Tag Archives: Security Blog

How to enforce creation of roles in a specific path: Use IAM role naming in hierarchy models

Post Syndicated from Varun Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-enforce-creation-of-roles-in-a-specific-path-use-iam-role-naming-in-hierarchy-models/

An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role is an IAM identity that you create in your AWS account that has specific permissions. An IAM role is similar to an IAM user because it’s an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do on AWS. However, as outlined in security best practices in IAM, AWS recommends that you use IAM roles instead of IAM users. An IAM user is uniquely associated with one person, while a role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it. An IAM role doesn’t have standard long-term credentials such as a password or access keys associated with it. Instead, when you assume a role, it provides you with temporary security credentials for your role session that are only valid for certain period of time.

This blog post explores the effective implementation of security controls within IAM roles, placing a specific focus on the IAM role’s path feature. By organizing IAM roles hierarchically using paths, you can address key challenges and achieve practical solutions to enhance IAM role management.

Benefits of using IAM paths

A fundamental benefit of using paths is the establishment of a clear and organized organizational structure. By using paths, you can handle diverse use cases while creating a well-defined framework for organizing roles on AWS. This organizational clarity can help you navigate complex IAM setups and establish a cohesive structure that’s aligned with your organizational needs.

Furthermore, by enforcing a specific structure, you can gain precise control over the scope of permissions assigned to roles, helping to reduce the risk of accidental assignment of overly permissive policies. By assisting in preventing inadvertent policy misconfigurations and assisting in coordinating permissions with the planned organizational structure, this proactive solution improves security. This approach is highly effective when you consistently apply established naming conventions to paths, role names, and policies. Enforcing a uniform approach to role naming enhances the standardization and efficiency of IAM role management. This practice fosters smooth collaboration and reduces the risk of naming conflicts.

Path example

In IAM, a role path is a way to organize and group IAM roles within your AWS account. You specify the role path as part of the role’s Amazon Resource Name (ARN).

As an example, imagine that you have a group of IAM roles related to development teams, and you want to organize them under a path. You might structure it like this:

Role name: Dev App1 admin
Role path: /D1/app1/admin/
Full ARN: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/D1/app1/admin/DevApp1admin

Role name: Dev App2 admin
Role path: /D2/app2/admin/
Full ARN: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/D2/app2/admin/DevApp2admin

In this example, the IAM roles DevApp1admin and DevApp2admin are organized under two different development team paths: D1/app1/admin and D2/app2/admin, respectively. The role path provides a way to group roles logically, making it simpler to manage and understand their purpose within the context of your organization.

Solution overview

Figure 1: Sample architecture

Figure 1: Sample architecture

The sample architecture in Figure 1 shows how you can separate and categorize the enterprise roles and development team roles into a hierarchy model by using a path in an IAM role. Using this hierarchy model, you can enable several security controls at the level of the service control policy (SCP), IAM policy, permissions boundary, or the pipeline. I recommend that you avoid incorporating business unit names in paths because they could change over time.

Here is what the IAM role path looks like as an ARN:

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/iam/adm/IAMAdmin

In this example, in the resource name, /EnT/iam/adm/ is the role path, and IAMAdmin is the role name.

You can now use the role path as part of a policy, such as the following:

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/iam/adm/*

In this example, in the resource name, /EnT/iam/adm/ is the role path, and * indicates any IAM role inside this path.

Walkthrough of examples for preventative controls

Now let’s walk through some example use cases and SCPs for a preventative control that you can use based on the path of an IAM role.

PassRole preventative control example

The following SCP denies passing a role for enterprise roles, except for roles that are part of the IAM admin hierarchy within the overall enterprise hierarchy.

		{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Sid": "DenyEnTPassRole",
			"Effect": "Deny",
			"Action": "iam:PassRole",
			"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/*",
			"Condition": {
				"ArnNotLike": {
					"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*"
				}
			}
		}
	]
}

With just a couple of statements in the SCP, this preventative control helps provide protection to your high-privilege roles for enterprise roles, regardless of the role’s name or current status.

This example uses the following paths:

  • /EnT/ — enterprise roles (roles owned by the central teams, such as cloud center of excellence, central security, and networking teams)
  • /fed/ — federated roles, which have interactive access
  • /iam/ — roles that are allowed to perform IAM actions, such as CreateRole, AttachPolicy, or DeleteRole

IAM actions preventative control example

The following SCP restricts IAM actions, including CreateRole, DeleteRole, AttachRolePolicy, and DetachRolePolicy, on the enterprise path.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "DenyIAMActionsonEnTRoles",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": [
                "iam:CreateRole",
                "iam:DeleteRole",
                "iam:DetachRolePolicy",
                "iam:AttachRolePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/*",
            "Condition": {
                "ArnNotLike": {
                    "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

This preventative control denies an IAM role that is outside of the enterprise hierarchy from performing the actions CreateRole, DeleteRole, DetachRolePolicy, and AttachRolePolicy in this hierarchy. Every IAM role will be denied those API actions except the one with the path as arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*

The example uses the following paths:

  • /EnT/ — enterprise roles (roles owned by the central teams, such as cloud center of excellence, central security, or network automation teams)
  • /fed/ — federated roles, which have interactive access
  • /iam/ — roles that are allowed to perform IAM actions (in this case, CreateRole, DeteleRole, DetachRolePolicy, and AttachRolePolicy)

IAM policies preventative control example

The following SCP policy denies attaching certain high-privilege AWS managed policies such as AdministratorAccess outside of certain IAM admin roles. This is especially important in an environment where business units have self-service capabilities.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "RolePolicyAttachment",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*",
            "Condition": {
                "ArnNotLike": {
                    "iam:PolicyARN": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

AssumeRole preventative control example

The following SCP doesn’t allow non-production roles to assume a role in production accounts. Make sure to replace <Your production OU ID> and <your org ID> with your own information.

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Sid": "DenyAssumeRole",
			"Effect": "Deny",
			"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
			"Resource": "*",
			"Condition": {
				"StringLike": {
					"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/np/*"
				},
				"ForAnyValue:StringLike": {
					"aws:ResourceOrgPaths": "<your org ID>/r-xxxx/<Your production OU ID>/*"
				}
			}
		}
	]
}

This example uses the /np/ path, which specifies non-production roles. The SCP denies non-production IAM roles from assuming a role in the production organizational unit (OU) (in our example, this is represented by <your org ID>/r-xxxx/<Your production OU ID>/*”). Depending on the structure of your organization, the ResourceOrgPaths will have one of the following formats:

  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/*”
  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/*”
  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/ou-ab12-22222222/”

Walkthrough of examples for monitoring IAM roles (detective control)

Now let’s walk through two examples of detective controls.

AssumeRole in CloudTrail Lake

The following is an example of a detective control to monitor IAM roles in AWS CloudTrail Lake.

SELECT
    userIdentity.arn as "Username", eventTime, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress, errorCode, errorMessage
FROM
    <Event data store ID>
WHERE
    userIdentity.arn IS NOT NULL
    AND eventName = 'AssumeRole'
    AND userIdentity.arn LIKE '%/np/%'
    AND errorCode = 'AccessDenied'
    AND eventTime > '2023-07-01 14:00:00'
    AND eventTime < '2023-11-08 18:00:00';

This query lists out AssumeRole events for non-production roles in the organization for AccessDenied errors. The output is stored in an Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket from CloudTrail Lake, from which the csv file can be downloaded. The following shows some example output:

Username,eventTime,eventSource,eventName,sourceIPAddress,errorCode,errorMessage
arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/np/test,2023-12-09 10:35:45.000,iam.amazonaws.com,AssumeRole,11.11.113.113,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/np/test is not authorized to perform: sts:AssumeRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/hello because no identity-based policy allows the sts:AssumeRole action

You can modify the query to audit production roles as well.

CreateRole in CloudTrail Lake

Another example of a CloudTrail Lake query for a detective control is as follows:

SELECT
    userIdentity.arn as "Username", eventTime, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress, errorCode, errorMessage
FROM
    <Event data store ID>
WHERE
    userIdentity.arn IS NOT NULL
    AND eventName = 'CreateRole'
    AND userIdentity.arn LIKE '%/EnT/fed/iam/%'
    AND eventTime > '2023-07-01 14:00:00'
    AND eventTime < '2023-11-08 18:00:00';

This query lists out CreateRole events for roles in the /EnT/fed/iam/ hierarchy. The following are some example outputs:

Username,eventTime,eventSource,eventName,sourceIPAddress,errorCode,errorMessage

arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test,2023-12-09 16:31:11.000,iam.amazonaws.com,CreateRole,10.10.10.10,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test is not authorized to perform: iam:CreateRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/fed/iam/security because no identity-based policy allows the iam:CreateRole action

arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test,2023-12-09 16:33:10.000,iam.amazonaws.com,CreateRole,10.10.10.10,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test is not authorized to perform: iam:CreateRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/fed/iam/security because no identity-based policy allows the iam:CreateRole action

Because these roles can create additional enterprise roles, you should audit roles created in this hierarchy.

Important considerations

When you implement specific paths for IAM roles, make sure to consider the following:

  • The path of an IAM role is part of the ARN. After you define the ARN, you can’t change it later. Therefore, just like the name of the role, consider what the path should be during the early discussions of design.
  • IAM roles can’t have the same name, even on different paths.
  • When you switch roles through the console, you need to include the path because it’s part of the role’s ARN.
  • The path of an IAM role can’t exceed 512 characters. For more information, see IAM and AWS STS quotas.
  • The role name can’t exceed 64 characters. If you intend to use a role with the Switch Role feature in the AWS Management Console, then the combined path and role name can’t exceed 64 characters.
  • When you create a role through the console, you can’t set an IAM role path. To set a path for the role, you need to use automation, such as AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) commands or SDKs. For example, you might use an AWS CloudFormation template or a script that interacts with AWS APIs to create the role with the desired path.

Conclusion

By adopting the path strategy, you can structure IAM roles within a hierarchical model, facilitating the implementation of security controls on a scalable level. You can make these controls effective for IAM roles by applying them to a path rather than specific roles, which sets this approach apart.

This strategy can help you elevate your overall security posture within IAM, offering a forward-looking solution for enterprises. By establishing a scalable IAM hierarchy, you can help your organization navigate dynamic changes through a robust identity management structure. A well-crafted hierarchy reduces operational overhead by providing a versatile framework that makes it simpler to add or modify roles and policies. This scalability can help streamline the administration of IAM and help your organization manage access control in evolving environments.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, & Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Varun Sharma

Varun Sharma

Varun is an AWS Cloud Security Engineer who wears his security cape proudly. With a knack for unravelling the mysteries of Amazon Cognito and IAM, Varun is a go-to subject matter expert for these services. When he’s not busy securing the cloud, you’ll find him in the world of security penetration testing. And when the pixels are at rest, Varun switches gears to capture the beauty of nature through the lens of his camera.

How AWS can help you navigate the complexity of digital sovereignty

Post Syndicated from Max Peterson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-aws-can-help-you-navigate-the-complexity-of-digital-sovereignty/

Customers from around the world often tell me that digital sovereignty is a top priority as they look to meet new compliance and industry regulations. In fact, 82% of global organizations are either currently using, planning to use, or considering sovereign cloud solutions in the next two years, according to the International Data Corporation (IDC). However, many leaders face complexity as policies and requirements continue to rapidly evolve, and have concerns on acquiring the right knowledge and skills, at an affordable cost, to simplify efforts in meeting digital sovereignty goals.

At Amazon Web Services (AWS), we understand that protecting your data in a world with changing regulations, technology, and risks takes teamwork. We’re committed to making sure that the AWS Cloud remains sovereign-by-design, as it has been from day one, and providing customers with more choice to help meet their unique sovereignty requirements across our offerings in AWS Regions around the world, dedicated sovereign cloud infrastructure solutions, and the recently announced independent European Sovereign Cloud. In this blog post, I’ll share how the cloud is helping organizations meet their digital sovereignty needs, and ways that we can help you navigate the ever-evolving landscape.

Digital sovereignty needs of customers vary based on multiple factors

Digital sovereignty means different things to different people, and every country or region has their own requirements. Adding to the complexity is the fact that no uniform guidance exists for the types of workloads, industries, and sectors that must adhere to these requirements.

Although digital sovereignty needs vary based on multiple factors, key themes that we’ve identified by listening to customers, partners, and regulators include data residency, operator access restriction, resiliency, and transparency. AWS works closely with customers to understand the digital sovereignty outcomes that they’re focused on to determine the right AWS solutions that can help to meet them.

Meet requirements without compromising the benefits of the cloud

We introduced the AWS Digital Sovereignty Pledge in 2022 as part of our commitment to offer all AWS customers the most advanced set of sovereignty controls and security features available in the cloud. We continue to deeply engage with regulators to help make sure that AWS meets various standards and achieves certifications that our customers directly inherit, allowing them to meet requirements while driving continuous innovation. AWS was recently named a leader in Sovereign Cloud Infrastructure Services (EU) by Information Services Group (ISG), a global technology research and IT advisory firm.

Customers who use our global infrastructure with sovereign-by-design features can optimize for increased scale, agility, speed, and reduced costs while getting the highest levels of security and protection. Our AWS Regions are powered by the AWS Nitro System, which helps ensure the confidentiality and integrity of customer data. Building on our commitment to provide greater transparency and assurances on how AWS services are designed and operated, the security design of our Nitro System was validated in an independent public report by the global cybersecurity consulting firm NCC Group.

Customers have full control of their data on AWS and determine where their data is stored, how it’s stored, and who has access to it. We provide tools to help you automate and monitor your storage location and encrypt your data, including data residency guardrails in AWS Control Tower. We recently announced more than 65 new digital sovereignty controls that you can choose from to help prevent actions, enforce configurations, and detect undesirable changes.

All AWS services support encryption, and most services also support encryption with customer managed keys that AWS can’t access such as AWS Key Management Service (KMS), AWS CloudHSM, and AWS KMS External Key Store (XKS). Both the hardware used in AWS KMS and the firmware used in AWS CloudHSM are FIPS 140-2 Level 3 compliant as certified by a NIST-accredited laboratory.

Infrastructure choice to support your unique needs and local regulations

AWS provides hybrid cloud storage and edge computing capabilities so that you can use the same infrastructure, services, APIs, and tools across your environments. We think of our AWS infrastructure and services as a continuum that helps meet your requirements wherever you need it. Having a consistent experience across environments helps to accelerate innovation, increase operational efficiencies and reduce costs by using the same skills and toolsets, and meet specific security standards by adopting cloud security wherever applications and data reside.

We work closely with customers to support infrastructure decisions that meet unique workload needs and local regulations, and continue to invent based on what we hear from customers. To help organizations comply with stringent regulatory requirements, we launched AWS Dedicated Local Zones. This is a type of infrastructure that is fully managed by AWS, built for exclusive use by a customer or community, and placed in a customer-specified location or data center to run sensitive or other regulated industry workloads. At AWS re:Invent 2023, I sat down with Cheow Hoe Chan, Government Chief Digital Technology Officer of Singapore, to discuss how we collaborated with Singapore’s Smart Nation and Digital Government Group to define and build this dedicated infrastructure.

We also recently announced our plans to launch the AWS European Sovereign Cloud to provide customers in highly regulated industries with more choice to help meet varying data residency, operational autonomy, and resiliency requirements. This is a new, independent cloud located and operated within the European Union (EU) that will have the same security, availability, and performance that our customers get from existing AWS Regions today, with important features specific to evolving EU regulations.

Build confidently with AWS and our AWS Partners

In addition to our AWS offerings, you can access our global network of more than 100,000 AWS Partners specialized in various competencies and industry verticals to get local guidance and services.

There is a lot of complexity involved with navigating the evolving digital sovereignty landscape—but you don’t have to do it alone. Using the cloud and working with AWS and our partners can help you move faster and more efficiently while keeping costs low. We’re committed to helping you meet necessary requirements while accelerating innovation, and can’t wait to see the kinds of advancements that you’ll continue to drive.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Max Peterson

Max Peterson

Max is the Vice President of AWS Sovereign Cloud. He leads efforts to ensure that all AWS customers around the world have the most advanced set of sovereignty controls, privacy safeguards, and security features available in the cloud. Before his current role, Max served as the VP of AWS Worldwide Public Sector (WWPS) and created and led the WWPS International Sales division, with a focus on empowering government, education, healthcare, aerospace and satellite, and nonprofit organizations to drive rapid innovation while meeting evolving compliance, security, and policy requirements. Max has over 30 years of public sector experience and served in other technology leadership roles before joining Amazon. Max has earned both a Bachelor of Arts in Finance and Master of Business Administration in Management Information Systems from the University of Maryland.

AWS completes the 2023 South Korea CSP Safety Assessment Program

Post Syndicated from Andy Hsia original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-completes-the-2023-south-korea-csp-safety-assessment-program/

We’re excited to announce that Amazon Web Services (AWS) has completed the 2023 South Korea Cloud Service Providers (CSP) Safety Assessment Program, also known as the Regulation on Supervision on Electronic Financial Transactions (RSEFT) Audit Program. The financial sector in South Korea is required to abide by a variety of cybersecurity standards and regulations. Key regulatory requirements include RSEFT and the Guidelines on the Use of Cloud Computing Services in the Financial Industry (FSIGUC). Prior to 2019, the RSEFT guidance didn’t permit the use of cloud computing. The guidance was amended on January 1, 2019, to allow financial institutions to use the public cloud to store and process data, subject to compliance with security measures applicable to financial companies.

AWS is committed to helping our customers adhere to applicable regulations and guidelines, and we help ensure that our financial customers have a hassle-free experience using the cloud. Since 2019, our RSEFT compliance program has aimed to provide a scalable approach to support South Korean financial services customers’ adherence to RSEFT and FSIGUC. Financial services customers can annually either perform an individual audit by using publicly available AWS resources and visiting on-site, or request the South Korea Financial Security Institute (FSI) to conduct the primary audit on their behalf and use the FSI-produced audit reports. In 2023, we worked again with FSI and completed the annual RSEFT primary audit with the participation of 59 customers.

The audit scope of the 2023 assessment covered data center facilities in four Availability Zones (AZ) of the AWS Asia Pacific (Seoul) Region and the services that are available in that Region. The audit program assessed different security domains including security policies, personnel security, risk management, business continuity, incident management, access control, encryption, and physical security.

Completion of this audit program helps our customers use the results and audit report for their annual submission to the South Korea Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) for their adoption and continued use of our cloud services and infrastructure. To learn more about the RSEFT program, see the AWS South Korea Compliance Page. If you have questions, contact your AWS account manager.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in th Comments section below.

Andy Hsia

Andy Hsia

Andy is the Customer Audit Lead for APJ, based in Singapore. He is responsible for all customer audits in the Asia Pacific region. Andy has been with Security Assurance since 2020 and has delivered key audit programs in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan.

AWS renews K-ISMS certificate for the AWS Asia Pacific (Seoul) Region

Post Syndicated from Joseph Goh original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-renews-k-isms-certificate-for-the-asia-pacific/

We’re excited to announce that Amazon Web Services (AWS) has successfully renewed certification under the Korea Information Security Management System (K-ISMS) standard (effective from December 16, 2023, to December 15, 2026).

The certification assessment covered the operation of infrastructure (including compute, storage, networking, databases, and security) in the AWS Asia Pacific (Seoul) Region. AWS was the first global cloud service provider (CSP) to obtain the K-ISMS certification back in 2017 and has held that certification longer than any other global CSP. In this year’s audit, 144 services running in the Asia Pacific (Seoul) Region were included.

Sponsored by the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and affiliated with the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT), K-ISMS serves as a standard for evaluating whether enterprises and organizations operate and manage their information security management systems consistently and securely, such that they thoroughly protect their information assets.

This certification helps enterprises and organizations across South Korea, regardless of industry, meet KISA compliance requirements more efficiently. Achieving this certification demonstrates the AWS commitment on cloud security adoption, adhering to compliance requirements set by the South Korean government and delivering secure AWS services to customers.

The Operational Best Practices (conformance pack) page provides customers with a compliance framework that they can use for their K-ISMS compliance needs. Enterprises and organizations can use the toolkit and AWS certification to reduce the effort and cost of getting their own K-ISMS certification.

Customers can download the AWS K-ISMS certification from AWS Artifact. To learn more about the AWS K-ISMS certification, see the AWS K-ISMS page. If you have questions, contact your AWS account manager.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Joseph Goh

Joseph Goh

Joseph is the APJ ASEAN Lead at AWS based in Singapore. He leads security audits, certifications, and compliance programs across the Asia Pacific region. Joseph is passionate about delivering programs that build trust with customers and provide them assurance on cloud security.

Hwee Hwang

Hwee Hwang

Hwee is an Audit Specialist at AWS based in Seoul, South Korea. Hwee is responsible for third-party and customer audits, certifications, and assessments in Korea. Hwee previously worked in security governance, risk, and compliance consulting in the Big Four. Hwee is laser focused on building customers’ trust and providing them assurance in the cloud.

How to migrate asymmetric keys from CloudHSM to AWS KMS

Post Syndicated from Mani Manasa Mylavarapu original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-migrate-asymmetric-keys-from-cloudhsm-to-aws-kms/

In June 2023, Amazon Web Services (AWS) introduced a new capability to AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS): you can now import asymmetric key materials such as RSA or elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) private keys for your signing workflow into AWS KMS. This means that you can move your asymmetric keys that are managed outside of AWS KMS—such as a hybrid (on-premises) environment, multi-cloud environment, and even AWS CloudHSM—and make them available through AWS KMS. Combined with the announcement on AWS KMS HSMs achieving FIPS 140-2 Security Level 3, you can make sure that your keys are secured and used in a manner that aligns to the cryptographic standards laid out by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

In this post, we will show you how to migrate your asymmetric keys from CloudHSM to AWS KMS. This can help you simplify your key management strategy and take advantage of the robust authorization control of AWS KMS key policies.

Benefits of importing key materials into AWS KMS

In general, we recommend that you use a native KMS key because it provides the best security, durability, and availability compared to other key store options. AWS KMS FIPS-validated hardware security modules (HSMs) generate the key materials for KMS keys, and these key materials never leave the HSMs unencrypted. Operations that require use of your KMS key (for example, decryption of a data key or digital signature signing) must occur within the HSM.

However, depending on your organization’s requirements, you might need to bring your own key (BYOK) from outside. Importing your own key gives you direct control over the generation, lifecycle management, and durability of your keys. In addition, you have full control over the availability of your imported keys because you can set an expiration period or delete and reimport the keys at any time. You have greater control over the durability of your imported keys because you can maintain the original version of the keys elsewhere. If you need to generate and store copies of keys outside of AWS, these additional controls can help you meet your compliance requirements.

Solution overview

At a high level, our solution involves downloading the wrapping key from AWS KMS, using the CloudHSM Command Line Interface (CLI) to import a wrapping key to CloudHSM, wrapping the private key by using the wrapping key in CloudHSM, and uploading the wrapped private key to AWS KMS by using an import token. You can perform the same procedures by using other supported libraries, such as the PKCS #11 library or a JCE provider.

Figure 1: Overall architecture of the solution

Figure 1: Overall architecture of the solution

As shown in Figure 1, the solution involves the following steps:

  1. Create a KMS key without key material in AWS KMS
  2. Download the wrapping public key and import token from AWS KMS
  3. Import the wrapping key provided by AWS KMS into CloudHSM
  4. Wrap the private key inside CloudHSM with the imported wrapping public key from AWS KMS
  5. Import the wrapped private key to AWS KMS

For the walkthrough in this post, you will import into AWS KMS an ECC 256-bit private key (NIST P-256) that’s used for signing purpose from a CloudHSM cluster. When you import an asymmetric key into AWS KMS, you only need to import a private key. You don’t need to import a public key because AWS KMS can generate and retrieve a public key from the private key after the private key is imported.

Prerequisites

To follow along with this walkthrough, make sure that you have the following prerequisites in place:

  1. An active CloudHSM cluster with at least one active HSM and a valid crypto user credential.
  2. An Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance with the CloudHSM Client SDK 5 installed and configured to connect to the CloudHSM cluster. For instructions on how to configure and connect the client instance, see Getting started with AWS CloudHSM.
  3. OpenSSL installed on your EC2 instance (we recommend version 3.0.0 or newer).

Step 1: Create a KMS key without key material in AWS KMS

The first step is to create a new KMS key. You can do this through the AWS KMS console or the AWS CLI, or by running the CreateKey API operation.

When you create your key, keep the following guidance in mind:

  • Set the key material origin to External so that no key material is created for this new key.
  • According to NIST SP 800-57 guidance and cryptography best practice, in general, you should use a single key for only one purpose (for example, if you use an RSA key for encryption, you shouldn’t also use that key for signing). Select the key usage that best suits your use case.
  • Make sure that the key spec match the algorithm specification of the key that you are trying to import from CloudHSM.
  • If you want to use the key in multiple AWS Regions (for example, to avoid the need for a cross-Region call to access the key), consider using a multi-Region key.

To create a KMS key using the AWS CLI

  • Run the following command:
    aws kms create-key --origin EXTERNAL --key-spec ECC_NIST_P256 --key-usage SIGN_VERIFY

Step 2: Download the wrapping public key and import token from AWS KMS

After you create the key, download the wrapping key and import token.

The wrapping key spec and the wrapping algorithm that you select depend on the key that you’re trying to import. AWS KMS supports several standard RSA wrapping algorithms and a two-step hybrid wrapping algorithm. CloudHSM supports both wrapping algorithms as well.

In general, an RSA wrapping algorithm (RSAES_OAEP_SHA_*) with a key spec of RSA_4096 should be sufficient for wrapping ECC private keys because it can wrap the key material completely. However, when importing RSA private keys, you will need to use the two-step hybrid wrapping algorithm (RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_SHA_*) due to their large key size. The overall process is the same as what’s shown here, but the two-step hybrid wrapping algorithm requires that you encrypt your key material with an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric key that you generate, and then encrypt the AES symmetric key with the RSA public wrapping key. Additionally, when you select the wrapping algorithm, you also have a choice between the SHA-1 or SHA-256 hashing algorithm. We recommend that you use the SHA-256 hashing algorithm whenever possible.

Note that each wrapping public key and import token set is valid for 24 hours. If you don’t use the set to import key material within 24 hours of downloading it, you must download a new set.

