance of diversity.

The Top 10 Most Downloaded AWS Security and Compliance Documents in 2017

Post Syndicated from Sara Duffer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/the-top-10-most-downloaded-aws-security-and-compliance-documents-in-2017/

AWS download logo

The following list includes the ten most downloaded AWS security and compliance documents in 2017. Using this list, you can learn about what other AWS customers found most interesting about security and compliance last year.

  1. AWS Security Best Practices – This guide is intended for customers who are designing the security infrastructure and configuration for applications running on AWS. The guide provides security best practices that will help you define your Information Security Management System (ISMS) and build a set of security policies and processes for your organization so that you can protect your data and assets in the AWS Cloud.
  2. AWS: Overview of Security Processes – This whitepaper describes the physical and operational security processes for the AWS managed network and infrastructure, and helps answer questions such as, “How does AWS help me protect my data?”
  3. Architecting for HIPAA Security and Compliance on AWS – This whitepaper describes how to leverage AWS to develop applications that meet HIPAA and HITECH compliance requirements.
  4. Service Organization Controls (SOC) 3 Report – This publicly available report describes internal AWS security controls, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy.
  5. Introduction to AWS Security –This document provides an introduction to AWS’s approach to security, including the controls in the AWS environment, and some of the products and features that AWS makes available to customers to meet your security objectives.
  6. AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency – This whitepaper covers techniques to mitigate distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
  7. AWS: Risk and Compliance – This whitepaper provides information to help customers integrate AWS into their existing control framework, including a basic approach for evaluating AWS controls and a description of AWS certifications, programs, reports, and third-party attestations.
  8. Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP’s Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities – AWS WAF is a web application firewall that helps you protect your websites and web applications against various attack vectors at the HTTP protocol level. This whitepaper outlines how you can use AWS WAF to mitigate the application vulnerabilities that are defined in the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 list of most common categories of application security flaws.
  9. Introduction to Auditing the Use of AWS – This whitepaper provides information, tools, and approaches for auditors to use when auditing the security of the AWS managed network and infrastructure.
  10. AWS Security and Compliance: Quick Reference Guide – By using AWS, you inherit the many security controls that we operate, thus reducing the number of security controls that you need to maintain. Your own compliance and certification programs are strengthened while at the same time lowering your cost to maintain and run your specific security assurance requirements. Learn more in this quick reference guide.

– Sara

How to Enhance the Security of Sensitive Customer Data by Using Amazon CloudFront Field-Level Encryption

Post Syndicated from Alex Tomic original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-enhance-the-security-of-sensitive-customer-data-by-using-amazon-cloudfront-field-level-encryption/

Amazon CloudFront is a web service that speeds up distribution of your static and dynamic web content to end users through a worldwide network of edge locations. CloudFront provides a number of benefits and capabilities that can help you secure your applications and content while meeting compliance requirements. For example, you can configure CloudFront to help enforce secure, end-to-end connections using HTTPS SSL/TLS encryption. You also can take advantage of CloudFront integration with AWS Shield for DDoS protection and with AWS WAF (a web application firewall) for protection against application-layer attacks, such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting.

Now, CloudFront field-level encryption helps secure sensitive data such as a customer phone numbers by adding another security layer to CloudFront HTTPS. Using this functionality, you can help ensure that sensitive information in a POST request is encrypted at CloudFront edge locations. This information remains encrypted as it flows to and beyond your origin servers that terminate HTTPS connections with CloudFront and throughout the application environment. In this blog post, we demonstrate how you can enhance the security of sensitive data by using CloudFront field-level encryption.

Note: This post assumes that you understand concepts and services such as content delivery networks, HTTP forms, public-key cryptography, CloudFrontAWS Lambda, and the AWS CLI. If necessary, you should familiarize yourself with these concepts and review the solution overview in the next section before proceeding with the deployment of this post’s solution.

How field-level encryption works

Many web applications collect and store data from users as those users interact with the applications. For example, a travel-booking website may ask for your passport number and less sensitive data such as your food preferences. This data is transmitted to web servers and also might travel among a number of services to perform tasks. However, this also means that your sensitive information may need to be accessed by only a small subset of these services (most other services do not need to access your data).

