Tag Archives: Identity and Access Management

An easier way to control access to AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals

2018-05-17 Sulay Shah

Post Syndicated from Sulay Shah original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/control-access-to-aws-resources-by-using-the-aws-organization-of-iam-principals/

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) now makes it easier for you to control access to your AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals (users and roles). For some services, you grant permissions using resource-based policies to specify the accounts and principals that can access the resource and what actions they can perform on it. Now, you can use a new condition key, aws:PrincipalOrgID, in these policies to require all principals accessing the resource to be from an account in the organization. For example, let’s say you have an Amazon S3 bucket policy and you want to restrict access to only principals from AWS accounts inside of your organization. To accomplish this, you can define the aws:PrincipalOrgID condition and set the value to your organization ID in the bucket policy. Your organization ID is what sets the access control on the S3 bucket. Additionally, when you use this condition, policy permissions apply when you add new accounts to this organization without requiring an update to the policy.

In this post, I walk through the details of the new condition and show you how to restrict access to only principals in your organization using S3.

Condition concepts

Before I introduce the new condition, let’s review the condition element of an IAM policy. A condition is an optional IAM policy element you can use to specify special circumstances under which the policy grants or denies permission. A condition includes a condition key, operator, and value for the condition. There are two types of conditions: service-specific conditions and global conditions. Service-specific conditions are specific to certain actions in an AWS service. For example, the condition key ec2:InstanceType supports specific EC2 actions. Global conditions support all actions across all AWS services.

Now that I’ve reviewed the condition element in an IAM policy, let me introduce the new condition.

AWS:PrincipalOrgID Condition Key

You can use this condition key to apply a filter to the Principal element of a resource-based policy. You can use any string operator, such as StringLike, with this condition and specify the AWS organization ID for as its value.

Condition key	Description	Operator(s)	Value
aws:PrincipalOrgID	Validates if the principal accessing the resource belongs to an account in your organization.	All String operators	Any AWS organization ID

Example: Restrict access to only principals from my organization

Let’s consider an example where I want to give specific IAM principals in my organization direct access to my S3 bucket, 2018-Financial-Data, that contains sensitive financial information. I have two accounts in my AWS organization with multiple account IDs, and only some IAM users from these accounts need access to this financial report.

To grant this access, I author a resource-based policy for my S3 bucket as shown below. In this policy, I list the individuals who I want to grant access. For the sake of this example, let’s say that while doing so, I accidentally specify an incorrect account ID. This means a user named Steve, who is not in an account in my organization, can now access my financial report. To require the principal account to be in my organization, I add a condition to my policy using the global condition key aws:PrincipalOrgID. This condition requires that only principals from accounts in my organization can access the S3 bucket. This means that although Steve is one of the principals in the policy, he can’t access the financial report because the account that he is a member of doesn’t belong to my organization.




{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AllowPutObject",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": ["arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Casey",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/David",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Tom",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Michael",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Brenda",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Lisa",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Norman",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565646:user/Steve",
				"arn:aws:iam::087695765465:user/Douglas",
				"arn:aws:iam::087695765465:user/Michelle"],
            "Action": "s3:GetObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::2018-Financial-Data/*",
            "Condition": {"ForAnyValue:StringLike": 
                             {"aws:PrincipalOrgID": [ "o-xxxxxxxxxx" ]}
                         }
        }
    ]
}

In the policy above, I specify the principals that I grant access to using the principal element of the statement. Next, I add s3:GetObject as the action and 2018-Financial-Data/* as the resource to grant read access to my S3 bucket. Finally, I add the new condition key aws:PrincipalOrgID and specify my organization ID in the condition element of the statement to make sure only the principals from the accounts in my organization can access this bucket.

Summary

You can now use the aws:PrincipalOrgID condition key in your resource-based policies to more easily restrict access to IAM principals from accounts in your AWS organization. For more information about this global condition key and policy examples using aws:PrincipalOrgID, read the IAM documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about or suggestions for this solution, start a new thread on the IAM forum or contact AWS Support.

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Refining Access to Branches in AWS CodeCommit

2018-05-16 Chris Barclay

Post Syndicated from Chris Barclay original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/refining-access-to-branches-in-aws-codecommit/

Thanks to Susan Ferrell, Senior Technical Writer, for a great blog post on how to use CodeCommit branch-level permissions.
—-

AWS CodeCommit users have been asking for a way to restrict commits to some repository branches to just a few people. In this blog post, we’re going to show you how to do that by creating and applying a conditional policy, an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy that contains a context key.

Why would I do this?

When you create a branch in an AWS CodeCommit repository, the branch is available, by default, to all repository users. Here are some scenarios in which refining access might help you:

You maintain a branch in a repository for production-ready code, and you don’t want to allow changes to this branch except from a select group of people.
You want to limit the number of people who can make changes to the default branch in a repository.
You want to ensure that pull requests cannot be merged to a branch except by an approved group of developers.

We’ll show you how to create a policy in IAM that prevents users from pushing commits to and merging pull requests to a branch named master. You’ll attach that policy to one group or role in IAM, and then test how users in that group are affected when that policy is applied. We’ll explain how it works, so you can create custom policies for your repositories.

What you need to get started

You’ll need to sign in to AWS with sufficient permissions to:
- - Create and apply policies in IAM.
  - Create groups in IAM.
  - Add users to those groups.
  - Apply policies to those groups.
You can use existing IAM groups, but because you’re going to be changing permissions, you might want to first test this out on groups and users you’ve created specifically for this purpose.
You’ll need a repository in AWS CodeCommit with at least two branches: master and test-branch. For information about how to create repositories, see Create a Repository. For information about how to create branches, see Create a Branch. In this blog post, we’ve named the repository MyDemoRepo. You can use an existing repository with branches of another name, if you prefer.

Let’s get started!

Create two groups in IAM

We’re going to set up two groups in IAM: Developers and Senior_Developers. To start, both groups will have the same managed policy, AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers, applied. Users in each group will have exactly the same permissions to perform actions in IAM.

Figure 1: Two example groups in IAM, with distinct users but the same managed policy applied to each group

First, create the Developers group.

Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/.
In the navigation pane, choose Groups, and then choose Create New Group.
In the Group Name box, type Developers, and then choose Next Step.
In the list of policies, select the check box for AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers, then choose Next Step.
Choose Create Group.

Now, follow these steps to create the Senior_Developers group and attach the AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers managed policy. You now have two empty groups with the same policy attached.

Create users in IAM

Next, add at least one unique user to each group. You can use existing IAM users, but because you’ll be affecting their access to AWS CodeCommit, you might want to create two users just for testing purposes. Let’s go ahead and create Arnav and Mary.

In the navigation pane, choose Users, and then choose Add user.
For the new user, type Arnav_Desai.
Choose Add another user, and then type Mary_Major.
Select the type of access (programmatic access, access to the AWS Management Console, or both). In this blog post, we’ll be testing everything from the console, but if you want to test AWS CodeCommit using the AWS CLI, make sure you include programmatic access and console access.
For Console password type, choose Custom password. Each user is assigned the password that you type in the box. Write these down so you don’t forget them. You’ll need to sign in to the console using each of these accounts.
Choose Next: Permissions.
On the Set permissions page, choose Add user to group. Add Arnav to the Developers group. Add Mary to the Senior_Developers group.
Choose Next: Review to see all of the choices you made up to this point. When you are ready to proceed, choose Create user.

Sign in as Arnav, and then follow these steps to go to the master branch and add a file. Then sign in as Mary and follow the same steps.

Open the AWS CodeCommit console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/codecommit.
On the Dashboard page, from the list of repositories, choose MyDemoRepo.
In the Code view, choose the branch named master.
Choose Add file, and then choose Create file. Type some text or code in the editor.
Provide information to other users about who added this file to the repository and why.
1. In Author name, type the name of the user (Arnav or Mary).
2. In Email address, type an email address so that other repository users can contact you about this change.
3. In Commit message, type a brief description to help you remember why you added this file or any other details you might find helpful.
4. Type a name for the file.
Choose Commit file.

Now follow the same steps to add a file in a different branch. (In our example repository, that’s the branch named test-branch.) You should be able to add a file to both branches regardless of whether you’re signed in as Arnav or Mary.

Let’s change that.

Create a conditional policy in IAM

You’re going to create a policy in IAM that will deny API actions if certain conditions are met. We want to prevent users with this policy applied from updating a branch named master, but we don’t want to prevent them from viewing the branch, cloning the repository, or creating pull requests that will merge to that branch. For this reason, we want to pick and choose our APIs carefully. Looking at the Permissions Reference, the logical permissions for this are:

GitPush
PutFile
MergePullRequestByFastForward

Now’s the time to think about what else you might want this policy to do. For example, because we don’t want users with this policy to make changes to this branch, we probably don’t want them to be able to delete it either, right? So let’s add one more permission:

DeleteBranch

The branch in which we want to deny these actions is master. The repository in which the branch resides is MyDemoRepo. We’re going to need more than just the repository name, though. We need the repository ARN. Fortunately, that’s easy to find. Just go to the AWS CodeCommit console, choose the repository, and choose Settings. The repository ARN is displayed on the General tab.

Now we’re ready to create a policy.
1. Open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/. Make sure you’re signed in with the account that has sufficient permissions to create policies, and not as Arnav or Mary.
2. In the navigation pane, choose Policies, and then choose Create policy.
3. Choose JSON, and then paste in the following:

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": [
                "codecommit:GitPush",
                "codecommit:DeleteBranch",
                "codecommit:PutFile",
                "codecommit:MergePullRequestByFastForward"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:codecommit:us-east-2:80398EXAMPLE:MyDemoRepo",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEqualsIfExists": {
                    "codecommit:References": [
                        "refs/heads/master"   
                    ]
                },
                "Null": {
                    "codecommit:References": false
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

You’ll notice a few things here. First, change the repository ARN to the ARN for your repository and include the repository name. Second, if you want to restrict access to a branch with a name different from our example, master, change that reference too.

Now let’s talk about this policy and what it does. You might be wondering why we’re using a Git reference (refs/heads) value instead of just the branch name. The answer lies in how Git references things, and how AWS CodeCommit, as a Git-based repository service, implements its APIs. A branch in Git is a simple pointer (reference) to the SHA-1 value of the head commit for that branch.

You might also be wondering about the second part of the condition, the nullification language. This is necessary because of the way git push and git-receive-pack work. Without going into too many technical details, when you attempt to push a change from a local repo to AWS CodeCommit, an initial reference call is made to AWS CodeCommit without any branch information. AWS CodeCommit evaluates that initial call to ensure that:

a) You’re authorized to make calls.

b) A repository exists with the name specified in the initial call. If you left that null out of the policy, users with that policy would be unable to complete any pushes from their local repos to the AWS CodeCommit remote repository at all, regardless of which branch they were trying to push their commits to.

Could you write a policy in such a way that the null is not required? Of course. IAM policy language is flexible. There’s an example of how to do this in the AWS CodeCommit User Guide, if you’re curious. But for the purposes of this blog post, let’s continue with this policy as written.

So what have we essentially said in this policy? We’ve asked IAM to deny the relevant CodeCommit permissions if the request is made to the resource MyDemoRepo and it meets the following condition: the reference is to refs/heads/master. Otherwise, the deny does not apply.

I’m sure you’re wondering if this policy has to be constrained to a specific repository resource like MyDemoRepo. After all, it would be awfully convenient if a single policy could apply to all branches in any repository in an AWS account, particularly since the default branch in any repository is initially the master branch. Good news! Simply replace the ARN with an *, and your policy will affect ALL branches named master in every AWS CodeCommit repository in your AWS account. Make sure that this is really what you want, though. We suggest you start by limiting the scope to just one repository, and then changing things when you’ve tested it and are happy with how it works.

When you’re sure you’ve modified the policy for your environment, choose Review policy to validate it. Give this policy a name, such as DenyChangesToMaster, provide a description of its purpose, and then choose Create policy.

Now that you have a policy, it’s time to apply and test it.

Apply the policy to a group

In theory, you could apply the policy you just created directly to any IAM user, but that really doesn’t scale well. You should apply this policy to a group, if you use IAM groups to manage users, or to a role, if your users assume a role when interacting with AWS resources.

In the IAM console, choose Groups, and then choose Developers.
On the Permissions tab, choose Attach Policy.
Choose DenyChangesToMaster, and then choose Attach policy.

Your groups now have a critical difference: users in the Developers group have an additional policy applied that restricts their actions in the master branch. In other words, Mary can continue to add files, push commits, and merge pull requests in the master branch, but Arnav cannot.

Figure 2: Two example groups in IAM, one with an additional policy applied that will prevent users in this group from making changes to the master branch

Test it out. Sign in as Arnav, and do the following:

Open the AWS CodeCommit console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/codecommit.
On the Dashboard page, from the list of repositories, choose MyDemoRepo.
In the Code view, choose the branch named master.
Choose Add file, and then choose Create file, just as you did before. Provide some text, and then add the file name and your user information.
Choose Commit file.

This time you’ll see an error after choosing Commit file. It’s not a pretty message, but at the very end, you’ll see a telling phrase: “explicit deny”. That’s the policy in action. You, as Arnav, are explicitly denied PutFile, which prevents you from adding a file to the master branch. You’ll see similar results if you try other actions denied by that policy, such as deleting the master branch.

Stay signed in as Arnav, but this time add a file to test-branch. You should be able to add a file without seeing any errors. You can create a branch based on the master branch, add a file to it, and create a pull request that will merge to the master branch, all just as before. However, you cannot perform denied actions on that master branch.

Sign out as Arnav and sign in as Mary. You’ll see that as that IAM user, you can add and edit files in the master branch, merge pull requests to it, and even, although we don’t recommend this, delete it.

Conclusion

You can use conditional statements in policies in IAM to refine how users interact with your AWS CodeCommit repositories. This blog post showed how to use such a policy to prevent users from making changes to a branch named master. There are many other options. We hope this blog post will encourage you to experiment with AWS CodeCommit, IAM policies, and permissions. If you have any questions or suggestions, we’d love to hear from you.

The AWS Shared Responsibility Model and GDPR

2018-05-15 Chad Woolf

Post Syndicated from Chad Woolf original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/the-aws-shared-responsibility-model-and-gdpr/

The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) describes data processor and data controller roles, and some customers and AWS Partner Network (APN) partners are asking how this affects the long-established AWS Shared Responsibility Model. I wanted to take some time to help folks understand shared responsibilities for us and for our customers in context of the GDPR.

How does the AWS Shared Responsibility Model change under GDPR? The short answer – it doesn’t. AWS is responsible for securing the underlying infrastructure that supports the cloud and the services provided; while customers and APN partners, acting either as data controllers or data processors, are responsible for any personal data they put in the cloud. The shared responsibility model illustrates the various responsibilities of AWS and our customers and APN partners, and the same separation of responsibility applies under the GDPR.

AWS responsibilities as a data processor

The GDPR does introduce specific regulation and responsibilities regarding data controllers and processors. When any AWS customer uses our services to process personal data, the controller is usually the AWS customer (and sometimes it is the AWS customer’s customer). However, in all of these cases, AWS is always the data processor in relation to this activity. This is because the customer is directing the processing of data through its interaction with the AWS service controls, and AWS is only executing customer directions. As a data processor, AWS is responsible for protecting the global infrastructure that runs all of our services. Controllers using AWS maintain control over data hosted on this infrastructure, including the security configuration controls for handling end-user content and personal data. Protecting this infrastructure, is our number one priority, and we invest heavily in third-party auditors to test our security controls and make any issues they find available to our customer base through AWS Artifact. Our ISO 27018 report is a good example, as it tests security controls that focus on protection of personal data in particular.

AWS has an increased responsibility for our managed services. Examples of managed services include Amazon DynamoDB, Amazon RDS, Amazon Redshift, Amazon Elastic MapReduce, and Amazon WorkSpaces. These services provide the scalability and flexibility of cloud-based resources with less operational overhead because we handle basic security tasks like guest operating system (OS) and database patching, firewall configuration, and disaster recovery. For most managed services, you only configure logical access controls and protect account credentials, while maintaining control and responsibility of any personal data.

Customer and APN partner responsibilities as data controllers — and how AWS Services can help

Our customers can act as data controllers or data processors within their AWS environment. As a data controller, the services you use may determine how you configure those services to help meet your GDPR compliance needs. For example, AWS Services that are classified as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), such as Amazon EC2, Amazon VPC, and Amazon S3, are under your control and require you to perform all routine security configuration and management that would be necessary no matter where the servers were located. With Amazon EC2 instances, you are responsible for managing: guest OS (including updates and security patches), application software or utilities installed on the instances, and the configuration of the AWS-provided firewall (called a security group).