To download the wrapping public key and import token from AWS KMS

  1. Run the following command. Make sure to replace <KMS KeyID> with the key ID of the KMS key that you created in the previous step. The key ID is the last part of the key ARN after :key/ (for example, arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:<AWS Account ID>:key/<Key ID>). “ImportToken.b64” represents the wrapping token, and “WrappingPublicKey.b64” represents the import token.
    aws kms get-parameters-for-import \
    --key-id <KMS KeyID> \
    --wrapping-algorithm RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256 \
    --wrapping-key-spec RSA_4096 \
    --query "[ImportToken, PublicKey]" \
    --output text \
    | awk '{print $1 > "ImportToken.b64"; print $2 > "WrappingPublicKey.b64"}'

  2. Decode the base64 encoding.
    openssl enc -d -base64 -A -in WrappingPublicKey.b64 -out WrappingPublicKey.bin

To convert the wrapping public key from DER to PEM format

  • The key import pem command in CloudHSM CLI requires that the public key is in PEM format. AWS KMS outputs public keys in the DER format, so you must convert the wrapping public key to PEM format. To convert the public key to PEM format, run the following command:
    openssl rsa -pubin -in WrappingPublicKey.bin -inform DER -outform PEM -out WrappingPublicKey.pem

Step 3: Import the wrapping key provided by AWS KMS into CloudHSM

Now that you have created the KMS key and made the necessary preparations to import it, switch to CloudHSM to import the key.

To import the wrapping key

  1. Log in to your EC2 instance that has the CloudHSM CLI installed and run the following command to use it in an interactive mode:
    /opt/cloudhsm/bin/cloudhsm-cli interactive

  2. Log in with your crypto user credential. Make sure to replace <YourUserName> with your own information and supply your password when prompted.
    login --username <YourUserName> --role crypto-user

  3. Import the wrapping key and set the attribute allowing this key to be used for wrapping other keys.
    key import pem --path ./WrappingPublicKey.pem --label <kms-wrapping-key> --key-type-class rsa-public --attributes wrap=true

    You should see an output similar to the following:

    {
      "error_code": 0,
      "data": {
        "key": {
          "key-reference": "0x00000000002800c2",
          "key-info": {
            "key-owners": [
              {
                "username": "<YourUserName>",
                "key-coverage": "full"
              }
            ],
            "shared-users": [],
            "cluster-coverage": "full"
          },
          "attributes": {
            "key-type": "rsa",
            "label": "<kms-wrapping-key>",
            "id": "0x",
            "check-value": "0x5efd07",
            "class": "public-key",
            "encrypt": false,
            "decrypt": false,
            "token": true,
            "always-sensitive": false,
            "derive": false,
            "destroyable": true,
            "extractable": true,
            "local": false,
            "modifiable": true,
            "never-extractable": false,
            "private": true,
            "sensitive": false,
            "sign": false,
            "trusted": false,
            "unwrap": false,
            "verify": false,
            "wrap": true,
            "wrap-with-trusted": false,
            "key-length-bytes": 1024,
            "public-exponent": "0x010001",
            "modulus": "0xd7683010 … b6fc9df07",
            "modulus-size-bits": 4096
          }
        },
        "message": "Successfully imported key"
      }
    }

  4. From the output, note the value for the key label (<kms-wrapping-key> in this example) because you will need it for the next step.

Step 4: Wrap the private key inside CloudHSM with the imported wrapping public key from AWS KMS

Now that you have imported the wrapping key into CloudHSM, you can wrap the private key that you want to import to AWS KMS by using the wrapping key.

Important: Only the owner of a key—the crypto user who created the key—can wrap the key. In addition, the key that you want to wrap must have the extractable attribute set to true.

To wrap the private key

  1. Use the key wrap command in the CloudHSM CLI to wrap the private key that’s stored in CloudHSM. Make sure to replace the following placeholder values with your own information:
    • rsa-oaep specifies the wrapping algorithm.
    • --payload-filter is used to define the key that you want to wrap out of the HSM. You can use the key reference (for example, key-reference=0x00000000002800c2) or reference key attributes, such as the key label. In our example, we used the key label ec-priv-import-to-kms.
    • --wrapping-filter is used to define the key that you will use to wrap out the payload key. This should be the wrapping key that you imported previously from AWS KMS, which was labeled kms-wrapping-key in Step 3.3.
    • --hash-function defines the hash function used as part of the OAEP encryption. This should match the wrapping algorithm that you specified when you got the import parameters from AWS KMS. In our example, it should be SHA-256 because we selected RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256 as the wrapping algorithm previously.
    • --mgf defines the mask generation function used as part of the OAEP encryption. The mask hash function must match the signing mechanism hash function, which is SHA-256 in this example.
    • --path defines the path to the binary file where the wrapped key data will be saved. In this example, we name the file EncryptedECC_P256KeyMaterial.bin but you can specify a different name.
    key wrap rsa-oaep --payload-filter attr.label=ec-priv-import-to-kms --wrapping-filter attr.label=kms-wrapping-key --hash-function sha256 --mgf mgf1-sha256 --path EncryptedECC_P256KeyMaterial.bin

(Optional) To export the public key

  • You can also use the CloudHSM CLI to export the public key of your private key. You will use this key for testing later. Make sure to replace the placeholder values <ec-priv-import-to-kms> and <KeyName.pem> with your own information.
    key generate-file --encoding pem --path <KeyName.pem> --filter attr.label=<ec-priv-import-to-kms>

Step 5: Import the wrapped private key to AWS KMS

Now that you’ve wrapped the private key from CloudHSM, you can import it into AWS KMS.

Note that you have the option to set an expiration time for your imported key. After the expiration time passes, AWS KMS deletes your imported key automatically.

To import the wrapped private key to AWS KMS

  1. If you have been using the CLI or API, the import token is base64 encoded. You must decode the token from base64 to binary format before it can be used. You can use OpenSSL to do this.
    openssl enc -d -base64 -A -in ImportToken.b64 -out ImportToken.bin

  2. Run the following command to import the wrapped private key. Make sure to replace <KMS KeyID> with the key ID of the KMS key that you created in Step 1.
    aws kms import-key-material --key-id <KMS KeyID> \
    --encrypted-key-material fileb://EncryptedECC_P256KeyMaterial.bin \
    --import-token fileb://ImportToken.bin \
    --expiration-model KEY_MATERIAL_DOES_NOT_EXPIRE

Test whether your private key was imported successfully

The nature of asymmetric cryptography means that a digital signature produced by your private key should produce the same signature on the same message, regardless of the tool that you used to perform the signing operation. To verify that your imported private key functions the same in both CloudHSM and AWS KMS, you can perform a signing operation and compare the signature on CloudHSM and AWS KMS to make sure that they are the same.

Another way to check that your imported private key functions are the same in AWS KMS is to perform a signing operation and then verify the signature by using the corresponding public key that you exported from CloudHSM in Step 4. We will show you how to use this method to check that your private key was imported successfully.

To test that your private key was imported

  1. Create a simple message in a text file and encode it in base64.
    echo -n 'Testing My Imported Key!' | openssl base64 -out msg_base64.txt

  2. Perform the signing operation by using AWS KMS. Make sure to replace <YourImported KMS KeyID> with your own information.
    aws kms sign --key-id <YourImported KMS KeyID> --message fileb://msg_base64.txt --message-type RAW --signing-algorithm ECDSA_SHA_256

    The following shows the output of the signing operation.

    {
    "KeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:111122223333:key/1234abcd-12ab-34cd-56ef-1234567890ab",
    "Signature": "EXAMPLEXsP11QVTkrSsab2CygcgtodDbSpd+j558B4qINpKIxwIhAMkKwd65mA3roo76ItuHiRsbwO9F0XMyuyKCKEXAMPLE",
    "SigningAlgorithm": "ECDSA_SHA_256"
    }

  3. Save the signature in a separate file called signature.sig and decode it from base64 to binary.
    openssl enc -d -base64 -in signature.sig -out signature.bin

  4. Verify the signature by using the public key that you exported from CloudHSM in Step 4.
    openssl dgst -sha256 -verify <KeyName.pem> -signature signature.bin msg_base64.txt

    If successful, you should see a message that says Verified OK.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to import an asymmetric key into AWS KMS from CloudHSM by using the CloudHSM CLI.

Although this post focused on migrating keys from CloudHSM, you can also follow the general directions to import your asymmetric key from elsewhere. When you import a private key, make sure that the imported key matches the key spec and the wrapping algorithm that you choose in AWS KMS.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Mani Manasa Mylavarapu

Mani Manasa Mylavarapu

Manasa is a Software Development Manager at AWS KMS. Manasa leads the development of custom key store features for both the CloudHSM Key Store and External Key Store. Beyond her professional role, Manasa enjoys playing board games and exploring the scenic hikes of Seattle.

Author

Kevin Lee

Kevin is a Senior Product Manager at AWS KMS. Kevin’s work interests include client-side encryption and key management strategy within a multi-tenant environment. Outside of work, Kevin enjoys occasional camping and snowboarding in the Pacific Northwest and playing video games.

Patrick Palmer

Patrick Palmer

Patrick is a Principal Security Specialist Solutions Architect. He helps customers around the world use AWS services in a secure manner, and specializes in cryptography. When not working, he enjoys spending time with his growing family and playing video games.

2023 C5 Type 2 attestation report available, including two new Regions and 170 services in scope

Post Syndicated from Julian Herlinghaus original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/2023-c5-type-2-attestation-report-available-including-two-new-regions-and-170-services-in-scope/

We continue to expand the scope of our assurance programs at Amazon Web Services (AWS), and we’re pleased to announce that AWS has successfully completed the 2023 Cloud Computing Compliance Controls Catalogue (C5) attestation cycle with 170 services in scope. This alignment with C5 requirements demonstrates our ongoing commitment to adhere to the heightened expectations for cloud service providers. AWS customers in Germany and across Europe can run their applications on AWS Regions in scope of the C5 report with the assurance that AWS aligns with C5 requirements.

The C5 attestation scheme is backed by the German government and was introduced by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2016. AWS has adhered to the C5 requirements since their inception. C5 helps organizations demonstrate operational security against common cybersecurity threats when using cloud services within the context of the German government’s Security Recommendations for Cloud Computing Providers.

Independent third-party auditors evaluated AWS for the period of October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023. The C5 report illustrates the compliance status of AWS for both the basic and additional criteria of C5. Customers can download the C5 report through AWS Artifact, a self-service portal for on-demand access to AWS compliance reports. Sign in to AWS Artifact in the AWS Management Console, or learn more at Getting Started with AWS Artifact.

AWS has added the following 16 services to the current C5 scope:

With the 2023 C5 attestation, we’re also expanding the scope to two new Regions — Europe (Spain) and Europe (Zurich). In addition, the services offered in the Asia Pacific (Singapore), Europe (Frankfurt), Europe (Ireland), Europe (London), Europe (Milan), Europe (Paris), and Europe (Stockholm) Regions remain in scope of this attestation. For up-to-date information, see the C5 page of our AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program.

AWS strives to continuously bring services into the scope of its compliance programs to help you meet your architectural and regulatory needs. If you have questions or feedback about C5 compliance, reach out to your AWS account team.

To learn more about our compliance and security programs, see AWS Compliance Programs. As always, we value your feedback and questions; reach out to the AWS Compliance team through the Contact Us page.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on X.

Julian Herlinghaus

Julian Herlinghaus

Julian is a Manager in AWS Security Assurance based in Berlin, Germany. He leads third-party security audits across Europe and specifically the DACH region. He has previously worked as an information security department lead of an accredited certification body and has multiple years of experience in information security and security assurance and compliance.

Andreas Terwellen

Andreas Terwellen

Andreas is a Senior Manager in Security Assurance at AWS, based in Frankfurt, Germany. His team is responsible for third-party and customer audits, attestations, certifications, and assessments across EMEA. Previously, he was a CISO in a DAX-listed telecommunications company in Germany. He also worked for different consulting companies managing large teams and programs across multiple industries and sectors.

How to migrate your on-premises domain to AWS Managed Microsoft AD using ADMT

Post Syndicated from Austin Webber original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-migrate-your-on-premises-domain-to-aws-managed-microsoft-ad-using-admt/

February 2, 2024: We’ve updated this post to fix broken links and added a note on migrating passwords.


Customers often ask us how to migrate their on-premises Active Directory (AD) domain to AWS so they can be free of the operational management of their AD infrastructure. Frequently they are unsure how to make the migration simple. A common approach using the CSVDE utility doesn’t migrate attributes such as user passwords. This makes migration difficult and necessitates manual effort for a large part of the migration that can cause operational and security challenges when migrating to a new directory. So, what’s changed?

You can now use the Active Directory Migration Toolkit (ADMT) along with the Password Export Service (PES) to migrate your self-managed AD to AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory, also known as AWS Managed Microsoft AD. This enables you to migrate AD objects and encrypted passwords for your users more easily.

AWS Managed Microsoft AD is a managed service built on Microsoft Active Directory. AWS provides operational management of the domain controllers, and you use standard AD tools to administer users, groups, and computers. AWS Managed Microsoft AD enables you to take advantage of built-in Active Directory features, such as Group Policy, trusts, and single sign-on and helps make it simple to migrate AD-dependent workloads into the AWS Cloud. With AWS Managed Microsoft AD, you can join Amazon EC2 and Amazon RDS for SQL Server instances to a domain, and use AWS Enterprise IT applications, such as Amazon WorkSpaces, and AWS IAM Identity Center with Active Directory users and groups.

In this post, we will show you how to migrate your existing AD objects to AWS Managed Microsoft AD. The source of the objects can be your self-managed AD running on EC2, on-premises, co-located, or even another cloud provider. We will show how to use ADMT and PES to migrate objects including users (and their passwords), groups, and computers.

The post assumes you are familiar with AD and how to use the Remote Desktop Protocol client to sign and use EC2 Windows instances.

Background

In this post, we will migrate user and computer objects, as well as passwords, to a new AWS Managed Microsoft AD directory. The source will be an on-premises domain.

This example migration will be for a fairly simple use case. Large customers with complex source domains or forests may have more complex processes involved to map users, groups, and computers to the single OU structure of AWS Managed Microsoft AD. For example, you may want to migrate an OU at a time. Customers with single domain forests may be able to migrate in fewer steps. Similarly, the options you might select in ADMT will vary based on what you are trying to accomplish.

To perform the migration, we will use the Admin user account from the AWS Managed Microsoft AD. AWS creates the Admin user account and delegates administrative permissions to the account for an organizational unit (OU) in the AWS Managed Microsoft AD domain. This account has most of the permissions required to manage your domain, and all the permissions required to complete this migration.

In this example, we have a Source domain called source.local that’s running in a 10.0.0.0/16 network range, and we want to migrate users, groups, and computers to a destination domain in AWS Managed Microsoft AD called destination.local that’s running in a network range of 192.168.0.0/16.

To migrate users from source.local to destination.local, we need a migration computer that we join to the destination.local domain on which we will run ADMT. We also use this machine to perform administrative tasks on the AWS Managed Microsoft AD. As a prerequisite for ADMT, we must install Microsoft SQL Express 2019 on the migration computer. We also need an administrative account that has permissions in both the source and destination AD domains. To do this, we will use an AD trust and add the AWS Managed Microsoft AD admin account from destination.local to the source.local domain. Next we will install ADMT on the migration computer, and run PES on one of the source.local domain controllers. Finally, we will migrate the users and computers.

Note: If you migrate user passwords by using ADMT and PES, and if the supported Kerberos encryption type RC4_HMAC_MD5 is disabled on client computers, Kerberos authentication fails for the users until they reset their passwords. This occurs because of the design of the PES tool and the method that it uses to synchronize passwords. We recommend for the user to reset their password after migration.

For this example, we have a handful of users, groups, and computers, shown in the source domain in these screenshots, that we will migrate:

Figure 1: Example source users

Figure 1: Example source users

Figure 2: Example client computers

Figure 2: Example client computers

In the remainder of this post, we will show you how to do the migration in 5 main steps:

  1. Prepare the forests, migration computer, and administrative account.
  2. Install SQL Express and ADMT on the migration computer.
  3. Configure ADMT and PES.
  4. Migrate users and groups.
  5. Migrate computers.

Step 1: Prepare the forests, migration computer, and administrative account

To migrate users and passwords from the source domain to AWS Managed Microsoft AD, you must have a 2-way forest trust. The trust from the source domain to AWS Managed Microsoft AD enables you to add the admin account from the AWS Managed Microsoft AD to the source domain. This is necessary so you can grant the AWS Managed Microsoft AD Admin account permissions in your source AD directory so it can read the attributes to migrate. We’ve already created a two-way forest trust between these domains. You should do the same by following this guide. Once your trust has been created, it should show up in the AWS console as Verified.

The ADMT tool should be installed on a computer that isn’t the domain controller in the destination domain destination.local. For this, we will launch an EC2 instance in the same VPC as the domain controller and we will add it to the destination.local domain using the EC2 seamless domain join feature. This will act as the ADMT transfer machine.

  1. Launch a Microsoft Windows Server 2019 instance.
  2. Complete a domain join to the target domain destination.local. You can complete this manually, or alternatively you can use AWS Systems Manager to complete a seamless domain join as covered here.
  3. Sign into the instance using RDP and use Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC) to add the AWS Managed Microsoft AD admin user from the destination.local domain to the source.local domain’s built-in administrators group (you will not be able to add the Admin user as a domain admin). For information on how to set up this instance to use ADUC, please see this documentation.
    Figure 3: the “Administrator’s Properties” dialog box

    Figure 3: the “Administrator’s Properties” dialog box

Step 2: Install SQL Express and ADMT on the migration computer

Next, we need to install SQL Express and ADMT on the migration computer by following these steps.

  1. Install Microsoft SQL Express 2019 on the migration computer with a basic install.
  2. Download ADMT version 3.2 from Microsoft.
  3. Run the installer and, when setting the tool up, on the Database Selection page of the wizard, for Database (Server\Instance), type the local instance of Microsoft SQL Express we previously installed to work with ADMT.
    Figure 4: Specify the “Database (Server\Instance)”

    Figure 4: Specify the “Database (Server\Instance)”

  4. On the Database Import page of the wizard, select No, do not import data from an existing database (Default).
    Figure 5: The “Database Import” dialog box

    Figure 5: The “Database Import” dialog box

  5. Complete the rest of the installation using all of the default options.

Step 3: Configure ADMT and PES

We’ll use PES to take care of encrypted password synchronization. Before we configure that, we need to create an encryption key that will be used during this process to encrypt the password migration.

  1. On the ADMT transfer machine, open an elevated Command Prompt and use the following format to create the encryption key.
    admt key /option:create /sourcedomain:<SourceDomain> /keyfile:<KeyFilePath> /keypassword:{<password>|*}

    Here’s an example:

    admt key /option:create /sourcedomain:source.local /keyfile:c:\ /keypassword:password123

    Note: If you get an error stating that the command is not found, close and reopen Command Prompt to refresh the path locations to the ADMT executable, and then try again.

  2. Copy the outputted key file onto one of the source.local domain controllers.
  3. Download the Password Export Server on one of the source.local domain controllers.
  4. Start the install and, in the ADMT Password Migration DLL Setup window, browse to the encryption file you created in the previous step.
  5. When prompted, enter the password used in the ADMT encryption command.
  6. Run PES using the local system account. Note that this will prompt a restart of the domain controller you’re installing PES on.
  7. Once the domain controller has rebooted, open services.msc and start the Password Export Server Service, which is currently set to Manual. You might choose to set this to automatic if it’s likely your DC will be rebooted again before the end of your migration.
    Figure 6: Start the Password Export Server Service

    Figure 6: Start the Password Export Server Service

  8. You can now open the Active Directory Migration Tool: Control Panel > System and Security > Administrative Tools > Active Directory Migration Tool.
  9. Right-click Active Directory Migration Tool to see the migration options:
    Figure 7: List of migration options

    Figure 7: List of migration options

Step 4: Migrate users and groups

  1. In the Domain Selection page, select or type the Source and Target domains, and then select Next.
  2. On the User Selection page, select the users to migrate. You can use an include file if you have a large domain. Select Next.
  3. On the Organizational Unit Selection page, select the destination OU that you want to migrate your users across to, and then select Next. AWS Managed Microsoft AD gives you a managed OU where you can create your OU tree structure.

    In this example, we will place them in Users OU:

    LDAP://destination.local/OU=Users,OU=destination,DC=destination,DC=local

  4. On the Password Options page, select Migrate passwords, and then select Next. This will contact PES running on the source domain controller.
  5. On the Account Transitions Page, decide how to handle the migration of user objects. In this example, we’re going to replicate the state from the source domain. Migrating SID history is beneficial when you’re doing long, staged migrations where users may need to access resources in the source and destination domain before migration is complete. At this time, AWS Managed Microsoft AD doesn’t support migrating user SIDs. We select Target same as source, and then select Next. Again, what you choose to do might be different.
    Figure 8: The “Account Transition Options” dialog

    Figure 8: The “Account Transition Options” dialog

  6. Now, let’s customize the transfer. The following screen shot shows the commonly selected options on the User Options page of the User Account Migration Wizard:
    Figure 9: Common user options

    \Figure 9: Common user options

    It’s likely that you’ll have more than one migration pass, so choosing how you handle existing objects is important. This will be a single run for us, but the default behavior is to not migrate if the object already exists (see the image of the Conflict Management page below). If you’re running multiple passes, you’ll will want to look at options that involve merging conflicting objects. The method you select will depend on your use case. If you don’t know where to start, read this article.

    Figure 10: The “Conflict Management” dialog box

    Figure 10: The “Conflict Management” dialog box

    In our example, you can see that our 3 users, and any groups they were members of, have been migrated.

    Figure 11: The “Migration Progress” window

    Figure 11: The “Migration Progress” window

    We can verify this by checking that the users exist in our destination.local domain:

    Figure 12: Checking the users exist in the destination.local domain

    Figure 12: Checking the users exist in the destination.local domain

Step 5: Migrate computers

Now, we’ll move on to computer objects.

  1. Open the Active Directory Migration Tool: Control Panel > System and Security > Administrative Tools > Active Directory Migration Tool.
  2. Right-click Active Directory Migration Tool and select Computer Migration Wizard.
  3. Select the computers you want to migrate to the new domain. We’ll select four computers for migration.
    Figure 13: Four computers that will be migrated

    Figure 13: Four computers that will be migrated

  4. On the Translate Objects page, select which access controls you want to reapply during the migration, and then select Next.
    Figure 14: The “Translate Objects” dialog box

    Figure 14: The “Translate Objects” dialog box

    The migration process will show completed, but we need to make sure the entire process worked.

  5. To verify that the migration was successful, select Close, and the migration tool will open a new window that has a link to the migration log. Check the log file to see that it has started the process of migrating these four computers:

    2017-08-11 04:09:01 The Active Directory Migration Tool Agent will be installed on WIN-56SQFFFJCR1.source.local

    2017-08-11 04:09:01 The Active Directory Migration Tool Agent will be installed on WIN-IG2V2NAN1MU.source.local

    2017-08-11 04:09:01 The Active Directory Migration Tool Agent will be installed on WIN-QKQEJHUEV27.source.local

    2017-08-11 04:09:01 The Active Directory Migration Tool Agent will be installed on WIN-SE98KE4Q9CR.source.local

    If the admin user doesn’t have access to the C$ or admin$ share on the computer in the source domain share, then then installation of the agent will fail as shown here:

    2017-08-11 04:09:29 ERR2:7006 Failed to install agent on \\WIN-IG2V2NAN1MU.source.local, rc=5 Access is denied.

    Once the agent is installed, it will perform a domain disjoin from source.local and perform a join to desintation.local. The log file will update when this has been successful:

    2017-08-11 04:13:29 Post-check passed on the computer ‘WIN-SE98KE4Q9CR.source.local’. The new computer name is ‘WIN-SE98KE4Q9CR.destination.local’.

    2017-08-11 04:13:29 Post-check passed on the computer ‘WIN-QKQEJHUEV27.source.local’. The new computer name is ‘WIN-QKQEJHUEV27.destination.local’.

    2017-08-11 04:13:29 Post-check passed on the computer ‘WIN-56SQFFFJCR1.source.local’. The new computer name is ‘WIN-56SQFFFJCR1.destination.local’.

    You can then view the new computer objects in the destination domain.

  6. Log in to one of the old source.local computers and, by looking at the computer’s System Properties, confirm that the computer is now a member of the new destination.local domain.
    Figure 15: Confirm the computer is member of the destination.local domain

    Figure 15: Confirm the computer is member of the destination.local domain

Summary

In this simple example we showed how to migrate users and their passwords, groups, and computer objects from an on premises deployment of Active Directory, to our fully AWS Managed Microsoft AD. We created a management instance on which we ran SQL Express and ADMT, we created a forest trust to grant permissions for an account to use ADMT to move users, we configured ADMT and the PES tool, and then stepped through the migration using ADMT.

The ADMT tool gives us a great way to migrate to our managed Microsoft AD service that allows powerful customization of the migration, and it does so in a more secure way through encrypted password synchronization. You may need to do additional investigation and planning if the complexity of your environment requires a different approach with some of these steps.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Directory service forum or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on X.

Austin Webber

Austin Webber

Austin is a Cloud Support Engineer specializing in enterprise applications on AWS. He holds subject matter expert accreditations for WorkSpaces and FSx for ONTAP. Outside of work he enjoys playing video games, traveling, and fishing.

AWS completes CCAG 2023 community audit for financial services customers in Europe

Post Syndicated from Manuel Mazarredo original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-completes-ccag-2023-community-audit-for-financial-services-customers-in-europe/

We’re excited to announce that Amazon Web Services (AWS) has completed its fifth annual Collaborative Cloud Audit Group (CCAG) pooled audit with European financial services institutions under regulatory supervision.

At AWS, security is the highest priority. As customers embrace the scalability and flexibility of AWS, we’re helping them evolve security and compliance into key business enablers. We’re obsessed with earning and maintaining customer trust, and providing our financial services customers and their regulatory bodies with the assurances that AWS has the necessary controls in place to help protect their most sensitive material and regulated workloads.

With the increasing digitalization of the financial industry, and the importance of cloud computing as a key enabling technology for digitalization, the financial services industry is experiencing greater regulatory scrutiny. Our annual audit engagement with CCAG is an example of how AWS supports customers’ risk management and regulatory efforts. For the fifth year, the CCAG pooled audit meticulously assessed the AWS controls that enable us to help protect customers’ data and material workloads, while satisfying strict regulatory obligations.

CCAG represents more than 50 leading European financial services institutions and has grown steadily since its founding in 2017. Based on its mission to provide organizational and logistical support to members so that they can conduct pooled audits with excellence, efficiency, and integrity, the CCAG audit was initiated based on customers’ right to conduct an audit of their service providers under the European Banking Authority (EBA) outsourcing recommendations to cloud service providers (CSPs).

Audit preparations

Using the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) as the framework of reference for the CCAG audit, auditors scoped in key domains and controls to audit, such as identity and access management, change control and configuration, logging and monitoring, and encryption and key management.

The scope of the audit targeted individual AWS services, such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), and specific AWS Regions where financial services institutions run their workloads, such as the Europe (Frankfurt) Region (eu-central-1).