User data is often stored in a database for retrieval at a later time. One approach to protecting stored sensitive data is to configure and code each service to protect that sensitive data. For example, you can develop safeguards in logging functionality to ensure sensitive data is masked or removed. However, this can add complexity to your code base and limit performance.

Field-level encryption addresses this problem by ensuring sensitive data is encrypted at CloudFront edge locations. Sensitive data fields in HTTPS form POSTs are automatically encrypted with a user-provided public RSA key. After the data is encrypted, other systems in your architecture see only ciphertext. If this ciphertext unintentionally becomes externally available, the data is cryptographically protected and only designated systems with access to the private RSA key can decrypt the sensitive data.

It is critical to secure private RSA key material to prevent unauthorized access to the protected data. Management of cryptographic key material is a larger topic that is out of scope for this blog post, but should be carefully considered when implementing encryption in your applications. For example, in this blog post we store private key material as a secure string in the Amazon EC2 Systems Manager Parameter Store. The Parameter Store provides a centralized location for managing your configuration data such as plaintext data (such as database strings) or secrets (such as passwords) that are encrypted using AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS). You may have an existing key management system in place that you can use, or you can use AWS CloudHSM. CloudHSM is a cloud-based hardware security module (HSM) that enables you to easily generate and use your own encryption keys in the AWS Cloud.

To illustrate field-level encryption, let’s look at a simple form submission where Name and Phone values are sent to a web server using an HTTP POST. A typical form POST would contain data such as the following.

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length:60

Name=Jane+Doe&Phone=404-555-0150

Instead of taking this typical approach, field-level encryption converts this data similar to the following.

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 1713

Name=Jane+Doe&Phone=AYABeHxZ0ZqWyysqxrB5pEBSYw4AAA...

To further demonstrate field-level encryption in action, this blog post includes a sample serverless application that you can deploy by using a CloudFormation template, which creates an application environment using CloudFront, Amazon API Gateway, and Lambda. The sample application is only intended to demonstrate field-level encryption functionality and is not intended for production use. The following diagram depicts the architecture and data flow of this sample application.

Sample application architecture and data flow

Diagram of the solution's architecture and data flow

Here is how the sample solution works:

  1. An application user submits an HTML form page with sensitive data, generating an HTTPS POST to CloudFront.
  2. Field-level encryption intercepts the form POST and encrypts sensitive data with the public RSA key and replaces fields in the form post with encrypted ciphertext. The form POST ciphertext is then sent to origin servers.
  3. The serverless application accepts the form post data containing ciphertext where sensitive data would normally be. If a malicious user were able to compromise your application and gain access to your data, such as the contents of a form, that user would see encrypted data.
  4. Lambda stores data in a DynamoDB table, leaving sensitive data to remain safely encrypted at rest.
  5. An administrator uses the AWS Management Console and a Lambda function to view the sensitive data.
  6. During the session, the administrator retrieves ciphertext from the DynamoDB table.
  7. The administrator decrypts sensitive data by using private key material stored in the EC2 Systems Manager Parameter Store.
  8. Decrypted sensitive data is transmitted over SSL/TLS via the AWS Management Console to the administrator for review.

Deployment walkthrough

The high-level steps to deploy this solution are as follows:

  1. Stage the required artifacts
    When deployment packages are used with Lambda, the zipped artifacts have to be placed in an S3 bucket in the target AWS Region for deployment. This step is not required if you are deploying in the US East (N. Virginia) Region because the package has already been staged there.
  2. Generate an RSA key pair
    Create a public/private key pair that will be used to perform the encrypt/decrypt functionality.
  3. Upload the public key to CloudFront and associate it with the field-level encryption configuration
    After you create the key pair, the public key is uploaded to CloudFront so that it can be used by field-level encryption.
  4. Launch the CloudFormation stack
    Deploy the sample application for demonstrating field-level encryption by using AWS CloudFormation.
  5. Add the field-level encryption configuration to the CloudFront distribution
    After you have provisioned the application, this step associates the field-level encryption configuration with the CloudFront distribution.
  6. Store the RSA private key in the Parameter Store
    Store the private key in the Parameter Store as a SecureString data type, which uses AWS KMS to encrypt the parameter value.