To help you realize data protection by design principles under the GDPR when using our infrastructure, we recommend you protect AWS account credentials and set up individual user accounts with Amazon Identity and Access Management (IAM) so that each user is only given the permissions necessary to fulfill their job duties. We also recommend using multi-factor authentication (MFA) with each account, requiring the use of SSL/TLS to communicate with AWS resources, setting up API/user activity logging with AWS CloudTrail, and using AWS encryption solutions, along with all default security controls within AWS Services. You can also use advanced managed security services, such as Amazon Macie, which assists in discovering and securing personal data stored in Amazon S3.

For more information, you can download the AWS Security Best Practices whitepaper or visit the AWS Security Resources or GDPR Center webpages. In addition to our solutions and services, AWS APN partners can provide hundreds of tools and features to help you meet your security objectives, ranging from network security and configuration management to access control and data encryption.

How to Use AWS Config to Monitor for and Respond to Amazon S3 Buckets Allowing Public Access

2018-05-01 Josh Zeiser

Post Syndicated from Josh Zeiser original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-aws-config-to-monitor-for-and-respond-to-amazon-s3-buckets-allowing-public-access/

AWS Config enables continuous monitoring of your AWS resources, making it simple to assess, audit, and record resource configurations and changes. AWS Config does this through the use of rules that define the desired configuration state of your AWS resources. AWS Config provides a number of AWS managed rules that address a wide range of security concerns such as checking if you encrypted your Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volumes, tagged your resources appropriately, and enabled multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root accounts. You can also create custom rules to codify your compliance requirements through the use of AWS Lambda functions.

In this post we’ll show you how to use AWS Config to monitor our Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket ACLs and policies for violations which allow public read or public write access. If AWS Config finds a policy violation, we’ll have it trigger an Amazon CloudWatch Event rule to trigger an AWS Lambda function which either corrects the S3 bucket ACL, or notifies you via Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) that the policy is in violation and allows public read or public write access. We’ll show you how to do this in five main steps.

Enable AWS Config to monitor Amazon S3 bucket ACLs and policies for compliance violations.
Create an IAM Role and Policy that grants a Lambda function permissions to read S3 bucket policies and send alerts through SNS.
Create and configure a CloudWatch Events rule that triggers the Lambda function when AWS Config detects an S3 bucket ACL or policy violation.
Create a Lambda function that uses the IAM role to review S3 bucket ACLs and policies, correct the ACLs, and notify your team of out-of-compliance policies.
Verify the monitoring solution.

Note: This post assumes your compliance policies require the buckets you monitor not allow public read or write access. If you have intentionally open buckets serving static content, for example, you can use this post as a jumping-off point for a solution tailored to your needs.

At the end of this post, we provide an AWS CloudFormation template that implements the solution outlined. The template enables you to deploy the solution in multiple regions quickly.

Important: The use of some of the resources deployed, including those deployed using the provided CloudFormation template, will incur costs as long as they are in use. AWS Config Rules incur costs in each region they are active.

Architecture

Here’s an architecture diagram of what we’ll implement:

Figure 1: Architecture diagram

Step 1: Enable AWS Config and Amazon S3 Bucket monitoring

The following steps demonstrate how to set up AWS Config to monitor Amazon S3 buckets.

Sign into the AWS Management Console and open the AWS Config console.
If this is your first time using AWS Config, select Get started. If you’ve already used AWS Config, select Settings.
In the Settings page, under Resource types to record, clear the All resources checkbox. In the Specific types list, select Bucket under S3.

Figure 2: The Settings dialog box showing the “Specific types” list
Choose the Amazon S3 bucket for storing configuration history and snapshots. We’ll create a new Amazon S3 bucket.

Figure 3: Creating an S3 bucket
1. If you prefer to use an existing Amazon S3 bucket in your account, select the Choose a bucket from your account radio button and, using the dropdown, select an existing bucket.
  
  Figure 4: Selecting an existing S3 bucket
Under Amazon SNS topic, check the box next to Stream configuration changes and notifications to an Amazon SNS topic, and then select the radio button to Create a topic.
1. Alternatively, you can choose a topic that you have previously created and subscribed to.
  
  Figure 5: Selecting a topic that you’ve previously created and subscribed to
2. If you created a new SNS topic you need to subscribe to it to receive notifications. We’ll cover this in a later step.
Under AWS Config role, choose Create a role (unless you already have a role you want to use). We’re using the auto-suggested role name.

Figure 6: Creating a role
Select Next.
Configure Amazon S3 bucket monitoring rules:
1. On the AWS Config rules page, search for S3 and choose the s3-bucket-publice-read-prohibited and s3-bucket-public-write-prohibited rules, then click Next.
  
  Figure 7: AWS Config rules dialog
2. On the Review page, select Confirm. AWS Config is now analyzing your Amazon S3 buckets, capturing their current configurations, and evaluating the configurations against the rules we selected.
If you created a new Amazon SNS topic, open the Amazon SNS Management Console and locate the topic you created:

Figure 8: Amazon SNS topic list
Copy the ARN of the topic (the string that begins with arn:) because you’ll need it in a later step.
Select the checkbox next to the topic, and then, under the Actions menu, select Subscribe to topic.
Select Email as the protocol, enter your email address, and then select Create subscription.
After several minutes, you’ll receive an email asking you to confirm your subscription for notifications for this topic. Select the link to confirm the subscription.

Step 2: Create a Role for Lambda

Our Lambda will need permissions that enable it to inspect and modify Amazon S3 bucket ACLs and policies, log to CloudWatch Logs, and publishing to an Amazon SNS topic. We’ll now set up a custom AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy and role to support these actions and assign them to the Lambda function we’ll create in the next section.

In the AWS Management Console, under Services, select IAM to access the IAM Console.

Create a policy with the following permissions, or copy the following policy:


{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "SNSPublish",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sns:Publish"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "S3GetBucketACLandPolicy",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:GetBucketAcl",
                "s3:GetBucketPolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "S3PutBucketACLAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "LambdaBasicExecutionAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "logs:CreateLogGroup",
                "logs:CreateLogStream",
                "logs:PutLogEvents"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}

Create a role for your Lambda function:

Select Lambda from the list of services that will use this role.
Select the check box next to the policy you created previously, and then select Next: Review
Name your role, give it a description, and then select Create Role. In this example, we’re naming the role LambdaS3PolicySecuringRole.

Step 3: Create and Configure a CloudWatch Rule

In this section, we’ll create a CloudWatch Rule to trigger the Lambda function when AWS Config determines that your Amazon S3 buckets are non-compliant.

In the AWS Management Console, under Services, select CloudWatch.
On the left-hand side, under Events, select Rules.
Click Create rule.
In Step 1: Create rule, under Event Source, select the dropdown list and select Build custom event pattern.

Copy the following pattern and paste it into the text box:


{
  "source": [
    "aws.config"
  ],
  "detail": {
    "requestParameters": {
      "evaluations": {
        "complianceType": [
          "NON_COMPLIANT"
        ]
      }
    },
    "additionalEventData": {
      "managedRuleIdentifier": [
        "S3_BUCKET_PUBLIC_READ_PROHIBITED",
        "S3_BUCKET_PUBLIC_WRITE_PROHIBITED"
      ]
    }
  }
}

The pattern matches events generated by AWS Config when it checks the Amazon S3 bucket for public accessibility.

We’ll add a Lambda target later. For now, select your Amazon SNS topic created earlier, and then select Configure details.

Figure 9: The “Create rule” dialog
Give your rule a name and description. For this example, we’ll name ours AWSConfigFoundOpenBucket
Click Create rule.

Step 4: Create a Lambda Function

In this section, we’ll create a new Lambda function to examine an Amazon S3 bucket’s ACL and bucket policy. If the bucket ACL is found to allow public access, the Lambda function overwrites it to be private. If a bucket policy is found, the Lambda function creates an SNS message, puts the policy in the message body, and publishes it to the Amazon SNS topic we created. Bucket policies can be complex, and overwriting your policy may cause unexpected loss of access, so this Lambda function doesn’t attempt to alter your policy in any way.

Get the ARN of the Amazon SNS topic created earlier.
In the AWS Management Console, under Services, select Lambda to go to the Lambda Console.
From the Dashboard, select Create Function. Or, if you were taken directly to the Functions page, select the Create Function button in the upper-right.
On the Create function page:
1. Choose Author from scratch.
2. Provide a name for the function. We’re using AWSConfigOpenAccessResponder.
3. The Lambda function we’ve written is Python 3.6 compatible, so in the Runtime dropdown list, select Python 3.6.
4. Under Role, select Choose an existing role. Select the role you created in the previous section, and then select Create function.
  
  Figure 10: The “Create function” dialog
We’ll now add a CloudWatch Event based on the rule we created earlier.
1. In the Add triggers section, select CloudWatch Events. A CloudWatch Events box should appear connected to the left side of the Lambda Function and have a note that states Configuration required.
  
  Figure 11: CloudWatch Events in the “Add triggers” section
2. From the Rule dropdown box, choose the rule you created earlier, and then select Add.
Scroll up to the Designer section and select the name of your Lambda function.

Delete the default code and paste in the following code:


import boto3
from botocore.exceptions import ClientError
import json
import os

ACL_RD_WARNING = "The S3 bucket ACL allows public read access."
PLCY_RD_WARNING = "The S3 bucket policy allows public read access."
ACL_WRT_WARNING = "The S3 bucket ACL allows public write access."
PLCY_WRT_WARNING = "The S3 bucket policy allows public write access."
RD_COMBO_WARNING = ACL_RD_WARNING + PLCY_RD_WARNING
WRT_COMBO_WARNING = ACL_WRT_WARNING + PLCY_WRT_WARNING

def policyNotifier(bucketName, s3client):
    try:
        bucketPolicy = s3client.get_bucket_policy(Bucket = bucketName)
        # notify that the bucket policy may need to be reviewed due to security concerns
        sns = boto3.client('sns')
        subject = "Potential compliance violation in " + bucketName + " bucket policy"
        message = "Potential bucket policy compliance violation. Please review: " + json.dumps(bucketPolicy['Policy'])
        # send SNS message with warning and bucket policy
        response = sns.publish(
            TopicArn = os.environ['TOPIC_ARN'],
            Subject = subject,
            Message = message
        )
    except ClientError as e:
        # error caught due to no bucket policy
        print("No bucket policy found; no alert sent.")

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    # instantiate Amazon S3 client
    s3 = boto3.client('s3')
    resource = list(event['detail']['requestParameters']['evaluations'])[0]
    bucketName = resource['complianceResourceId']
    complianceFailure = event['detail']['requestParameters']['evaluations'][0]['annotation']
    if(complianceFailure == ACL_RD_WARNING or complianceFailure == PLCY_RD_WARNING):
        s3.put_bucket_acl(Bucket = bucketName, ACL = 'private')
    elif(complianceFailure == PLCY_RD_WARNING or complianceFailure == PLCY_WRT_WARNING):
        policyNotifier(bucketName, s3)
    elif(complianceFailure == RD_COMBO_WARNING or complianceFailure == WRT_COMBO_WARNING):
        s3.put_bucket_acl(Bucket = bucketName, ACL = 'private')
        policyNotifier(bucketName, s3)
    return 0  # done

Scroll down to the Environment variables section. This code uses an environment variable to store the Amazon SNS topic ARN.
1. For the key, enter TOPIC_ARN.
2. For the value, enter the ARN of the Amazon SNS topic created earlier.
Under Execution role, select Choose an existing role, and then select the role created earlier from the dropdown.
Leave everything else as-is, and then, at the top, select Save.

Step 5: Verify it Works

We now have the Lambda function, an Amazon SNS topic, AWS Config watching our Amazon S3 buckets, and a CloudWatch Rule to trigger the Lambda function if a bucket is found to be non-compliant. Let’s test them to make sure they work.

We have an Amazon S3 bucket, myconfigtestbucket that’s been created in the region monitored by AWS Config, as well as the associated Lambda function. This bucket has no public read or write access set in an ACL or a policy, so it’s compliant.

Figure 12: The “Config Dashboard”

Let’s change the bucket’s ACL to allow public listing of objects:

Screen shot of "Permissions" tab showing Everyone granted access

Figure 13: Screen shot of “Permissions” tab showing Everyone granted list access

After saving, the bucket now has public access. After several minutes, the AWS Config Dashboard notes that there is one non-compliant resource:

Figure 14: The “Config Dashboard” shown with a non-compliant resource

In the Amazon S3 Console, we can see that the bucket no longer has public listing of objects enabled after the invocation of the Lambda function triggered by the CloudWatch Rule created earlier.

The "Permissions" tab showing access no longer allowed

Figure 15: The “Permissions” tab showing list access no longer allowed

Notice that the AWS Config Dashboard now shows that there are no longer any non-compliant resources:

Figure 16: The “Config Dashboard” showing zero non-compliant resources

Now, let’s try out the Amazon S3 bucket policy check by configuring a bucket policy that allows list access:

Figure 17: A bucket policy that allows list access

A few minutes after setting this bucket policy on the
myconfigtestbucket bucket, AWS Config recognizes the bucket is no longer compliant. Because this is a bucket policy rather than an ACL, we publish a notification to the SNS topic we created earlier that lets us know about the potential policy violation:

Figure 18: Notification about potential policy violation

Knowing that the policy allows open listing of the bucket, we can now modify or delete the policy, after which AWS Config will recognize that the resource is compliant.

Conclusion

In this post, we demonstrated how you can use AWS Config to monitor for Amazon S3 buckets with open read and write access ACLs and policies. We also showed how to use Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon SNS, and Lambda to overwrite a public bucket ACL, or to alert you should a bucket have a suspicious policy. You can use the CloudFormation template to deploy this solution in multiple regions quickly. With this approach, you will be able to easily identify and secure open Amazon S3 bucket ACLs and policies. Once you have deployed this solution to multiple regions you can aggregate the results using an AWS Config aggregator. See this post to learn more.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the AWS Config forum or contact AWS Support.

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How to Eliminate the Need for Hardcoded AWS Credentials in Devices by Using the AWS IoT Credentials Provider

2018-04-30 Ramkishore Bhattacharyya

Post Syndicated from Ramkishore Bhattacharyya original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-eliminate-the-need-for-hardcoded-aws-credentials-in-devices-by-using-the-aws-iot-credentials-provider/

The Internet of Things (IoT) has precipitated to an influx of connected devices and data that can be mined to gain useful business insights. If you own an IoT device, you might want the data to be uploaded seamlessly from your connected devices to the cloud so that you can make use of cloud storage and the processing power to perform sophisticated analysis of data. To upload the data to the AWS Cloud, devices must pass authentication and authorization checks performed by the respective AWS services. The standard way of authenticating AWS requests is the Signature Version 4 algorithm that requires the caller to have an access key ID and secret access key. Consequently, you need to hardcode the access key ID and the secret access key on your devices. Alternatively, you can use the built-in X.509 certificate as the unique device identity to authenticate AWS requests.

AWS IoT has introduced the credentials provider feature that allows a caller to authenticate AWS requests by having an X.509 certificate. The credentials provider authenticates a caller using an X.509 certificate, and vends a temporary, limited-privilege security token. The token can be used to sign and authenticate any AWS request. Thus, the credentials provider relieves you from having to manage and periodically refresh the access key ID and secret access key remotely on your devices.

In the process of retrieving a security token, you use AWS IoT to create a thing (a representation of a specific device or logical entity), register a certificate, and create AWS IoT policies. You also configure an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role and attach appropriate IAM policies to the role so that the credentials provider can assume the role on your behalf. You also make an HTTP-over-Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual authentication request to the credentials provider that uses your preconfigured thing, certificate, policies, and IAM role to authenticate and authorize the request, and obtain a security token on your behalf. You can then use the token to sign any AWS request using Signature Version 4.

In this blog post, I explain the AWS IoT credentials provider design and then demonstrate the end-to-end process of retrieving a security token from AWS IoT and using the token to write a temperature and humidity record to a specific Amazon DynamoDB table.

Note: This post assumes you are familiar with AWS IoT and IAM to perform steps using the AWS CLI and OpenSSL. Make sure you are running the latest version of the AWS CLI.

Overview of the credentials provider workflow

The following numbered diagram illustrates the credentials provider workflow. The diagram is followed by explanations of the steps.