During this phase, to help provide auditors with a common cloud-specific knowledge and language base, AWS gave various educational and alignment sessions. We offered access to our online resources such as Skill Builder, and delivered onsite briefing and orientation sessions in Paris, France; Barcelona, Spain; and London, UK.

Audit fieldwork

This phase started after a joint kick-off in Berlin, Germany, and used a hybrid approach, with work occurring remotely through the use of videoconferencing and a secure audit portal for the inspection of evidence, and onsite at Amazon’s HQ2, in Arlington, Virginia, in the US.

Auditors assessed AWS policies, procedures, and controls, following a risk-based approach and using sampled evidence and access to subject matter experts (SMEs).

Audit results

After a joint closure ceremony onsite in Warsaw, Poland, auditors finalized the audit report, which included the following positive feedback:

“CCAG would like to thank AWS for helping in achieving the audit objectives and to advocate on CCAG’s behalf to obtain the required assurances. In consequence, CCAG was able to execute the audit according to agreed timelines, and exercise audit rights in line with contractual conditions.”

The results of the CCAG pooled audit are available to the participants and their respective regulators only, and provide CCAG members with assurance regarding the AWS controls environment, enabling members to work to remove compliance blockers, accelerate their adoption of AWS services, and obtain confidence and trust in the security controls of AWS.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Manuel Mazarredo

Manuel Mazarredo

Manuel is a security audit program manager at AWS based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Manuel leads security audits, attestations, and certification programs across Europe. For the past 18 years, he has worked in information systems audits, ethical hacking, project management, quality assurance, and vendor management across a variety of industries.

Andreas Terwellen

Andreas Terwellen

Andreas is a senior manager in security audit assurance at AWS, based in Frankfurt, Germany. His team is responsible for third-party and customer audits, attestations, certifications, and assessments across Europe. Previously, he was a CISO in a DAX-listed telecommunications company in Germany. He also worked for different consulting companies managing large teams and programs across multiple industries and sectors.

Data masking and granular access control using Amazon Macie and AWS Lake Formation

Post Syndicated from Iris Ferreira original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/data-masking-and-granular-access-control-using-amazon-macie-and-aws-lake-formation/

Companies have been collecting user data to offer new products, recommend options more relevant to the user’s profile, or, in the case of financial institutions, to be able to facilitate access to higher credit lines or lower interest rates. However, personal data is sensitive as its use enables identification of the person using a specific system or application and in the wrong hands, this data might be used in unauthorized ways. Governments and organizations have created laws and regulations, such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the EU, General Data Protection Law (LGPD) in Brazil, and technical guidance such as the Cloud Computing Implementation Guide published by the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), that specify what constitutes sensitive data and how companies should manage it. A common requirement is to ensure that consent is obtained for collection and use of personal data and that any data collected is anonymized to protect consumers from data breach risks.

In this blog post, we walk you through a proposed architecture that implements data anonymization by using granular access controls according to well-defined rules. It covers a scenario where a user might not have read access to data, but an application does. A common use case for this scenario is a data scientist working with sensitive data to train machine learning models. The training algorithm would have access to the data, but the data scientist would not. This approach helps reduce the risk of data leakage while enabling innovation using data.

Prerequisites

To implement the proposed solution, you must have an active AWS account and AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions to use the following services:

Note: If there’s a pre-existing Lake Formation configuration, there might be permission issues when testing this solution. We suggest that you test this solution on a development account that doesn’t yet have Lake Formation active. If you don’t have access to a development account, see more details about the permissions required on your role in the Lake Formation documentation.

You must give permission for AWS DMS to create the necessary resources, such as the EC2 instance where you will run DMS tasks. If you have ever worked with DMS, this permission should already exist. Otherwise, you can use CloudFormation to create the necessary roles to deploy the solution. To see if permission already exists, open the AWS Management Console and go to IAM, select Roles, and see if there is a role called dms-vpc-role. If not, you must create the role during deployment.

We use the Faker library to create dummy data consisting of the following tables:

  • Customer
  • Bank
  • Card

Solution overview

This architecture allows multiple data sources to send information to the data lake environment on AWS, where Amazon S3 is the central data store. After the data is stored in an S3 bucket, Macie analyzes the objects and identifies sensitive data using machine learning (ML) and pattern matching. AWS Glue then uses the information to run a workflow to anonymize the data.

Figure 1: Solution architecture for data ingestion and identification of PII

Figure 1: Solution architecture for data ingestion and identification of PII

We will describe two techniques used in the process: data masking and data encryption. After the workflow runs, the data is stored in a separate S3 bucket. This hierarchy of buckets is used to segregate access to data for different user personas.

Figure 1 depicts the solution architecture:

  1. The data source in the solution is an Amazon RDS database. Data can be stored in a database on an EC2 instance, in an on-premises server, or even deployed in a different cloud provider.
  2. AWS DMS uses full load, which allows data migration from the source (an Amazon RDS database) into the target S3 bucket — dcp-macie — as a one-time migration. New objects uploaded to the S3 bucket are automatically encrypted using server-side encryption (SSE-S3).
  3. A personally identifiable information (PII) detection pipeline is invoked after the new Amazon S3 objects are uploaded. Macie analyzes the objects and identifies values that are sensitive. Users can manually identify which fields and values within the files should be classified as sensitive or use the Macie automated sensitive data discovery capabilities.
  4. The sensitive values identified by Macie are sent to EventBridge, invoking Kinesis Data Firehose to store them in the dcp-glue S3 bucket. AWS Glue uses this data to know which fields to mask or encrypt using an encryption key stored in AWS KMS.
    1. Using EventBridge enables an event-based architecture. EventBridge is used as a bridge between Macie and Kinesis Data Firehose, integrating these services.
    2. Kinesis Data Firehose supports data buffering mitigating the risk of information loss when sent by Macie while reducing the overall cost of storing data in Amazon S3. It also allows data to be sent to other locations, such as Amazon Redshift or Splunk, making it available to be analyzed by other products.
  5. At the end of this step, Amazon S3 is invoked from a Lambda function that starts the AWS Glue workflow, which masks and encrypts the identified data.
    1. AWS Glue starts a crawler on the S3 bucket dcp-macie (a) and the bucket dcp-glue (b) to populate two tables, respectively, created as part of the AWS Glue service.
    2. After that, a Python script is run (c), querying the data in these tables. It uses this information to mask and encrypt the data and then store it in the prefixes dcp-masked (d) and dcp-encrypted (e) in the bucket dcp-athena.
    3. The last step in the workflow is to perform a crawler for each of these prefixes (f) and (g) by creating their respective tables in the AWS Glue Data Catalog.
  6. To enable fine-grained access to data, Lake Formation maps permissions to the tags you have configured. The implementation of this part is described further in this post.
  7. Athena can be used to query the data. Other tools, such as Amazon Redshift or Amazon Quicksight can also be used, as well as third-party tools.

If a user lacks permission to view sensitive data but needs to access it for machine learning model training purposes, AWS KMS can be used. The AWS KMS service manages the encryption keys that are used for data masking and to give access to the training algorithms. Users can see the masked data, but the algorithms can use the data in its original form to train the machine learning models.

This solution uses three personas:

secure-lf-admin: Data lake administrator. Responsible for configuring the data lake and assigning permissions to data administrators.
secure-lf-business-analyst: Business analyst. No access to certain confidential information.
secure-lf-data-scientist: Data scientist. No access to certain confidential information.

Solution implementation

To facilitate implementation, we created a CloudFormation template. The model and other artifacts produced can be found in this GitHub repository. You can use the CloudFormation dashboard to review the output of all the deployed features.

Choose the following Launch Stack button to deploy the CloudFormation template.

Select this image to open a link that starts building the CloudFormation stack

Deploy the CloudFormation template

To deploy the CloudFormation template and create the resources in your AWS account, follow the steps below.

  1. After signing in to the AWS account, deploy the CloudFormation template. On the Create stack window, choose Next.
    Figure 2: CloudFormation create stack screen

    Figure 2: CloudFormation create stack screen

  2. In the following section, enter a name for the stack. Enter a password in the TestUserPassword field for Lake Formation personas to use to sign in to the console. When finished filling in the fields, choose Next.
  3. On the next screen, review the selected options and choose Next.
  4. In the last section, review the information and select I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources with custom names. Choose Create Stack.
    Figure 3: List of parameters and values in the CloudFormation stack

    Figure 3: List of parameters and values in the CloudFormation stack

  5. Wait until the stack status changes to CREATE_COMPLETE.

The deployment process should take approximately 15 minutes to finish.

Run an AWS DMS task

To extract the data from the Amazon RDS instance, you must run an AWS DMS task. This makes the data available to Macie in an S3 bucket in Parquet format.

  1. Open the AWS DMS console.
  2. On the navigation bar, for the Migrate data option, select Database migration tasks.
  3. Select the task with the name rdstos3task.
  4. Choose Actions.
  5. Choose Restart/Resume. The loading process should take around 1 minute.

When the status changes to Load Complete, you will be able to see the migrated data in the target bucket (dcp-macie-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>) in the dataset folder. Within each prefix there will be a parquet file that follows the naming pattern: LOAD00000001.parquet. After this step, use Macie to scan the data for sensitive information in the files.

Run a classification job with Macie 

You must create a data classification job before you can evaluate the contents of the bucket. The job you create will run and evaluate the full contents of your S3 bucket to determine the files stored in the bucket contain PII. This job uses the managed identifiers available in Macie and a custom identifier.

  1. Open the Macie Console, on the navigation bar, select Jobs.
  2. Choose Create job.
  3. Select the S3 bucket dcp-macie-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID> containing the output of the AWS DMS task. Choose Next to continue.
  4. On the Review Bucket page, verify the selected bucket is dcp-macie-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>, and then choose Next.
  5. In Refine the scope, create a new job with the following scope:
    1. Sensitive data Discovery options: One-time job (for demonstration purposes, this will be a single discovery job. For production environments, we recommend selecting the Scheduled job option, so Macie can analyze objects following a scheduled).
    2. Sampling Depth: 100 percent.
    3. Leave the other settings at their default values.
  6. On Managed data identifiers options, select All so Macie can use all managed data identifiers. This enables a set of built-in criteria to detect all identified types of sensitive data. Choose Next.
  7. On the Custom data identifiers option, select account_number, and then choose Next. With the custom identifier, you can create custom business logic to look for certain patterns in files stored in Amazon S3. In this example, the task generates a discovery job for files that contain data with the following regular expression format XYZ- followed by numbers, which is the default format of the false account_number generated in the dataset. The logic used for creating this custom data identifier is included in the CloudFormation template file.
  8. On the Select allow lists, choose Next to continue.
  9. Enter a name and description for the job.
  10. Choose Next to continue.
  11. On Review and create step, check the details of the job you created and choose Submit.
    Figure 4: List of Macie findings detected by the solution

    Figure 4: List of Macie findings detected by the solution

The amount of data being scanned directly influences how long the job takes to run. You can choose the Update button at the top of the screen, as shown in Figure 4, to see the updated status of the job. This job, based on the size of the test dataset, will take about 10 minutes to complete.

Run the AWS Glue data transformation pipeline

After the Macie job is finished, the discovery results are ingested into the bucket dcp-glue-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>, invoking the AWS Glue step of the workflow (dcp-Workflow), which should take approximately 11 minutes to complete.

To check the workflow progress:

  1. Open the AWS Glue console and on navigation bar, select Workflows (orchestration).
  2. Next, choose dcp-workflow.
  3. Next, select History to see the past runs of the dcp-workflow.

The AWS Glue job, which is launched as part of the workflow (dcp-workflow), reads the Macie findings to know the exact location of sensitive data. For example, in the customer table are name and birthdate. In the bank table are account_number, iban, and bban. And in the card table are card_number, card_expiration, and card_security_code. After this data is found, the job masks and encrypts the information.

Text encryption is done using an AWS KMS key. Here is the code snippet that provides this functionality:

def encrypt_rows(r):
    encrypted_entities = columns_to_be_masked_and_encrypted
    try:
        for entity in encrypted_entities:
            if entity in table_columns:
                encrypted_entity = get_kms_encryption(r[entity])
                r[entity + '_encrypted'] = encrypted_entity.decode("utf-8")
                del r[entity]
    except:
        print ("DEBUG:",sys.exc_info())
    return r

def get_kms_encryption(row):
    # Create a KMS client
    session = boto3.session.Session()
    client = session.client(service_name='kms',region_name=region_name)
   
    try:
        encryption_result = client.encrypt(KeyId=key_id, Plaintext=row)
        blob = encryption_result['CiphertextBlob']
        encrypted_row = base64.b64encode(blob)       
        return encrypted_row
       
    except:
        return 'Error on get_kms_encryption function'

If your application requires access to the unencrypted text, and because access to the AWS KMS encryption key exists, you can use the following excerpt example to access the information:

client.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=base64.b64decode(data_encrypted))
print(decrypted['Plaintext'])

After performing all the above steps, the datasets are fully anonymized with tables created in Data Catalog and data stored in the respective S3 buckets. These are the buckets where fine-grained access controls are applied through Lake Formation:

  • Masked data — s3://dcp-athena-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>/masked/
  • Encrypted data — s3://dcp-athena-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>/encrypted/

Now that the tables are defined, you refine the permissions using Lake Formation.

Enable Lake Formation fine-grained access

After the data is processed and stored, you use Lake Formation to define and enforce fine-grained access permissions and provide secure access to data analysts and data scientists.

To enable fine-grained access, you first add a user (secure-lf-admin) to Lake Formation:

  1. In the Lake Formation console, clear Add myself and select Add other AWS users or roles.
  2. From the drop-down menu, select secure-lf-admin.
  3. Choose Get started.
    Figure 5: Lake Formation deployment process

    Figure 5: Lake Formation deployment process

Grant access to different personas

Before you grant permissions to different user personas, you must register Amazon S3 locations in Lake Formation so that the personas can access the data. All buckets have been created with the following pattern <prefix>-<bucket_name>-<aws_region>-<account_id>, where <prefix> matches the prefix you selected when you deployed the Cloudformation template and <aws_region> corresponds to the selected AWS Region (for example, ap-southeast-1), and <account_id> is the 12 numbers that match your AWS account (for example, 123456789012). For ease of reading, we left only the initial part of the bucket name in the following instructions.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, on the navigation bar, on the Register and ingest option, select Data Lake locations.
  2. Choose Register location.
  3. Select the dcp-glue bucket and choose Register Location.
  4. Repeat for the dcp-macie/dataset, dcp-athena/masked, and dcp-athena/encrypted prefixes.
    Figure 6: Amazon S3 locations registered in the solution

    Figure 6: Amazon S3 locations registered in the solution

You’re now ready to grant access to different users.

Granting per-user granular access

After successfully deploying the AWS services described in the CloudFormation template, you must configure access to resources that are part of the proposed solution.

Grant read-only accesses to all tables for secure-lf-admin

Before proceeding you must sign in as the secure-lf-admin user. To do this, sign out from the AWS console and sign in again using the secure-lf-admin credential and password that you set in the CloudFormation template.

Now that you’re signed in as the user who administers the data lake, you can grant read-only access to all tables in the dataset database to the secure-lf-admin user.

  1. In the Permissions section, select Data Lake permissions, and then choose Grant.
  2. Select IAM users and roles.
  3. Select the secure-lf-admin user.
  4. Under LF-Tags or catalog resources, select Named data catalog resources.
  5. Select the database dataset.
  6. For Tables, select All tables.
  7. In the Table permissions section, select Alter and Super.
  8. Under Grantable permissions, select Alter and Super.
  9. Choose Grant.

You can confirm your user permissions on the Data Lake permissions page.

Create tags to grant access

Return to the Lake Formation console to define tag-based access control for users. You can assign policy tags to Data Catalog resources (databases, tables, and columns) to control access to this type of resources. Only users who receive the corresponding Lake Formation tag (and those who receive access with the resource method named) can access the resources.

  1. Open the Lake Formation console, then on the navigation bar, under Permissions, select LF-tags.
  2. Choose Add LF Tag. In the dialog box Add LF-tag, for Key, enter data, and for Values, enter mask. Choose Add, and then choose Add LF-Tag.
  3. Follow the same steps to add a second tag. For Key, enter segment, and for Values enter campaign.

Assign tags to users and databases

Now grant read-only access to the masked data to the secure-lf-data-scientist user.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, on the navigation bar, under Permissions, select Data Lake permissions
  2. Choose Grant.
  3. Under IAM users and roles, select secure-lf-data-scientist as the user.
  4. In the LF-Tags or catalog resources section, select Resources matched by LF-Tags and choose add LF-Tag. For Key, enter data and for Values, enter mask.
    Figure 7: Creating resource tags for Lake Formation

    Figure 7: Creating resource tags for Lake Formation

  5. In the section Database permissions, in the Database permissions part and in Grantable permissions, select Describe.
  6. In the section Table permissions, in the Table permissions part and in Grantable permissions, select Select.
  7. Choose Grant.
    Figure 8: Database and table permissions granted

    Figure 8: Database and table permissions granted

To complete the process and give the secure-lf-data-scientist user access to the dataset_masked database, you must assign the tag you created to the database.

  1. On the navigation bar, under Data Catalog, select Databases.
  2. Select dataset_masked and select Actions. From the drop-down menu, select Edit LF-Tags.
  3. In the section Edit LF-Tags: dataset_masked, choose Assign new LF-Tag. For Key, enter data, and for Values, enter mask. Choose Save.

Grant read-only accesses to secure-lf-business-analyst

Now grant the secure-lf-business-analyst user read-only access to certain encrypted columns using column-based permissions.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, under Data Catalog, select Databases.
  2. Select the database dataset_encrypted and then select Actions. From the drop-down menu, choose Grant.
  3. Select IAM users and roles.
  4. Choose secure-lf-business-analyst.
  5. In the LF-Tags or catalog resources section, select Named data catalog resources.
  6. In the Database permissions section, in the Database permissions section and in Grantable permissions, select Describe and Alter.
  7. Choose Grant.

Now give the secure-lf-business-analyst user access to the Customer table, except for the username column.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, under Data Catalog, select Databases.
  2. Select the database dataset_encrypted and then, choose View tables.
  3. From the Actions option in the drop-down menu, select Grant.
  4. Select IAM users and roles.
  5. Select secure-lf-business-analyst.
  6. In the LF-Tags or catalog resources part, select Named data catalog resources.
  7. In the Database section, leave the dataset_encrypted selected.
  8. In the tables section, select the customer table.
  9. In the Table permission section, in the Table permission section and in Grantable permissions, choose Select.
  10. In the Data Permissions section, select Column-based access.
  11. Select Include columns and select the idusername, mail, and gender columns, which are the data-less columns encrypted for the secure-lf-business-analyst user to have access to.
  12. Choose Grant.
    Figure 9: Granting access to secure-lf-business-analyst user in the Customer table

    Figure 9: Granting access to secure-lf-business-analyst user in the Customer table

Now give the secure-lf-business-analyst user access to the table Card, only for columns that do not contain PII information.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, under Data Catalog, choose Databases.
  2. Select the database dataset_encrypted and choose View tables.
  3. Select the table Card.
  4. In the Schema section, choose Edit schema.
  5. Select the cred_card_provider column, which is the column that has no PII data.
  6. Choose Edit tags.
  7. Choose Assign new LF-Tag.
  8. For Assigned keys, enter segment and for Values, enter mask.
    Figure 10: Editing tags in Lake Formation tables

    Figure 10: Editing tags in Lake Formation tables

  9. Choose Save, and then choose Save as new version.

In this step you add the segment tag in the column cred_card_provider to the card table. For the user secure-lf-business-analyst to have access, you need to configure this tag for the user.

  1. In the Lake Formation console, under Permissions, select Data Lake permissions.
  2. Choose Grant.
  3. Under IAM users and roles, select secure-lf-business-analyst as the user.
  4. In the LF-Tags or catalog resources section, select Resources matched by LF-Tags, and choose add LF-tag and for as Key enter segment and for Values, enter campaign.
    Figure 11: Configure tag-based access for user secure-lf-business-analyst

    Figure 11: Configure tag-based access for user secure-lf-business-analyst

  5. In the Database permissions section, in the Database permissions part and in Grantable permissions, select Describe from both options.
  6. In the Table permission section, in the Table permission part as well as in Grantable permissions, choose Select.
  7. Choose Grant.

The next step is to revoke Super access to the IAMAllowedPrincipals group.

The IAMAllowedPrincipals group includes all IAM users and roles that are allowed access to Data Catalog resources using IAM policies. The Super permission allows a principal to perform all operations supported by Lake Formation on the database or table on which it is granted. These settings provide access to Data Catalog resources and Amazon S3 locations controlled exclusively by IAM policies. Therefore, the individual permissions configured by Lake Formation are not considered, so you will remove the concessions already configured by the IAMAllowedPrincipals group, leaving only the Lake Formation settings.

  1. In the Databases menu, select the database dataset, and then select Actions. From the drop-down menu, select Revoke.
  2. In the Principals section, select IAM users and roles, and then select the IAMAllowedPrincipals group as the user.
  3. Under LF-Tags or catalog resources, select Named data catalog resources.
  4. In the Database section, leave the dataset option selected.
  5. Under Tables, select the following tables: bank, card, and customer.
  6. In the Table permissions section, select Super.
  7. Choose Revoke.

Repeat the same steps for the dataset_encrypted and dataset_masked databases.

Figure 12: Revoke SUPER access to the IAMAllowedPrincipals group

Figure 12: Revoke SUPER access to the IAMAllowedPrincipals group

You can confirm all user permissions on the Data Permissions page.

Querying the data lake using Athena with different personas

To validate the permissions of different personas, you use Athena to query the Amazon S3 data lake.

Ensure the query result location has been created as part of the CloudFormation stack (secure-athena-query-<ACCOUNT_ID>-<AWS_REGION>).

  1. Sign in to the Athena console with secure-lf-admin (use the password value for TestUserPassword from the CloudFormation stack) and verify that you are in the AWS Region used in the query result location.
  2. On the navigation bar, choose Query editor.
  3. Choose Setting to set up a query result location in Amazon S3, and then choose Browse S3 and select the bucket secure-athena-query-<ACCOUNT_ID>-<AWS_REGION>.
  4. Run a SELECT query on the dataset.
    SELECT * FROM "dataset"."bank" limit 10;

The secure-lf-admin user should see all tables in the dataset database and dcp. As for the banks dataset_encrypted and dataset_masked, the user should not have access to the tables.

Figure 13: Athena console with query results in clear text

Figure 13: Athena console with query results in clear text

Finally, validate the secure-lf-data-scientist permissions.

  1. Sign in to the Athena console with secure-lf-data-scientist (use the password value for TestUserPassword from the CloudFormation stack) and verify that you are in the correct Region.
  2. Run the following query:
    SELECT * FROM “dataset_masked”.”bank” limit 10;

The user secure-lf-data-scientist will only be able to view all the columns in the database dataset_masked.

Figure 14: Athena query results with masked data

Figure 14: Athena query results with masked data

Now, validate the secure-lf-business-analyst user permissions.

  1. Sign in to the Athena console as secure-lf-business-analyst (use the password value for TestUserPassword from the CloudFormation stack) and verify that you are in the correct Region.
  2. Run a SELECT query on the dataset.
    SELECT * FROM “dataset_encrypted”.”card” limit 10;

    Figure 15: Validating secure-lf-business-analyst user permissions to query data

    Figure 15: Validating secure-lf-business-analyst user permissions to query data

The user secure-lf-business-analyst should only be able to view the card and customer tables of the dataset_encrypted database. In the table card, you will only have access to the cred_card_provider column and in the table Customer, you will have access only in the username, mail, and sex columns, as previously configured in Lake Formation.

Cleaning up the environment

After testing the solution, remove the resources you created to avoid unnecessary expenses.

  1. Open the Amazon S3 console.
  2. Navigate to each of the following buckets and delete all the objects within:
    1. dcp-assets-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>
    2. dcp-athena-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>
    3. dcp-glue-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>
    4. dcp-macie-<AWS_REGION>-<ACCOUNT_ID>
  3. Open the CloudFormation console.
  4. Select the Stacks option from the navigation bar.
  5. Select the stack that you created in Deploy the CloudFormation Template.
  6. Choose Delete, and then choose Delete Stack in the pop-up window.
  7. If you also want to delete the bucket that was created, go to Amazon S3 and delete it from the console or by using the AWS CLI.
  8. To remove the settings made in Lake Formation, go to the Lake Formation dashboard, and remove the data lake locales and the Lake Formation administrator.

Conclusion 

Now that the solution is implemented, you have an automated anonymization dataflow. This solution demonstrates how you can build a solution using AWS serverless solutions where you only pay for what you use and without worrying about infrastructure provisioning. In addition, this solution is customizable to meet other data protection requirements such as General Data Protection Law (LGPD) in Brazil, General Data Protection Regulation in Europe (GDPR), and the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) Cloud Computing Implementation Guide.

We used Macie to identify the sensitive data stored in Amazon S3 and AWS Glue to generate Macie reports to anonymize the sensitive data found. Finally, we used Lake Formation to implement fine-grained data access control to specific information and demonstrated how you can programmatically grant access to applications that need to work with unmasked data.

Related links

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Iris Ferreira

Iris Ferreira

Iris is a solutions architect at AWS, supporting clients in their innovation and digital transformation journeys in the cloud. In her free time, she enjoys going to the beach, traveling, hiking and always being in contact with nature.

Paulo Aragão

Paulo Aragão

Paulo is a Principal Solutions Architect and supports clients in the financial sector to tread the new world of DeFi, web3.0, Blockchain, dApps, and Smart Contracts. In addition, he has extensive experience in high performance computing (HPC) and machine learning. Passionate about music and diving, he devours books, plays World of Warcraft and New World, and cooks for friends.

Leo da Silva

Leo da Silva

Leo is a Principal Security Solutions Architect at AWS and uses his knowledge to help customers better use cloud services and technologies securely. Over the years, he had the opportunity to work in large, complex environments, designing, architecting, and implementing highly scalable and secure solutions to global companies. He is passionate about football, BBQ, and Jiu Jitsu — the Brazilian version of them all.

Export a Software Bill of Materials using Amazon Inspector

Post Syndicated from Varun Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/export-a-software-bill-of-materials-using-amazon-inspector/

Amazon Inspector is an automated vulnerability management service that continually scans Amazon Web Services (AWS) workloads for software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. Amazon Inspector has expanded capability that allows customers to export a consolidated Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for supported Amazon Inspector monitored resources, excluding Windows EC2 instances.

Customers have asked us to provide additional software application inventory collected from Amazon Inspector monitored resources. This makes it possible to precisely track the software supply chain and security threats that might be connected to the results of the current Amazon Inspector. Generating an SBOM gives you critical security information that offers you visibility into specifics about your software supply chain, including the packages you use the most frequently and the related vulnerabilities that might affect your whole company.