Deploy the solution

1. Stage the required artifacts

(If you are deploying in the US East [N. Virginia] Region, skip to Step 2, “Generate an RSA key pair.”)

Stage the Lambda function deployment package in an Amazon S3 bucket located in the AWS Region you are using for this solution. To do this, download the zipped deployment package and upload it to your in-region bucket. For additional information about uploading objects to S3, see Uploading Object into Amazon S3.

2. Generate an RSA key pair

In this section, you will generate an RSA key pair by using OpenSSL:

  1. Confirm access to OpenSSL.
    $ openssl version

    You should see version information similar to the following.

    OpenSSL <version> <date>

  1. Create a private key using the following command.
    $ openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem 2048

    The command results should look similar to the following.

    Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
    ................................................................................+++
    ..........................+++
    e is 65537 (0x10001)
  1. Extract the public key from the private key by running the following command.
    $ openssl rsa -pubout -in private_key.pem -out public_key.pem

    You should see output similar to the following.

    writing RSA key
  1. Restrict access to the private key.$ chmod 600 private_key.pem Note: You will use the public and private key material in Steps 3 and 6 to configure the sample application.

3. Upload the public key to CloudFront and associate it with the field-level encryption configuration

Now that you have created the RSA key pair, you will use the AWS Management Console to upload the public key to CloudFront for use by field-level encryption. Complete the following steps to upload and configure the public key.

Note: Do not include spaces or special characters when providing the configuration values in this section.

  1. From the AWS Management Console, choose Services > CloudFront.
  2. In the navigation pane, choose Public Key and choose Add Public Key.
    Screenshot of adding a public key

Complete the Add Public Key configuration boxes:

  • Key Name: Type a name such as DemoPublicKey.
  • Encoded Key: Paste the contents of the public_key.pem file you created in Step 2c. Copy and paste the encoded key value for your public key, including the -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- and -----END PUBLIC KEY----- lines.
  • Comment: Optionally add a comment.
  1. Choose Create.
  2. After adding at least one public key to CloudFront, the next step is to create a profile to tell CloudFront which fields of input you want to be encrypted. While still on the CloudFront console, choose Field-level encryption in the navigation pane.
  3. Under Profiles, choose Create profile.
    Screenshot of creating a profile

Complete the Create profile configuration boxes:

  • Name: Type a name such as FLEDemo.
  • Comment: Optionally add a comment.
  • Public key: Select the public key you configured in Step 4.b.
  • Provider name: Type a provider name such as FLEDemo.
    This information will be used when the form data is encrypted, and must be provided to applications that need to decrypt the data, along with the appropriate private key.
  • Pattern to match: Type phone. This configures field-level encryption to match based on the phone.
  1. Choose Save profile.
  2. Configurations include options for whether to block or forward a query to your origin in scenarios where CloudFront can’t encrypt the data. Under Encryption Configurations, choose Create configuration.
    Screenshot of creating a configuration

Complete the Create configuration boxes:

  • Comment: Optionally add a comment.
  • Content type: Enter application/x-www-form-urlencoded. This is a common media type for encoding form data.
  • Default profile ID: Select the profile you added in Step 3e.
  1. Choose Save configuration

4. Launch the CloudFormation stack

Launch the sample application by using a CloudFormation template that automates the provisioning process.

Input parameterInput parameter description
ProviderIDEnter the Provider name you assigned in Step 3e. The ProviderID is used in field-level encryption configuration in CloudFront (letters and numbers only, no special characters)
PublicKeyNameEnter the Key Name you assigned in Step 3b. This name is assigned to the public key in field-level encryption configuration in CloudFront (letters and numbers only, no special characters).
PrivateKeySSMPathLeave as the default: /cloudfront/field-encryption-sample/private-key
ArtifactsBucketThe S3 bucket with artifact files (staged zip file with app code). Leave as default if deploying in us-east-1.
ArtifactsPrefixThe path in the S3 bucket containing artifact files. Leave as default if deploying in us-east-1.

To finish creating the CloudFormation stack:

  1. Choose Next on the Select Template page, enter the input parameters and choose Next.
    Note: The Artifacts configuration needs to be updated only if you are deploying outside of us-east-1 (US East [N. Virginia]). See Step 1 for artifact staging instructions.
  2. On the Options page, accept the defaults and choose Next.
  3. On the Review page, confirm the details, choose the I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources check box, and then choose Create. (The stack will be created in approximately 15 minutes.)