To explain the steps of the workflow as illustrated in the preceding diagram:

The AWS IoT device uses the AWS SDK or custom client to make an HTTPS request to the credentials provider for a security token. The request includes the device X.509 certificate for authentication.
The credentials provider forwards the request to the AWS IoT authentication and authorization module to verify the certificate and the permission to request the security token.
If the certificate is valid and has permission to request a security token, the AWS IoT authentication and authorization module returns success. Otherwise, it returns failure, which goes back to the device with the appropriate exception.
On successful validation, the credentials provider invokes the AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) to assume the preconfigured IAM role.
If assuming the role succeeds, AWS STS returns a temporary, limited-privilege security token to the credentials provider.
The credentials provider returns the security token to the device.
The AWS SDK on the device uses the security token to sign an AWS request with AWS Signature Version 4.
The requested service invokes IAM to validate the signature and authorize the request against access policies attached to the preconfigured IAM role.
If IAM validates the signature successfully and authorizes the request, the request goes through.

In another solution, you could configure an AWS Lambda rule that ingests your device data and sends it to another AWS service. However, in applications that require the uploading of large files such as videos or aggregated telemetry to the AWS Cloud, you may want your devices to be able to authenticate and send data directly to the AWS service of your choice. The credentials provider enables you to do that.

Outline of the steps to retrieve and use security token

Perform the following steps as part of this solution:

Create an AWS IoT thing: Start by creating a thing that corresponds to your home thermostat in the AWS IoT thing registry database. This allows you to authenticate the request as a thing and use thing attributes as policy variables in AWS IoT and IAM policies.
Register a certificate: Create and register a certificate with AWS IoT, and attach it to the thing for successful device authentication.
Create and configure an IAM role: Create an IAM role to be assumed by the service on behalf of your device. I illustrate how to configure a trust policy and an access policy so that AWS IoT has permission to assume the role, and the token has necessary permission to make requests to DynamoDB.
Create a role alias: Create a role alias in AWS IoT. A role alias is an alternate data model pointing to an IAM role. The credentials provider request must include a role alias name to indicate which IAM role to assume for obtaining a security token from AWS STS. You may update the role alias on the server to point to a different IAM role and thus make your device obtain a security token with different permissions.
Attach a policy: Create an authorization policy with AWS IoT and attach it to the certificate to control which device can assume which role aliases.
Request a security token: Make an HTTPS request to the credentials provider and retrieve a security token and use it to sign a DynamoDB request with Signature Version 4.
Use the security token to sign a request: Use the retrieved token to sign a request to DynamoDB and successfully write a temperature and humidity record from your home thermostat in a specific table. Thus, starting with an X.509 certificate on your home thermostat, you can successfully upload your thermostat record to DynamoDB and use it for further analysis. Before the availability of the credentials provider, you could not do this.

Deploy the solution

1. Create an AWS IoT thing

Register your home thermostat in the AWS IoT thing registry database by creating a thing type and a thing. You can use the AWS CLI with the following command to create a thing type. The thing type allows you to store description and configuration information that is common to a set of things.

aws iot create-thing-type --thing-type-name Thermostat

The following is sample output of the create-thing-type command. It contains the thingTypeName, thingTypeId, and thingTypeArn.

{
    "thingTypeName": "Thermostat", 
    "thingTypeId": "11f6d708-919e-479d-8a37-790ce48204d8",
    "thingTypeArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:thingtype/Thermostat"
}

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create a thing.

aws iot create-thing --thing-name MyHomeThermostat --thing-type-name Thermostat --attribute-payload "{\"attributes\": {\"Owner\":\"Alice\"}}"

The following is sample output of the create-thing command. It contains the thingArn, thingName, and thingId.

{
    "thingArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:thing/MyHomeThermostat", 
    "thingName": "MyHomeThermostat",
    "thingId": "a9b098ac-2ee9-4ba6-aa40-163113eb18d0"
}

2. Register a certificate

Now, you need to have a Certificate Authority (CA) certificate, sign a device certificate using the CA certificate, and register both certificates with AWS IoT before your device can authenticate to AWS IoT. If you do not already have a CA certificate, you can use OpenSSL to create a CA certificate, as described in Use Your Own Certificate. To register your CA certificate with AWS IoT, follow the steps on Registering Your CA Certificate.

You then have to create a device certificate signed by the CA certificate and register it with AWS IoT, which you can do by following the steps on Creating a Device Certificate Using Your CA Certificate. Save the certificate and the corresponding key pair; you will use them when you request a security token later. Also, remember the password you provide when you create the certificate.

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to attach the device certificate to your thing so that you can use thing attributes in policy variables.

aws iot attach-thing-principal --thing-name MyHomeThermostat --principal <certificate-arn>

If the attach-thing-principal command succeeds, the output is empty.

3. Configure an IAM role

Next, configure an IAM role in your AWS account that will be assumed by the credentials provider on behalf of your device. You are required to associate two policies with the role: a trust policy that controls who can assume the role, and an access policy that controls which actions can be performed on which resources by assuming the role.

The following trust policy grants the credentials provider permission to assume the role. Put it in a text document and save the document with the name, trustpolicyforiot.json.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {"Service": "credentials.iot.amazonaws.com"},
    "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
  }
}

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create an IAM role with the preceding trust policy.

aws iam create-role --role-name dynamodb-access-role --assume-role-policy-document file://trustpolicyforiot.json

The following is sample output of the create-role command.

{
    "Role": {
        "AssumeRolePolicyDocument": {
            "Version": "2012-10-17", 
            "Statement": {
                "Action": "sts:AssumeRole", 
                "Effect": "Allow", 
                "Principal": {
                    "Service": "credentials.iot.amazonaws.com"
                }
            }
        }, 
        "RoleId": "AROAJWE6XX2DBF3PMINT6", 
        "CreateDate": "2018-01-18T08:40:03.788Z", 
        "RoleName": "dynamodb-access-role", 
        "Path": "/", 
        "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:role/dynamodb-access-role"
    }
}

The following access policy allows DynamoDB operations on the table that has the same name as the thing name that you created in Step 1, MyHomeThermostat, by using credentials-iot:ThingName as a policy variable. I explain after Step 5 about using thing attributes as policy variables. Put the following policy in a text document and save the document with the name, accesspolicyfordynamodb.json.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": [
      "dynamodb:GetItem",
      "dynamodb:BatchGetItem",
      "dynamodb:PutItem",
      "dynamodb:UpdateItem",
      "dynamodb:DeleteItem"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:table/${credentials-iot:ThingName}"
  }
}

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create the access policy.

aws iam create-policy --policy-name accesspolicyfordynamodb --policy-document file://accesspolicyfordynamodb.json

The following is sample output of the create-policy command.

{
    "Policy": {
        "PolicyName": "accesspolicyfordynamodb", 
        "CreateDate": "2018-01-18T08:47:38.368Z", 
        "AttachmentCount": 0, 
        "IsAttachable": true, 
        "PolicyId": "ANPAJMRTTZH25SEHZOBYG", 
        "DefaultVersionId": "v1", 
        "Path": "/", 
        "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:policy/accesspolicyfordynamodb", 
        "UpdateDate": "2018-01-18T08:47:38.368Z"
    }
}

Finally, run the following command in the AWS CLI to attach the access policy to your role.

aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name dynamodb-access-role --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:policy/accesspolicyfordynamodb

If the attach-role-policy command succeeds, the output is empty.

Configure the PassRole permissions

The IAM role that you have created must be passed to AWS IoT to create a role alias, as described in Step 4. The user who performs the operation requires iam:PassRole permission to authorize this action. You also should add permission for the iam:GetRole action to allow the user to retrieve information about the specified role. Create the following policy to grant iam:PassRole and iam:GetRole permissions. Name this policy, passrolepermission.json.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": [
        "iam:GetRole",
        "iam:PassRole"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:role/dynamodb-access-role"
  }
}

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create the policy in your AWS account.

aws iam create-policy --policy-name passrolepermission --policy-document file://passrolepermission.json

The following is sample output of the create-policy command.

{
    "Policy": {
        "PolicyName": "passrolepermission", 
        "CreateDate": "2018-01-18T08:53:35.016Z", 
        "AttachmentCount": 0, 
        "IsAttachable": true, 
        "PolicyId": "ANPAJ6HSQYSBLAUCR5XRC", 
        "DefaultVersionId": "v1", 
        "Path": "/", 
        "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:policy/passrolepermission", 
        "UpdateDate": "2018-01-18T08:53:35.016Z"
    }
}

Now, run the following command to attach the policy to the user.

aws iam attach-user-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:policy/passrolepermission --user-name <user_name>

If the attach-user-policy command succeeds, the output is empty.

4. Create a role alias

Now that you have configured the IAM role, you will create a role alias with AWS IoT. You must provide the following pieces of information when creating a role alias:

RoleAlias: This is the primary key of the role alias data model and hence a mandatory attribute. It is a string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 128 characters.
RoleArn: This is the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the IAM role you have created. This is also a mandatory attribute.
CredentialDurationSeconds: This is an optional attribute specifying the validity (in seconds) of the security token. The minimum value is 900 seconds (15 minutes), and the maximum value is 3,600 seconds (60 minutes); the default value is 3,600 seconds, if not specified.

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create a role alias. Use the credentials of the user to whom you have given the iam:PassRole permission.

aws iot create-role-alias --role-alias Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias --role-arn arn:aws:iam::<your_aws_account_id>:role/dynamodb-access-role --credential-duration-seconds 3600

The following is sample output of the create-role-alias command. It contains the roleAlias as specified in the request and the roleArn.

{
    "roleAlias": "Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias",
    "roleAliasArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:rolealias/Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias"
}

5. Attach a policy

You created and registered a certificate with AWS IoT earlier for successful authentication of your device. Now, you need to create and attach a policy to the certificate to authorize the request for the security token.

Let’s say you want to allow a thing to get credentials for the role alias, Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias, with thing owner Alice, thing type thermostat, and the thing attached to a principal. The following policy, with thing attributes as policy variables, achieves these requirements. After this step, I explain more about using thing attributes as policy variables. Put the policy in a text document, and save it with the name, alicethermostatpolicy.json.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "iot:AssumeRoleWithCertificate",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:rolealias/${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingTypeName}-dynamodb-access-role-alias",
    "Condition": {
      "StringEquals": {
        "iot:Connection.Thing.Attributes[Owner]": "Alice",
        "iot:Connection.Thing.ThingTypeName": "Thermostat"
      },
      "Bool": {
        "iot:Connection.Thing.IsAttached": "true"
      }
    }
  }
}

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create the policy in your AWS IoT database.

aws iot create-policy --policy-name AliceThermostatPolicy --policy-document file://alicethermostatpolicy.json

The following is sample output of the create-policy command. It contains the policyName, policyArn, policyDocument, and policyVersionId.

{
    "policyName": "AliceThermostatPolicy", 
    "policyArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:policy/AliceThermostatPolicy", 
    "policyDocument": "{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": {\n    \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n    \"Action\": \"iot:AssumeRoleWithCertificate\",\n    \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:rolealias/${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingTypeName}-dynamodb-access-role-alias\",\n    \"Condition\": {\n      \"StringEquals\": {\n        \"iot:Connection.Thing.Attributes[Owner]\": \"Alice\",\n        \"iot:Connection.Thing.ThingTypeName\": \"Thermostat\"\n      },\n      \"Bool\": {\n        \"iot:Connection.Thing.IsAttached\": \"true\"\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n", 
    "policyVersionId": "1"
}

Use the following command to attach the policy with the certificate you registered earlier.

aws iot attach-policy --policy-name AliceThermostatPolicy --target <certificate-arn>

If the attach-policy command succeeds, the output is empty.

You have completed all the necessary steps to request an AWS security token from the credentials provider!

Using thing attributes as policy variables

Before I show how to request a security token, I want to explain more about how to use thing attributes as policy variables and the advantage of using them. As a prerequisite, a device must provide a thing name in the credentials provider request.

Thing substitution variables in AWS IoT policies

AWS IoT Simplified Permission Management allows you to associate a connection with a specific thing, and allow the thing name, thing type, and other thing attributes to be available as substitution variables in AWS IoT policies. You can write a generic AWS IoT policy as in alicethermostatpolicy.json in Step 5, attach it to multiple certificates, and authorize the connection as a thing. For example, you could attach alicethermostatpolicy.json to certificates corresponding to each of the thermostats you have that you want to assume the role alias, Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias, and allow operations only on the table with the name that matches the thing name. For more information, see the full list of thing policy variables.

Thing substitution variables in IAM policies

You also can use the following three substitution variables in the IAM role’s access policy (I used credentials-iot:ThingName in accesspolicyfordynamodb.json in Step 3):

credentials-iot:ThingName
credentials-iot:ThingTypeName
credentials-iot:AwsCertificateId

When the device provides the thing name in the request, the credentials provider fetches these three variables from the database and adds them as context variables to the security token. When the device uses the token to access DynamoDB, the variables in the role’s access policy are replaced with the corresponding values in the security token. Note that you also can use credentials-iot:AwsCertificateId as a policy variable; AWS IoT returns certificateId during registration.

6. Request a security token

Make an HTTPS request to the credentials provider to fetch a security token. You have to supply the following information:

Certificate and key pair: Because this is an HTTP request over TLS mutual authentication, you have to provide the certificate and the corresponding key pair to your client while making the request. Use the same certificate and key pair that you used during certificate registration with AWS IoT.
RoleAlias: Provide the role alias (in this example, Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias) to be assumed in the request.
ThingName: Provide the thing name that you created earlier in the AWS IoT thing registry database. This is passed as a header with the name, x-amzn-iot-thingname. Note that the thing name is mandatory only if you have thing attributes as policy variables in AWS IoT or IAM policies.

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to obtain your AWS account-specific endpoint for the credentials provider. See the DescribeEndpoint API documentation for further details.

aws iot describe-endpoint --endpoint-type iot:CredentialProvider

The following is sample output of the describe-endpoint command. It contains the endpointAddress.

{
    "endpointAddress": "<your_aws_account_specific_prefix>.credentials.iot.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
}

Note that if you are on Mac OS X, you need to export your certificate to a .pfx or .p12 file before you can pass it in the https request. Use OpenSSL with the following command to convert the device certificate from .pem to .pfx format. Remember the password because you will need it subsequently in a curl command.

openssl pkcs12 -export -out deviceCert.pfx -inkey <device-certificate-key-pair> -in <device-certificate-pem>

Now, make an HTTPS request to the credentials provider to fetch a security token. You may use your preferred HTTP client for the request. I use curl in the following examples.

curl --cert deviceCert.pfx --pass <certificate-password> --key <device-certificate-key-pair> -H "x-amzn-iot-thingname: MyHomeThermostat" https://<your_credentials_provider_endpoint>/role-aliases/Thermostat-dynamodb-access-role-alias/credentials

This command returns a security token object that has an accessKeyId, a secretAccessKey, a sessionToken, and an expiration. The following is sample output of the curl command.

{"credentials":{"accessKeyId":"ASIAJAKDHYFVFZCETC4A","secretAccessKey":"6RcojWDX0uWj3hRekTu/kOhXyyfqMU+T5U81LZzf","sessionToken":"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","expiration":"2018-01-18T09:18:06Z"}}

7. Use the security token to sign a request

Create a DynamoDB table called MyHomeThermostat in your AWS account. You will have to choose the hash (partition key) and the range (sort key) while creating the table to uniquely identify a record. Make the hash the serial_number of the thermostat and the range the timestamp of the record. Create a text file with the following JSON to put a temperature and humidity record in the table. Name the file, item.json.

{
  "serial_number": {"S": "123456789"},
  "timestamp": {"S": "2017-11-20T06:00:00.000Z"},
  "current_temp": {"N": "65"},
  "target_temp": {"N": "70"},
  "humidity": {"N": "45"}
}

You can use the accessKeyId, secretAccessKey, and sessionToken retrieved from the output of the curl command to sign a request that writes the temperature and humidity record to the DynamoDB table. Use the following commands to accomplish this.

export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<access-key-id>
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<secret-access-key>
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=<session-token>
aws dynamodb put-item --table-name MyHomeThermostat --item file://item.json --return-consumed-capacity TOTAL

The following is sample output of the put-item command.

{
    "ConsumedCapacity": {
        "CapacityUnits": 1.0, 
        "TableName": "MyHomeThermostat"
    }
}

Conclusion

In this blog post, I demonstrated how to retrieve a security token by using an X.509 certificate and then writing an item to a DynamoDB table by using the security token. Similarly, you could run applications on surveillance cameras or sensor devices that exchange the X.509 certificate for an AWS security token and use the token to upload video streams to Amazon Kinesis or telemetry data to Amazon CloudWatch.

If you have comments about this blog post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing this solution, start a new thread on the AWS IoT forum.

– Ramkishore

New .BOT gTLD from Amazon

2018-04-24 Randall Hunt

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-bot-gtld-from-amazon/

Today, I’m excited to announce the launch of .BOT, a new generic top-level domain (gTLD) from Amazon. Customers can use .BOT domains to provide an identity and portal for their bots. Fitness bots, slack bots, e-commerce bots, and more can all benefit from an easy-to-access .BOT domain. The phrase “bot” was the 4th most registered domain keyword within the .COM TLD in 2016 with more than 6000 domains per month. A .BOT domain allows customers to provide a definitive internet identity for their bots as well as enhancing SEO performance.