This blog post includes steps that you can follow to export a consolidated SBOM for the resources monitored by Amazon Inspector across your organization in industry standard formats, including CycloneDx and SPDX. It also shares insights and approaches for analyzing SBOM artifacts using Amazon Athena.

Overview

An SBOM is defined as a nested inventory with a list of ingredients that make up software components. Security teams can export a consolidated SBOM to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) for an entire organization from the resource coverage page in the AWS Management Console for Amazon Inspector.

Using CycloneDx and SPDX industry standard formats, you can use insights gained from an SBOM to make decisions such as which software packages need to be updated across your organization or deprecated, if there’s no other option. Individual application or security engineers can also export an SBOM for a single resource or group of resources by applying filters for a specific account, resource type, resource ID, tags, or a combination of these as a part of the SBOM export workflow in the console or application programming interfaces.

Exporting SBOMs

To export Amazon Inspector SBOM reports to an S3 bucket, you must create and configure a bucket in the AWS Region where the SBOM reports are to be exported. You must configure your bucket permissions to allow only Amazon Inspector to put new objects into the bucket. This prevents other AWS services and users from adding objects to the bucket.

Each SBOM report is stored in an S3 bucket and has the name Cyclonedx_1_4 (Json) or Spdx_2_3-compatible (Json), depending on the export format that you specify. You can also use S3 event notifications to alert different operational teams that new SBOM reports have been exported.

Amazon Inspector requires that you use an AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key to encrypt the SBOM report. The key must be a customer managed, symmetric KMS encryption key and must be in the same Region as the S3 bucket that you configured to store the SBOM report. The new KMS key for the SBOM report requires a key policy to be configured to grant permissions for Amazon Inspector to use the key. (Shown in Figure 1.)

Figure 1: Amazon Inspector SBOM export

Figure 1: Amazon Inspector SBOM export

Deploy prerequisites

The AWS CloudFormation template provided creates an S3 bucket with an associated bucket policy to enable Amazon Inspector to export SBOM report objects into the bucket. The template also creates a new KMS key to be used for SBOM report exports and grants the Amazon Inspector service permissions to use the key.

The export can be initiated from the AWS Inspector delegated administrator account or the AWS Inspector administrator account itself. This way, the S3 bucket contains reports for the AWS Inspector member accounts. To export the SBOM reports from Amazon Inspector deployed in the same Region, make sure the CloudFormation template is deployed within the AWS account and Region. If you enabled AWS Inspector in multiple accounts, the CloudFormation stack must be deployed in each Region where AWS Inspector is enabled.

To deploy the CloudFormation template

  1. Choose the following Launch Stack button to launch a CloudFormation stack in your account.

    Launch Stack

  2. Review the stack name and the parameters (MyKMSKeyName and MyS3BucketName) for the template. Note that the S3 bucket name must be unique.
  3. Choose Next and confirm the stack options.
  4. Go to the next page and choose Submit. The deployment of the CloudFormation stack will take 1–2 minutes.

After the CloudFormation stack has deployed successfully, you can use the S3 bucket and KMS key created by the stack to export SBOM reports.

Export SBOM reports

After setup is complete, you can export SBOM reports to an S3 bucket.

To export SBOM reports from the console

  1. Navigate to the AWS Inspector console in the same Region where the S3 bucket and KMS key were created.
  2. Select Export SBOMs from the navigation pane.
  3. Add filters to create reports for specific subsets of resources. The SBOMs for all active, supported resources are exported if you don’t supply a filter.
  4. Select the export file type you want. Options are Cyclonedx_1_4 (Json) or Spdx_2_3-compatible (Json).
  5. Enter the S3 bucket URI from the output section of the CloudFormation template and enter the KMS key that was created.
  6. Choose Export. It can take 3–5 minutes to complete depending on the number of artifacts to be exported.
Figure 2: SBOM export configuration

Figure 2: SBOM export configuration

When complete, all SBOM artifacts will be in the S3 bucket. This gives you the flexibility to download the SBOM artifacts from the S3 bucket, or you can use Amazon S3 Select to retrieve a subset of data from an object using standard SQL queries.

Figure 3: Amazon S3 Select

Figure 3: Amazon S3 Select

You can also run advanced queries using Amazon Athena or create dashboards using Amazon QuickSight to gain insights and map trends.

Querying and visualization

With Athena, you can run SQL queries on raw data that’s stored in S3 buckets. The Amazon Inspector reports are exported to an S3 bucket, and you can query the data and create tables by following the Adding an AWS Glue crawler tutorial.

To enable AWS Glue to crawl the S3 data, you must add the role as described in the AWS Glue crawler tutorial to the AWS KMS key permissions so that AWS Glue can decrypt the S3 data.

The following is an example policy JSON that you can update for your use case. Make sure to replace the AWS account ID <111122223333> and S3 bucket name <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET-111122223333> with your own information.

{
    "Sid": "Allow the AWS Glue crawler usage of the KMS key",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::<111122223333>:role/service-role/AWSGlueServiceRole-S3InspectorSBOMReports"
    },
    "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey*"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET-111122223333>"
},

Note: The role created for AWS Glue also needs permission to read the S3 bucket where the reports are exported for creating the crawlers. The AWS Glue AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role allows the crawler to run and access your Amazon S3 data stores.

After an AWS Glue Data Catalog has been built, you can run the crawler on a scheduled basis to help ensure that it’s kept up to date with the latest Amazon Inspector SBOM manifests as they’re exported into the S3 bucket.

You can further navigate to the added table using the crawler and view the data in Athena. Using Athena, you can run queries against the Amazon Inspector reports to generate output data relevant to your environment. The schema for the generated SBOM report is different depending on the specific resources (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AWS Lambda, Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR)) in the reports. So, depending on the schema, you can create a SQL Athena query to fetch information from the reports.

The following is an Athena example query that identifies the top 10 vulnerabilities for resources in an SBOM report. You can use the common vulnerability and exposures (CVE) IDs from the report to list the individual components affected by the CVEs.

SELECT
   account,
   vuln.id as vuln_id, 
   count(*) as vuln_count
FROM
   <Insert_table_name>,
   UNNEST(Inset_table_name.vulnerabilities)as t(vuln)
GROUP BY
   account,
   vuln.id
ORDER BY
vuln_count DESC
LIMIT 10;

The following Athena example query can be used to identify the top 10 operating systems (OS) along with the resource types and their count.

SELECT
   resource,
   metadata.component.name as os_name,
   count(*) as os_count 
FROM
   <Insert_table_name>
WHERE
   resource = 'AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION'
GROUP BY
   resource,
   metadata.component.name 
ORDER BY
   os_count DESC 
LIMIT 10;

If you have a package that has a critical vulnerability and you need to know if the package is used as a primary package or adds a dependency, you can use the following Athena sample query to check for the package in your application. In this example, I’m searching for a Log4j package. The result returns account ID, resource type, package_name, and package_count.

SELECT
   account,
   resource,
   comp.name as package_name,
   count(*) as package_count 
FROM
   <Insert_Table _name>,
   UNNEST(<Insert_Table_name>.components) as t(comp) 
WHERE
   comp.name = 'Log4j' 
GROUP BY
   account,
   comp.name,
   resource 
ORDER BY
   package_count DESC 
LIMIT 10 ;

Note: The sample Athena queries must be customized depending on the schema of the SBOM export report.

To further extend this solution, you can use Amazon QuickSight to produce dashboards to visualize the data by connecting to the AWS Glue table.

Conclusion

The new SBOM generation capabilities in Amazon Inspector improve visibility into the software supply chain by providing a comprehensive list of software packages across multiple levels of dependencies. You can also use SBOMs to monitor the licensing information for each of the software packages and identify potential licensing violations in your organization, helping you avoid potential legal risks.

The most important benefit of SBOM export is to help you comply with industry regulations and standards. By providing an industry-standard format (SPDX and CycloneDX) and enabling easy integration with other tools, systems, or services (such as Nexus IQ and WhiteSource), you can streamline the incident response processes, improve the accuracy and speed of security assessments, and adhere to compliance with regulatory requirements.

In addition to these benefits, the SBOM export feature provides a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the OS packages and software libraries found in their resources, further enhancing your ability to adhere to industry regulations and standards.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have any question/query in regard to information shared in this post, start a new thread on the AWS IAM Identity Center re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Varun Sharma

Varun Sharma

Varun is an AWS Cloud Security Engineer who wears his security cape proudly. With a knack for unravelling the mysteries of Amazon Cognito and IAM, Varun is a go-to subject matter expert for these services. When he’s not busy securing the cloud, you’ll find him in the world of security penetration testing. And when the pixels are at rest, Varun switches gears to capture the beauty of nature through the lens of his camera.

AWS re:Invent 2023: Security, identity, and compliance recap

Post Syndicated from Nisha Amthul original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-reinvent-2023-security-identity-and-compliance-recap/

In this post, we share the key announcements related to security, identity, and compliance at AWS re:Invent 2023, and offer details on how you can learn more through on-demand video of sessions and relevant blog posts. AWS re:Invent returned to Las Vegas in November 2023. The conference featured over 2,250 sessions and hands-on labs, with over 52,000 attendees over five days. If you couldn’t join us in person or want to revisit the security, identity, and compliance announcements and on-demand sessions, this post is for you.

At re:Invent 2023, and throughout the AWS security service announcements, there are key themes that underscore the security challenges that we help customers address through the sharing of knowledge and continuous development in our native security services. The key themes include helping you architect for zero trust, scalable identity and access management, early integration of security in the development cycle, container security enhancement, and using generative artificial intelligence (AI) to help improve security services and mean time to remediation.

Key announcements

To help you more efficiently manage identity and access at scale, we introduced several new features:

  • A week before re:Invent, we announced two new features of Amazon Verified Permissions:
    • Batch authorization — Batch authorization is a new way for you to process authorization decisions within your application. Using this new API, you can process 30 authorization decisions for a single principal or resource in a single API call. This can help you optimize multiple requests in your user experience (UX) permissions.
    • Visual schema editor — This new visual schema editor offers an alternative to editing policies directly in the JSON editor. View relationships between entity types, manage principals and resources visually, and review the actions that apply to principal and resources types for your application schema.
  • We launched two new features for AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) Access Analyzer:
    • Unused access — The new analyzer continuously monitors IAM roles and users in your organization in AWS Organizations or within AWS accounts, identifying unused permissions, access keys, and passwords. Using this new capability, you can benefit from a dashboard to help prioritize which accounts need attention based on the volume of excessive permissions and unused access findings. You can set up automated notification workflows by integrating IAM Access Analyzer with Amazon EventBridge. In addition, you can aggregate these new findings about unused access with your existing AWS Security Hub findings.
    • Custom policy checks — This feature helps you validate that IAM policies adhere to your security standards ahead of deployments. Custom policy checks use the power of automated reasoning—security assurance backed by mathematical proof—to empower security teams to detect non-conformant updates to policies proactively. You can move AWS applications from development to production more quickly by automating policy reviews within your continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines. Security teams automate policy reviews before deployments by collaborating with developers to configure custom policy checks within AWS CodePipeline pipelines, AWS CloudFormation hooks, GitHub Actions, and Jenkins jobs.
  • We announced AWS IAM Identity Center trusted identity propagation to manage and audit access to AWS Analytics services, including Amazon QuickSight, Amazon Redshift, Amazon EMR, AWS Lake Formation, and Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) through S3 Access Grants. This feature of IAM Identity Center simplifies data access management for users, enhances auditing granularity, and improves the sign-in experience for analytics users across multiple AWS analytics applications.

To help you improve your security outcomes with generative AI and automated reasoning, we introduced the following new features:

AWS Control Tower launched a set of 65 purpose-built controls designed to help you meet your digital sovereignty needs. In November 2022, we launched AWS Digital Sovereignty Pledge, our commitment to offering all AWS customers the most advanced set of sovereignty controls and features available in the cloud. Introducing AWS Control Tower controls that support digital sovereignty is an additional step in our roadmap of capabilities for data residency, granular access restriction, encryption, and resilience. AWS Control Tower offers you a consolidated view of the controls enabled, your compliance status, and controls evidence across multiple accounts.

We announced two new feature expansions for Amazon GuardDuty to provide the broadest threat detection coverage:

We launched two new capabilities for Amazon Inspector in addition to Amazon Inspector code remediation for Lambda function to help you detect software vulnerabilities at scale:

We introduced four new capabilities in AWS Security Hub to help you address security gaps across your organization and enhance the user experience for security teams, providing increased visibility:

  • Central configuration — Streamline and simplify how you set up and administer Security Hub in your multi-account, multi-Region organizations. With central configuration, you can use the delegated administrator account as a single pane of glass for your security findings—and also for your organization’s configurations in Security Hub.
  • Customize security controls — You can now refine the best practices monitored by Security Hub controls to meet more specific security requirements. There is support for customer-specific inputs in Security Hub controls, so you can customize your security posture monitoring on AWS.
  • Metadata enrichment for findings — This enrichment adds resource tags, a new AWS application tag, and account name information to every finding ingested into Security Hub. This includes findings from AWS security services such as GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, and IAM Access Analyzer, in addition to a large and growing list of AWS Partner Network (APN) solutions. Using this enhancement, you can better contextualize, prioritize, and act on your security findings.
  • Dashboard enhancements — You can now filter and customize your dashboard views, and access a new set of widgets that we carefully chose to help reflect the modern cloud security threat landscape and relate to potential threats and vulnerabilities in your AWS cloud environment. This improvement makes it simpler for you to focus on risks that require your attention, providing a more comprehensive view of your cloud security.

We added three new capabilities for Amazon Detective in addition to Amazon Detective finding group summaries to simplify the security investigation process:

We introduced AWS Secrets Manager batch retrieval of secrets to identify and retrieve a group of secrets for your application at once with a single API call. The new API, BatchGetSecretValue, provides greater simplicity for common developer workflows, especially when you need to incorporate multiple secrets into your application.

We worked closely with AWS Partners to create offerings that make it simpler for you to protect your cloud workloads:

  • AWS Built-in Competency — AWS Built-in Competency Partner solutions help minimize the time it takes for you to figure out the best AWS services to adopt, regardless of use case or category.
  • AWS Cyber Insurance Competency — AWS has worked with leading cyber insurance partners to help simplify the process of obtaining cyber insurance. This makes it simpler for you to find affordable insurance policies from AWS Partners that integrate their security posture assessment through a user-friendly customer experience with Security Hub.

Experience content on demand

If you weren’t able to join in person or you want to watch a session again, you can see the many sessions that are available on demand.

Keynotes, innovation talks, and leadership sessions

Catch the AWS re:Invent 2023 keynote where AWS chief executive officer Adam Selipsky shares his perspective on cloud transformation and provides an exclusive first look at AWS innovations in generative AI, machine learning, data, and infrastructure advancements. You can also replay the other AWS re:Invent 2023 keynotes.

The security landscape is evolving as organizations adapt and embrace new technologies. In this talk, discover the AWS vision for security that drives business agility. Stream the innovation talk from Amazon chief security officer, Steve Schmidt, and AWS chief information security officer, Chris Betz, to learn their insights on key topics such as Zero Trust, builder security experience, and generative AI.

At AWS, we work closely with customers to understand their requirements for their critical workloads. Our work with the Singapore Government’s Smart Nation and Digital Government Group (SNDGG) to build a Smart Nation for their citizens and businesses illustrates this approach. Watch the leadership session with Max Peterson, vice president of Sovereign Cloud at AWS, and Chan Cheow Hoe, government chief digital technology officer of Singapore, as they share how AWS is helping Singapore advance on its cloud journey to build a Smart Nation.

Breakout sessions and new launch talks

Stream breakout sessions and new launch talks on demand to learn about the following topics:

  • Discover how AWS, customers, and partners work together to raise their security posture with AWS infrastructure and services.
  • Learn about trends in identity and access management, detection and response, network and infrastructure security, data protection and privacy, and governance, risk, and compliance.
  • Dive into our launches! Learn about the latest announcements from security experts, and uncover how new services and solutions can help you meet core security and compliance requirements.

Consider joining us for more in-person security learning opportunities by saving the date for AWS re:Inforce 2024, which will occur June 10-12 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We look forward to seeing you there!

If you’d like to discuss how these new announcements can help your organization improve its security posture, AWS is here to help. Contact your AWS account team today.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Nisha Amthul

Nisha Amthul

Nisha is a Senior Product Marketing Manager at AWS Security, specializing in detection and response solutions. She has a strong foundation in product management and product marketing within the domains of information security and data protection. When not at work, you’ll find her cake decorating, strength training, and chasing after her two energetic kiddos, embracing the joys of motherhood.

Author

Himanshu Verma

Himanshu is a Worldwide Specialist for AWS Security Services. He leads the go-to-market creation and execution for AWS security services, field enablement, and strategic customer advisement. Previously, he held leadership roles in product management, engineering, and development, working on various identity, information security, and data protection technologies. He loves brainstorming disruptive ideas, venturing outdoors, photography, and trying new restaurants.

Author

Marshall Jones

Marshall is a Worldwide Security Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS. His background is in AWS consulting and security architecture, focused on a variety of security domains including edge, threat detection, and compliance. Today, he is focused on helping enterprise AWS customers adopt and operationalize AWS security services to increase security effectiveness and reduce risk.

2023 PiTuKri ISAE 3000 Type II attestation report available with 171 services in scope

Post Syndicated from Tariro Dongo original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/2023-pitukri-isae-3000-type-ii-attestation-report-available-with-171-services-in-scope/

Amazon Web Services (AWS) is pleased to announce the issuance of the Criteria to Assess the Information Security of Cloud Services (PiTuKri) International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 Type II attestation report. The scope of the report covers a total of 171 services and 29 global AWS Regions.

The Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (Traficom) Cyber Security Centre published PiTuKri, which consists of 52 criteria that provide guidance when assessing the security of cloud service providers. The criteria are organized into the following 11 subdivisions:

  • Framework conditions
  • Security management
  • Personnel security
  • Physical security
  • Communications security
  • Identity and access management
  • Information system security
  • Encryption
  • Operations security
  • Transferability and compatibility
  • Change management and system development

The report includes 17 additional services in scope, for a total of 171 services. See the full list on our Services in Scope by Compliance Program page.

The following are the 17 additional services now in scope for the 2023 Pitukri report:

Five additional AWS Regions have been added to the scope, for a total of 29 Regions. The following are the five additional Regions now in scope:

  • Australia: Asia Pacific (Melbourne) (ap-southeast-4)
  • India: Asia Pacific (Hyderabad) (ap-south-2)
  • Spain: Europe (Spain) (eu-south-2)
  • Switzerland: Europe (Zurich) (eu-central-2)
  • United Arab Emirates: Middle East (UAE) (me-central-1)

The latest report covers the period from October 1, 2022, to September 30, 2023. An independent third-party audit firm issued the report to assure customers that the AWS control environment is appropriately designed and implemented for support of adherence with PiTuKri requirements. This attestation demonstrates the AWS commitment to meet security expectations for cloud service providers set by Traficom.

Customers can find the full PiTuKri ISAE 3000 report on AWS Artifact. To learn more about the complete list of certified services and Regions, see AWS Compliance Programs and AWS Services in Scope for PiTuKri.

AWS strives to continuously bring new services into the scope of its compliance programs to help you meet your architectural and regulatory needs. Contact your AWS account team for questions about the PiTuKri report.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Tariro Dongo

Tariro Dongo

Tariro is a Security Assurance Program Manager at AWS, based in London. Tari is responsible for third-party and customer audits, attestations, certifications, and assessments across EMEA. Previously, Tari worked in security assurance and technology risk in the big four and financial services industry over the last 12 years.

How to build a unified authorization layer for identity providers with Amazon Verified Permissions

Post Syndicated from Akash Kumar original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-build-a-unified-authorization-layer-for-identity-providers-with-amazon-verified-permissions/

Enterprises often have an identity provider (IdP) for their employees and another for their customers. Using multiple IdPs allows you to apply different access controls and policies for employees and for customers. However, managing multiple identity systems can be complex. A unified authorization layer can ease administration by centralizing access policies for APIs regardless of the user’s IdP. The authorization layer evaluates access tokens from any authorized IdP before allowing API access. This removes authorization logic from the APIs and simplifies specifying organization-wide policies. Potential drawbacks include additional complexity in the authorization layer. However, simplifying the management of policies reduces cost of ownership and the likelihood of errors.

Consider a veterinary clinic that has an IdP for their employees. Their clients, the pet owners, would have a separate IdP. Employees might have different sign-in requirements than the clients. These requirements could include features such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) or additional auditing functionality. Applying identical access controls for clients may not be desirable. The clinic’s scheduling application would manage access from both the clinic employees and pet owners. By implementing a unified authorization layer, the scheduling app doesn’t need to be aware of the different IdPs or tokens. The authorization layer handles evaluating tokens and applying policies, such as allowing the clinic employees full access to appointment data while limiting pet owners to just their pet’s records. In this post, we show you an architecture for this situation that demonstrates how to build a unified authorization layer using multiple Amazon Cognito user pools, Amazon Verified Permissions, and an AWS Lambda authorizer for Amazon API Gateway-backed APIs.

In the architecture, API Gateway exposes APIs to provide access to backend resources. API Gateway is a fully-managed service that allows developers to build APIs that act as an entry point for applications. To integrate API Gateway with multiple IdPs, you can use a Lambda authorizer to control access to the API. The IdP in this architecture is Amazon Cognito, which provides the authentication function for users before they’re authorized by Verified Permissions, which implements fine-grained authorization on resources in an application. Keep in mind that Verified Permissions has limits on policy sizes and requests per second. Large deployments might require a different policy store or a caching layer. The four services work together to combine multiple IdPs into a unified authorization layer. The architecture isn’t limited to the Cognito IdP — third-party IdPs that generate JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) can be used, including combinations of different IdPs.

Architecture overview

This sample architecture relies on user-pool multi-tenancy for user authentication. It uses Cognito user pools to assign authenticated users a set of temporary and least-privilege credentials for application access. Once users are authenticated, they are authorized to access backend functions via a Lambda Authorizer function. This function interfaces with Verified Permissions to apply the appropriate access policy based on user attributes.

This sample architecture is based on the scenario of an application that has two sets of users: an internal set of users, veterinarians, as well as an external set of users, clients, with each group having specific access to the API. Figure 1 shows the user request flow.

Figure 1: User request flow

Figure 1: User request flow

Let’s go through the request flow to understand what happens at each step, as shown in Figure 1:

  1. There two groups of users — External (Clients) and Internal (Veterinarians). These user groups sign in through a web portal that authenticates against an IdP (Amazon Cognito).
  2. The groups attempt to access the get appointment API through API Gateway, along with their JWT tokens with claims and client ID.
  3. The Lambda authorizer validates the claims.

    Note: If Cognito is the IdP, then Verified Permissions can authorize the user from their JWT directly with the IsAuthorizedWithToken API.

  4. After validating the JWT token, the Lambda authorizer makes a query to Verified Permissions with associated policy information to check the request.
  5. API Gateway evaluates the policy that the Lambda authorizer returned, to allow or deny access to the resource.
  6. If allowed, API Gateway accesses the resource. If denied, API Gateway returns a 403 Forbidden error.

Note: To further optimize the Lambda authorizer, the authorization decision can be cached or disabled, depending on your needs. By enabling caching, you can improve the performance, because the authorization policy will be returned from the cache whenever there is a cache key match. To learn more, see Configure a Lambda authorizer using the API Gateway console.

Walkthrough

This walkthrough demonstrates the preceding scenario for an authorization layer supporting veterinarians and clients. Each set of users will have their own distinct Amazon Cognito user pool.

Verified Permissions policies associated with each Cognito pool enforce access controls. In the veterinarian pool, veterinarians are only allowed to access data for their own patients. Similarly, in the client pool, clients are only able to view and access their own data. This keeps data properly segmented and secured between veterinarians and clients.

Internal policy

permit (principal in UserGroup::"AllVeterinarians",
   action == Action::"GET/appointment",
   resource in UserGroup::"AllVeterinarians")
   when {principal == resource.Veterinarian };

External policy

permit (principal in UserGroup::"AllClients",
   action == Action::"GET/appointment",
   resource in UserGroup::"AllClients")
   when {principal == resource.owner};

The example internal and external policies, along with Cognito serving as an IdP, allow the veterinarian users to federate in to the application through one IdP, while the external clients must use another IdP. This, coupled with the associated authorization policies, allows you to create and customize fine-grained access policies for each user group.

To validate the access request with the policy store, the Lambda authorizer execution role also requires the verifiedpermissions:IsAuthorized action.

Although our example Verified Permissions policies are relatively simple, Cedar policy language is extensive and allows you to define custom rules for your business needs. For example, you could develop a policy that allows veterinarians to access client records only during the day of the client’s appointment.

Implement the sample architecture

The architecture is based on a user-pool multi-tenancy for user authentication. It uses Amazon Cognito user pools to assign authenticated users a set of temporary and least privilege credentials for application access. After users are authenticated, they are authorized to access APIs through a Lambda function. This function interfaces with Verified Permissions to apply the appropriate access policy based on user attributes.

Prerequisites

You need the following prerequisites:

  • The AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) installed and configured for use.
  • Python 3.9 or later, to package Python code for Lambda.

    Note: We recommend that you use a virtual environment or virtualenvwrapper to isolate the sample from the rest of your Python environment.

  • An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role or user with enough permissions to create an Amazon Cognito user pool, IAM role, Lambda function, IAM policy, and API Gateway instance.
  • jq for JSON processing in bash script.

    To install on Ubuntu/Debian, use the following command:

    sudo apt-get install jq

    To install on Mac with Homebrew, using the following command:

    brew install jq

  • The GitHub repository for the sample. You can download it, or you can use the following Git command to download it from your terminal.

    Note: This sample code should be used to test the solution and is not intended to be used in a production account.

    $ git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/amazon-cognito-avp-apigateway.git
    $ cd amazon-cognito-avp-apigateway

To implement this reference architecture, you will use the following services:

  • Amazon Verified Permissions is a service that helps you implement and enforce fine-grained authorization on resources within the applications that you build and deploy, such as HR systems and banking applications.
  • Amazon API Gateway is a fully managed service that developers can use to create, publish, maintain, monitor, and secure APIs at any scale.
  • AWS Lambda is a serverless compute service that lets you run code without provisioning or managing servers, creating workload-aware cluster scaling logic, maintaining event integrations, or managing runtimes.
  • Amazon Cognito provides an identity store that scales to millions of users, supports social and enterprise identity federation, and offers advanced security features to protect your consumers and business.

Note: We tested this architecture in the us-east-1 AWS Region. Before you select a Region, verify that the necessary services — Amazon Verified Permissions, Amazon Cognito, API Gateway, and Lambda — are available in those Regions.

Deploy the sample architecture

From within the directory where you downloaded the sample code from GitHub, first run the following command to package the Lambda functions. Then run the next command to generate a random Cognito user password and create the resources described in the previous section.