5. Add the field-level encryption configuration to the CloudFront distribution

While still on the CloudFront console, choose Distributions in the navigation pane, and then:

    1. In the Outputs section of the FLE-Sample-App stack, look for CloudFrontDistribution and click the URL to open the CloudFront console.
    2. Choose Behaviors, choose the Default (*) behavior, and then choose Edit.
    3. For Field-level Encryption Config, choose the configuration you created in Step 3g.
      Screenshot of editing the default cache behavior
    4. Choose Yes, Edit.
    5. While still in the CloudFront distribution configuration, choose the General Choose Edit, scroll down to Distribution State, and change it to Enabled.
    6. Choose Yes, Edit.

6. Store the RSA private key in the Parameter Store

In this step, you store the private key in the EC2 Systems Manager Parameter Store as a SecureString data type, which uses AWS KMS to encrypt the parameter value. For more information about AWS KMS, see the AWS Key Management Service Developer Guide. You will need a working installation of the AWS CLI to complete this step.

  1. Store the private key in the Parameter Store with the AWS CLI by running the following command. You will find the <KMSKeyID> in the KMSKeyID in the CloudFormation stack Outputs. Substitute it for the placeholder in the following command.
    $ aws ssm put-parameter --type "SecureString" --name /cloudfront/field-encryption-sample/private-key --value file://private_key.pem --key-id "<KMSKeyID>"
    
    ------------------
    |  PutParameter  |
    +----------+-----+
    |  Version |  1  |
    +----------+-----+

  1. Verify the parameter. Your private key material should be accessible through the ssm get-parameter in the following command in the Value The key material has been truncated in the following output.
    $ aws ssm get-parameter --name /cloudfront/field-encryption-sample/private-key --with-decryption
    
    -----…
    
    ||  Value  |  -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
    MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAwGRBGuhacmw+C73kM6Z…….

    Notice we use the —with decryption argument in this command. This returns the private key as cleartext.

    This completes the sample application deployment. Next, we show you how to see field-level encryption in action.

  1. Delete the private key from local storage. On Linux for example, using the shred command, securely delete the private key material from your workstation as shown below. You may also wish to store the private key material within an AWS CloudHSM or other protected location suitable for your security requirements. For production implementations, you also should implement key rotation policies.
    $ shred -zvu -n  100 private*.pem
    
    shred: private_encrypted_key.pem: pass 1/101 (random)...
    shred: private_encrypted_key.pem: pass 2/101 (dddddd)...
    shred: private_encrypted_key.pem: pass 3/101 (555555)...
    ….

Test the sample application

Use the following steps to test the sample application with field-level encryption:

  1. Open sample application in your web browser by clicking the ApplicationURL link in the CloudFormation stack Outputs. (for example, https:d199xe5izz82ea.cloudfront.net/prod/). Note that it may take several minutes for the CloudFront distribution to reach the Deployed Status from the previous step, during which time you may not be able to access the sample application.
  2. Fill out and submit the HTML form on the page:
    1. Complete the three form fields: Full Name, Email Address, and Phone Number.
    2. Choose Submit.
      Screenshot of completing the sample application form
      Notice that the application response includes the form values. The phone number returns the following ciphertext encryption using your public key. This ciphertext has been stored in DynamoDB.
      Screenshot of the phone number as ciphertext
  3. Execute the Lambda decryption function to download ciphertext from DynamoDB and decrypt the phone number using the private key:
    1. In the CloudFormation stack Outputs, locate DecryptFunction and click the URL to open the Lambda console.
    2. Configure a test event using the “Hello World” template.
    3. Choose the Test button.
  4. View the encrypted and decrypted phone number data.
    Screenshot of the encrypted and decrypted phone number data

Summary

In this blog post, we showed you how to use CloudFront field-level encryption to encrypt sensitive data at edge locations and help prevent access from unauthorized systems. The source code for this solution is available on GitHub. For additional information about field-level encryption, see the documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing this solution, please start a new thread on the CloudFront forum.

– Alex and Cameron