At the time of this writing .BOT domains start at $75 each and must be verified and published with a supported tool like: Amazon Lex, Botkit Studio, Dialogflow, Gupshup, Microsoft Bot Framework, or Pandorabots. You can expect support for more tools over time and if your favorite bot framework isn’t supported feel free to contact us here: [email protected].

Below, I’ll walk through the experience of registering and provisioning a domain for my bot, whereml.bot. Then we’ll look at setting up the domain as a hosted zone in Amazon Route 53. Let’s get started.

Registering a .BOT domain

First, I’ll head over to https://amazonregistry.com/bot, type in a new domain, and click magnifying class to make sure my domain is available and get taken to the registration wizard.

Next, I have the opportunity to choose how I want to verify my bot. I build all of my bots with Amazon Lex so I’ll select that in the drop down and get prompted for instructions specific to AWS. If I had my bot hosted somewhere else I would need to follow the unique verification instructions for that particular framework.

To verify my Lex bot I need to give the Amazon Registry permissions to invoke the bot and verify it’s existence. I’ll do this by creating an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) cross account role and providing the AmazonLexReadOnly permissions to that role. This is easily accomplished in the AWS Console. Be sure to provide the account number and external ID shown on the registration page.

Now I’ll add read only permissions to our Amazon Lex bots.

I’ll give my role a fancy name like DotBotCrossAccountVerifyRole and a description so it’s easy to remember why I made this then I’ll click create to create the role and be transported to the role summary page.

Finally, I’ll copy the ARN from the created role and save it for my next step.

Here I’ll add all the details of my Amazon Lex bot. If you haven’t made a bot yet you can follow the tutorial to build a basic bot. I can refer to any alias I’ve deployed but if I just want to grab the latest published bot I can pass in $LATEST as the alias. Finally I’ll click Validate and proceed to registering my domain.

Amazon Registry works with a partner EnCirca to register our domains so we’ll select them and optionally grab Site Builder. I know how to sling some HTML and Javascript together so I’ll pass on the Site Builder side of things.

After I click continue we’re taken to EnCirca’s website to finalize the registration and with any luck within a few minutes of purchasing and completing the registration we should receive an email with some good news:

Alright, now that we have a domain name let’s find out how to host things on it.

Using Amazon Route53 with a .BOT domain

Amazon Route 53 is a highly available and scalable DNS with robust APIs, healthchecks, service discovery, and many other features. I definitely want to use this to host my new domain. The first thing I’ll do is navigate to the Route53 console and create a hosted zone with the same name as my domain.

Great! Now, I need to take the Name Server (NS) records that Route53 created for me and use EnCirca’s portal to add these as the authoritative nameservers on the domain.

Now I just add my records to my hosted zone and I should be able to serve traffic! Way cool, I’ve got my very own .bot domain for @WhereML.

Next Steps

I could and should add to the security of my site by creating TLS certificates for people who intend to access my domain over TLS. Luckily with AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) this is extremely straightforward and I’ve got my subdomains and root domain verified in just a few clicks.
I could create a cloudfront distrobution to front an S3 static single page application to host my entire chatbot and invoke Amazon Lex with a cognito identity right from the browser.

– Randall

Announcing the new AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam

2018-04-23 Janna Pellegrino

Post Syndicated from Janna Pellegrino original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/announcing-the-new-aws-certified-security-specialty-exam/

Good news for cloud security experts: following our most popular beta exam ever, the AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam is here. This new exam allows experienced cloud security professionals to demonstrate and validate their knowledge of how to secure the AWS platform.

About the exam
The security exam covers incident response, logging and monitoring, infrastructure security, identity and access management, and data protection. The exam is open to anyone who currently holds a Cloud Practitioner or Associate-level certification. We recommend candidates have five years of IT security experience designing and implementing security solutions, and at least two years of hands-on experience securing AWS workloads.

The exam validates:

An understanding of specialized data classifications and AWS data protection mechanisms.
An understanding of data encryption methods and AWS mechanisms to implement them.
An understanding of secure Internet protocols and AWS mechanisms to implement them.
A working knowledge of AWS security services and features of services to provide a secure production environment.
Competency gained from two or more years of production deployment experience using AWS security services and features.
Ability to make trade-off decisions with regard to cost, security, and deployment complexity given a set of application requirements.
An understanding of security operations and risk.

Learn more and register >>

How to prepare
We have training and other resources to help you prepare for the exam:

AWS Training (aws.amazon.com/training)

Advanced Architecting on AWS classroom training
Security Operations on AWS classroom training
AWS Digital Training focused on security services and topics, including:

Additional Resources

Security and Compliance documentation
Compliance resources

Learn more and register >>

Please contact us if you have questions about exam registration.

Good luck!

Announcing the new AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam

2018-04-23 Ozlem Yilmaz

Post Syndicated from Ozlem Yilmaz original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/announcing-the-new-aws-certified-security-specialty-exam/

Good news for cloud security experts: the AWS Certified Security — Specialty exam is here. This new exam allows experienced cloud security professionals to demonstrate and validate their knowledge of how to secure the AWS platform.

About the exam

The security exam covers incident response, logging and monitoring, infrastructure security, identity and access management, and data protection. The exam is open to anyone who currently holds a Cloud Practitioner or Associate-level certification. We recommend candidates have five years of IT security experience designing and implementing security solutions, and at least two years of hands-on experience securing AWS workloads.

The exam validates your understanding of:

Specialized data classifications and AWS data protection mechanisms
Data encryption methods and AWS mechanisms to implement them
Secure Internet protocols and AWS mechanisms to implement them
AWS security services and features of services to provide a secure production environment
Making tradeoff decisions with regard to cost, security, and deployment complexity given a set of application requirements
Security operations and risk

How to prepare

We have training and other resources to help you prepare for the exam.

AWS Training that includes:

Additional Resources

Security documentation
Compliance resources

Learn more and register here, and please contact us if you have questions about exam registration.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Rotate Amazon RDS database credentials automatically with AWS Secrets Manager

2018-04-05 Apurv Awasthi

Post Syndicated from Apurv Awasthi original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/rotate-amazon-rds-database-credentials-automatically-with-aws-secrets-manager/

Recently, we launched AWS Secrets Manager, a service that makes it easier to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically, which can help you meet your security and compliance needs. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora on Amazon RDS, and can rotate credentials for these databases natively. You can control access to your secrets by using fine-grained AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies. To retrieve secrets, employees replace plaintext secrets with a call to Secrets Manager APIs, eliminating the need to hard-code secrets in source code or update configuration files and redeploy code when secrets are rotated.

In this post, I introduce the key features of Secrets Manager. I then show you how to store a database credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS and how your applications can access this secret. Finally, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this secret automatically.

Key features of Secrets Manager

These features include the ability to:

Rotate secrets safely. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically without disrupting your applications. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for Amazon RDS databases for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora. You can extend Secrets Manager to meet your custom rotation requirements by creating an AWS Lambda function to rotate other types of secrets. For example, you can create an AWS Lambda function to rotate OAuth tokens used in a mobile application. Users and applications retrieve the secret from Secrets Manager, eliminating the need to email secrets to developers or update and redeploy applications after AWS Secrets Manager rotates a secret.
Secure and manage secrets centrally. You can store, view, and manage all your secrets. By default, Secrets Manager encrypts these secrets with encryption keys that you own and control. Using fine-grained IAM policies, you can control access to secrets. For example, you can require developers to provide a second factor of authentication when they attempt to retrieve a production database credential. You can also tag secrets to help you discover, organize, and control access to secrets used throughout your organization.
Monitor and audit easily. Secrets Manager integrates with AWS logging and monitoring services to enable you to meet your security and compliance requirements. For example, you can audit AWS CloudTrail logs to see when Secrets Manager rotated a secret or configure AWS CloudWatch Events to alert you when an administrator deletes a secret.
Pay as you go. Pay for the secrets you store in Secrets Manager and for the use of these secrets; there are no long-term contracts or licensing fees.

Get started with Secrets Manager

Now that you’re familiar with the key features, I’ll show you how to store the credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. To demonstrate how to retrieve and use the secret, I use a python application running on Amazon EC2 that requires this database credential to access the MySQL instance. Finally, I show how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this database credential automatically. Let’s get started.

Phase 1: Store a secret in Secrets Manager

Open the Secrets Manager console and select Store a new secret.
I select Credentials for RDS database because I’m storing credentials for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. For this example, I store the credentials for the database superuser. I start by securing the superuser because it’s the most powerful database credential and has full access over the database.

Note: For this example, you need permissions to store secrets in Secrets Manager. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWSSecretsManagerReadWriteAccess managed policy. Read the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation for more information about the minimum IAM permissions required to store a secret.
Next, I review the encryption setting and choose to use the default encryption settings. Secrets Manager will encrypt this secret using the Secrets Manager DefaultEncryptionKeyDefaultEncryptionKey in this account. Alternatively, I can choose to encrypt using a customer master key (CMK) that I have stored in AWS KMS.
Next, I view the list of Amazon RDS instances in my account and select the database this credential accesses. For this example, I select the DB instance mysql-rds-database, and then I select Next.
In this step, I specify values for Secret Name and Description. For this example, I use Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database as the name and enter a description of this secret, and then select Next.
For the next step, I keep the default setting Disable automatic rotation because my secret is used by my application running on Amazon EC2. I’ll enable rotation after I’ve updated my application (see Phase 2 below) to use Secrets Manager APIs to retrieve secrets. I then select Next.

Note: If you’re storing a secret that you’re not using in your application, select Enable automatic rotation. See our AWS Secrets Manager getting started guide on rotation for details.
Review the information on the next screen and, if everything looks correct, select Store. We’ve now successfully stored a secret in Secrets Manager.
Next, I select See sample code.
Take note of the code samples provided. I will use this code to update my application to retrieve the secret using Secrets Manager APIs.

Phase 2: Update an application to retrieve secret from Secrets Manager

Now that I have stored the secret in Secrets Manager, I update my application to retrieve the database credential from Secrets Manager instead of hard coding this information in a configuration file or source code. For this example, I show how to configure a python application to retrieve this secret from Secrets Manager.

I connect to my Amazon EC2 instance via Secure Shell (SSH).
Previously, I configured my application to retrieve the database user name and password from the configuration file. Below is the source code for my application.
import MySQLdb import config def no_secrets_manager_sample() # Get the user name, password, and database connection information from a config file. database = config.database user_name = config.user_name password = config.password

# Use the user name, password, and database connection information to connect to the database db = MySQLdb.connect(database.endpoint, user_name, password, database.db_name, database.port)
I use the sample code from Phase 1 above and update my application to retrieve the user name and password from Secrets Manager. This code sets up the client and retrieves and decrypts the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database. I’ve added comments to the code to make the code easier to understand.
# Use the code snippet provided by Secrets Manager. import boto3 from botocore.exceptions import ClientError def get_secret(): #Define the secret you want to retrieve secret_name = "Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database" #Define the Secrets mManager end-point your code should use. endpoint_url = "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" region_name = "us-east-1" #Setup the client session = boto3.session.Session() client = session.client( service_name='secretsmanager', region_name=region_name, endpoint_url=endpoint_url ) #Use the client to retrieve the secret try: get_secret_value_response = client.get_secret_value( SecretId=secret_name ) #Error handling to make it easier for your code to tolerate faults except ClientError as e: if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'ResourceNotFoundException': print("The requested secret " + secret_name + " was not found") elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidRequestException': print("The request was invalid due to:", e) elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidParameterException': print("The request had invalid params:", e) else: # Decrypted secret using the associated KMS CMK # Depending on whether the secret was a string or binary, one of these fields will be populated if 'SecretString' in get_secret_value_response: secret = get_secret_value_response['SecretString'] else: binary_secret_data = get_secret_value_response['SecretBinary']

# Your code goes here.
Applications require permissions to access Secrets Manager. My application runs on Amazon EC2 and uses an IAM role to obtain access to AWS services. I will attach the following policy to my IAM role. This policy uses the GetSecretValue action to grant my application permissions to read secret from Secrets Manager. This policy also uses the resource element to limit my application to read only the Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database secret from Secrets Manager. You can visit the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation to understand the minimum IAM permissions required to retrieve a secret.
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": { "Sid": "RetrieveDbCredentialFromSecretsManager", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue", "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:::secret:Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database" } }

Phase 3: Enable Rotation for Your Secret

Rotating secrets periodically is a security best practice because it reduces the risk of misuse of secrets. Secrets Manager makes it easy to follow this security best practice and offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora databases hosted on Amazon RDS. When you enable rotation, Secrets Manager creates a Lambda function and attaches an IAM role to this function to execute rotations on a schedule you define.

Note: Configuring rotation is a privileged action that requires several IAM permissions and you should only grant this access to trusted individuals. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWS IAMFullAccess managed policy.

Next, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database automatically.

From the Secrets Manager console, I go to the list of secrets and choose the secret I created in the first step Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database.
I scroll to Rotation configuration, and then select Edit rotation.
To enable rotation, I select Enable automatic rotation. I then choose how frequently I want Secrets Manager to rotate this secret. For this example, I set the rotation interval to 60 days.
Next, Secrets Manager requires permissions to rotate this secret on your behalf. Because I’m storing the superuser database credential, Secrets Manager can use this credential to perform rotations. Therefore, I select Use the secret that I provided in step 1, and then select Next.
The banner on the next screen confirms that I have successfully configured rotation and the first rotation is in progress, which enables you to verify that rotation is functioning as expected. Secrets Manager will rotate this credential automatically every 60 days.

Summary

I introduced AWS Secrets Manager, explained the key benefits, and showed you how to help meet your compliance requirements by configuring AWS Secrets Manager to rotate database credentials automatically on your behalf. Secrets Manager helps you protect access to your applications, services, and IT resources without the upfront investment and on-going maintenance costs of operating your own secrets management infrastructure. To get started, visit the Secrets Manager console. To learn more, visit Secrets Manager documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Secrets Manager forum.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

How to Use Service Control Policies in AWS Organizations

2018-04-02 Frank Phillis

Post Syndicated from Frank Phillis original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-service-control-policies-in-aws-organizations/

With AWS Organizations, you can centrally manage policies across multiple AWS accounts without having to use custom scripts and manual processes. For example, you can apply service control policies (SCPs) across multiple AWS accounts that are members of an organization. SCPs allow you to define which AWS service APIs can and cannot be executed by AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) entities (such as IAM users and roles) in your organization’s member AWS accounts. SCPs are created and applied from the master account, which is the AWS account that you used when you created your organization.

In a previous post, How to Use Service Control Policies in AWS Organizations to Enforce Healthcare Compliance in Your AWS Account, we reviewed how to create and manage SCPs and Organizational Units (OU) within an organization. In this post, I show how to use SCPs for access control in Organizations, with a specific focus on evaluating SCPs when an IAM entity calls an API in a member AWS account. I first cover some key Organizations concepts, and then I show how an SCP attached to an organization impacts which AWS service APIs are available to member accounts. Finally, I demonstrate these concepts with an example.

Organizational structure in Organizations

OUs give you a way to logically group and structure member AWS accounts in your organization. The screenshot shows the tree view of an example organizational structure in my organization with several OUs. Currently, I have selected OrgUnit01, and this is the current view I see in my main window. You can see here that within the OrgUnit01 OU, I have nested two additional OUs (OrgUnit01ChildA and OrgUnit01ChildB) and an AWS account is also contained within OrgUnit01, named “Developer Sandbox Account”.

The parts of the example organizational structure in the screenshot are:

Tree view — The hierarchy of your organization’s root and any OUs you have created
Tree view toggle — Enable and disable tree view
Organizational Units — Any child OUs of the selected root or OU in tree view
Accounts — Any AWS accounts (members or master) in the current OU

In the next section, I explain why at least one SCP must be attached to your root and OUs and introduce SCP evaluation.

How Service Control Policy evaluation logic works

To allow an AWS service API at the member account level, you must allow the API at every level between the member account and the root of your organization. This means you must attach an SCP at every level between your organization’s root and the member account that allows the given AWS service API (such as ec2:RunInstances). For more information, see About Service Control Policies.

Let’s say you want to allow the ec2:RunInstances API in the Developer Sandbox Account in the example structure in the preceding screenshot. To allow this AWS service API, you must allow the API in at least one SCP attached at each of these levels:

The organization’s root
The OU named OrgUnit01

If you don’t allow the AWS service in an SCP attached at each of these two levels, neither IAM entities nor the root user in the Developer Sandbox Account will be able to call ec2:RunInstances, even if an administrator has given them permission to do so (for IAM entities). In terms of policy evaluation, SCPs follow exactly the same policy evaluation logic as IAM does: by default, all requests are denied, an explicit allow overrides this default, and an explicit deny overrides any explicit allows.