Note: In this case, you’re generating a random user password for demonstration purposes. Follow best practices for user passwords in production implementations.

$ bash ./helper.sh package-lambda-functions
 …
Successfully completed packaging files.
$ bash ./helper.sh cf-create-stack-gen-password
 …
Successfully created CloudFormation stack.

Validate Cognito user creation

Run the following commands to open the Cognito UI in your browser and then sign in with your credentials. This validates that the previous commands created Cognito users successfully.

Note: When you run the commands, they return the username and password that you should use to sign in.

For internal user pool domain users

$ bash ./helper.sh open-cognito-internal-domain-ui
 Opening Cognito UI...
 URL: xxxxxxxxx
 Please use following credentials to login:
 Username: cognitouser
 Password: xxxxxxxx

For external user pool domain users

$ bash ./helper.sh open-cognito-external-domain-ui
 Opening Cognito UI...
 URL: xxxxxxxxx
 Please use following credentials to login:
 Username: cognitouser
 Password: xxxxxxxx

Validate Cognito JWT upon sign in

Because you haven’t installed a web application that would respond to the redirect request, Cognito will redirect to localhost, which might look like an error. The key aspect is that after a successful sign-in, there is a URL similar to the following in the navigation bar of your browser.

http://localhost/#id_token=eyJraWQiOiJicVhMYWFlaTl4aUhzTnY3W...

Test the API configuration

Before you protect the API with Cognito so that only authorized users can access it, let’s verify that the configuration is correct and API Gateway serves the API. The following command makes a curl request to API Gateway to retrieve data from the API service.

$ bash ./helper.sh curl-api

API to check the appointment details of PI-T123
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123
Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T123", "name": "Dave", "Pet": "Onyx - Dog. 2y 3m", "Phone Number": "+1234567", "Visit History": "Patient History from last visit with primary vet", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Jane"}}

API to check the appointment details of PI-T124
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T124
Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T124", "name": "Joy", "Pet": "Jelly - Dog. 6y 2m", "Phone Number": "+1368728", "Visit History": "None", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Jane"}}

API to check the appointment details of PI-T125
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T125
Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T125", "name": "Dave", "Pet": "Sassy - Cat. 1y", "Phone Number": "+1398777", "Visit History": "Patient History from last visit with primary vet", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Adam"}}

Protect the API

In the next step, you deploy a Verified Permissions policy store and a Lambda authorizer. The policy store contains the policies for user authorization. The Lambda authorizer verifies users’ access tokens and authorizes the users through Verified Permissions.

Update and create resources

Run the following command to update existing resources and create a Lambda authorizer and Verified Permissions policy store.

$ bash ./helper.sh cf-update-stack
 Successfully updated CloudFormation stack.

Test the custom authorizer setup

Begin your testing with the following request, which doesn’t include an access token.

Note: Wait for a few minutes to allow API Gateway to deploy before you run the following commands.

$ bash ./helper.sh curl-api
API to check the appointment details of PI-T123
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123
Response: 
{"message":"Unauthorized"}

API to check the appointment details of PI-T124
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T124
Response: 
{"message":"Unauthorized"}

API to check the appointment details of PI-T125
URL: https://epgst74zff.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T125
Response: 
{"message":"Unauthorized"}

The architecture denied the request with the message “Unauthorized.” At this point, API Gateway expects a header named Authorization (case sensitive) in the request. If there’s no authorization header, API Gateway denies the request before it reaches the Lambda authorizer. This is a way to filter out requests that don’t include required information.

Use the following command for the next test. In this test, you pass the required header, but the token is invalid because it wasn’t issued by Cognito and is instead a simple JWT-format token stored in ./helper.sh. To learn more about how to decode and validate a JWT, see Decode and verify a Cognito JSON token.

$ bash ./helper.sh curl-api-invalid-token
 {"Message":"User is not authorized to access this resource"}

This time the message is different. The Lambda authorizer received the request and identified the token as invalid and responded with the message “User is not authorized to access this resource.”

To make a successful request to the protected API, your code must perform the following steps:

  1. Use a user name and password to authenticate against your Cognito user pool.
  2. Acquire the tokens (ID token, access token, and refresh token).
  3. Make an HTTPS (TLS) request to API Gateway and pass the access token in the headers.

To finish testing, programmatically sign in to the Cognito UI, acquire a valid access token, and make a request to API Gateway. Run the following commands to call the protected internal and external APIs.

$ ./helper.sh curl-protected-internal-user-api

Getting API URL, Cognito Usernames, Cognito Users Password and Cognito ClientId...
User: Jane
Password: Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T123
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T123", "name": "Dave", "Pet": "Onyx - Dog. 2y 3m", "Phone Number": "+1234567", "Visit History": "Patient History from last visit with primary vet", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Jane"}}

User: Adam
Password: Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T123
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"Message":"User is not authorized to access this resource"}

User: Adam
Password: Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T125
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T125

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T125", "name": "Dave", "Pet": "Sassy - Cat. 1y", "Phone Number": "+1398777", "Visit History": "Patient History from last visit with primary vet", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Adam"}}

Now calling external userpool users for accessing request

$ ./helper.sh curl-protected-external-user-api
User: Dave
Password: Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T123
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T123", "name": "Dave", "Pet": "Onyx - Dog. 2y 3m", "Phone Number": "+1234567", "Visit History": "Patient History from last visit with primary vet", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Jane"}}

User: Joy
Password Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T123
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T123

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"Message":"User is not authorized to access this resource"}

User: Joy
Password Pa%%word-2023-04-17-17-11-32
Resource: PI-T124
URL: https://16qyz501mg.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/appointment/PI-T124

Authenticating to get access_token...
Access Token: eyJraWQiOiJIaVRvckxxxxxxxxxx6BfCBKASA

Response: 
{"appointment": {"id": "PI-T124", "name": "Joy", "Pet": "Jelly - Dog. 6y 2m", "Phone Number": "+1368728", "Visit History": "None", "Assigned Veterinarian": "Jane"}}

This time, you receive a response with data from the API service. Let’s recap the steps that the example code performed:

  1. The Lambda authorizer validates the access token.
  2. The Lambda authorizer uses Verified Permissions to evaluate the user’s requested actions against the policy store.
  3. The Lambda authorizer passes the IAM policy back to API Gateway.
  4. API Gateway evaluates the IAM policy, and the final effect is an allow.
  5. API Gateway forwards the request to Lambda.
  6. Lambda returns the response.

In each of the tests, internal and external, the architecture denied the request because the Verified Permissions policies denied access to the user. In the internal user pool, the policies only allow veterinarians to see their own patients’ data. Similarly, in the external user pool, the policies only allow clients to see their own data.

Clean up resources

Run the following command to delete the deployed resources and clean up.

$ bash ./helper.sh cf-delete-stack

Additional information

Verified Permissions is integrated with AWS CloudTrail, a service that provides a record of actions taken by a user, role, or AWS service in Verified Permissions. CloudTrail captures API calls for Verified Permissions as events. You can choose to capture actions performed on a Verified Permissions policy store by the Lambda authorizer. Verified Permissions logs can also be injected into your security information and event management (SEIM) solution for security analysis and compliance. For information about API call quotas, see Quotas for Amazon Verified Permission.

Conclusion

In this post, we demonstrated how you can use multiple Amazon Cognito user pools alongside Amazon Verified Permissions to build a single access layer to APIs. We used Cognito in this example, but you could implement the solution with another third-party IdP instead. As a next step, explore the Cedar playground to test policies that can be used with Verified Permissions, or expand this solution by integrating a third-party IdP.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Akash Kumar

Akash is a Senior Lead Consultant at AWS, based in India. He works with customers for application development, security, and DevOps to modernize and re-architect their workloads to the AWS Cloud. His passion is building innovative solutions and automating infrastructure, enabling customers to focus more on their businesses.

Brett Seib

Brett Seib

Brett is a Senior Solutions Architect, based in Austin, Texas. He is passionate about innovating and using technology to solve business challenges for customers. Brett has several years of experience in the enterprise, Internet of Things (IoT), and data analytics industries, accelerating customer business outcomes.

John Thach

John Thach

John is a Technical Account Manager, based in Houston, Texas. He focuses on enabling customers to implement resilient, secure, and cost-effective solutions by using AWS services. He is passionate about helping customers solve unique challenges through their cloud journeys.

AWS completes the first cloud audit by the Ingelheim Kreis Initiative Joint Audits group for the pharmaceutical and life sciences sector

Post Syndicated from Janice Leung original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-completes-the-first-cloud-audit-by-the-ingelheim-kreis-initiative-joint-audits-group-for-the-pharmaceutical-and-life-sciences-sector/

We’re excited to announce that Amazon Web Services (AWS) has completed the first cloud service provider (CSP) audit by the Ingelheim Kreis (IK) Initiative Joint Audits group. The audit group represents quality and compliance professionals from some of our largest pharmaceutical and life sciences customers who collectively perform audits on their key suppliers.

As customers embrace the scalability and flexibility of AWS, we’re helping them evolve security, identity, and compliance into key business enablers. At AWS, we’re obsessed with earning and maintaining customer trust. We work hard to provide our pharmaceutical and life sciences customers and their regulatory bodies with the assurance that AWS has the necessary controls in place to help protect their most sensitive data and regulated workloads.

Our collaboration with the IK Joint Audits Group to complete the first CSP audit is a good example of how we support your risk management and regulatory efforts. Regulated pharmaceutical and life sciences customers are required by GxP to employ a risk-based approach to design, develop, and maintain computerized systems. GxP is a collection of quality guidelines and regulations that are designed to ensure safe development and manufacturing of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, biologic, and other food and medical products. Currently, no specific certifications for GxP compliance exist for CSPs. Pharmaceutical companies must do their own supplier assessment to determine the adequacy of their development and support processes.

The joint audit thoroughly assessed the AWS controls that are designed to protect your data and material workloads and help satisfy your regulatory requirements. As more pharmaceutical and life sciences companies use cloud technology for their operations, the industry is experiencing greater regulatory oversight. Because the joint audit of independent auditors represented a group of companies, both AWS and our customers were able to streamline common controls and increase transparency, and use audit resources more efficiently to help decrease the organizational burden on both the companies and the supplier (in this case, AWS).

Audit results

The IK audit results provide IK members with assurance regarding the AWS controls environment, enabling members to work to remove compliance blockers, accelerate their adoption of AWS services, and obtain confidence and trust in the security controls of AWS.

As stated by the IK auditors, “…in the course of the Audit it became obvious that AWS within their service development, their data center operation and with their employees acts highly professional with a clear customer focus. The amount of control that AWS implemented and continuously extends exceeds our expectations of a qualified CSP”.

The report is confidential and only available to IK members who signed the NDA with AWS prior to the start of the audit in 2023. Members can access the report and assess their own residual risk. To participate in a future audit cycle, contact [email protected].

To learn more about our commitment to safeguard customer data, see AWS Cloud Security. For more information about the robust controls that are in place at AWS, see the AWS Compliance Program page. By integrating governance-focused, audit-friendly service features with applicable compliance or audit standards, AWS Compliance helps you set up and operate in an AWS control environment. Customers can also access AWS Artifact to download other compliance reports that independent auditors have evaluated.

Further reading

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Janice Leung

Janice is a Security Assurance Program Manager at AWS, based in New York. She leads various audit programs for industry including the automobile, healthcare, and telecommunications sectors across Europe. She previously worked in security assurance and technology risk management in the financial industry for 10 years.

Ian Sutcliffe

Ian Sutcliffe

Ian is a Global Solution Architect with more than 30 years of experience in IT, primarily in the life sciences industry. A thought leader in the area of regulated cloud computing, one of his areas of focus is IT operating model and process optimization and automation with the intent of helping customers become regulated cloud natives.

Senthil Gurumoorthi

Senthil Gurumoorthi

Senthil is the Principal, Global Security Assurance Lead- HCLS at AWS. He has over 20 years of experience in global biopharmaceutical healthcare and life sciences business technologies with leadership expertise in technology delivery, risk, security, health authority inspection, audits, and quality management. He is an experienced speaker, panelist, and moderator on HCLS security, quality, and compliance topics.

Latest PCI DSS v4.0 compliance package available in AWS Artifact

Post Syndicated from Nivetha Chandran original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/latest-pci-dss-v4-0-compliance-package-available-in-aws-artifact/

Amazon Web Services is pleased to announce that eight additional AWS services have been added to the scope of our Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v4.0 certification:

Coalfire, a third-party Qualified Security Assessor (QSA), evaluated AWS. For the full list of services in scope, see AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program.

Customers can access the PCI DSS package in AWS Artifact. The package includes the following:

  • Attestation of Compliance (AoC) — shows that AWS has been successfully validated against the PCI DSS standard.
  • AWS Responsibility Summary – provides information to help you effectively manage a PCI cardholder environment on AWS and better understand your responsibility regarding operating controls to effectively develop and operate a secure environment on AWS.

To learn more about our PCI program and other compliance and security programs, see the AWS Compliance Programs page. As always, we value your feedback and questions; reach out to the AWS Compliance team through the Contact Us page.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Nivetha Chandran

Nivetha is a Security Assurance Manager at Amazon Web Services. She leads multiple security and compliance initiatives within AWS. Nivetha has over ten years of experience in security assurance and holds a Master’s degree in Information Management from the University of Washington.

How to use AWS Database Encryption SDK for client-side encryption and perform searches on encrypted attributes in DynamoDB tables

Post Syndicated from Samit Kumbhani original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-aws-database-encryption-sdk-for-client-side-encryption-and-perform-searches-on-encrypted-attributes-in-dynamodb-tables/

Today’s applications collect a lot of data from customers. The data often includes personally identifiable information (PII), that must be protected in compliance with data privacy laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). Modern business applications require fast and reliable access to customer data, and Amazon DynamoDB is an ideal choice for high-performance applications at scale. While server-side encryption options exist to safeguard customer data, developers can also add client-side encryption to further enhance the security of their customer’s data.

In this blog post, we show you how the AWS Database Encryption SDK (DB-ESDK) – an upgrade to the DynamoDB Encryption Client – provides client-side encryption to protect sensitive data in transit and at rest. At its core, the DB-ESDK is a record encryptor that encrypts, signs, verifies, and decrypts the records in DynamoDB table. You can also use DB-ESDK to search on encrypted records and retrieve data, thereby alleviating the need to download and decrypt your entire dataset locally. In this blog, we demonstrate how to use DB-ESDK to build application code to perform client-side encryption of sensitive data within your application before transmitting and storing it in DynamoDB and then retrieve data by searching on encrypted fields.

Client-side encryption

For protecting data at rest, many AWS services integrate with AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS). When you use server-side encryption, your plaintext data is encrypted in transit over an HTTPS connection, decrypted at the service endpoint, and then re-encrypted by the service before being stored. Client-side encryption is the act of encrypting your data locally to help ensure its security in transit and at rest. When using client-side encryption, you encrypt the plaintext data from the source (for example, your application) before you transmit the data to an AWS service. This verifies that only the authorized users with the right permission to the encryption key can decrypt the ciphertext data. Because data is encrypted inside an environment that you control, it is not exposed to a third party, including AWS.

While client-side encryption can be used to improve overall security posture, it introduces additional complexity on the application, including managing keys and securely executing cryptographic tasks. Furthermore, client-side encryption often results in reduced portability of the data. After data is encrypted and written to the database, it’s generally not possible to perform additional tasks such as creating index on the data or search directly on the encrypted records without first decrypting it locally. In the next section, you’ll see how you can address these issues by using the AWS Database Encryption SDK (DB-ESDK)—to implement client-side encryption in your DynamoDB workloads and perform searches.

AWS Database Encryption SDK

DB-ESDK can be used to encrypt sensitive attributes such as those containing PII attributes before storing them in your DynamoDB table. This enables your application to help protect sensitive data in transit and at rest, because data cannot be exposed unless decrypted by your application. You can also use DB-ESDK to find information by searching on encrypted attributes while your data remains securely encrypted within the database.

In regards to key management, DB-ESDK gives you direct control over the data by letting you supply your own encryption key. If you’re using AWS KMS, you can use key policies to enforce clear separation between the authorized users who can access specific encrypted data and those who cannot. If your application requires storing multiple tenant’s data in single table, DB-ESDK supports configuring distinct key for each of those tenants to ensure data protection. Follow this link to view how searchable encryption works for multiple tenant databases.

While DB-ESDK provides many features to help you encrypt data in your database, in this blog post, we focus on demonstrating the ability to search on encrypted data.

How the AWS Database Encryption SDK works with DynamoDB

Figure 1: DB-ESDK overview

Figure 1: DB-ESDK overview

As illustrated in Figure 1, there are several steps that you must complete before you can start using the AWS Database Encryption SDK. First, you need to set up your cryptographic material provider library (MPL), which provides you with the lower level abstraction layer for managing cryptographic materials (that is, keyrings and wrapping keys) used for encryption and decryption. The MPL provides integration with AWS KMS as your keyring and allows you to use a symmetric KMS key as your wrapping key. When data needs to be encrypted, DB-ESDK uses envelope encryption and asks the keyring for encryption material. The material consists of a plaintext data key and an encrypted data key, which is encrypted with the wrapping key. DB-ESDK uses the plaintext data key to encrypt the data and stores the ciphertext data key with the encrypted data. This process is reversed for decryption.

The AWS KMS hierarchical keyring goes one step further by introducing a branch key between the wrapping keys and data keys. Because the branch key is cached, it reduces the number of network calls to AWS KMS, providing performance and cost benefits. The hierarchical keyring uses a separate DynamoDB table is referred as the keystore table that must be created in advance. The mapping of wrapping keys to branch keys to data keys is handled automatically by the MPL.

Next, you need to set up the main DynamoDB table for your application. The Java version of DB-ESDK for DynamoDB provides attribute level actions to let you define which attribute should be encrypted. To allow your application to search on encrypted attribute values, you also must configure beacons, which are truncated hashes of plaintext value that create a map between the plaintext and encrypted value and are used to perform the search. These configuration steps are done once for each DynamoDB table. When using beacons, there are tradeoffs between how efficient your queries are and how much information is indirectly revealed about the distribution of your data. You should understand the tradeoff between security and performance before deciding if beacons are right for your use case.

After the MPL and DynamoDB table are set up, you’re ready to use DB-ESDK to perform client-side encryption. To better understand the preceding steps, let’s dive deeper into an example of how this all comes together to insert data and perform searches on a DynamoDB table.

AWS Database Encryption SDK in action

Let’s review the process of setting up DB-ESDK and see it in action. For the purposes of this blog post, let’s build a simple application to add records and performs searches.

The following is a sample plaintext record that’s received by the application:

{
"order_id": "ABC-10001",
“order_time”: “1672531500”,
“email”: "[email protected]",
"first_name": "John",
"last_name": "Doe",
"last4_creditcard": "4567"
"expiry_date": 082026
}

Prerequisite: For client side encryption to work, set up the integrated development environment (IDE) of your choice or set up AWS Cloud9.

Note: To focus on DB-ESDK capabilities, the following instructions omit basic configuration details for DynamoDB and AWS KMS.

Configure DB-ESDK cryptography

As mentioned previously, you must set up the MPL. For this example, you use an AWS KMS hierarchical keyring.

  1. Create KMS key: Create the wrapping key for your keyring. To do this, create a symmetric KMS key using the AWS Management Console or the API.
  2. Create keystore table: Create a DynamoDB table to serve as a keystore to hold the branch keys. The logical keystore name is cryptographically bound to the data stored in the keystore table. The logical keystore name can be the same as your DynamoDB table name, but it doesn’t have to be.
    private static void keyStoreCreateTable(String keyStoreTableName,
                                           String logicalKeyStoreName,
                                           String kmsKeyArn) {
        
        final KeyStore keystore = KeyStore.builder().KeyStoreConfig(
                KeyStoreConfig.builder()
                        .ddbClient(DynamoDbClient.create())
                        .ddbTableName(keyStoreTableName)
                        .logicalKeyStoreName(logicalKeyStoreName)
                        .kmsClient(KmsClient.create())
                        .kmsConfiguration(KMSConfiguration.builder()
                                .kmsKeyArn(kmsKeyArn)
                                .build())
                        .build()).build();
    
        
          keystore.CreateKeyStore(CreateKeyStoreInput.builder().build());
        // It may take a couple minutes for the table to reflect ACTIVE state
    }

  3. Create keystore keys: This operation generates the active branch key and beacon key using the KMS key from step 1 and stores it in the keystore table. The branch and beacon keys will be used by DB-ESDK for encrypting attributes and generating beacons.
    private static String keyStoreCreateKey(String keyStoreTableName,
                                             String logicalKeyStoreName,
                                             String kmsKeyArn) {
       
          final KeyStore keystore = KeyStore.builder().KeyStoreConfig(
                  KeyStoreConfig.builder()
                          .ddbClient(DynamoDbClient.create())
                          .ddbTableName(keyStoreTableName)
                          .logicalKeyStoreName(logicalKeyStoreName)
                          .kmsClient(KmsClient.create())
                          .kmsConfiguration(KMSConfiguration.builder()
                              .kmsKeyArn(kmsKeyArn)
                              .build())
                          .build()).build();
        
          final String branchKeyId = keystore.CreateKey(CreateKeyInput.builder().build()).branchKeyIdentifier();
          return branchKeyId;
      }

At this point, the one-time set up to configure the cryptography material is complete.

Set up a DynamoDB table and beacons

The second step is to set up your DynamoDB table for client-side encryption. In this step, define the attributes that you want to encrypt, define beacons to enable search on encrypted data, and set up the index to query the data. For this example, use the Java client-side encryption library for DynamoDB.

  1. Define DynamoDB table: Define the table schema and the attributes to be encrypted. For this blog post, lets define the schema based on the sample record that was shared previously. To do that, create a DynamoDB table called OrderInfo with order_id as the partition key and order_time as the sort key.

    DB-ESDK provides the following options to define the sensitivity level for each field. Define sensitivity level for each of the attributes based on your use case.

    • ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN: Encrypts and signs the attributes in each record using a unique encryption key. Choose this option for attributes with data you want to encrypt.
    • SIGN_ONLY: Adds a digital signature to verify the authenticity of your data. Choose this option for attributes that you would like to protect from being altered. The partition and sort key should always be set as SIGN_ONLY.
    • DO_NOTHING: Does not encrypt or sign the contents of the field and stores the data as-is. Only choose this option if the field doesn’t contain sensitive data and doesn’t need to be authenticated with the rest of your data. In this example, the partition key and sort key will be defined as “Sign_Only” attributes. All additional table attributes will be defined as “Encrypt and Sign”: email, firstname, lastname, last4creditcard and expirydate.
      private static DynamoDbClient configDDBTable(String ddbTableName, 
                                            IKeyring kmsKeyring, 
                                            List<BeaconVersion> beaconVersions){
      
          // Partition and Sort keys must be SIGN_ONLY
           
          final Map<String, CryptoAction> attributeActionsOnEncrypt = new HashMap<>();
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("order_id", CryptoAction.SIGN_ONLY);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("order_time", CryptoAction.SIGN_ONLY);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("email", CryptoAction.ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("firstname", CryptoAction.ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("lastname", CryptoAction.ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("last4creditcard", CryptoAction.ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN);
          attributeActionsOnEncrypt.put("expirydate", CryptoAction.ENCRYPT_AND_SIGN);
      
      
          final Map<String, DynamoDbTableEncryptionConfig> tableConfigs = new HashMap<>();
          final DynamoDbTableEncryptionConfig config = DynamoDbTableEncryptionConfig.builder()
                  .logicalTableName(ddbTableName)
                  .partitionKeyName("order_id")
                  .sortKeyName("order_time")
                  .attributeActionsOnEncrypt(attributeActionsOnEncrypt)
                  .keyring(kmsKeyring)
                  .search(SearchConfig.builder()
                          .writeVersion(1) // MUST be 1
                          .versions(beaconVersions)
                          .build())
                  .build();
          tableConfigs.put(ddbTableName, config);
      
          // Create the DynamoDb Encryption Interceptor
          DynamoDbEncryptionInterceptor encryptionInterceptor = DynamoDbEncryptionInterceptor.builder()
                  .config(DynamoDbTablesEncryptionConfig.builder()
                          .tableEncryptionConfigs(tableConfigs)
                          .build())
                  .build();
      
          // Create a new AWS SDK DynamoDb client using the DynamoDb Encryption Interceptor above
          final DynamoDbClient ddb = DynamoDbClient.builder()
                  .overrideConfiguration(
                          ClientOverrideConfiguration.builder()
                                  .addExecutionInterceptor(encryptionInterceptor)
                                  .build())
                  .build();
          return ddb;
      }

  2. Configure beacons: Beacons allow searches on encrypted fields by creating a mapping between the plaintext value of a field and the encrypted value that’s stored in your database. Beacons are generated by DB-ESDK when the data is being encrypted and written by your application. Beacons are stored in your DynamoDB table along with your encrypted data in fields labelled with the prefix aws_dbe_b_.

    It’s important to note that beacons are designed to be implemented in new, unpopulated tables only. If configured on existing tables, beacons will only map to new records that are written and the older records will not have the values populated. There are two types of beacons – standard and compound. The type of beacon you configure determines the type of queries you are able to perform. You should select the type of beacon based on your queries and access patterns:

    • Standard beacons: This beacon type supports querying a single source field using equality operations such as equals and not-equals. It also allows you to query a virtual (conceptual) field by concatenating one or more source fields.
    • Compound beacons: This beacon type supports querying a combination of encrypted and signed or signed-only fields and performs complex operations such as begins with, contains, between, and so on. For compound beacons, you must first build standard beacons on individual fields. Next, you need to create an encrypted part list using a unique prefix for each of the standard beacons. The prefix should be a short value and helps differentiate the individual fields, simplifying the querying process. And last, you build the compound beacon by concatenating the standard beacons that will be used for searching using a split character. Verify that the split character is unique and doesn’t appear in any of the source fields’ data that the compound beacon is constructed from.

    Along with identifying the right beacon type, each beacon must be configured with additional properties such as a unique name, source field, and beacon length. Continuing the previous example, let’s build beacon configurations for the two scenarios that will be demonstrated in this blog post.

    Scenario 1: Identify orders by exact match on the email address.

    In this scenario, search needs to be conducted on a singular attribute using equality operation.

    • Beacon type: Standard beacon.
    • Beacon name: The name can be the same as the encrypted field name, so let’s set it as email.
    • Beacon length: For this example, set the beacon length to 15. For your own uses cases, see Choosing a beacon length.

    Scenario 2: Identify orders using name (first name and last name) and credit card attributes (last four digits and expiry date).