What does this look like in practice? In the next section, I share a practical example to demonstrate how this works in Organizations.

An example structure with nested OUs and SCPs

In the previous section, I introduced design aspects of AWS Organizations that help prevent administrators from breaking structures in their Organizations. But because AWS Organizations is flexible enough to address multiple use cases, administrators can make changes that have unintended consequences, such as breaking organizational structures when moving an AWS account from one OU to another. In this section, I show an example with broken OU and SCP structures and explain how you can fix them.

I’ll take a blacklisting approach. That is, I’ll use the FullAWSAccess SCP, which doesn’t filter out any AWS service APIs. Then, I will filter out specific APIs by blacklisting them in subsequent SCPs attached to OUs at various points in my organization’s structure. For further reading on blacklisting and whitelisting with AWS Organizations, review AWS Organizations Terminology and Concepts.

Let’s say I have developed the OU and SCP structure shown in the diagram below. Before taking a close look at that diagram, I’ll briefly outline the goals I’m trying to achieve. Broadly speaking, there’s a small subset of APIs that I want to filter out using SCPs. This means that IAM entities in some AWS accounts in my organization will not have access to particular AWS service APIs, such as those related to Amazon EC2, while other accounts will not have access to APIs associated with Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon S3, and so on. Apart from these special cases, I do want the accounts in my organization to have access to all other APIs. More specifically, my goals are as follows:

Any AWS accounts in the Root should not have any API filtered out.
Any AWS accounts in OU 001 should have APIs for CloudWatch filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.
Any AWS accounts in OU 002 should have APIs for both CloudWatch and EC2 filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.
Any AWS accounts in OU 003 should have APIs for S3 filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.

To that end, let’s now look at my initial SCP and OU configuration in the image below that shows the example OU and SCP structure. The arrow shows the direction of inheritance: the root and the OUs below it (children) inherit SCPs from the OUs above them (parents). This example structure contains the following SCPs:

FullAWSAccess — Allows all AWS service APIs
Deny_CW — Denies all CloudWatch APIs
Deny_EC2 — Denies all Amazon EC2 APIs
Deny_S3 — Denies all Amazon S3 APIs

Now that I’ve outlined my intent, and shown you the OU / SCP structure that I’ve created to meet that set of goals, you can probably already see that the structure provided in the image above will not work correctly for my stated goals. In fact, AWS accounts in the Root container and OU 001 will have the intended access, as per my goals (1) and (2). I will not, however, meet my goals (3) and (4) with the above structure: entities in member accounts directly under OU 002 cannot perform any actions, even if they’re granted permissions by IAM access policies. This is because the FullAWSAccess SCP isn’t attached directly to this OU (it’s only inherited).

Why is this important? For an AWS service API to be available to IAM entities in a member account, the API must be specified in an SCP attached at every level all the way down the hierarchy to the relevant member account. Similarly, even though OU 003 does have the FullAWSAccess SCP attached directly to it, the fact that it’s not attached to the parent OU (OU 002) means that IAM entities in member accounts under OU 003 also aren’t able to access any service APIs. This doesn’t happen by default—I have deliberately taken this action to organize my structure in this way, to show both the flexibility and the kind of problems you can encounter when working with OUs and SCPs.

So I now need to fix the problems that I’ve inadvertently created. To start with, I’m going to make one change to OU 002 by attaching the FullAWSAccess SCP directly to that OU. After I do that, OU 002 has the attached and inherited policies that are shown in the following image.

With the FullAWSAccess policy attached to OU 002, member accounts in both OU 002 and OU 003 can access the other non-restricted AWS service APIs (keeping in mind that the FullAWSAccess policy was already applied to OU 003).

I have one final issue to address in this example: OU 003 has an SCP attached that blocks access to the Amazon S3 APIs. However, in this OU, the intent is to allow IAM entities in member accounts to access the EC2 APIs. EC2 API access is blocked because in the parent OU (OU 002), an SCP is attached that denies access to that API (the Deny_EC2 SCP), which means that any actions listed in Deny_EC2 have already been filtered out. An explicit deny always trumps an allow, so to meet goal (4) and have an OU in which EC2 APIs are allowed but access to CloudWatch APIs and S3 APIs is filtered out, I will move OU 003 up one level, placing it directly under OU 001. This change gives me a working OU and policy structure, as shown in the following image.

I recommend that at each level of your organization’s hierarchy, you directly apply the relevant SCPs. By doing this, you’re less likely to forget to apply an SCP to a particular OU, which can break your permission structure. By directly applying SCPs, you also make your policy structure easier to read.

If you have a group of accounts in your organization that are for testing purposes, I recommend that you experiment with OUs and SCPs. Applying SCPs to OUs and then moving an AWS account around within that structure can show you how SCPs affect IAM entities. For example, if you have an IAM user with the AdministratorAccess policy attached, you should see how SCPs can filter out certain AWS service APIs from specified member accounts.

Conclusion

I showed you how you can effectively apply SCPs to OUs in your organization and avoid some of the common issues that you might experience. I demonstrated an approach to designing a working organizational structure that I hope will help smooth your deployment of your organization and enables you to better centrally secure and manage your AWS accounts.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Organizations forum.

Managing Cross-Account Serverless Microservices

2018-03-29 Chris Munns

Post Syndicated from Chris Munns original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/managing-cross-account-serverless-microservices/

This post courtesy of Michael Edge, Sr. Cloud Architect – AWS Professional Services

Applications built using a microservices architecture typically result in a number of independent, loosely coupled microservices communicating with each other, synchronously via their APIs and asynchronously via events. These microservices are often owned by different product teams, and these teams may segregate their resources into different AWS accounts for reasons that include security, billing, and resource isolation. This can sometimes result in the following challenges:

Cross-account deployment: A single pipeline must deploy a microservice into multiple accounts; for example, a microservice must be deployed to environments such as DEV, QA, and PROD, all in separate accounts.
Cross-account lookup: During deployment, a resource deployed into one AWS account may need to refer to a resource deployed in another AWS account.
Cross-account communication: Microservices executing in one AWS account may need to communicate with microservices executing in another AWS account.

In this post, I look at ways to address these challenges using a sample application composed of a web application supported by two serverless microservices. The microservices are owned by different product teams and deployed into different accounts using AWS CodePipeline, AWS CloudFormation, and the Serverless Application Model (SAM). At runtime, the microservices communicate using an event-driven architecture that requires asynchronous, cross-account communication via an Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) topic.

Sample application

First, look at the sample application I use to demonstrate these concepts. In the following overview diagram, you can see the following:

The entire application consists of three main services:
- A Booking microservice, owned by the Booking account.
- An Airmiles microservice, owned by the Airmiles account.
- A web application that uses the services exposed by both microservices, owned by the Web Channel account.
The Booking microservice creates flight bookings and publishes booking events to an SNS topic.
The Airmiles microservice consumes booking events from the SNS topic and uses the booking event to calculate the airmiles associated with the flight booking. It also supports querying airmiles for a specific flight booking.
The web application allows an end user to make flight bookings, view flights bookings, and view the airmiles associated with a flight booking.
In the sample application, the Booking and Airmiles microservices are implemented using AWS Lambda. Together with Amazon API Gateway, Amazon DynamoDB, and SNS, the sample application is completely serverless.

Sample Serverless microservices application

The typical booking flow would be triggered by an end user making a flight booking using the web application, which invokes the Booking microservice via its REST API. The Booking microservice persists the flight booking and publishes the booking event to an SNS topic to enable sharing of the booking with other interested consumers. In this sample application, the Airmiles microservice subscribes to the SNS topic and consumes the booking event, using the booking information to calculate the airmiles. In line with microservices best practices, both the Booking and Airmiles microservices store their information in their own DynamoDB tables, and expose an API (via API Gateway) that is used by the web application.

Setup

Before you delve into the details of the sample application, get the source code and deploy it.

Cross-account deployment of Lambda functions using CodePipeline has been previously discussed by my colleague Anuj Sharma in his post, Building a Secure Cross-Account Continuous Delivery Pipeline. This sample application builds upon the solution proposed by Anuj, using some of the same scripts and a similar account structure. To make it feasible for you to deploy the sample application, I’ve reduced the number of accounts needed down to three accounts by consolidating some of the services. In the following diagram, you can see the services used by the sample application require three accounts:

Tools: A central location for the continuous delivery/deployment services such as CodePipeline and AWS CodeBuild. To reduce the number of accounts required by the sample application, also deploy the AWS CodeCommit repositories here, though typically they may belong in a separate Dev account.
Booking: Account for the Booking microservice.
Airmiles: Account for the Airmiles microservice.

Without consolidation, the sample application may require up to 10 accounts: one for Tools, and three accounts each for Booking, Airmiles and Web Application (to support the DEV, QA, and PROD environments).

Account structure for sample application

To follow the rest of this post, clone the repository in step 1 below. To deploy the application on AWS, follow steps 2 and 3:

Clone this repository. It contains the AWS CloudFormation templates to use in this walkthrough.
```
git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/aws-cross-account-serverless-microservices.git
```
Install the AWS CLI. To prepare your access keys or a role to make calls to AWS, configure the AWS CLI settings.
Follow the instructions in the repository README to build the CodePipeline pipelines and deploy the microservices and web application.

Challenge 1: Cross-account deployment using CodePipeline

Though the Booking pipeline executes in the Tools account, it deploys the Booking Lambda functions into the Booking account.

In the sample application code repository, open the ToolsAcct/code-pipeline.yaml CloudFormation template.
Scroll down to the Pipeline resource and look for the DeployToTest pipeline stage (shown below). There are two AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) service roles used in this stage that allow cross-account activity. Both of these roles exist in the Booking account:
- Under Actions.RoleArn, find the service role assumed by CodePipeline to execute this pipeline stage in the Booking account. The role referred to by the parameter NonProdCodePipelineActionServiceRole allows access to the CodePipeline artifacts in the S3 bucket in the Tools account, and also access to the AWS KMS key needed to encrypt/decrypt the artifacts.
- Under Actions.Configuration.RoleArn, find the service role assumed by CloudFormation when it carries out the CHANGE_SET_REPLACE action in the Booking account.

These roles are created in the CloudFormation template NonProdAccount/toolsacct-codepipeline-cloudformation-deployer.yaml.

- Name: DeployToTest
  Actions:
    - Name: CreateChangeSetTest
      ActionTypeId:
        Category: Deploy
        Owner: AWS
        Version: 1
        Provider: CloudFormation
      Configuration:
        ChangeSetName: !Join ['-',[!Ref ProjectName, 'lambda', 'CS']]
        ActionMode: CHANGE_SET_REPLACE
        StackName: !Join ['-',[!Ref ProjectName, 'lambda']]
        Capabilities: CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM
        TemplatePath: BuildOutput::output-sam-template.yml
        TemplateConfiguration: BuildOutput::sam-config.json
        RoleArn: !Ref NonProdCloudFormationServiceRole
      InputArtifacts:
        - Name: BuildOutput
      RunOrder: 1
      RoleArn: !Ref NonProdCodePipelineActionServiceRole
    - Name: DeployChangeSetTest
      ActionTypeId:
        Category: Deploy
        Owner: AWS
        Version: 1
        Provider: CloudFormation
      Configuration:
        ChangeSetName: !Join ['-',[!Ref ProjectName, 'lambda', 'CS']]
        ActionMode: CHANGE_SET_EXECUTE
        StackName: !Join ['-',[!Ref ProjectName, 'lambda']]
      InputArtifacts:
        - Name: BuildOutput
      RunOrder: 2
      RoleArn: !Ref NonProdCodePipelineActionServiceRole

Challenge 2: Cross-account stack lookup using custom resources

Asynchronous communication is a fairly common pattern in microservices architectures. A publishing microservice publishes an event that consumers may be interested in, without any concern for who those consumers may be.

In the case of the sample application, the publisher is the Booking microservice, publishing a flight booking event onto an SNS topic that exists in the Booking account. The consumer is the Airmiles microservice in the Airmiles account. To enable the two microservices to communicate, the Airmiles microservice must look up the ARN of the Booking SNS topic at deployment time in order to set up a subscription to it.

To enable CloudFormation templates to be reused, you are not hardcoding resource names in the templates. Because you allow CloudFormation to generate a resource name for the Booking SNS topic, the Airmiles microservice CloudFormation template must look up the SNS topic name at stack creation time. It’s not possible to use cross-stack references, as these can’t be used across different accounts.

However, you can use a CloudFormation custom resource to achieve the same outcome. This is discussed in the next section. Using a custom resource to look up stack exports in another stack does not create a dependency between the two stacks, unlike cross-stack references. A stack dependency would prevent one stack being deleted if another stack depended upon it. For more information, see Fn::ImportValue.

Using a Lambda function as a custom resource to look up the booking SNS topic

The sample application uses a Lambda function as a custom resource. This approach is discussed in AWS Lambda-backed Custom Resources.
Walk through the sample application and see how the custom resource is used to list the stack export variables in another account and return these values to the calling AWS CloudFormation stack. Examine each of the following aspects of the custom resource:

Deploying the custom resource.
Custom resource IAM role.
A calling CloudFormation stack uses the custom resource.
The custom resource assumes a role in another account.
The custom resource obtains the stack exports from all stacks in the other account.
The custom resource returns the stack exports to the calling CloudFormation stack.
The custom resource handles all the event types sent by the calling CloudFormation stack.

Step1: Deploying the custom resource

The custom Lambda function is deployed using SAM, as are the Lambda functions for the Booking and Airmiles microservices. See the CustomLookupExports resource in Custom/custom-lookup-exports.yml.

Step2: Custom resource IAM role

The CustomLookupExports resource in Custom/custom-lookup-exports.yml executes using the CustomLookupLambdaRole IAM role. This role allows the custom Lambda function to assume a cross account role that is created along with the other cross account roles in the NonProdAccount/toolsacct-codepipeline-cloudformation-deployer.yml. See the resource CustomCrossAccountServiceRole.

Step3: The CloudFormation stack uses the custom resource

The Airmiles microservice is created by the Airmiles CloudFormation template Airmiles/sam-airmile.yml, a SAM template that uses the custom Lambda resource to look up the ARN of the Booking SNS topic. The custom resource is specified by the CUSTOMLOOKUP resource, and the PostAirmileFunction resource uses the custom resource to look up the ARN of the SNS topic and create a subscription to it.

Because the Airmiles Lambda function is going to subscribe to an SNS topic in another account, it must grant the SNS topic in the Booking account permissions to invoke the Airmiles Lambda function in the Airmiles account whenever a new event is published. Permissions are granted by the LambdaResourcePolicy resource.

Step4: The custom resource assumes a role in another account

When the Lambda custom resource is invoked by the Airmiles CloudFormation template, it must assume a role in the Booking account (see Step 2) in order to query the stack exports in that account.

This can be seen in Custom/custom-lookup-exports.py, where the AWS Simple Token Service (AWS STS) is used to obtain a temporary access key to allow access to resources in the account referred to by the environment variable: ‘CUSTOM_CROSS_ACCOUNT_ROLE_ARN’. This environment variable is defined in the Custom/custom-lookup-exports.yml CloudFormation template, and refers to the role created in Step 2.

sts = boto3.client('sts')
assumedRole = sts.assume_role(
    RoleArn=os.environ['CUSTOM_CROSS_ACCOUNT_ROLE_ARN'],
    RoleSessionName='LambdaCloudFormationSession'
)
credentials = assumedRole['Credentials']
accessKey = credentials['AccessKeyId']
secretAccessKey = credentials['SecretAccessKey']
sessionToken = credentials['SessionToken']
cfn = boto3.client('cloudformation',  
	region_name=os.environ['AWS_DEFAULT_REGION'], 
aws_access_key_id=accessKey,
aws_secret_access_key=secretAccessKey, 
	aws_session_token=sessionToken)

Step5: The custom resource obtains the stack exports from all stacks in the other account

The function get_exports() in Custom/custom-lookup-exports.py uses the AWS SDK to list all the stack exports in the Booking account.

Step 6: The custom resource returns the stack exports to the calling CloudFormation stack

The calling CloudFormation template, Airmiles/sam-airmile.yml, uses the custom resource to look up a stack export with the name of booking-lambda-BookingTopicArn. This is exported by the CloudFormation template Booking/sam-booking.yml.

PostAirmileFunction:
  Type: AWS::Serverless::Function
  Properties:
    Handler: post-airmiles-lambda.handler
    Runtime: python2.7
    Policies: AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess
    Events:
      SubmitBooking:
        Type: SNS
        Properties:
          Topic:
            !GetAtt CUSTOMLOOKUP.booking-lambda-BookingTopicArn

Step7: The custom resource handles all the event types sent by the calling CloudFormation stack

Custom resources used in a stack are called whenever the stack is created, updated, or deleted. They must therefore handle CREATE, UPDATE, and DELETE stack events. If your custom resource fails to send a SUCCESS or FAILED notification for each of these stack events, your stack may become stuck in a state such as CREATE_IN_PROGRESS or UPDATE_ROLLBACK_IN_PROGRESS. To handle this cleanly, use the crhelper custom resource helper. This strongly encourages you to handle the CREATE, UPDATE, and DELETE CloudFormation stack events.

Challenge 3: Cross-account SNS subscription

The SNS topic is specified as a resource in the Booking/sam-booking.yml CloudFormation template. To allow an event published to this topic to trigger the Airmiles Lambda function, permissions must be granted on both the Booking SNS topic and the Airmiles Lambda function. This is discussed in the next section.

Permissions on booking SNS topic

SNS topics support resource-based policies, which allow a policy to be attached directly to a resource specifying who can access the resource. This policy can specify which accounts can access a resource, and what actions those accounts are allowed to perform. This is the same approach as used by a small number of AWS services, such as Amazon S3, KMS, Amazon SQS, and Lambda. In Booking/sam-booking.yml, the SNS topic policy allows resources in the Airmiles account (referenced by the parameter NonProdAccount in the following snippet) to subscribe to the Booking SNS topic:

BookingTopicPolicy:
  Type: AWS::SNS::TopicPolicy
  Properties:
    PolicyDocument:
      Id: BookingTopicPolicy
      Version: '2012-10-17'
      Statement:
      - Sid: BookingTopicPolicy-stmt1
        Effect: Allow
        Principal:
            AWS:
              - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:root
        Action:
          - sns:Publish
          - sns:RemovePermission
          - sns:SetTopicAttributes
          - sns:DeleteTopic
          - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
          - sns:GetTopicAttributes
          - sns:Receive
          - sns:AddPermission
          - sns:Subscribe
        Resource: !Ref BookingTopic
      - Sid: BookingTopicPolicy-stmt2
        Effect: Allow
        Principal:
            AWS:
              - !Sub arn:aws:iam::${NonProdAccount}:root
        Action:
          - sns:Subscribe
          - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
        Resource: !Ref BookingTopic
    Topics:
    - !Ref BookingTopic

Permissions on the Airmiles Lambda function

The Airmiles microservice is created by the Airmiles/sam-airmile.yml CloudFormation template. The template uses SAM to specify the Lambda functions together with their associated API Gateway configurations. SAM hides much of the complexity of deploying Lambda functions from you.

For instance, by adding an ‘Events’ resource to the PostAirmileFunction in the CloudFormation template, the Airmiles Lambda function is triggered by an event published to the Booking SNS topic. SAM creates the SNS subscription, as well as the permissions necessary for the SNS subscription to trigger the Lambda function.

PostAirmileFunction:
  Type: AWS::Serverless::Function
  Properties:
    Handler: post-airmiles-lambda.handler
    Runtime: python2.7
    Policies: AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess
    Events:
      SubmitBooking:
        Type: SNS
        Properties:
          Topic:
            !GetAtt CUSTOMLOOKUP.booking-lambda-BookingTopicArn
    Environment:
      Variables: 
        TABLE_NAME: !Ref AirmileDBTable

However, the Lambda permissions generated automatically by SAM are not sufficient for cross-account SNS subscription, which means you must specify an additional Lambda permissions resource in the CloudFormation template. LambdaResourcePolicy, in the following snippet, specifies that the Booking SNS topic is allowed to invoke the Lambda function PostAirmileFunction in the Airmiles account.

LambdaResourcePolicy:
  Type: AWS::Lambda::Permission
  Properties:
    FunctionName: !GetAtt PostAirmileFunction.Arn
    Principal: sns.amazonaws.com
    Action: lambda:InvokeFunction
    SourceArn : !GetAtt CUSTOMLOOKUP.booking-lambda-BookingTopicArn

Summary

In this post, I showed you how product teams can use CodePipeline to deploy microservices into different AWS accounts and different environments such as DEV, QA, and PROD. I also showed how, at runtime, microservices in different accounts can communicate securely with each other using an asynchronous, event-driven architecture. This allows product teams to maintain their own AWS accounts for billing and security purposes, while still supporting communication with microservices in other accounts owned by other product teams.

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to the following people for their help in preparing this post:

Kevin Yung for the great web application used in the sample application
Jay McConnell for crhelper, the custom resource helper used with the CloudFormation custom resources

AWS Online Tech Talks – March 2018

2018-03-07 Betsy Chernoff

Post Syndicated from Betsy Chernoff original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-online-tech-talks-march-2018/

Can you believe it’s already the month of March? With some great new Tech Talks available this month, there’s no better time to grow your knowledge about AWS services and solutions.

AWS Online Tech Talks

March 2018– Schedule

Below is the full schedule for the live, online technical sessions being held during the month of March. Make sure to register ahead of time so you won’t miss out on these free talks conducted by AWS subject matter experts.

Webinars featured this month are:

Analytics & Big Data

March 21, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – Amazon Elasticsearch Service Deep Dive (300) – Learn how to run Elasticsearch using Amazon Elasticsearch Service.

March 28, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM PT – Deep Dive on Amazon Athena (300) – Dive deep into the most common Amazon Athena use cases, including working with other AWS services.

Compute

March 26, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – High Performance Computing in the Cloud (200) – Learn how AWS is enabling faster time to results and higher ROI when it comes to solving the big problems in science, engineering and business with high performance computing in the cloud.

March 27, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Introduction to Hybrid Cloud on AWS (200) – Learn how AWS is building the industry’s broadest capabilities for Hybrid Cloud deployments.

Containers

March 19, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Running Kubernetes with Amazon EKS (200) – Learn about how Amazon EKS makes it easy to run and scale Kubernetes in the cloud.

Databases

March 21, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Best Practices for Migrating Oracle Databases to the Cloud (200) – Learn best practices for migrating your Oracle databases to the cloud.

DevOps

March 21, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Life of a Code Change to a Tier 1 Service (200) – Come follow the journey of an AWS code change on its way to production.

Enterprise

March 26, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Improve Efficiency by Migrating Messaging to Amazon MQ (200) – Learn how Amazon MQ makes it easy for enterprises, like GE, to save time and money by migrating to a managed message broker.

IoT

March 22, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM PT – Learn Step by Step How iDevices Uses AWS IoT Analytics (300) – Learn how iDevices, with AWS IoT Analytics, built an anomaly system and gains deep insights into user behavior.

Machine Learning

March 20, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Working with Scalable Machine Learning Algorithms in Amazon SageMaker (400) – Get an introduction the collection of distributed streaming machine learning algorithms that come with Amazon SageMaker.

March 22, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 01:45 PM PT – Enabling Deep Learning in IoT Applications with Apache MXNet (200) – Learn how to use deep learning in IoT apps using Apache MXNet.

March 28, 2018 | 01:00 PM – 02:00 PM PT – Media Processing Workflows at High Velocity and Scale using AI and ML (200) – Hear how AWS customers have improved media supply chains using AI in areas such as metadata tagging (Rekognition and Comprehend), translations, transcriptions, and cloud services (Elemental).

Management Tools

March 19, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM PT – Achieving Global Consistency Using AWS CloudFormation StackSets (300) – Learn how to centrally manage your accounts and regions using AWS CloudFormation StackSets.

Mobile

March 22, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – New Mobile CLI and Console Experience (200) – Learn how AWS Mobile Services has introduced a new CLI and streamlined console experience in order to simplify and speed up the development of mobile applications with innovative AWS features and back-end functionality.

Networking

March 28, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – Deep Dive on New AWS Networking Features (300) – Learn how AWS PrivateLink, Direct Connect gateway, and new features with Elastic Load Balancers (ELB) come together to meet the needs of a modern enterprise.

Security, Identity & Compliance

March 27, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – The Evolution of Identity and Access Management on AWS (300) – Learn how identity federation can address many security and management scenarios as you expand your use of AWS.

March 29, 2018 | 09:00 AM – 09:45 AM PT – Navigating GDPR Compliance on AWS (300) – Get a walkthrough of potential General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) obligations and see how the AWS cloud offers services and features that are consistent with GDPR considerations in the ramp-up to the May 25th, 2018 enforcement date.

Serverless

March 20, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Operating Your Serverless API in Production at Scale (400) – Learn how to deploy, monitor, and manage serverless APIs in production.

Storage

March 27, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Enterprise Applications with Amazon EFS (300) – Join us for a technical deep dive on Amazon EFS, where you’ll learn tips and tricks for integrating your enterprise applications with Amazon EFS.

March 29, 2018 | 11:00 AM – 11:45 AM PT – Transforming Data Lakes with Amazon S3 Select & Amazon Glacier Select (300) – Join us for a webinar where we’ll demonstrate how Amazon S3 Select can increase analytics query performance up to 400%, and Amazon Glacier Select makes it practical to extend queries to archive storage, significantly reducing data lake storage costs.

How to Use Bucket Policies and Apply Defense-in-Depth to Help Secure Your Amazon S3 Data

2018-03-07 Rajat Ravinder Varuni

Post Syndicated from Rajat Ravinder Varuni original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-bucket-policies-and-apply-defense-in-depth-to-help-secure-your-amazon-s3-data/

Amazon S3 provides comprehensive security and compliance capabilities that meet even the most stringent regulatory requirements. It gives you flexibility in the way you manage data for cost optimization, access control, and compliance. However, because the service is flexible, a user could accidentally configure buckets in a manner that is not secure. For example, let’s say you uploaded files to an Amazon S3 bucket with public read permissions, even though you intended only to share this file with a colleague or a partner. Although this might have accomplished your task to share the file internally, the file is now available to anyone on the internet, even without authentication.

In this blog post, we show you how to prevent your Amazon S3 buckets and objects from allowing public access. We discuss how to secure data in Amazon S3 with a defense-in-depth approach, where multiple security controls are put in place to help prevent data leakage. This approach helps prevent you from allowing public access to confidential information, such as personally identifiable information (PII) or protected health information (PHI).

Preventing your Amazon S3 buckets and objects from allowing public access

Every call to an Amazon S3 service becomes a REST API request. When your request is transformed via a REST call, the permissions are converted into parameters included in the HTTP header or as URL parameters. The Amazon S3 bucket policy allows or denies access to the Amazon S3 bucket or Amazon S3 objects based on policy statements, and then evaluates conditions based on those parameters. To learn more, see Using Bucket Policies and User Policies.

With this in mind, let’s say multiple AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users at Example Corp. have access to an Amazon S3 bucket and the objects in the bucket. Example Corp. wants to share the objects among its IAM users, while at the same time preventing the objects from being made available publicly.

To demonstrate how to do this, we start by creating an Amazon S3 bucket named examplebucket. After creating this bucket, we must apply the following bucket policy. This policy denies any uploaded object (PutObject) with the attribute x-amz-acl having the values public-read, public-read-write, or authenticated-read. This means authenticated users cannot upload objects to the bucket if the objects have public permissions.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicReadACL",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:PutObjectAcl"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                        "public-read",
                        "public-read-write",
                        "authenticated-read"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicReadGrant",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:PutObjectAcl"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringLike": {
                    "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicListACL",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                        "public-read",
                        "public-read-write",
                        "authenticated-read"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicListGrant",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
            "Condition": {
                "StringLike": {
                    "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

To better understand what is happening in this bucket policy, we’ll explain each statement. Let’s start with the first statement.


{
    "Sid": "DenyPublicReadACL",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "*"
    },
    "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:PutObjectAcl"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
    "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
            "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                "public-read",
                "public-read-write",
                "authenticated-read"
            ]
        }
    }
}

This statement accomplishes the following:

“Deny any Amazon S3 request to PutObject or PutObjectAcl in the bucket examplebucket when the request includes one of the following access control lists (ACLs): public-read, public-read-write, or authenticated-read.”

Remember that IAM policies are evaluated not in a first-match-and-exit model. Instead, IAM evaluates first if there is an explicit Deny. If there is not, IAM continues to evaluate if you have an explicit Allow and then you have an implicit Deny.

The above policy creates an explicit Deny. Even when any authenticated user tries to upload (PutObject) an object with public read or write permissions, such as public-read or public-read-write or authenticated-read, the action will be denied. To understand how S3 Access Permissions work, you must understand what Access Control Lists (ACL) and Grants are. You can find the documentation here.

Now let’s continue our bucket policy explanation by examining the next statement.

{
    "Sid": "DenyPublicReadGrant",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "*"
    },
    "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:PutObjectAcl"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
    "Condition": {
        "StringLike": {
            "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
            ]
        }
    }
}

This statement is very similar to the first statement, except that instead of checking the ACLs, we are checking specific user groups’ grants that represent the following groups:

AuthenticatedUsers group. Represented by http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers, this group represents all AWS accounts. Access permissions to this group allow any AWS account to access the resource. However, all requests must be signed (authenticated).
AllUsers group. Represented by http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers, access permissions to this group allow anyone on the internet access to the resource. The requests can be signed (authenticated) or unsigned (anonymous). Unsigned requests omit the Authentication header in the request.

For more information about which parameters you can use to create bucket policies, see Using Bucket Policies and User Policies.

Now that you know how to deny object uploads with permissions that would make the object public, you just have two statement policies that prevent users from changing the bucket permissions (Denying s3:PutBucketACL from ACL and Denying s3:PutBucketACL from Grants).

Below is how we’re preventing users from changing the bucket permisssions.

{
  "Sid": "DenyPublicListACL",
  "Effect": "Deny",
  "Principal": {
    "AWS": "*"
  },
  "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "s3:x-amz-acl": [
        "public-read",
        "public-read-write",
        "authenticated-read"
      ]
    }
  }
},
{
  "Sid": "DenyPublicListGrant",
  "Effect": "Deny",
  "Principal": {
    "AWS": "*"
  },
  "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
  "Condition": {
    "StringLike": {
      "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
      ]
    }
  }
}

As you can see above, the statement is very similar to the Object statements, except that now we use s3:PutBucketAcl instead of s3:PutObjectAcl, the Resource is just the bucket ARN, and the objects have the “/*” in the end of the ARN.

In this section, we showed how to prevent IAM users from accidently uploading Amazon S3 objects with public permissions to buckets. In the next section, we show you how to enforce multiple layers of security controls, such as encryption of data at rest and in transit while serving traffic from Amazon S3.

Securing data on Amazon S3 with defense-in-depth

Let’s say that Example Corp. wants to serve files securely from Amazon S3 to its users with the following requirements:

The data must be encrypted at rest and during transit.
The data must be accessible only by a limited set of public IP addresses.
All requests for data should be handled only by Amazon CloudFront (which is a content delivery network) instead of being directly available from an Amazon S3 URL. If you’re using an Amazon S3 bucket as the origin for a CloudFront distribution, you can grant public permission to read the objects in your bucket. This allows anyone to access your objects either through CloudFront or the Amazon S3 URL. CloudFront doesn’t expose Amazon S3 URLs, but your users still might have access to those URLs if your application serves any objects directly from Amazon S3, or if anyone gives out direct links to specific objects in Amazon S3.
A domain name is required to consume the content. Custom SSL certificate support lets you deliver content over HTTPS by using your own domain name and your own SSL certificate. This gives visitors to your website the security benefits of CloudFront over an SSL connection that uses your own domain name, in addition to lower latency and higher reliability.

To represent defense-in-depth visually, the following diagram contains several Amazon S3 objects (A) in a single Amazon S3 bucket (B). You can encrypt these objects on the server side or the client side. You also can configure the bucket policy such that objects are accessible only through CloudFront, which you can accomplish through an origin access identity (C). You then can configure CloudFront to deliver content only over HTTPS in addition to using your own domain name (D).

Defense-in-depth requirement 1: Data must be encrypted at rest and during transit

Let’s start with the objects themselves. Amazon S3 objects—files in this case—can range from zero bytes to multiple terabytes in size (see service limits for the latest information). Each Amazon S3 bucket includes a collection of objects, and the objects can be uploaded via the Amazon S3 console, AWS CLI, or AWS API.

You can encrypt Amazon S3 objects at rest and during transit. At rest, objects in a bucket are encrypted with server-side encryption by using Amazon S3 managed keys or AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) managed keys or customer-provided keys through AWS KMS. You also can encrypt objects on the client side by using AWS KMS managed keys or a customer-supplied client-side master key.