    In this scenario, multiple attributes are required to conduct a search. To satisfy the use case, one option is to create individual compound beacons on name attributes and credit card attributes. However, the name attributes are considered correlated and, as mentioned in the beacon selection guidance, we should avoid building a compound beacon on such correlated fields. Instead in this scenario we will concatenate the attributes and build a virtual field on the name attributes

    • Beacon type: Compound beacon
    • Beacon Configuration:
      • Define a virtual field on firstname and lastname, and label it fullname.
      • Define standard beacons on each of the individual fields that will be used for searching: fullname, last4creditcard, and expirydate. Follow the guidelines for setting standard beacons as explained in Scenario 1.
      • For compound beacons, create an encrypted part list to concatenate the standard beacons with a unique prefix for each of the standard beacons. The prefix helps separate the individual fields. For this example, use C- for the last four digits of the credit card and E- for the expiry date.
      • Build the compound beacons using their respective encrypted part list and a unique split character. For this example, use ~ as the split character.
    • Beacon length: Set beacon length to 15.
    • Beacon Name: Set the compound beacon name as CardCompound.
    private static List<VirtualField> getVirtualField(){
        
        List<VirtualPart> virtualPartList = new ArrayList<>();
        VirtualPart firstnamePart = VirtualPart.builder()
            .loc("firstname")
            .build();
        VirtualPart lastnamePart = VirtualPart.builder()
            .loc("lastname")
            .build();
    
        virtualPartList.add(firstnamePart);
        virtualPartList.add(lastnamePart);
    
        VirtualField fullnameField = VirtualField.builder()
            .name("FullName")
            .parts(virtualPartList)
            .build();
    
        List<VirtualField> virtualFieldList = new ArrayList<>();
        
        virtualFieldList.add(fullnameField);
        return virtualFieldList;
       }
      
      private static List<StandardBeacon> getStandardBeacon(){
    
        List<StandardBeacon> standardBeaconList = new ArrayList<>();
        StandardBeacon emailBeacon = StandardBeacon
          .builder()
          .name("email")
          .length(15)
          .build();
        StandardBeacon last4creditcardBeacon = StandardBeacon
          .builder()
          .name("last4creditcard")
          .length(15)
          .build();
        StandardBeacon expirydateBeacon = StandardBeacon
          .builder()
          .name("expirydate")
          .length(15)
          .build();  
          
      // Virtual field
        StandardBeacon fullnameBeacon = StandardBeacon
          .builder()
          .name("FullName")
          .length(15)
          .build();  
       
        standardBeaconList.add(emailBeacon);
        standardBeaconList.add(fullnameBeacon);
        standardBeaconList.add(last4creditcardBeacon);
        standardBeaconList.add(expirydateBeacon);
        return standardBeaconList;
      }
    
    // Define compound beacon
      private static List<CompoundBeacon> getCompoundBeacon() {
         
       List<EncryptedPart> encryptedPartList_card = new ArrayList<>(); 
        EncryptedPart last4creditcardEncryptedPart = EncryptedPart
          .builder()
          .name("last4creditcard")
          .prefix("C-")
          .build();
          
        EncryptedPart expirydateEncryptedPart = EncryptedPart
          .builder()
          .name("expirydate")
          .prefix("E-")
          .build();  
          
        encryptedPartList_card.add(last4creditcardEncryptedPart);
        encryptedPartList_card.add(expirydateEncryptedPart);
    
        List<CompoundBeacon> compoundBeaconList = new ArrayList<>();
    
        CompoundBeacon CardCompoundBeacon = CompoundBeacon
          .builder()
          .name("CardCompound")
          .split("~")
          .encrypted(encryptedPartList_card)
          .build();      
    
        compoundBeaconList.add(CardCompoundBeacon);
        return compoundBeaconList;  }
    
    // Build the beacons
    private static List<BeaconVersion> getBeaconVersions(List<StandardBeacon> standardBeaconList, List<CompoundBeacon> compoundBeaconList, KeyStore keyStore, String branchKeyId){
        List<BeaconVersion> beaconVersions = new ArrayList<>();
        beaconVersions.add(
                BeaconVersion.builder()
                        .standardBeacons(standardBeaconList)
                        .compoundBeacons(compoundBeaconList)
                        .version(1) // MUST be 1
                        .keyStore(keyStore)
                        .keySource(BeaconKeySource.builder()
                                .single(SingleKeyStore.builder()
                                        .keyId(branchKeyId)
                                        .cacheTTL(6000)
                                        .build())
                                .build())
                        .build()
        );
        return beaconVersions;
    }

  3. Define index: Following DynamoDB best practices, secondary indexes are often essential to support query patterns. DB-ESDK performs searches on the encrypted fields by doing a look up on the fields with matching beacon values. Therefore, if you need to query an encrypted field, you must create an index on the corresponding beacon fields generated by the DB-ESDK library (attributes with prefix aws_dbe_b_), which will be used by your application for searches.

    For this step, you will manually create a global secondary index (GSI).

    Scenario 1: Create a GSI with aws_dbe_b_email as the partition key and leave the sort key empty. Set the index name as aws_dbe_b_email-index. This will allow searches using the email address attribute.

    Scenario 2: Create a GSI with aws_dbe_b_FullName as the partition key and aws_dbe_b_CardCompound as the sort key. Set the index name as aws_dbe_b_VirtualNameCardCompound-index. This will allow searching based on firstname, lastname, last four digits of the credit card, and the expiry date. At this point the required DynamoDB table setup is complete.

Set up the application to insert and query data

Now that the setup is complete, you can use the DB-ESDK from your application to insert new items into your DynamoDB table. DB-ESDK will automatically fetch the data key from the keyring, perform encryption locally, and then make the put call to DynamoDB. By using beacon fields, the application can perform searches on the encrypted fields.

  1. Keyring initialization: Initialize the AWS KMS hierarchical keyring.
    //Retrieve keystore object required for keyring initialization
    private static KeyStore getKeystore(
        String branchKeyDdbTableName,
        String logicalBranchKeyDdbTableName,
        String branchKeyWrappingKmsKeyArn
      ) {
        KeyStore keyStore = KeyStore
          .builder()
          .KeyStoreConfig(
            KeyStoreConfig
              .builder()
              .kmsClient(KmsClient.create())
              .ddbClient(DynamoDbClient.create())
              .ddbTableName(branchKeyDdbTableName)
              .logicalKeyStoreName(logicalBranchKeyDdbTableName)
              .kmsConfiguration(
                KMSConfiguration
                  .builder()
                  .kmsKeyArn(branchKeyWrappingKmsKeyArn)
                  .build()
              )
              .build()
          )
          .build();
        return keyStore;
      }
    
    //Initialize keyring
    private static IKeyring getKeyRing(String branchKeyId, KeyStore keyStore){
        final MaterialProviders matProv = MaterialProviders.builder()
                .MaterialProvidersConfig(MaterialProvidersConfig.builder().build())
                .build();
        CreateAwsKmsHierarchicalKeyringInput keyringInput = CreateAwsKmsHierarchicalKeyringInput.builder()
                .branchKeyId(branchKeyId)
                .keyStore(keyStore)
                .ttlSeconds(60)
                .build();
        final IKeyring kmsKeyring = matProv.CreateAwsKmsHierarchicalKeyring(keyringInput);
      
        return kmsKeyring;
    }

  2. Insert source data: For illustration purpose, lets define a method to load sample data into the OrderInfo table. By using DB-ESDK, the application will encrypt data attributes as defined in the DynamoDB table configuration steps.
    // Insert Order Data
      private static void insertOrder(HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order, DynamoDbClient ddb, String ddbTableName) {
    
        final PutItemRequest putRequest = PutItemRequest.builder()
            .tableName(ddbTableName)
            .item(order)
            .build();
    
        final PutItemResponse putResponse = ddb.putItem(putRequest);
        assert 200 == putResponse.sdkHttpResponse().statusCode();
      }
      
        private static HashMap<String, AttributeValue> getOrder(
        String orderId,
        String orderTime,
        String firstName,
        String lastName,
        String email,
        String last4creditcard,
        String expirydate
      ) 
      {
        final HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order = new HashMap<>();
        order.put("order_id", AttributeValue.builder().s(orderId).build());
        order.put("order_time", AttributeValue.builder().s(orderTime).build());
        order.put("firstname", AttributeValue.builder().s(firstName).build());
        order.put("lastname", AttributeValue.builder().s(lastName).build());
        order.put("email", AttributeValue.builder().s(email).build());
        order.put("last4creditcard", AttributeValue.builder().s(last4creditcard).build());
        order.put("expirydate", AttributeValue.builder().s(expirydate).build());
    
        return order;
      }

  3. Query Data: Define a method to query data using plaintext values

    Scenario 1: Identify orders associated with email address [email protected]. This query should return Order ID ABC-1001.

    private static void runQueryEmail(DynamoDbClient ddb, String ddbTableName) {
        Map<String, String> expressionAttributesNames = new HashMap<>();
        expressionAttributesNames.put("#e", "email");
    
        Map<String, AttributeValue> expressionAttributeValues = new HashMap<>();
        expressionAttributeValues.put(
          ":e",
          AttributeValue.builder().s("[email protected]").build()
        );
    
        QueryRequest queryRequest = QueryRequest
          .builder()
          .tableName(ddbTableName)
          .indexName("aws_dbe_b_email-index")
          .keyConditionExpression("#e = :e")
          .expressionAttributeNames(expressionAttributesNames)
          .expressionAttributeValues(expressionAttributeValues)
          .build();
    
        final QueryResponse queryResponse = ddb.query(queryRequest);
        assert 200 == queryResponse.sdkHttpResponse().statusCode();
    
        List<Map<String, AttributeValue>> items = queryResponse.items();
    
        for (Map<String, AttributeValue> returnedItem : items) {
          System.out.println(returnedItem.get("order_id").s());
        }
      }

    Scenario 2: Identify orders that were placed by John Doe using a specific credit card with the last four digits of 4567 and expiry date of 082026. This query should return Order ID ABC-1003 and ABC-1004.

    private static void runQueryNameCard(DynamoDbClient ddb, String ddbTableName) {
        Map<String, String> expressionAttributesNames = new HashMap<>();
        expressionAttributesNames.put("#PKName", "FullName");
        expressionAttributesNames.put("#SKName", "CardCompound");
    
    
       Map<String, AttributeValue> expressionAttributeValues = new HashMap<>();
        expressionAttributeValues.put(
          ":PKValue",
          AttributeValue.builder().s("JohnDoe").build()
          );
        expressionAttributeValues.put(
          ":SKValue",
          AttributeValue.builder().s("C-4567~E-082026").build()
          ); 
        
        QueryRequest queryRequest = QueryRequest
          .builder()
          .tableName(ddbTableName)
          .indexName("aws_dbe_b_VirtualNameCardCompound-index")
          .keyConditionExpression("#PKName = :PKValue and #SKName = :SKValue")
          .expressionAttributeNames(expressionAttributesNames)
          .expressionAttributeValues(expressionAttributeValues)
          .build();
        final QueryResponse queryResponse = ddb.query(queryRequest);
    
        // Validate query was returned successfully
        assert 200 == queryResponse.sdkHttpResponse().statusCode();
    
        List<Map<String, AttributeValue>> items = queryResponse.items();
    
        for (Map<String, AttributeValue> returnedItem : items) {
          System.out.println(returnedItem.get("order_id").s());
        }
      }

    Note: Compound beacons support complex string operation such as begins_with. In Scenario 2, if you had only the name attributes and last four digits of the credit card, you could still use the compound beacon for querying. You can set the values as shown below to query the beacon using the same code:

    PKValue = “JohnDoe”
    SKValue = "C-4567”
    keyConditionExpression = "#PKName = :PKValue and begins_with(#SKName, :SKValue)"

Now that you have the building blocks, let’s bring this all together and run the following steps to set up the application. For this example, a few of the input parameters have been hard coded. In your application code, replace <KMS key ARN> and <branch-key-id derived from keystore table> from Step 1 and Step 3 mentioned in the Configure DB-ESDK cryptography sections.

//Hard coded values for illustration
String keyStoreTableName = "tblKeyStore";
String logicalKeyStoreName = "lglKeyStore";
String kmsKeyArn = "<KMS key ARN>";
String ddbTableName = "OrderInfo";
String branchKeyId = "<branch-key-id derived from keystore table>";
String branchKeyWrappingKmsKeyArn = "<KMS key ARN>";
String branchKeyDdbTableName = keyStoreTableName;


//run only once to setup keystore 
keyStoreCreateTable(keyStoreTableName, logicalKeyStoreName, kmsKeyArn);

//run only once to create branch and beacon key
keyStoreCreateKey(keyStoreTableName, logicalKeyStoreName, kmsKeyArn);

//run configuration per DynamoDb table 
List<VirtualField> virtualField = getVirtualField();
List<StandardBeacon> beacon = getStandardBeacon ();
List<CompoundBeacon> compoundBeacon = getCompoundBeacon();
KeyStore keyStore = getKeystore(branchKeyDdbTableName, logicalKeyStoreName, branchKeyWrappingKmsKeyArn);
List<BeaconVersion> beaconVersions = getBeaconVersions(beacon, compoundBeacon, keyStore, branchKeyId);
IKeyring keyRing = getKeyRing(branchKeyId, keyStore);
DynamoDbClient ddb = configDDBTable(ddbTableName, keyRing, beaconVersions);

//insert sample records
    HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order1 = getOrder("ABC-1001", "1672531200", "Mary", "Major", "[email protected]", "1234", "012001");
    HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order2 = getOrder("ABC-1002", "1672531400", "John", "Doe", "[email protected]", "1111", "122023");
    HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order3 = getOrder("ABC-1003", "1672531500", "John", "Doe", "[email protected]","4567", "082026");
    HashMap<String, AttributeValue> order4 = getOrder("ABC-1004", "1672531600", "John", "Doe", "[email protected]","4567", "082026");

   insertOrder(order1, ddb, ddbTableName);
   insertOrder(order2, ddb, ddbTableName);
   insertOrder(order3, ddb, ddbTableName);
   insertOrder(order4, ddb, ddbTableName);

//Query OrderInfo table
runQueryEmail(ddb, ddbTableName); //returns orderid ABC-1001
runQueryNameCard(ddb, ddbTableName); // returns orderid ABC-1003, ABC-1004

Conclusion

You’ve just seen how to build an application that encrypts sensitive data on client side, stores it in a DynamoDB table and performs queries on the encrypted data transparently to the application code without decrypting the entire data set. This allows your applications to realize the full potential of the encrypted data while adhering to security and compliance requirements. The code snippet used in this blog is available for reference on GitHub. You can further read the documentation of the AWS Database Encryption SDK and reference the source code at this repository. We encourage you to explore other examples of searching on encrypted fields referenced in this GitHub repository.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Samit Kumbhani

Samit Kumbhani

Samit is an AWS Sr. Solutions Architect in the New York City area. He has 18 years of experience building applications and focuses on Analytics, Business Intelligence, and Databases. He enjoys working with customers to understand and solve their challenges by creating innovative solutions using AWS services. Samit enjoys playing cricket, traveling, and biking.

Author

Nir Ozeri

Nir is a Solutions Architect Manager with Amazon Web Services, based out of New York City. Nir specializes in application modernization, application delivery, and mobile architecture.

Yuri Duchovny

Yuri Duchovny

Yuri is a New York–based Principal Solutions Architect specializing in cloud security, identity, and compliance. He supports cloud transformations at large enterprises, helping them make optimal technology and organizational decisions. Prior to his AWS role, Yuri’s areas of focus included application and networking security, DoS, and fraud protection. Outside of work, he enjoys skiing, sailing, and traveling the world.

OT/IT convergence security maturity model

Post Syndicated from James Hobbs original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/ot-it-convergence-security-maturity-model/

For decades, we’ve watched energy companies attempt to bring off-the-shelf information technology (IT) systems into operations technology (OT) environments. These attempts have had varying degrees of success. While converging OT and IT brings new efficiencies, it also brings new risks. There are many moving parts to convergence, and there are several questions that you must answer, such as, “Are systems, processes, and organizations at the same point in their convergence journey?” and “Are risks still being managed well?”

To help you answer these questions, this post provides an aid in the form of a maturity model focused on the security of OT/IT convergence.

OT environments consist of industrial systems that measure, automate, and control physical machines. Because of this, OT risk management must consider potential risks to environment, health, and safety. Adding common IT components can add to these risks. For example, OT networks were typically highly segmented to reduce exposure to external untrusted networks while IT has a seemingly ever-growing network surface. Because of this growing surface, IT networks have built-in resiliency against cyber threats, though they weren’t originally designed for the operational requirements found in OT. However, you can use the strengths of Amazon Web Services (AWS) to help meet regulatory requirements and manage risks in both OT and IT.

The merging of OT and IT has begun at most companies and includes the merging of systems, organizations, and policies. These components are often at different points along their journey, making it necessary to identify each one and where it is in the process to determine where additional attention is needed. Another purpose of the OT/IT security convergence model is to help identify those maturity points.

Patterns in this model often reference specific aspects of how much involvement OT teams have in overall IT and cloud strategies. It’s important to understand that OT is no longer an air-gapped system that is hidden away from cyber risks, and so it now shares many of the same risks as IT. This understanding enables and improves your preparedness for a safe and secure industrial digital transformation using AWS to accelerate your convergence journey.

Getting started with secure OT/IT convergence

The first step in a secure OT/IT convergence is to ask questions. The answers to these questions lead to establishing maturity patterns. For example, the answer might indicate a quick win for convergence, or it might demonstrate a more optimized maturity level. In this section, we review the questions you should ask about your organization:

  1. When was the last time your organization conducted an OT/IT cybersecurity risk assessment using a common framework (such as ISA/IEC 62443) and used it to inform system design?

    When taking advantage of IT technologies in OT environments, it’s important to conduct a cybersecurity risk assessment to fully understand and proactively manage risks. For risk assessments, companies with maturing OT/IT convergence display common patterns. Some patterns to be aware of are:

    • The frequency of risk assessments is driven by risk measures and data
    • IT technologies are successfully being adopted into OT environments
    • Specific cybersecurity risk assessments are conducted in OT
    • Risk assessments are conducted at the start of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) projects
    • Risk assessments inform system designs
    • Proactively managing risks, gaps, and vulnerabilities between OT and IT
    • Up-to-date threat modeling capabilities for both OT and IT

    For more information, see:

  2. What is the extent and maturity of IIoT enabled digital transformation in your organization?

    There are several good indicators to determine the maturity of IIoT’s effect on OT/IT convergence in an organization. For example, the number of IIoT implementations with well-defined security controls. Also, the number of IIoT digital use cases developed and realized. Additionally, some maturing IIoT convergence practices are:

    • Simplification and standardization of IIoT security controls
    • Scaling digital use cases across the shop floor
    • IIoT being consumed collaboratively or within organizational silos
    • Integrated IIoT enterprise applications
    • Identifying connections to external networks and how they are routed
    • IoT use cases identified and implemented across multiple industrial sites

    For more information, see:

     

  3. Does your organization maintain an inventory of connected assets and use it to manage risk effectively?

    A critical aspect of a good security program is having visibility into your entire OT and IIoT system and knowing which systems don’t support open networks and modern security controls. Since you can’t protect what you can’t see, your organization must have comprehensive asset visibility. Highly capable asset management processes typically demonstrate the following considerations:

    • Visibility across your entire OT and IIoT system
    • Identifies systems not supporting open networks and modern security controls
    • Vulnerabilities and threats readily map to assets and asset owners
    • Asset visibility is used to improve cybersecurity posture
    • An up-to-date and clear understanding of the OT/IIoT network architecture
    • Defined locations for OT data including asset and configuration data
    • Automated asset inventory with modern discovery processes in OT
    • Asset inventory collections that are non-disruptive and do not introduce new vulnerabilities to OT

    For more information, see:

     

  4. Does your organization have an incident response plan for converged OT and IT environments?

    Incident response planning is essential for critical infrastructure organizations to minimize the impacts of cyber events. Some considerations are:

    • An incident response plan that aims to minimize the effects of a cyber event
    • The effect of incidents on an organization’s operations, reputation, and assets
    • Developed and tested incident response runbooks
    • A plan identifying potential risks and vulnerabilities
    • A plan prioritizing and allocating response personnel
    • Established clear roles and responsibilities
    • Documented communication procedures, backup, and recovery
    • Defined incident escalation procedures
    • Frequency of response plan testing and cyber drills
    • Incident response collaboration between OT and IT authorities
    • Relying on individuals versus team processes for incident response
    • Measuring incident response OT/IT coordination hesitation during drills
    • An authoritative decision maker across OT and IT for seamless incident response leadership

    For more information, see:

     

  5. With reference to corporate governance, are OT and IT using separate policies and controls to manage cybersecurity risks or are they using the same policy?

    The ongoing maturity and adoption of cloud within IT and now within OT creates a more common environment. A comprehensive enterprise and OT security policy will encompass risks across the entirety of the business. This allows for OT risks such as safety to be recognized and addressed within IT. Conversely, this allows for IT risks such as bots and ransomware to be addressed within OT. While policies might converge, mitigation strategies will still differ in many cases. Some considerations are:

    • OT and IT maintaining separate risk policies.
    • Assuming air-gapped OT systems.
    • The degree of isolation for process control and safety networks.
    • Interconnectedness of OT and IT systems and networks.
    • Security risks that were applicable to either IT or OT might now apply to both.
    • OT comprehension of risks related to lateral movement.
    • Singular security control policy that governs both OT and IT.
    • Different mitigation strategies as appropriate for OT and for IT. For example, the speed of patching is often different between OT and IT by design.
    • Different risk measures maintained between OT and IT.
    • A common view of risk to the business.
    • The use of holistic approaches to manage OT and IT risk.

    For more information, see:

     

  6. Is there a central cloud center of excellence (CCoE) with equivalent representation from OT and IT?

    Consolidating resources into centers of excellence has proven an effective way to bring focus to new or transforming enterprises. Many companies have created CCoEs around security within the past two decades to consolidate experts from around the company. Such focused areas are a central point of technical authority and accelerates decision making. Some considerations are:

    • Consolidating resources into centers of excellence.
    • Security experts consolidated from around the company into a singular organization.
    • Defining security focus areas based on risk priorities.
    • Having a central point of security authority.
    • OT and IT teams operating uniformly.
    • Well understood and applied incident response decision rights in OT.

    For more information, see:

     

  7. Is there a clear definition of the business value of converging OT and IT?

    Security projects face extra scrutiny from multiple parties ranging from shareholders to regulators. Because of this, each project must be tied to business and operational outcomes. The value of securing converged OT and IT technologies is realized by maintaining and improving operations and resilience. Some considerations are:

    • Security projects are tied to appropriate outcomes
    • The same measures are used to track security program benefits across OT and IT.
    • OT and IT security budgets merged.
    • The CISO has visibility to OT security risk data.
    • OT personnel are invited to cloud strategy meetings.
    • OT and IT security reporting is through a singular leader such as a CISO.
    • Engagement of OT personnel in IT security meetings.

    For more information, see:

     

  8. Does your organization have security monitoring across the full threat surface?

    With the increasing convergence of OT and IT, the digital threat surface has expanded and organizations must deploy security audit and monitoring mechanisms across OT, IIoT, edge, and cloud environments and collect security logs for analysis using security information and event management (SIEM) tools within a security operations center (SOC). Without full visibility of traffic entering and exiting OT networks, a quickly spreading event between OT and IT might go undetected. Some considerations are:

    • Awareness of the expanding digital attack surface.
    • Security audit and monitoring mechanisms across OT, IIoT, edge, and cloud environments.
    • Security logs collected for analysis using SIEM tools within a SOC.
    • Full visibility and control of traffic entering and exiting OT networks.
    • Malicious threat actor capabilities for destructive consequences to physical cyber systems.
    • The downstream impacts resulting in OT networks being shut down due to safety concerns.
    • The ability to safely operate and monitor OT networks during a security event.
    • Benefits of a unified SOC.
    • Coordinated threat detection and immediate sharing of indicators enabled.
    • Access to teams that can map potential attack paths and origins.

    For more information, see:

     

  9. Does your IT team fully comprehend the differences in priority between OT and IT with regard to availability, integrity, and confidentiality?

    Downtime equals lost revenue. While this is true in IT as well, it is less direct than it is in OT and can often be overcome with a variety of redundancy strategies. While the OT formula for data and systems is availability, integrity, then confidentiality, it also focuses on safety and reliability. To develop a holistic picture of corporate security risks, you must understand that systems in OT have been and will continue to be built with availability as the key component. Some considerations are:

    • Availability is vital in OT. Systems must run in order to produce and manufacture product. Downtime equals lost revenue.
    • IT redundancy strategies might not directly translate to OT.
    • OT owners previously relied on air-gapped systems or layers of defenses to achieve confidentiality.
    • Must have a holistic picture of all corporate security risks.
    • Security defenses are often designed to wrap around OT zones while restricting the conduits between them.
    • OT and IT risks are managed collectively.
    • Implement common security controls between OT and IT.

    For more information, see:

     

  10. Are your OT support teams engaged with cloud strategy?

    Given the historical nature of the separation of IT and OT, organizations might still operate in silos. An indication of converging maturity is how well those teams are working across divisions or have even removed silos altogether. OT systems are part of larger safety and risk management programs within industrial systems from which many IT systems have typically remained separated. As the National Institute of Standards and Technology states, “To properly address security in an industrial control system (ICS), it is essential for a cross-functional cybersecurity team to share their varied domain knowledge and experience to evaluate and mitigate risk to the ICS.” [NIST 800-82r2, Pg. 3]. Some considerations are:

    • OT experts should be directly involved in security and cloud strategy.
    • OT systems are part of larger safety and risk management programs.
    • Make sure that communications between OT and IT aren’t limited or strained.
    • OT and IT personnel should interact regularly.
    • OT personnel should not only be informed of cloud strategies, but should be active participants.

    For more information, see:

     

  11. How much of your cloud security across OT and IT is managed manually and how much is automated?

    Security automation means addressing threats automatically by providing predefined response and remediation actions based on compliance standards or best practices. Automation can resolve common security findings to improve your posture within AWS. It also allows you to quickly respond to threat events. Some considerations are:

    • Cyber responses are predefined and are real-time.
    • Playbooks exist and include OT scenarios.
    • Automated remediations are routine practice.
    • Foundational security is automated.
    • Audit trails are enabled with notifications for automated actions.
    • OT events are aggregated, prioritized, and consumed into orchestration tools.
    • Cloud security postures for OT and IT are understood and documented.

    For more information, see:

     

  12. To what degree are your OT and IT networks segmented?

    Network segmentation has been well established as a foundational security practice. NIST SP800-82r3 pg.72 states, “Implementing network segmentation utilizing levels, tiers, or zones allows organizations to control access to sensitive information and components while also considering operational performance and safety.”

    Minimizing network access to OT systems reduces the available threat surface. Typically, firewalls are used as control points between different segments. Several models exist showing separation of OT and IT networks and maintaining boundary zones between the two. As stated in section 5.2.3.1 “A good practice for network architectures is to characterize, segment, and isolate IT and OT devices.” (NIST SP800-82r3).

    AWS provides multiple ways to segment and firewall network boundaries depending upon requirements and customer needs. Some considerations are:

    • Existence of a perimeter network between OT and IT.
    • Level of audit and inspection of perimeter network traffic.
    • Amount of direct connectivity between OT and IT.
    • Segmentation is regularly tested for threat surface vulnerabilities.
    • Use of cloud-native tools to manage networks.
    • Identification and use of high-risk ports.
    • OT and IT personnel are collaborative network boundary decision makers.
    • Network boundary changes include OT risk management methodologies.
    • Defense in depth measures are evident.
    • Network flow log data analysis.

    For more information, see:

The following table describes typical patterns seen at each maturity level.

Phase 1: Quick wins Phase 2: Foundational Phase 3: Efficient Phase 4: Optimized
1 When was the last time your organization conducted an OT/IT cybersecurity risk assessment using a common framework (such as ISA/IEC 62443) and used it to inform system design? A basic risk assessment performed to identify risks, gaps, and vulnerabilities Organization has manual threat modeling capabilities and maintains an up-to-date threat model Organization has automated threat modeling capabilities using the latest tools Organization maintains threat modeling automation as code and an agile ability to use the latest tools
2 What is the extent and maturity of IIoT enabled digital transformation in your organization? Organization is actively introducing IIoT on proof-of-value projects Organization is moving from proof-of-value projects to production pilots Organization is actively identifying and prioritizing business opportunities and use cases and using the lessons learned from pilot sites to reduce the time-to-value at other sites Organization is scaling the use of IIoT across multiple use cases, sites, and assets and can rapidly iterate new IIoT to meet changing business needs
3 Does your organization maintain an inventory of connected assets and use it to manage risk effectively? Manual tracking of connected assets with no automated tools for new asset discovery Introduction of asset discovery tools to discover and create an inventory of all connected assets Automated tools for asset discovery, inventory management, and frequent reporting Near real time asset discovery and consolidated inventory in a configuration management database (CMDB)
4 Does your organization have an incident response plan for converged OT and IT environments? Organization has separate incident response plans for OT and IT environments Organization has an ICS-specific incident response plan to account for the complexities and operational necessities of responding in operational environments Cyber operators are trained to ensure process safety and system reliability when responding to security events in converged OT/IT environments Organization has incident response plans and playbooks for converged OT/IT environments
5 With reference to corporate governance, are OT and IT using separate policies and controls to manage cybersecurity risks or are they using the same policy? Organization has separate risk policies for OT and IT environments Organization has some combined policies across OT and IT but might not account for all OT risks Organization accounts for OT risks such as health and safety in a central cyber risk register Organization has codified central risk management policy accounting for both OT and IT risks
6 Is there a central cloud center of excellence (CCoE) with equivalent representation from OT and IT? Cloud CoE exists with as-needed engagement from OT on special projects Some representation from OT in cloud CoE Increasing representation from OT in cloud CoE Cloud CoE exists with good representation from OT and IT
7 Is there a clear definition of the business value of converging OT and IT? No clear definition of business value from convergence projects Organization working towards defining key performance indicators (KPIs) for convergence projects Organization has identified KPIs and created a baseline of their current as-is state Organization is actively measuring KPIs on convergence projects
8 Does your organization have security monitoring across the full threat surface? Stand-alone monitoring systems in OT and IT with no integration between systems Limited integration between OT and IT monitoring systems and may have separate SOCs Increasing integration between OT and IT systems with some holistic SOC activities Convergence of OT and IT security monitoring in a unified and global SOC
9 Does your IT team fully comprehend the differences in priority between IT and OT with regard to availability, integrity, and confidentiality? IT teams lack an understanding of the priorities in OT as they relate to safety and availability IT teams have a high level understanding of the differences between OT and IT risks and OT teams understand cyber threat models IT teams being trained on the priorities and differences of OT systems and include them in cyber risk measures IT fully understands the differences and increased risk from OT/IT convergence and members work on cross-functional teams as interchangeable experts
10 Are your OT support teams engaged with cloud strategy? Separate OT and IT teams with limited collaboration on projects Limited OT team engagement in cloud strategy Increasing OT team engagement in cloud security OT teams actively engaged with cloud strategy
11 How much of your cloud security across OT and IT is managed manually and how much is automated? Processes are manual and use non-enterprise grade tools Automation exists in pockets within OT Security decisions are increasingly automated and iterated upon with guardrails in place Manual steps are minimized and security decisions are automated as code
12 To what degree are your OT and IT networks segmented? Limited segmentation between OT and IT networks Introduction of an industrial perimeter network between OT and IT networks Industrial perimeter network exists with some OT network segmentation Industrial perimeter network between OT and IT networks with micro-network segmentation within OT and IT networks

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how you can use this OT/IT convergence security maturity model to help identify areas for improvement. There were 12 questions and patterns that are examples you can build upon. This model isn’t the end, but a guide for getting started. Successful implementation of OT/IT convergence for industrial digital transformation requires ongoing strategic security management because it’s not just about technology integration. The risks of cyber events that OT/IT convergence exposes must be addressed. Organizations fall into various levels of maturity. These are quick wins, foundational, efficient, and optimized. AWS tools, guidance, and professional services can help accelerate your journey to both technical and organizational maturity.

Additional reading

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

James Hobbs

James Hobbs

James is a Security Principal for AWS Energy & Utilities Professional Services. He has over 30 years of IT experience, including 20 years leading cybersecurity and incident response teams for the world’s largest Energy companies. He spent years focused on OT security and controls. He guides internal security practices and advises Energy customers on OT and IT cybersecurity practices.

Ryan Dsouza

Ryan Dsouza

Ryan is a Principal IoT Security Solutions Architect at AWS. Based in NYC, Ryan helps customers design, develop, and operate more secure, scalable, and innovative IIoT solutions using the breadth and depth of AWS capabilities to deliver measurable business outcomes. He is passionate about bringing security to all connected devices and being a champion of building a better, safer, and more resilient world for everyone.

Building a security-first mindset: three key themes from AWS re:Invent 2023

Post Syndicated from Clarke Rodgers original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/building-a-security-first-mindset-three-key-themes-from-aws-reinvent-2023/

Amazon CSO Stephen Schmidt

Amazon CSO Stephen Schmidt

AWS re:Invent drew 52,000 attendees from across the globe to Las Vegas, Nevada, November 27 to December 1, 2023.

Now in its 12th year, the conference featured 5 keynotes, 17 innovation talks, and over 2,250 sessions and hands-on labs offering immersive learning and networking opportunities.

With dozens of service and feature announcements—and innumerable best practices shared by AWS executives, customers, and partners—the air of excitement was palpable. We were on site to experience all of the innovations and insights, but summarizing highlights isn’t easy. This post details three key security themes that caught our attention.

Security culture

When we think about cybersecurity, it’s natural to focus on technical security measures that help protect the business. But organizations are made up of people—not technology. The best way to protect ourselves is to foster a proactive, resilient culture of cybersecurity that supports effective risk mitigation, incident detection and response, and continuous collaboration.

In Sustainable security culture: Empower builders for success, AWS Global Services Security Vice President Hart Rossman and AWS Global Services Security Organizational Excellence Leader Sarah Currey presented practical strategies for building a sustainable security culture.

Rossman noted that many customers who meet with AWS about security challenges are attempting to manage security as a project, a program, or a side workstream. To strengthen your security posture, he said, you have to embed security into your business.

“You’ve got to understand early on that security can’t be effective if you’re running it like a project or a program. You really have to run it as an operational imperative—a core function of the business. That’s when magic can happen.” — Hart Rossman, Global Services Security Vice President at AWS

Three best practices can help:

  1. Be consistently persistent. Routinely and emphatically thank employees for raising security issues. It might feel repetitive, but treating security events and escalations as learning opportunities helps create a positive culture—and it’s a practice that can spread to other teams. An empathetic leadership approach encourages your employees to see security as everyone’s responsibility, share their experiences, and feel like collaborators.
  2. Brief the board. Engage executive leadership in regular, business-focused meetings. By providing operational metrics that tie your security culture to the impact that it has on customers, crisply connecting data to business outcomes, and providing an opportunity to ask questions, you can help build the support of executive leadership, and advance your efforts to establish a sustainable proactive security posture.
  3. Have a mental model for creating a good security culture. Rossman presented a diagram (Figure 1) that highlights three elements of security culture he has observed at AWS: a student, a steward, and a builder. If you want to be a good steward of security culture, you should be a student who is constantly learning, experimenting, and passing along best practices. As your stewardship grows, you can become a builder, and progress the culture in new directions.
Figure 1: Sample mental model for building security culture

Figure 1: Sample mental model for building security culture

Thoughtful investment in the principles of inclusivity, empathy, and psychological safety can help your team members to confidently speak up, take risks, and express ideas or concerns. This supports an escalation-friendly culture that can reduce employee burnout, and empower your teams to champion security at scale.

In Shipping securely: How strong security can be your strategic advantage, AWS Enterprise Strategy Director Clarke Rodgers reiterated the importance of security culture to building a security-first mindset.

Rodgers highlighted three pillars of progression (Figure 2)—aware, bolted-on, and embedded—that are based on meetings with more than 800 customers. As organizations mature from a reactive security posture to a proactive, security-first approach, he noted, security culture becomes a true business enabler.

“When organizations have a strong security culture and everyone sees security as their responsibility, they can move faster and achieve quicker and more secure product and service releases.” — Clarke Rodgers, Director of Enterprise Strategy at AWS
Figure 2: Shipping with a security-first mindset

Figure 2: Shipping with a security-first mindset

Human-centric AI

CISOs and security stakeholders are increasingly pivoting to a human-centric focus to establish effective cybersecurity, and ease the burden on employees.

According to Gartner, by 2027, 50% of large enterprise CISOs will have adopted human-centric security design practices to minimize cybersecurity-induced friction and maximize control adoption.

As Amazon CSO Stephen Schmidt noted in Move fast, stay secure: Strategies for the future of security, focusing on technology first is fundamentally wrong. Security is a people challenge for threat actors, and for defenders. To keep up with evolving changes and securely support the businesses we serve, we need to focus on dynamic problems that software can’t solve.

Maintaining that focus means providing security and development teams with the tools they need to automate and scale some of their work.

“People are our most constrained and most valuable resource. They have an impact on every layer of security. It’s important that we provide the tools and the processes to help our people be as effective as possible.” — Stephen Schmidt, CSO at Amazon

Organizations can use artificial intelligence (AI) to impact all layers of security—but AI doesn’t replace skilled engineers. When used in coordination with other tools, and with appropriate human review, it can help make your security controls more effective.

Schmidt highlighted the internal use of AI at Amazon to accelerate our software development process, as well as new generative AI-powered Amazon Inspector, Amazon Detective, AWS Config, and Amazon CodeWhisperer features that complement the human skillset by helping people make better security decisions, using a broader collection of knowledge. This pattern of combining sophisticated tooling with skilled engineers is highly effective, because it positions people to make the nuanced decisions required for effective security that AI can’t make on its own.

In How security teams can strengthen security using generative AI, AWS Senior Security Specialist Solutions Architects Anna McAbee and Marshall Jones, and Principal Consultant Fritz Kunstler featured a virtual security assistant (chatbot) that can address common security questions and use cases based on your internal knowledge bases, and trusted public sources.

Figure 3: Generative AI-powered chatbot architecture

Figure 3: Generative AI-powered chatbot architecture

The generative AI-powered solution depicted in Figure 3—which includes Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) with Amazon Kendra, Amazon Security Lake, and Amazon Bedrock—can help you automate mundane tasks, expedite security decisions, and increase your focus on novel security problems.

It’s available on Github with ready-to-use code, so you can start experimenting with a variety of large and multimodal language models, settings, and prompts in your own AWS account.

Secure collaboration

Collaboration is key to cybersecurity success, but evolving threats, flexible work models, and a growing patchwork of data protection and privacy regulations have made maintaining secure and compliant messaging a challenge.

An estimated 3.09 billion mobile phone users access messaging apps to communicate, and this figure is projected to grow to 3.51 billion users in 2025.

The use of consumer messaging apps for business-related communications makes it more difficult for organizations to verify that data is being adequately protected and retained. This can lead to increased risk, particularly in industries with unique recordkeeping requirements.

In How the U.S. Army uses AWS Wickr to deliver lifesaving telemedicine, Matt Quinn, Senior Director at The U.S. Army Telemedicine & Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), Laura Baker, Senior Manager at Deloitte, and Arvind Muthukrishnan, AWS Wickr Head of Product highlighted how The TATRC National Emergency Tele-Critical Care Network (NETCCN) was integrated with AWS Wickr—a HIPAA-eligible secure messaging and collaboration service—and AWS Private 5G, a managed service for deploying and scaling private cellular networks.

During the session, Quinn, Baker, and Muthukrishnan described how TATRC achieved a low-resource, cloud-enabled, virtual health solution that facilitates secure collaboration between onsite and remote medical teams for real-time patient care in austere environments. Using Wickr, medics on the ground were able to treat injuries that exceeded their previous training (Figure 4) with the help of end-to-end encrypted video calls, messaging, and file sharing with medical professionals, and securely retain communications in accordance with organizational requirements.

“Incorporating Wickr into Military Emergency Tele-Critical Care Platform (METTC-P) not only provides the security and privacy of end-to-end encrypted communications, it gives combat medics and other frontline caregivers the ability to gain instant insight from medical experts around the world—capabilities that will be needed to address the simultaneous challenges of prolonged care, and the care of large numbers of casualties on the multi-domain operations (MDO) battlefield.” — Matt Quinn, Senior Director at TATRC
Figure 4: Telemedicine workflows using AWS Wickr

Figure 4: Telemedicine workflows using AWS Wickr

In a separate Chalk Talk titled Bolstering Incident Response with AWS Wickr and Amazon EventBridge, Senior AWS Wickr Solutions Architects Wes Wood and Charles Chowdhury-Hanscombe demonstrated how to integrate Wickr with Amazon EventBridge and Amazon GuardDuty to strengthen incident response capabilities with an integrated workflow (Figure 5) that connects your AWS resources to Wickr bots. Using this approach, you can quickly alert appropriate stakeholders to critical findings through a secure communication channel, even on a potentially compromised network.

Figure 5: AWS Wickr integration for incident response communications

Figure 5: AWS Wickr integration for incident response communications

Security is our top priority

AWS re:Invent featured many more highlights on a variety of topics, including adaptive access control with Zero Trust, AWS cyber insurance partners, Amazon CTO Dr. Werner Vogels’ popular keynote, and the security partnerships showcased on the Expo floor. It was a whirlwind experience, but one thing is clear: AWS is working hard to help you build a security-first mindset, so that you can meaningfully improve both technical and business outcomes.

To watch on-demand conference sessions, visit the AWS re:Invent Security, Identity, and Compliance playlist on YouTube.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Clarke Rodgers

Clarke Rodgers

Clarke is a Director of Enterprise Security at AWS. Clarke has more than 25 years of experience in the security industry, and works with enterprise security, risk, and compliance-focused executives to strengthen their security posture, and understand the security capabilities of the cloud. Prior to AWS, Clarke was a CISO for the North American operations of a multinational insurance company.

Anne Grahn

Anne Grahn

Anne is a Senior Worldwide Security GTM Specialist at AWS, based in Chicago. She has more than 13 years of experience in the security industry, and focuses on effectively communicating cybersecurity risk. She maintains a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification.

Generate AI powered insights for Amazon Security Lake using Amazon SageMaker Studio and Amazon Bedrock

Post Syndicated from Jonathan Nguyen original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/generate-ai-powered-insights-for-amazon-security-lake-using-amazon-sagemaker-studio-and-amazon-bedrock/

In part 1, we discussed how to use Amazon SageMaker Studio to analyze time-series data in Amazon Security Lake to identify critical areas and prioritize efforts to help increase your security posture. Security Lake provides additional visibility into your environment by consolidating and normalizing security data from both AWS and non-AWS sources. Security teams can use Amazon Athena to query data in Security Lake to aid in a security event investigation or proactive threat analysis. Reducing the security team’s mean time to respond to or detect a security event can decrease your organization’s security vulnerabilities and risks, minimize data breaches, and reduce operational disruptions. Even if your security team is already familiar with AWS security logs and is using SQL queries to sift through data, determining appropriate log sources to review and crafting customized SQL queries can add time to an investigation. Furthermore, when security analysts conduct their analysis using SQL queries, the results are point-in-time and don’t automatically factor results from previous queries.

In this blog post, we show you how to extend the capabilities of SageMaker Studio by using Amazon Bedrock, a fully-managed generative artificial intelligence (AI) service natively offering high-performing foundation models (FMs) from leading AI companies with a single API. By using Amazon Bedrock, security analysts can accelerate security investigations by using a natural language companion to automatically generate SQL queries, focus on relevant data sources within Security Lake, and use previous SQL query results to enhance the results from future queries. We walk through a threat analysis exercise to show how your security analysts can use natural language processing to answer questions such as which AWS account has the most AWS Security Hub findings, irregular network activity from AWS resources, or which AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) principals invoked highly suspicious activity. By identifying possible vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, you can minimize mean time to detect and pinpoint specific resources to assess overall impact. We also discuss methods to customize Amazon Bedrock integration with data from your Security Lake. While large language models (LLMs) are useful conversational partners, it’s important to note that LLM responses can include hallucinations, which might not reflect truth or reality. We discuss some mechanisms to validate LLM responses and mitigate hallucinations. This blog post is best suited for technologists who have an in-depth understanding of generative artificial intelligence concepts and the AWS services used in the example solution.

Solution overview

Figure 1 depicts the architecture of the sample solution.

Figure 1: Security Lake generative AI solution architecture

Figure 1: Security Lake generative AI solution architecture

Before you deploy the sample solution, complete the following prerequisites:

  1. Enable Security Lake in your organization in AWS Organizations and specify a delegated administrator account to manage the Security Lake configuration for all member accounts in your organization. Configure Security Lake with the appropriate log sources: Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Flow Logs, AWS Security Hub, AWS CloudTrail, and Amazon Route53.
  2. Create subscriber query access from the source Security Lake AWS account to the subscriber AWS account.
  3. Accept a resource share request in the subscriber AWS account in AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM).
  4. Create a database link in AWS Lake Formation in the subscriber AWS account and grant access for the Athena tables in the Security Lake AWS account.
  5. Grant Claude v2 model access for Amazon Bedrock LLM Claude v2 in the AWS subscriber account where you will deploy the solution. If you try to use a model before you enable it in your AWS account, you will get an error message.

After you set up the prerequisites, the sample solution architecture provisions the following resources:

  1. A VPC is provisioned for SageMaker with an internet gateway, a NAT gateway, and VPC endpoints for all AWS services within the solution. An internet gateway or NAT gateway is required to install external open-source packages.
  2. A SageMaker Studio domain is created in VPCOnly mode with a single SageMaker user-profile that’s tied to an IAM role. As part of the SageMaker deployment, an Amazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS) is provisioned for the SageMaker domain.
  3. A dedicated IAM role is created to restrict access to create or access the SageMaker domain’s presigned URL from a specific Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) for accessing the SageMaker notebook.
  4. An AWS CodeCommit repository containing Python notebooks used for the artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) workflow by the SageMaker user profile.
  5. An Athena workgroup is created for Security Lake queries with a S3 bucket for output location (access logging is configured for the output bucket).

Cost

Before deploying the sample solution and walking through this post, it’s important to understand the cost factors for the main AWS services being used. The cost will largely depend on the amount of data you interact with in Security Lake and the duration of running resources in SageMaker Studio.

  1. A SageMaker Studio domain is deployed and configured with default setting of a ml.t3.medium instance type. For a more detailed breakdown, see SageMaker Studio pricing. It’s important to shut down applications when they’re not in use because you’re billed for the number of hours an application is running. See the AWS samples repository for an automated shutdown extension.
  2. Amazon Bedrock on-demand pricing is based on the selected LLM and the number of input and output tokens. A token is comprised of a few characters and refers to the basic unit of text that a model learns to understand the user input and prompts. For a more detailed breakdown, see Amazon Bedrock pricing.
  3. The SQL queries generated by Amazon Bedrock are invoked using Athena. Athena cost is based on the amount of data scanned within Security Lake for that query. For a more detailed breakdown, see Athena pricing.

Deploy the sample solution

You can deploy the sample solution by using either the AWS Management Console or the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK). For instructions and more information on using the AWS CDK, see Get Started with AWS CDK.

Option 1: Deploy using AWS CloudFormation using the console

Use the console to sign in to your subscriber AWS account and then choose the Launch Stack button to open the AWS CloudFormation console that’s pre-loaded with the template for this solution. It takes approximately 10 minutes for the CloudFormation stack to complete.

Select the Launch Stack button to launch the template

Option 2: Deploy using AWS CDK

  1. Clone the Security Lake generative AI sample repository.
  2. Navigate to the project’s source folder (…/amazon-security-lake-generative-ai/source).
  3. Install project dependencies using the following commands:
    npm install -g aws-cdk-lib
    npm install
    

  4. On deployment, you must provide the following required parameters:
    • IAMroleassumptionforsagemakerpresignedurl – this is the existing IAM role you want to use to access the AWS console to create presigned URLs for SageMaker Studio domain.
    • securitylakeawsaccount – this is the AWS account ID where Security Lake is deployed.
  5. Run the following commands in your terminal while signed in to your subscriber AWS account. Replace <INSERT_AWS_ACCOUNT> with your account number and replace <INSERT_REGION> with the AWS Region that you want the solution deployed to.
    cdk bootstrap aws://<INSERT_AWS_ACCOUNT>/<INSERT_REGION>
    
    cdk deploy --parameters IAMroleassumptionforsagemakerpresignedurl=arn:aws:iam::<INSERT_AWS_ACCOUNT>:role/<INSERT_IAM_ROLE_NAME> --parameters securitylakeawsaccount=<INSERT_SECURITY_LAKE_AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>
    

Post-deployment configuration steps

Now that you’ve deployed the solution, you must add permissions to allow SageMaker and Amazon Bedrock to interact with your Security Lake data.

Grant permission to the Security Lake database

  1. Copy the SageMaker user profile Amazon Resource Name (ARN)
    arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/sagemaker-user-profile-for-security-lake
    

  2. Go to the Lake Formation console.
  3. Select the amazon_security_lake_glue_db_<YOUR-REGION> database. For example, if your Security Lake is in us-east-1, the value would be amazon_security_lake_glue_db_us_east_1
  4. For Actions, select Grant.
  5. In Grant Data Permissions, select SAML Users and Groups.
  6. Paste the SageMaker user profile ARN from Step 1.
  7. In Database Permissions, select Describe, and then Grant.

Grant permission to Security Lake tables

You must repeat these steps for each source configured within Security Lake. For example, if you have four sources configured within Security Lake, you must grant permissions for the SageMaker user profile to four tables. If you have multiple sources that are in separate Regions and you don’t have a rollup Region configured in Security Lake, you must repeat the steps for each source in each Region.

The following example grants permissions to the Security Hub table within Security Lake. For more information about granting table permissions, see the AWS LakeFormation user-guide.

  1. Copy the SageMaker user-profile ARN arn:aws:iam:<account-id>:role/sagemaker-user-profile-for-security-lake.
  2. Go to the Lake Formation console.
  3. Select the amazon_security_lake_glue_db_<YOUR-REGION> database.
    For example, if your Security Lake database is in us-east-1 the value would be amazon_security_lake_glue_db_us_east_1
  4. Choose View Tables.
  5. Select the amazon_security_lake_table_<YOUR-REGION>_sh_findings_1_0 table.
    For example, if your Security Lake table is in us-east-1 the value would be amazon_security_lake_table_us_east_1_sh_findings_1_0

    Note: Each table must be granted access individually. Selecting All Tables won’t grant the access needed to query Security Lake.

  6. For Actions, select Grant.
  7. In Grant Data Permissions, select SAML Users and Groups.
  8. Paste the SageMaker user profile ARN from Step 1.
  9. In Table Permissions, select Describe, and then Grant.

Launch your SageMaker Studio application

Now that you’ve granted permissions for a SageMaker user profile, you can move on to launching the SageMaker application associated to that user profile.

  1. Navigate to the SageMaker Studio domain in the console.
  2. Select the SageMaker domain security-lake-gen-ai-<subscriber-account-id>.
  3. Select the SageMaker user profile sagemaker-user-profile-for-security-lake.
  4. For Launch, select Studio.
Figure 2: SageMaker Studio domain view

Figure 2: SageMaker Studio domain view

Clone the Python notebook

As part of the solution deployment, we’ve created a foundational Python notebook in CodeCommit to use within your SageMaker app.

  1. Navigate to CloudFormation in the console.
  2. In the Stacks section, select the SageMakerDomainStack.
  3. Select the Outputs tab.
  4. Copy the value for the SageMaker notebook generative AI repository URL. (For example: https://git-codecommit.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/sagemaker_gen_ai_repo)
  5. Go back to your SageMaker app.
  6. In SageMaker Studio, in the left sidebar, choose the Git icon (a diamond with two branches), then choose Clone a Repository.
    Figure 3: SageMaker Studio clone repository option

    Figure 3: SageMaker Studio clone repository option

  7. Paste the CodeCommit repository link from Step 4 under the Git repository URL (git). After you paste the URL, select Clone “https://git-codecommit.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/sagemaker_gen_ai_repo”, then select Clone.

Note: If you don’t select from the auto-populated list, SageMaker won’t be able to clone the repository and will return a message that the URL is invalid.

Figure 4: SageMaker Studio clone HTTPS repository URL

Figure 4: SageMaker Studio clone HTTPS repository URL

Configure your notebook to use generative AI

In the next section, we walk through how we configured the notebook and why we used specific LLMs, agents, tools, and additional configurations so you can extend and customize this solution to your use case.

The notebook we created uses the LangChain framework. LangChain is a framework for developing applications powered by language models and processes natural language inputs from the user, generates SQL queries, and runs those queries on your Security Lake data. For our use case, we’re using LangChain with Anthropic’s Claude 2 model on Amazon Bedrock.

Set up the notebook environment

  1. After you’re in the generative_ai_security_lake.ipynb notebook, you can set up your notebook environment. Keep the default settings and choose Select.
    Figure 5: SageMaker Studio notebook start-up configuration

    Figure 5: SageMaker Studio notebook start-up configuration

  2. Run the first cell to install the requirements listed in the requirements.txt file.

Connect to the Security Lake database using SQLAlchemy

The example solution uses a pre-populated Security Lake database with metadata in the AWS Glue Data Catalog. The inferred schema enables the LLM to generate SQL queries in response to the questions being asked.