If you choose to use server-side encryption, Amazon S3 encrypts your objects before saving them on disks in AWS data centers. To encrypt an object at the time of upload, you need to add the x-amz-server-side-encryption header to the request to tell Amazon S3 to encrypt the object using Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3), AWS KMS managed keys (SSE-KMS), or customer-provided keys (SSE-C). There are two possible values for the x-amz-server-side-encryption header: AES256, which tells Amazon S3 to use Amazon S3 managed keys, and aws:kms, which tells Amazon S3 to use AWS KMS managed keys.

The following code example shows a Put request using SSE-S3.

PUT /example-object HTTP/1.1
Host: myBucket.s3.amazonaws.com
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 17:50:00 GMT
Authorization: authorization string
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 11434
x-amz-meta-author: Janet
Expect: 100-continue
x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256
[11434 bytes of object data]

If you choose to use client-side encryption, you can encrypt data on the client side and upload the encrypted data to Amazon S3. In this case, you manage the encryption process, the encryption keys, and related tools. You encrypt data on the client side by using AWS KMS managed keys or a customer-supplied, client-side master key.

Defense-in-depth requirement 2: Data must be accessible only by a limited set of public IP addresses

At the Amazon S3 bucket level, you can configure permissions through a bucket policy. For example, you can limit access to the objects in a bucket by IP address range or specific IP addresses. Alternatively, you can make the objects accessible only through HTTPS.

The following bucket policy allows access to Amazon S3 objects only through HTTPS (the policy was generated with the AWS Policy Generator). Here the bucket policy explicitly denies ("Effect": "Deny") all read access ("Action": "s3:GetObject") from anybody who browses ("Principal": "*") to Amazon S3 objects within an Amazon S3 bucket if they are not accessed through HTTPS ("aws:SecureTransport": "false").

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Id": "Policy1504640911349",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Stmt1504640908907",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": "*",
            "Action": "s3:GetObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::/*",
            "Condition": {
                "Bool": {
                    "aws:SecureTransport": "false"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

Defense-in-depth requirement 3: Data must not be publicly accessible directly from an Amazon S3 URL

Next, configure Amazon CloudFront to serve traffic from within the bucket. The use of CloudFront serves several purposes:

CloudFront is a content delivery network that acts as a cache to serve static files quickly to clients.
Depending on the number of requests, the cost of delivery is less than if objects were served directly via Amazon S3.
Objects served through CloudFront can be limited to specific countries.

Access to these Amazon S3 objects is available only through CloudFront. We do this by creating an origin access identity (OAI) for CloudFront and granting access to objects in the respective Amazon S3 bucket only to that OAI. As a result, access to Amazon S3 objects from the internet is possible only through CloudFront; all other means of accessing the objects—such as through an Amazon S3 URL—are denied. CloudFront acts not only as a content distribution network, but also as a host that denies access based on geographic restrictions. You apply these restrictions by updating your CloudFront web distribution and adding a whitelist that contains only a specific country’s name (let’s say Liechtenstein). Alternatively, you could add a blacklist that contains every country except that country. Learn more about how to use CloudFront geographic restriction to whitelist or blacklist a country to restrict or allow users in specific locations from accessing web content in the AWS Support Knowledge Center.

Defense-in-depth requirement 4: A domain name is required to consume the content

To serve content from CloudFront, you must use a domain name in the URLs for objects on your webpages or in your web application. The domain name can be either of the following:

The domain name that CloudFront automatically assigns when you create a distribution, such as d111111abcdef8.cloudfront.net
Your own domain name, such as example.com

For example, you might use one of the following URLs to return the file image.jpg:

http://d111111abcdef8.cloudfront.net/images/image.jpg
http://example.com/images/image.jpg

You use the same URL format whether you store the content in Amazon S3 buckets or at a custom origin, like one of your own web servers.

Instead of using the default domain name that CloudFront assigns for you when you create a distribution, you can add an alternate domain name that’s easier to work with, like example.com. By setting up your own domain name with CloudFront, you can use a URL like this for objects in your distribution: http://example.com/images/image.jpg.

Let’s say that you already have a domain name hosted on Amazon Route 53. You would like to serve traffic from the domain name, request an SSL certificate, and add this to your CloudFront web distribution. The SSL offloading occurs in CloudFront by serving traffic securely from each CloudFront location. You also can configure CloudFront to deliver your content over HTTPS by using your custom domain name and your own SSL certificate. Serving web content through CloudFront reduces response from the origin as requests are redirected to the nearest edge location. This results in faster download times than if the visitor had requested the content from a data center that is located farther away.

Summary

In this post, we demonstrated how you can apply policies to Amazon S3 buckets so that only users with appropriate permissions are allowed to access the buckets. Anonymous users (with public-read/public-read-write permissions) and authenticated users without the appropriate permissions are prevented from accessing the buckets.

We also examined how to secure access to objects in Amazon S3 buckets. The objects in Amazon S3 buckets can be encrypted at rest and during transit. Doing so helps provide end-to-end security from the source (in this case, Amazon S3) to your users.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the Amazon S3 forum or contact AWS Support.

AWS Federated Authentication with Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS)

2018-03-03 Kevin Higgins

Post Syndicated from Kevin Higgins original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-federated-authentication-with-active-directory-federation-services-ad-fs/

Today we’d like to walk you through AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), federated sign-in through Active Directory (AD) and Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS). With IAM, you can centrally manage users, security credentials such as access keys, and permissions that control which resources users can access. Customers have the option of creating users and group objects within IAM or they can utilize a third-party federation service to assign external directory users access to AWS resources. To streamline the administration of user access in AWS, organizations can utilize a federated solution with an external directory, allowing them to minimize administrative overhead. Benefits of this approach include leveraging existing passwords and password policies, roles and groups. This guide provides a walk-through on how to automate the federation setup across multiple accounts/roles with an Active Directory backing identity store. This will establish the minimum baseline for the authentication architecture, including the initial IdP deployment and elements for federation.

ADFS Federated Authentication Process

The following describes the process a user will follow to authenticate to AWS using Active Directory and ADFS as the identity provider and identity brokers:

Corporate user accesses the corporate Active Directory Federation Services portal sign-in page and provides Active Directory authentication credentials.
AD FS authenticates the user against Active Directory.
Active Directory returns the user’s information, including AD group membership information.
AD FS dynamically builds ARNs by using Active Directory group memberships for the IAM roles and user attributes for the AWS account IDs, and sends a signed assertion to the users browser with a redirect to post the assertion to AWS STS.
Temporary credentials are returned using STS AssumeRoleWithSAML.
The user is authenticated and provided access to the AWS management console.

Configuration Steps

Configuration requires setup in the Identity Provider store (e.g. Active Directory), the identity broker (e.g. Active Directory Federation Services), and AWS. It is possible to configure AWS to federate authentication using a variety of third-party SAML 2.0 compliant identity providers, more information can be found here.

AWS Configuration

The configuration steps outlined in this document can be completed to enable federated access to multiple AWS accounts, facilitating a single sign on process across a multi-account AWS environment. Access can also be provided to multiple roles in each AWS account. The roles available to a user are based on their group memberships in the identity provider (IdP). In a multi-role and/or multi-account scenario, role assumption requires the user to select the account and role they wish to assume during the authentication process.

Identity Provider

A SAML 2.0 identity provider is an IAM resource that describes an identity provider (IdP) service that supports the SAML 2.0 (Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0) standard. AWS SAML identity provider configurations can be used to establish trust between AWS and SAML-compatible identity providers, such as Shibboleth or Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services. These enable users in an organization to access AWS resources using existing credentials from the identity provider.

A SAML identify provider can be configured using the AWS console by completing the following steps.

1. Access the “Identity Providers” section of the AWS IAM console at the following URL: https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/home?region=us-east-1#/providers. Click on the “Create Provider” button.

2. Select SAML for the provider type. Select a provider name of your choosing (this will become the logical name used in the identity provider ARN). Lastly, download the FederationMetadata.xml file from your ADFS server to your client system file (https://yourADFSserverFQDN/FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml). Click “Choose File” and upload it to AWS.

3. Click “Next Step” and then verify the information you have entered. Click “Create” to complete the AWS identity provider configuration process.

IAM Role Naming Convention for User Access
Once the AWS identity provider configuration is complete, it is necessary to create the roles in AWS that federated users can assume via SAML 2.0. An IAM role is an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS. In a federated authentication scenario, users (as defined in the IdP) assume an AWS role during the sign-in process. A role should be defined for each access delineation that you wish to define. For example, create a role for each line of business (LOB), or each function within a LOB. Each role will then be assigned a set of policies that define what privileges the users who will be assuming that role will have.

The following steps detail how to create a single role. These steps should be completed multiple times to enable assumption of different roles within AWS, as required.

1. Access the “Roles” section of the AWS IAM console at the following URL: https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/home?region=us-east-1#/roles. Click on the “Create Role” button.

2. Select “SAML” as the trusted entity type. Click Next Step.

3. Select your previously created identity provider. Click Next: Permissions.

4. The next step requires selection of policies that represent the desired permissions the user should obtain in AWS, once they have authenticated and successfully assumed the role. This can be either a custom policy or preferably an AWS managed policy. AWS recommends leveraging existing AWS access policies for job functions for common levels of access. For example, the “Billing” AWS Managed policy should be utilized to provide financial analyst access to AWS billing and cost information.

5. Provide a name for your role. All roles should be created with the prefix ADFS-<rolename> to simplify the identification of roles in AWS that are accessed through the federated authentication process. Next click, “Create Role”.

Active Directory Configuration

Determining how you will create and delineate your AD groups and IAM roles in AWS is crucial to how you secure access to your account and manage resources. SAML assertions to the AWS environment and the respective IAM role access will be managed through regular expression (regex) matching between your on-premises AD group name to an AWS IAM role.

One approach for creating the AD groups that uniquely identify the AWS IAM role mapping is by selecting a common group naming convention. For example, your AD groups would start with an identifier, for example AWS-, as this will distinguish your AWS groups from others within the organization. Next, include the 12-digit AWS account number. Finally, add the matching role name within the AWS account. Here is an example:

You should do this for each role and corresponding AWS account you wish to support with federated access. Users in Active Directory can subsequently be added to the groups, providing the ability to assume access to the corresponding roles in AWS. If a user is associated with multiple Active Directory groups and AWS accounts, they will see a list of roles by AWS account and will have the option to choose which role to assume. A user will not be able to assume more than one role at a time, but has the ability to switch between them as needed.

Note: Microsoft imposes a limit on the number of groups a user can be a member of (approximately 1,015 groups) due to the size limit for the access token that is created for each security principal. This limitation, however, is not affected by how the groups may or may not be nested.

Active Directory Federation Services Configuration

ADFS federation occurs with the participation of two parties; the identity or claims provider (in this case the owner of the identity repository – Active Directory) and the relying party, which is another application that wishes to outsource authentication to the identity provider; in this case Amazon Secure Token Service (STS). The relying party is a federation partner that is represented by a claims provider trust in the federation service.

Relying Party

You can configure a new relying party in Active Directory Federation Services by doing the following.

1. From the ADFS Management Console, right-click ADFS and select Add Relying Party Trust.

2. In the Add Relying Party Trust Wizard, click Start.

3. Check Import data about the relying party published online or on a local network, enter
https://signin.aws.amazon.com/static/saml-metadata.xml, and then click Next. The metadata XML file is a standard SAML metadata document that describes AWS as a relying party.

Note: SAML federations use metadata documents to maintain information about the public keys and certificates that each party utilizes. At run time, each member of the federation can then use this information to validate that the cryptographic elements of the distributed transactions come from the expected actors and haven’t been tampered with. Since these metadata documents do not contain any sensitive cryptographic material, AWS publishes federation metadata at https://signin.aws.amazon.com/static/saml-metadata.xml

4. Set the display name for the relying party and then click Next.

5. We will not choose to enable/configure the MFA settings at this time.

6. Select “Permit all users to access this relying party” and click Next.

7. Review your settings and then click Next.

8. Choose Close on the Finish page to complete the Add Relying Party Trust Wizard. AWS is now configured as a relying party.

Custom Claim Rules

Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) uses Claims Rule Language to issue and transform claims between claims providers and relying parties. A claim is information about a user from a trusted source. The trusted source is asserting that the information is true, and that source has authenticated the user in some manner. The claims provider is the source of the claim. This can be information pulled from an attribute store such as Active Directory (AD). The relying party is the destination for the claims, in this case AWS.

AD FS provides administrators with the option to define custom rules that they can use to determine the behavior of identity claims with the claim rule language. The Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) claim rule language acts as the administrative building block to help manage the behavior of incoming and outgoing claims. There are four claim rules that need to be created to effectively enable Active Directory users to assume roles in AWS based on group membership in Active Directory.

Right-click on the relying party (in this case Amazon Web Services) and then click Edit Claim Rules

Here are the steps used to create the claim rules for NameId, RoleSessionName, Get AD Groups and Roles.

1. NameId

a) In the Edit Claim Rules for <relying party> dialog box, click Add Rule.
b) Select Transform an Incoming Claim and then click Next.
c) Use the following settings:

i) Claim rule name: NameId
ii) Incoming claim type: Windows Account Name
iii) Outgoing claim type: Name ID
iv) Outgoing name ID format: Persistent Identifier
v) Pass through all claim values: checked

d) Click OK.

Rule language:
c:[Type == "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccountname"] => issue(Type = "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/nameidentifier", Issuer = c.Issuer, OriginalIssuer = c.OriginalIssuer, Value = c.Value, ValueType = c.ValueType, Properties["http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claimproperties/format"] = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent");

2. RoleSessionName

a) Click Add Rule
b) In the Claim rule template list, select Send LDAP Attributes as Claims.
c) Use the following settings:

i) Claim rule name: RoleSessionName
ii) Attribute store: Active Directory
iii) LDAP Attribute: E-Mail-Addresses
iv) Outgoing Claim Type: https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/RoleSessionName

d) Click OK

Rule language:
c:[Type == "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccountname", Issuer == "AD AUTHORITY"] => issue(store = "Active Directory", types = ("https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/RoleSessionName"), query = ";mail;{0}", param = c.Value);

3. Get AD Groups

a) Click Add Rule.
b) In the Claim rule template list, select Send Claims Using a Custom Rule and then click Next.
c) For Claim Rule Name, select Get AD Groups, and then in Custom rule, enter the following:

Rule language:
c:[Type == "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccountname", Issuer == "AD AUTHORITY"] => add(store = "Active Directory", types = ("http://temp/variable"), query = ";tokenGroups;{0}", param = c.Value);

This custom rule uses a script in the claim rule language that retrieves all the groups the authenticated user is a member of and places them into a temporary claim named http://temp/variable. Think of this as a variable you can access later.

Note: Ensure there’s no trailing whitespace to avoid unexpected results.

4. Role Attributes

a) Unlike the two previous claims, here we used custom rules to send role attributes. This is done by retrieving all the authenticated user’s AD groups and then matching the groups that start with to IAM roles of a similar name. I used the names of these groups to create Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) of IAM roles in my AWS account (i.e., those that start with AWS-). Sending role attributes requires two custom rules. The first rule retrieves all the authenticated user’s AD group memberships and the second rule performs the transformation to the roles claim.

i) Click Add Rule.
ii) In the Claim rule template list, select Send Claims Using a Custom Rule and then click Next.
iii) For Claim Rule Name, enter Roles, and then in Custom rule, enter the following:

Rule language:
c:[Type == "http://temp/variable", Value =~ "(?i)^AWS-([\d]{12})"] => issue(Type = "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/Role", Value = RegExReplace(c.Value, "AWS-([\d]{12})-", "arn:aws:iam::$1:saml-provider/idp1,arn:aws:iam::$1:role/"));

This custom rule uses regular expressions to transform each of the group memberships of the form AWS-<Account Number>-<Role Name> into in the IAM role ARN, IAM federation provider ARN form AWS expects.

Note: In the example rule language above idp1 represents the logical name given to the SAML identity provider in the AWS identity provider setup. Please change this based on the logical name you chose in the IAM console for your identity provider.

Adjusting Session Duration

By default, the temporary credentials that are issued by AWS IAM for SAML federation are valid for an hour. Depending on your organizations security stance, you may wish to adjust. You can allow your federated users to work in the AWS Management Console for up to 12 hours. This can be accomplished by adding another claim rule in your ADFS configuration. To add the rule, do the following:

1. Access ADFS Management Tool on your ADFS Server.
2. Choose Relying Party Trusts, then select your AWS Relying Party configuration.
3. Choose Edit Claim Rules.
4. Choose Add Rule to configure a new rule, and then choose Send claims using a custom rule. Finally, choose Next.
5. Name your Rule “Session Duration” and add the following rule syntax.
6. Adjust the value of 28800 seconds (8 hours) as appropriate.