LangChain uses SQLAlchemy, which is a Python SQL toolkit and object relational mapper, to access databases. To connect to a database, first import SQLAlchemy and create an engine object by specifying the following:

  • SCHEMA_NAME
  • S3_STAGING_DIR
  • AWS_REGION
  • ATHENA REST API details

You can use the following configuration code to establish database connections and start querying.

import os
ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ["AWS_ACCOUNT_ID"]
REGION_NAME = os.environ.get('REGION_NAME', 'us-east-1')
REGION_FMT = REGION_NAME.replace("-","_")

from langchain import SQLDatabase
from sqlalchemy import create_engine

#Amazon Security Lake Database
SCHEMA_NAME = f"amazon_security_lake_glue_db_{REGION_FMT}"

#S3 Staging location for Athena query output results and this will be created by deploying the Cloud Formation stack
S3_STAGING_DIR = f's3://athena-gen-ai-bucket-results-{ACCOUNT_ID}/output/'

engine_athena = create_engine(
    "awsathena+rest://@athena.{}.amazonaws.com:443/{}?s3_staging_dir={}".
    format(REGION_NAME, SCHEMA_NAME, S3_STAGING_DIR)
)

athena_db = SQLDatabase(engine_athena)
db = athena_db

Initialize the LLM and Amazon Bedrock endpoint URL

Amazon Bedrock provides a list of Region-specific endpoints for making inference requests for models hosted in Amazon Bedrock. In this post, we’ve defined the model ID as Claude v2 and the Amazon Bedrock endpoint as us-east-1. You can change this to other LLMs and endpoints as needed for your use case.

Obtain a model ID from the AWS console

  1. Go to the Amazon Bedrock console.
  2. In the navigation pane, under Foundation models, select Providers.
  3. Select the Anthropic tab from the top menu and then select Claude v2.
  4. In the model API request note the model ID value in the JSON payload.

Note: Alternatively, you can use the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to run the list-foundation-models command in a SageMaker notebook cell or a CLI terminal to the get the model ID. For AWS SDK, you can use the ListFoundationModels operation to retrieve information about base models for a specific provider.

Figure 6: Amazon Bedrock Claude v2 model ID

Figure 6: Amazon Bedrock Claude v2 model ID

Set the model parameters

After the LLM and Amazon Bedrock endpoints are configured, you can use the model_kwargs dictionary to set model parameters. Depending on your use case, you might use different parameters or values. In this example, the following values are already configured in the notebook and passed to the model.

  1. temperature: Set to 0. Temperature controls the degree of randomness in responses from the LLM. By adjusting the temperature, users can control the balance between having predictable, consistent responses (value closer to 0) compared to more creative, novel responses (value closer to 1).

    Note: Instead of using the temperature parameter, you can set top_p, which defines a cutoff based on the sum of probabilities of the potential choices. If you set Top P below 1.0, the model considers the most probable options and ignores less probable ones. According to Anthropic’s user guide, “you should either alter temperature or top_p, but not both.”

  2. top_k: Set to 0. While temperature controls the probability distribution of potential tokens, top_k limits the sample size for each subsequent token. For example, if top_k=50, the model selects from the 50 most probable tokens that could be next in a sequence. When you lower the top_k value, you remove the long tail of low probability tokens to select from in a sequence.
  3. max_tokens_to_sample: Set to 4096. For Anthropic models, the default is 256 and the max is 4096. This value denotes the absolute maximum number of tokens to predict before the generation stops. Anthropic models can stop before reaching this maximum.
Figure 7: Notebook configuration for Amazon Bedrock

Figure 7: Notebook configuration for Amazon Bedrock

Create and configure the LangChain agent

An agent uses a LLM and tools to reason and determine what actions to take and in which order. For this use case, we used a Conversational ReAct agent to remember conversational history and results to be used in a ReAct loop (Question → Thought → Action → Action Input → Observation ↔ repeat → Answer). This way, you don’t have to remember how to incorporate previous results in the subsequent question or query. Depending on your use case, you can configure a different type of agent.

Create a list of tools

Tools are functions used by an agent to interact with the available dataset. The agent’s tools are used by an action agent. We import both SQL and Python REPL tools:

  1. List the available log source tables in the Security Lake database
  2. Extract the schema and sample rows from the log source tables
  3. Create SQL queries to invoke in Athena
  4. Validate and rewrite the queries in case of syntax errors
  5. Invoke the query to get results from the appropriate log source tables
Figure 8: Notebook LangChain agent tools

Figure 8: Notebook LangChain agent tools

Here’s a breakdown for the tools used and the respective prompts:

  • QuerySQLDataBaseTool: This tool accepts detailed and correct SQL queries as input and returns results from the database. If the query is incorrect, you receive an error message. If there’s an error, rewrite and recheck the query, and try again. If you encounter an error such as Unknown column xxxx in field list, use the sql_db_schema to verify the correct table fields.
  • InfoSQLDatabaseTool: This tool accepts a comma-separated list of tables as input and returns the schema and sample rows for those tables. Verify that the tables exist by invoking the sql_db_list_tables first. The input format is: table1, table2, table3
  • ListSQLDatabaseTool: The input is an empty string, the output is a comma separated list of tables in the database
  • QuerySQLCheckerTool: Use this tool to check if your query is correct before running it. Always use this tool before running a query with sql_db_query
  • PythonREPLTool: A Python shell. Use this to run python commands. The input should be a valid python command. If you want to see the output of a value, you should print it out with print(…).

Note: If a native tool doesn’t meet your needs, you can create custom tools. Throughout our testing, we found some of the native tools provided most of what we needed but required minor tweaks for our use case. We changed the default behavior for the tools for use with Security Lake data.

Create an output parser

Output parsers are used to instruct the LLM to respond in the desired output format. Although the output parser is optional, it makes sure the LLM response is formatted in a way that can be quickly consumed and is actionable by the user.

Figure 9: LangChain output parser setting

Figure 9: LangChain output parser setting

Adding conversation buffer memory

To make things simpler for the user, previous results should be stored for use in subsequent queries by the Conversational ReAct agent. ConversationBufferMemory provides the capability to maintain state from past conversations and enables the user to ask follow-up questions in the same chat context. For example, if you asked an agent for a list of AWS accounts to focus on, you want your subsequent questions to focus on that same list of AWS accounts instead of writing the values down somewhere and keeping track of it in the next set of questions. There are many other types of memory that can be used to optimize your use cases.

Figure 10: LangChain conversation buffer memory setting

Figure 10: LangChain conversation buffer memory setting

Initialize the agent

At this point, all the appropriate configurations are set and it’s time to load an agent executor by providing a set of tools and a LLM.

  1. tools: List of tools the agent will have access to.
  2. llm: LLM the agent will use.
  3. agent: Agent type to use. If there is no value provided and agent_path is set, the agent used will default to AgentType.ZERO_SHOT_REACT_DESCRIPTION.
  4. agent_kwargs: Additional keyword arguments to pass to the agent.
Figure 11: LangChain agent initialization

Figure 11: LangChain agent initialization

Note: For this post, we set verbose=True to view the agent’s intermediate ReAct steps, while answering questions. If you’re only interested in the output, set verbose=False.

You can also set return_direct=True to have the tool output returned to the user and closing the agent loop. Since we want to maintain the results of the query and used by the LLM, we left the default value of return_direct=False.

Provide instructions to the agent on using the tools

In addition to providing the agent with a list of tools, you would also give instructions to the agent on how and when to use these tools for your use case. This is optional but provides the agent with more context and can lead to better results.

Figure 12: LangChain agent instructions

Figure 12: LangChain agent instructions

Start your threat analysis journey with the generative AI-powered agent

Now that you’ve walked through the same set up process we used to create and initialize the agent, we can demonstrate how to analyze Security Lake data using natural language input questions that a security researcher might ask. The following examples focus on how you can use the solution to identify security vulnerabilities, risks, and threats and prioritize mitigating them. For this post, we’re using native AWS sources, but the agent can analyze any custom log sources configured in Security Lake. You can also use this solution to assist with investigations of possible security events in your environment.

For each of the questions that follow, you would enter the question in the free-form cell after it has run, similar to Figure 13.

Note: Because the field is free form, you can change the questions. Depending on the changes, you might see different results than are shown in this post. To end the conversation, enter exit and press the Enter key.

Figure 13: LangChain agent conversation input

Figure 13: LangChain agent conversation input

Question 1: What data sources are available in Security Lake?

In addition to the native AWS sources that Security Lake automatically ingests, your security team can incorporate additional custom log sources. It’s important to know what data is available to you to determine what and where to investigate. As shown in Figure 14, the Security Lake database contains the following log sources as tables:

If there are additional custom sources configured, they will also show up here. From here, you can focus on a smaller subset of AWS accounts that might have a larger number of security-related findings.

Figure 14: LangChain agent output for Security Lake tables

Figure 14: LangChain agent output for Security Lake tables

Question 2: What are the top five AWS accounts that have the most Security Hub findings?

Security Hub is a cloud security posture management service that not only aggregates findings from other AWS security services—such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Macie, AWS Firewall Manager, and Amazon Inspector—but also from a number of AWS partner security solutions. Additionally, Security Hub has its own security best practices checks to help identify any vulnerabilities within your AWS environment. Depending on your environment, this might be a good starting place to look for specific AWS accounts to focus on.

Figure 15: LangChain output for AWS accounts with Security Hub findings

Figure 15: LangChain output for AWS accounts with Security Hub findings

Question 3: Within those AWS accounts, were any of the following actions found in (CreateUser, AttachUserPolicy, CreateAccessKey, CreateLoginProfile, DeleteTrail, DeleteMembers, UpdateIPSet, AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress) in CloudTrail?

With the list of AWS accounts to look at narrowed down, you might be interested in mutable changes in your AWS account that you would deem suspicious. It’s important to note that every AWS environment is different, and some actions might be suspicious for one environment but normal in another. You can tailor this list to actions that shouldn’t happen in your environment. For example, if your organization normally doesn’t use IAM users, you can change the list to look at a list of actions for IAM, such as CreateAccessKey, CreateLoginProfile, CreateUser, UpdateAccessKey, UpdateLoginProfile, and UpdateUser.

By looking at the actions related to AWS CloudTrail (CreateUser, AttachUserPolicy, CreateAccessKey, CreateLoginProfile, DeleteTrail, DeleteMembers, UpdateIPSet, AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress), you can see which actions were taken in your environment and choose which to focus on. Because the agent has access to previous chat history and results, you can ask follow-up questions on the SQL results without having to specify the AWS account IDs or event names.

Figure 16: LangChain agent output for CloudTrail actions taken in AWS Organization

Figure 16: LangChain agent output for CloudTrail actions taken in AWS Organization

Question 4: Which IAM principals took those actions?

The previous question narrowed down the list to mutable actions that shouldn’t occur. The next logical step is to determine which IAM principals took those actions. This helps correlate an actor to the actions that are either unexpected or are reserved for only authorized principals. For example, if you have an IAM principal tied to a continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) pipeline, that could be less suspicious. Alternatively, if you see an IAM principal that you don’t recognize, you could focus on all actions taken by that IAM principal, including how it was provisioned in the first place.

Figure 17: LangChain agent output for CloudTrail IAM principals that invoked events from the previous query

Figure 17: LangChain agent output for CloudTrail IAM principals that invoked events from the previous query

Question 5: Within those AWS accounts, were there any connections made to “3.0.0.0/8”?

If you don’t find anything useful related to mutable changes to CloudTrail, you can pivot to see if there were any network connections established from a specific Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) range. For example, if an organization primarily interacts with AWS resources within your AWS Organizations from your corporate-owned CIDR range, anything outside of that might be suspicious. Additionally, if you have threat lists or suspicious IP ranges, you can add them to the query to see if there are any network connections established from those ranges. The agent knows that the query is network related and to look in VPC flow logs and is focusing on only the AWS accounts from Question 2.

Figure 18: LangChain agent output for VPC flow log matches to specific CIDR

Figure 18: LangChain agent output for VPC flow log matches to specific CIDR

Question 6: As a security analyst, what other evidence or logs should I look for to determine if there are any indicators of compromise in my AWS environment?

If you haven’t found what you’re looking for and want some inspiration from the agent, you can ask the agent what other areas you should look at within your AWS environment. This might help you create a threat analysis thesis or use case as a starting point. You can also refer to the MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix for more areas to focus on when setting up questions for your agent.

Figure 19: LangChain agent output for additional scenarios and questions to investigate

Figure 19: LangChain agent output for additional scenarios and questions to investigate

Based on the answers given, you can start a new investigation to identify possible vulnerabilities and threats:

  • Is there any unusual API activity in my organization that could be an indicator of compromise?
  • Have there been any AWS console logins that don’t match normal geographic patterns?
  • Have there been any spikes in network traffic for my AWS resources?

Agent running custom SQL queries

If you want to use a previously generated or customized SQL query, the agent can run the query as shown in Figure 20 that follows. In the previous questions, a SQL query is generated in the agent’s Action Input field. You can use that SQL query as a baseline, edit the SQL query manually to fit your use case, and then run the modified query through the agent. The modified query results are stored in memory and can be used for subsequent natural language questions to the agent. Even if your security analysts already have SQL experience, having the agent give a recommendation or template SQL query can shorten your investigation.

Figure 20: LangChain agent output for invoking custom SQL queries

Figure 20: LangChain agent output for invoking custom SQL queries

Agent assistance to automatically generate visualizations

You can get help from the agent to create visualizations by using the PythonREPL tool to generate code and plot SQL query results. As shown in Figure 21, you can ask the agent to get results from a SQL query and generate code to create a visualization based on those results. You can then take the generated code and put it into the next cell to create the visualization.

Figure 21: LangChain agent output to generate code to visualize SQL results in a plot

Figure 21: LangChain agent output to generate code to visualize SQL results in a plot

The agent returns example code after To plot the results. You can copy the code between ‘‘‘python and ’’’ and input that code in the next cell. After you run that cell, a visual based on the SQL results is created similar to Figure 22 that follows. This can be helpful to share the notebook output as part of an investigation to either create a custom detection to monitor or determine how a vulnerability can be mitigated.

Figure 22: Notebook Python code output from code generated by LangChain agent

Figure 22: Notebook Python code output from code generated by LangChain agent

Tailoring your agent to your data

As previously discussed, use cases and data vary between organizations. It’s important to understand the foundational components in terms of how you can configure and tailor the LLM, agents, tools, and configuration to your environment. The notebook in the solution was the result of experiments to determine and display what’s possible. Along the way, you might encounter challenges or issues depending on changes you make in the notebook or by adding additional data sources. Below are some tips to help you create and tailor the notebook to your use case.

  • If the agent pauses in the intermediate steps or asks for guidance to answer the original question, you can guide the agent with prompt engineering techniques, using commands such as execute or continue to move the process along.
  • If the agent is hallucinating or providing data that isn’t accurate, see Anthropic’s user guide for mechanisms to reduce hallucinations. An example of a hallucination would be the response having generic information such as an AWS account that is 1234567890 or the resulting count of a query being repeated for multiple rows.

    Note: You can also use Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) in Amazon SageMaker to mitigate hallucinations.

SageMaker Studio and Amazon Bedrock provide native integration to use a variety of generative AI tools with your Security Lake data to help increase your organization’s security posture. Some other use cases you can try include:

  • Investigating impact and root cause for a suspected compromise of an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance from a GuardDuty finding.
  • Determining if network ACL or firewall changes in your environment affected the number of AWS resources communicating with public endpoints.
  • Checking if any S3 buckets with possibly confidential or sensitive data were accessed by non-authorized IAM principals.
  • Identify if an EC2 instance that might be compromised made any internal or external connections to other AWS resources and then if those resources were impacted.

Conclusion

This solution demonstrates how you can use the generative AI capabilities of Amazon Bedrock and natural language input in SageMaker Studio to analyze data in Security Lake and work towards reducing your organization’s risk and increase your security posture. The Python notebook is primarily meant to serve as a starting point to walk through an example scenario to identify potential vulnerabilities and threats.

Security Lake is continually working on integrating native AWS sources, but there are also custom data sources outside of AWS that you might want to import for your agent to analyze. We also showed you how we configured the notebook to use agents and LLMs, and how you can tune each component within a notebook to your specific use case.

By enabling your security team to analyze and interact with data in Security Lake using natural language input, you can reduce the amount of time needed to conduct an investigation by automatically identifying the appropriate data sources, generating and invoking SQL queries, and visualizing data from your investigation. This post focuses on Security Lake, which normalizes data into Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF), but as long as the database data schema is normalized, the solution can be applied to other data stores.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the Generative AI on AWS re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Author

Jonathan Nguyen

Jonathan is a Principal Security Architect at AWS. His background is in AWS security with a focus on threat detection and incident response. He helps enterprise customers develop a comprehensive AWS security strategy and deploy security solutions at scale, and trains customers on AWS security best practices.

Madhunika-Reddy-Mikkili

Madhunika Reddy Mikkili

Madhunika is a Data and Machine Learning Engineer with the AWS Professional Services Shared Delivery Team. She is passionate about helping customers achieve their goals through the use of data and machine learning insights. Outside of work, she loves traveling and spending time with family and friends.

Harsh Asnani

Harsh Asnani

Harsh is a Machine Learning Engineer at AWS. His Background is in applied Data Science with a focus on operationalizing Machine Learning workloads in the cloud at scale.

Kartik Kannapur

Kartik Kannapur

Kartik is a Senior Data Scientist with AWS Professional Services. His background is in Applied Mathematics and Statistics. He works with enterprise customers, helping them use machine learning to solve their business problems.

How to customize access tokens in Amazon Cognito user pools

Post Syndicated from Edward Sun original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-customize-access-tokens-in-amazon-cognito-user-pools/

With Amazon Cognito, you can implement customer identity and access management (CIAM) into your web and mobile applications. You can add user authentication and access control to your applications in minutes.

In this post, I introduce you to the new access token customization feature for Amazon Cognito user pools and show you how to use it. Access token customization is included in the advanced security features (ASF) of Amazon Cognito. Note that ASF is subject to additional pricing as described on the Amazon Cognito pricing page.

What is access token customization?

When a user signs in to your app, Amazon Cognito verifies their sign-in information, and if the user is authenticated successfully, returns the ID, access, and refresh tokens. The access token, which uses the JSON Web Token (JWT) format following the RFC7519 standard, contains claims in the token payload that identify the principal being authenticated, and session attributes such as authentication time and token expiration time. More importantly, the access token also contains authorization attributes in the form of user group memberships and OAuth scopes. Your applications or API resource servers can evaluate the token claims to authorize specific actions on behalf of users.

With access token customization, you can add application-specific claims to the standard access token and then make fine-grained authorization decisions to provide a differentiated end-user experience. You can refine the original scope claims to further restrict access to your resources and enforce the least privileged access. You can also enrich access tokens with claims from other sources, such as user subscription information stored in an Amazon DynamoDB table. Your application can use this enriched claim to determine the level of access and content available to the user. This reduces the need to build a custom solution to look up attributes in your application’s code, thereby reducing application complexity, improving performance, and smoothing the integration experience with downstream applications.

How do I use the access token customization feature?

Amazon Cognito works with AWS Lambda functions to modify your user pool’s authentication behavior and end-user experience. In this section, you’ll learn how to configure a pre token generation Lambda trigger function and invoke it during the Amazon Cognito authentication process. I’ll also show you an example function to help you write your own Lambda function.

Lambda trigger flow

During a user authentication, you can choose to have Amazon Cognito invoke a pre token generation trigger to enrich and customize your tokens.

Figure 1: Pre token generation trigger flow

Figure 1: Pre token generation trigger flow

Figure 1 illustrates the pre token generation trigger flow. This flow has the following steps:

  1. An end user signs in to your app and authenticates with an Amazon Cognito user pool.
  2. After the user completes the authentication, Amazon Cognito invokes the pre token generation Lambda trigger, and sends event data to your Lambda function, such as userAttributes and scopes, in a pre token generation trigger event.
  3. Your Lambda function code processes token enrichment logic, and returns a response event to Amazon Cognito to indicate the claims that you want to add or suppress.
  4. Amazon Cognito vends a customized JWT to your application.

The pre token generation trigger flow supports OAuth 2.0 grant types, such as the authorization code grant flow and implicit grant flow, and also supports user authentication through the AWS SDK.

Enable access token customization

Your Amazon Cognito user pool delivers two different versions of the pre token generation trigger event to your Lambda function. Trigger event version 1 includes userAttributes, groupConfiguration, and clientMetadata in the event request, which you can use to customize ID token claims. Trigger event version 2 adds scope in the event request, which you can use to customize scopes in the access token in addition to customizing other claims.

In this section, I’ll show you how to update your user pool to trigger event version 2 and enable access token customization.

To enable access token customization

  1. Open the Cognito user pool console, and then choose User pools.
  2. Choose the target user pool for token customization.
  3. On the User pool properties tab, in the Lambda triggers section, choose Add Lambda trigger.
  4. Figure 2: Add Lambda trigger

    Figure 2: Add Lambda trigger

  5. In the Lambda triggers section, do the following:
    1. For Trigger type, select Authentication.
    2. For Authentication, select Pre token generation trigger.
    3. For Trigger event version, select Basic features + access token customization – Recommended. If this option isn’t available to you, make sure that you have enabled advanced security features. You must have advanced security features enabled to access this option.
  6. Figure 3: Select Lambda trigger

    Figure 3: Select Lambda trigger

  7. Select your Lambda function and assign it as the pre token generation trigger. Then choose Add Lambda trigger.
  8. Figure 4: Add Lambda trigger

    Figure 4: Add Lambda trigger

Example pre token generation trigger

Now that you have enabled access token customization, I’ll walk you through a code example of the pre token generation Lambda trigger, and the version 2 trigger event. This code example examines the trigger event request, and adds a new custom claim and a custom OAuth scope in the response for Amazon Cognito to customize the access token to suit various authorization scheme.

Here is an example version 2 trigger event. The event request contains the user attributes from the Amazon Cognito user pool, the original scope claims, and the original group configurations. It has two custom attributes—membership and location—which are collected during the user registration process and stored in the Cognito user pool.

{
  "version": "2",
  "triggerSource": "TokenGeneration_HostedAuth",
  "region": "us-east-1",
  "userPoolId": "us-east-1_01EXAMPLE",
  "userName": "mytestuser",
  "callerContext": {
    "awsSdkVersion": "aws-sdk-unknown-unknown",
    "clientId": "1example23456789"
  },
  "request": {
    "userAttributes": {
      "sub": "a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-EXAMPLE11111",
      "cognito:user_status": "CONFIRMED",
      "email": "[email protected]",
      "email_verified": "true",
      "custom:membership": "Premium",
      "custom:location": "USA"
    },
    "groupConfiguration": {
      "groupsToOverride": [],
      "iamRolesToOverride": [],
      "preferredRole": null
    },
    "scopes": [
      "openid",
      "profile",
      "email"
    ]
  },
  "response": {
    "claimsAndScopeOverrideDetails": null
  }
}

In the following code example, I transformed the user’s location attribute and membership attribute to add a custom claim and a custom scope. I used the claimsToAddOrOverride field to create a new custom claim called demo:membershipLevel with a membership value of Premium from the event request. I also constructed a new scope with the value of membership:USA.Premium through the scopesToAdd claim, and added the new claim and scope in the event response.

export const handler = function(event, context) {
  // Retrieve user attribute from event request
  const userAttributes = event.request.userAttributes;
  // Add scope to event response
  event.response = {
    "claimsAndScopeOverrideDetails": {
      "idTokenGeneration": {},
      "accessTokenGeneration": {
        "claimsToAddOrOverride": {
          "demo:membershipLevel": userAttributes['custom:membership']
        },
        "scopesToAdd": ["membership:" + userAttributes['custom:location'] + "." + userAttributes['custom:membership']]
      }
    }
  };
  // Return to Amazon Cognito
  context.done(null, event);
};

With the preceding code, the Lambda trigger sends the following response back to Amazon Cognito to indicate the customization that was needed for the access tokens.

"response": {
  "claimsAndScopeOverrideDetails": {
    "idTokenGeneration": {},
    "accessTokenGeneration": {
      "claimsToAddOrOverride": {
        "demo:membershipLevel": "Premium"
      },
      "scopesToAdd": [
        "membership:USA.Premium"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Then Amazon Cognito issues tokens with these customizations at runtime:

{
  "sub": "a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-EXAMPLE11111",
  "iss": "https://cognito-idp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/us-east-1_01EXAMPLE",
  "version": 2,
  "client_id": "1example23456789",
  "event_id": "01faa385-562d-4730-8c3b-458e5c8f537b",
  "token_use": "access",
  "demo:membershipLevel": "Premium",
  "scope": "openid profile email membership:USA.Premium",
  "auth_time": 1702270800,
  "exp": 1702271100,
  "iat": 1702270800,
  "jti": "d903dcdf-8c73-45e3-bf44-51bf7c395e06",
  "username": "mytestuser"
}

Your application can then use the newly-minted, custom scope and claim to authorize users and provide them with a personalized experience.

Considerations and best practices

There are four general considerations and best practices that you can follow:

  1. Some claims and scopes aren’t customizable. For example, you can’t customize claims such as auth_time, iss, and sub, or scopes such as aws.cognito.signin.user.admin. For the full list of excluded claims and scopes, see the Excluded claims and scopes.
  2. Work backwards from authorization. When you customize access tokens, you should start with your existing authorization schema and then decide whether to customize the scopes or claims, or both. Standard OAuth based authorization scenarios, such as Amazon API Gateway authorizers, typically use custom scopes to provide access. However, if you have complex or fine-grained authorization requirements, then you should consider using both scopes and custom claims to pass additional contextual data to the application or to a policy-based access control service such as Amazon Verified Permission.
  3. Establish governance in token customization. You should have a consistent company engineering policy to provide nomenclature guidance for scopes and claims. A syntax standard promotes globally unique variables and avoids a name collision across different application teams. For example, Application X at AnyCompany can choose to name their scope as ac.appx.claim_name, where ac represents AnyCompany as a global identifier and appx.claim_name represents Application X’s custom claim.
  4. Be aware of limits. Because tokens are passed through various networks and systems, you need to be aware of potential token size limitations in your systems. You should keep scope and claim names as short as possible, while still being descriptive.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to integrate a pre token generation Lambda trigger with your Amazon Cognito user pool to customize access tokens. You can use the access token customization feature to provide differentiated services to your end users based on claims and OAuth scopes. For more information, see pre token generation Lambda trigger in the Amazon Cognito Developer Guide.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Edward Sun

Edward Sun

Edward is a Security Specialist Solutions Architect focused on identity and access management. He loves helping customers throughout their cloud transformation journey with architecture design, security best practices, migration, and cost optimizations. Outside of work, Edward enjoys hiking, golfing, and cheering for his alma mater, the Georgia Bulldogs.