Rule language:
=> issue(Type = "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/SessionDuration", Value = "28800");

Note: AD FS 2012 R2 and AD FS 2016 tokens have a sixty-minute validity period by default. This value is configurable on a per-relying party trust basis. In addition to adding the “Session Duration” claim rule, you will also need to update the security token created by AD FS. To update this value, run the following command:

Set-ADFSRelyingPartyTrust -TargetName “[Display Name]” -TokenLifetime 480

The Parameter “-TokenLifetime” determines the Lifetime in Minutes. In this example, we set the Lifetime to 480 minutes, eight hours.

These are the main settings related to session lifetimes and user authentication. Once updated, any new console session your federated users initiate will be valid for the duration specified in the SessionDuration claim.

API/CLI Access
Access to the AWS API and command-line tools using federated access can be accomplished using techniques in the following blog article:

https://blogs.aws.amazon.com/security/post/Tx1LDN0UBGJJ26Q/How-to-Implement-Federated-API-and-CLI-Access-Using-SAML-2-0-and-AD-FS

This will enable your users to access your AWS environment using their domain credentials through the AWS CLI or one of the AWS SDKs.

Conclusion
In this post, I’ve shown you how to provide identity federation, and thus SSO, to the AWS Management Console for multiple accounts using SAML assertions. With this approach, the AWS Security Token service (STS) will provide temporary credentials (via SAML) for the user to ‘assume’ a role (that they have access to use, as denoted by AD Group membership) that has specific permissions associated; as opposed to providing long-term access credentials to the AWS resources. By adopting this model, you will have a secure and robust IAM approach for accessing AWS resources that align with AWS security best practices.

Best Practices for Running Apache Cassandra on Amazon EC2

2018-02-28 Prasad Alle

Post Syndicated from Prasad Alle original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/best-practices-for-running-apache-cassandra-on-amazon-ec2/

Apache Cassandra is a commonly used, high performance NoSQL database. AWS customers that currently maintain Cassandra on-premises may want to take advantage of the scalability, reliability, security, and economic benefits of running Cassandra on Amazon EC2.

Amazon EC2 and Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) provide secure, resizable compute capacity and storage in the AWS Cloud. When combined, you can deploy Cassandra, allowing you to scale capacity according to your requirements. Given the number of possible deployment topologies, it’s not always trivial to select the most appropriate strategy suitable for your use case.

In this post, we outline three Cassandra deployment options, as well as provide guidance about determining the best practices for your use case in the following areas:

Cassandra resource overview
Deployment considerations
Storage options
Networking
High availability and resiliency
Maintenance
Security

Before we jump into best practices for running Cassandra on AWS, we should mention that we have many customers who decided to use DynamoDB instead of managing their own Cassandra cluster. DynamoDB is fully managed, serverless, and provides multi-master cross-region replication, encryption at rest, and managed backup and restore. Integration with AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) enables DynamoDB customers to implement fine-grained access control for their data security needs.

Several customers who have been using large Cassandra clusters for many years have moved to DynamoDB to eliminate the complications of administering Cassandra clusters and maintaining high availability and durability themselves. Gumgum.com is one customer who migrated to DynamoDB and observed significant savings. For more information, see Moving to Amazon DynamoDB from Hosted Cassandra: A Leap Towards 60% Cost Saving per Year.

AWS provides options, so you’re covered whether you want to run your own NoSQL Cassandra database, or move to a fully managed, serverless DynamoDB database.

Cassandra resource overview

Here’s a short introduction to standard Cassandra resources and how they are implemented with AWS infrastructure. If you’re already familiar with Cassandra or AWS deployments, this can serve as a refresher.

Resource	Cassandra	AWS
Cluster	A single Cassandra deployment. This typically consists of multiple physical locations, keyspaces, and physical servers.	A logical deployment construct in AWS that maps to an AWS CloudFormation StackSet, which consists of one or many CloudFormation stacks to deploy Cassandra.
Datacenter	A group of nodes configured as a single replication group.	A logical deployment construct in AWS. A datacenter is deployed with a single CloudFormation stack consisting of Amazon EC2 instances, networking, storage, and security resources.
Rack	A collection of servers. A datacenter consists of at least one rack. Cassandra tries to place the replicas on different racks.	A single Availability Zone.
Server/node	A physical virtual machine running Cassandra software.	An EC2 instance.
Token	Conceptually, the data managed by a cluster is represented as a ring. The ring is then divided into ranges equal to the number of nodes. Each node being responsible for one or more ranges of the data. Each node gets assigned with a token, which is essentially a random number from the range. The token value determines the node’s position in the ring and its range of data.	Managed within Cassandra.
Virtual node (vnode)	Responsible for storing a range of data. Each vnode receives one token in the ring. A cluster (by default) consists of 256 tokens, which are uniformly distributed across all servers in the Cassandra datacenter.	Managed within Cassandra.
Replication factor	The total number of replicas across the cluster.	Managed within Cassandra.

Deployment considerations

One of the many benefits of deploying Cassandra on Amazon EC2 is that you can automate many deployment tasks. In addition, AWS includes services, such as CloudFormation, that allow you to describe and provision all your infrastructure resources in your cloud environment.

We recommend orchestrating each Cassandra ring with one CloudFormation template. If you are deploying in multiple AWS Regions, you can use a CloudFormation StackSet to manage those stacks. All the maintenance actions (scaling, upgrading, and backing up) should be scripted with an AWS SDK. These may live as standalone AWS Lambda functions that can be invoked on demand during maintenance.

You can get started by following the Cassandra Quick Start deployment guide. Keep in mind that this guide does not address the requirements to operate a production deployment and should be used only for learning more about Cassandra.

Deployment patterns

In this section, we discuss various deployment options available for Cassandra in Amazon EC2. A successful deployment starts with thoughtful consideration of these options. Consider the amount of data, network environment, throughput, and availability.

Single AWS Region, 3 Availability Zones
Active-active, multi-Region
Active-standby, multi-Region

Single region, 3 Availability Zones

In this pattern, you deploy the Cassandra cluster in one AWS Region and three Availability Zones. There is only one ring in the cluster. By using EC2 instances in three zones, you ensure that the replicas are distributed uniformly in all zones.

To ensure the even distribution of data across all Availability Zones, we recommend that you distribute the EC2 instances evenly in all three Availability Zones. The number of EC2 instances in the cluster is a multiple of three (the replication factor).

This pattern is suitable in situations where the application is deployed in one Region or where deployments in different Regions should be constrained to the same Region because of data privacy or other legal requirements.

Pros

Cons

● Highly available, can sustain failure of one Availability Zone.

● Simple deployment

● Does not protect in a situation when many of the resources in a Region are experiencing intermittent failure.

Active-active, multi-Region

In this pattern, you deploy two rings in two different Regions and link them. The VPCs in the two Regions are peered so that data can be replicated between two rings.

We recommend that the two rings in the two Regions be identical in nature, having the same number of nodes, instance types, and storage configuration.

This pattern is most suitable when the applications using the Cassandra cluster are deployed in more than one Region.

Pros

Cons

● No data loss during failover.

● Highly available, can sustain when many of the resources in a Region are experiencing intermittent failures.

● Read/write traffic can be localized to the closest Region for the user for lower latency and higher performance.

● High operational overhead

● The second Region effectively doubles the cost

Active-standby, multi-region

In this pattern, you deploy two rings in two different Regions and link them. The VPCs in the two Regions are peered so that data can be replicated between two rings.

However, the second Region does not receive traffic from the applications. It only functions as a secondary location for disaster recovery reasons. If the primary Region is not available, the second Region receives traffic.

We recommend that the two rings in the two Regions be identical in nature, having the same number of nodes, instance types, and storage configuration.

This pattern is most suitable when the applications using the Cassandra cluster require low recovery point objective (RPO) and recovery time objective (RTO).

Pros

Cons

● No data loss during failover.

● Highly available, can sustain failure or partitioning of one whole Region.

● High operational overhead.

● High latency for writes for eventual consistency.

● The second Region effectively doubles the cost.

Storage options

In on-premises deployments, Cassandra deployments use local disks to store data. There are two storage options for EC2 instances:

Your choice of storage is closely related to the type of workload supported by the Cassandra cluster. Instance store works best for most general purpose Cassandra deployments. However, in certain read-heavy clusters, Amazon EBS is a better choice.

The choice of instance type is generally driven by the type of storage:

If ephemeral storage is required for your application, a storage-optimized (I3) instance is the best option.
If your workload requires Amazon EBS, it is best to go with compute-optimized (C5) instances.
Burstable instance types (T2) don’t offer good performance for Cassandra deployments.

Instance store

Ephemeral storage is local to the EC2 instance. It may provide high input/output operations per second (IOPs) based on the instance type. An SSD-based instance store can support up to 3.3M IOPS in I3 instances. This high performance makes it an ideal choice for transactional or write-intensive applications such as Cassandra.

In general, instance storage is recommended for transactional, large, and medium-size Cassandra clusters. For a large cluster, read/write traffic is distributed across a higher number of nodes, so the loss of one node has less of an impact. However, for smaller clusters, a quick recovery for the failed node is important.

As an example, for a cluster with 100 nodes, the loss of 1 node is 3.33% loss (with a replication factor of 3). Similarly, for a cluster with 10 nodes, the loss of 1 node is 33% less capacity (with a replication factor of 3).

	Ephemeral storage	Amazon EBS	Comments
IOPS (translates to higher query performance)	Up to 3.3M on I3	80K/instance 10K/gp2/volume 32K/io1/volume	This results in a higher query performance on each host. However, Cassandra implicitly scales well in terms of horizontal scale. In general, we recommend scaling horizontally first. Then, scale vertically to mitigate specific issues. Note: 3.3M IOPS is observed with 100% random read with a 4-KB block size on Amazon Linux.
AWS instance types	I3	Compute optimized, C5	Being able to choose between different instance types is an advantage in terms of CPU, memory, etc., for horizontal and vertical scaling.
Backup/ recovery	Custom	Basic building blocks are available from AWS.	Amazon EBS offers distinct advantage here. It is small engineering effort to establish a backup/restore strategy. a) In case of an instance failure, the EBS volumes from the failing instance are attached to a new instance. b) In case of an EBS volume failure, the data is restored by creating a new EBS volume from last snapshot.

Amazon EBS

EBS volumes offer higher resiliency, and IOPs can be configured based on your storage needs. EBS volumes also offer some distinct advantages in terms of recovery time. EBS volumes can support up to 32K IOPS per volume and up to 80K IOPS per instance in RAID configuration. They have an annualized failure rate (AFR) of 0.1–0.2%, which makes EBS volumes 20 times more reliable than typical commodity disk drives.

The primary advantage of using Amazon EBS in a Cassandra deployment is that it reduces data-transfer traffic significantly when a node fails or must be replaced. The replacement node joins the cluster much faster. However, Amazon EBS could be more expensive, depending on your data storage needs.

Cassandra has built-in fault tolerance by replicating data to partitions across a configurable number of nodes. It can not only withstand node failures but if a node fails, it can also recover by copying data from other replicas into a new node. Depending on your application, this could mean copying tens of gigabytes of data. This adds additional delay to the recovery process, increases network traffic, and could possibly impact the performance of the Cassandra cluster during recovery.

Data stored on Amazon EBS is persisted in case of an instance failure or termination. The node’s data stored on an EBS volume remains intact and the EBS volume can be mounted to a new EC2 instance. Most of the replicated data for the replacement node is already available in the EBS volume and won’t need to be copied over the network from another node. Only the changes made after the original node failed need to be transferred across the network. That makes this process much faster.

EBS volumes are snapshotted periodically. So, if a volume fails, a new volume can be created from the last known good snapshot and be attached to a new instance. This is faster than creating a new volume and coping all the data to it.

Most Cassandra deployments use a replication factor of three. However, Amazon EBS does its own replication under the covers for fault tolerance. In practice, EBS volumes are about 20 times more reliable than typical disk drives. So, it is possible to go with a replication factor of two. This not only saves cost, but also enables deployments in a region that has two Availability Zones.

EBS volumes are recommended in case of read-heavy, small clusters (fewer nodes) that require storage of a large amount of data. Keep in mind that the Amazon EBS provisioned IOPS could get expensive. General purpose EBS volumes work best when sized for required performance.

Networking

If your cluster is expected to receive high read/write traffic, select an instance type that offers 10–Gb/s performance. As an example, i3.8xlarge and c5.9xlarge both offer 10–Gb/s networking performance. A smaller instance type in the same family leads to a relatively lower networking throughput.

Cassandra generates a universal unique identifier (UUID) for each node based on IP address for the instance. This UUID is used for distributing vnodes on the ring.

In the case of an AWS deployment, IP addresses are assigned automatically to the instance when an EC2 instance is created. With the new IP address, the data distribution changes and the whole ring has to be rebalanced. This is not desirable.

To preserve the assigned IP address, use a secondary elastic network interface with a fixed IP address. Before swapping an EC2 instance with a new one, detach the secondary network interface from the old instance and attach it to the new one. This way, the UUID remains same and there is no change in the way that data is distributed in the cluster.

If you are deploying in more than one region, you can connect the two VPCs in two regions using cross-region VPC peering.

High availability and resiliency

Cassandra is designed to be fault-tolerant and highly available during multiple node failures. In the patterns described earlier in this post, you deploy Cassandra to three Availability Zones with a replication factor of three. Even though it limits the AWS Region choices to the Regions with three or more Availability Zones, it offers protection for the cases of one-zone failure and network partitioning within a single Region. The multi-Region deployments described earlier in this post protect when many of the resources in a Region are experiencing intermittent failure.

Resiliency is ensured through infrastructure automation. The deployment patterns all require a quick replacement of the failing nodes. In the case of a regionwide failure, when you deploy with the multi-Region option, traffic can be directed to the other active Region while the infrastructure is recovering in the failing Region. In the case of unforeseen data corruption, the standby cluster can be restored with point-in-time backups stored in Amazon S3.

Maintenance

In this section, we look at ways to ensure that your Cassandra cluster is healthy:

Scaling
Upgrades
Backup and restore

Scaling

Cassandra is horizontally scaled by adding more instances to the ring. We recommend doubling the number of nodes in a cluster to scale up in one scale operation. This leaves the data homogeneously distributed across Availability Zones. Similarly, when scaling down, it’s best to halve the number of instances to keep the data homogeneously distributed.

Cassandra is vertically scaled by increasing the compute power of each node. Larger instance types have proportionally bigger memory. Use deployment automation to swap instances for bigger instances without downtime or data loss.

Upgrades

All three types of upgrades (Cassandra, operating system patching, and instance type changes) follow the same rolling upgrade pattern.

In this process, you start with a new EC2 instance and install software and patches on it. Thereafter, remove one node from the ring. For more information, see Cassandra cluster Rolling upgrade. Then, you detach the secondary network interface from one of the EC2 instances in the ring and attach it to the new EC2 instance. Restart the Cassandra service and wait for it to sync. Repeat this process for all nodes in the cluster.

Backup and restore

Your backup and restore strategy is dependent on the type of storage used in the deployment. Cassandra supports snapshots and incremental backups. When using instance store, a file-based backup tool works best. Customers use rsync or other third-party products to copy data backups from the instance to long-term storage. For more information, see Backing up and restoring data in the DataStax documentation. This process has to be repeated for all instances in the cluster for a complete backup. These backup files are copied back to new instances to restore. We recommend using S3 to durably store backup files for long-term storage.

For Amazon EBS based deployments, you can enable automated snapshots of EBS volumes to back up volumes. New EBS volumes can be easily created from these snapshots for restoration.

Security

We recommend that you think about security in all aspects of deployment. The first step is to ensure that the data is encrypted at rest and in transit. The second step is to restrict access to unauthorized users. For more information about security, see the Cassandra documentation.

Encryption at rest

Encryption at rest can be achieved by using EBS volumes with encryption enabled. Amazon EBS uses AWS KMS for encryption. For more information, see Amazon EBS Encryption.

Instance store–based deployments require using an encrypted file system or an AWS partner solution. If you are using DataStax Enterprise, it supports transparent data encryption.

Encryption in transit

Cassandra uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) for client and internode communications.

Authentication

The security mechanism is pluggable, which means that you can easily swap out one authentication method for another. You can also provide your own method of authenticating to Cassandra, such as a Kerberos ticket, or if you want to store passwords in a different location, such as an LDAP directory.

Authorization

The authorizer that’s plugged in by default is org.apache.cassandra.auth.Allow AllAuthorizer. Cassandra also provides a role-based access control (RBAC) capability, which allows you to create roles and assign permissions to these roles.

Conclusion

In this post, we discussed several patterns for running Cassandra in the AWS Cloud. This post describes how you can manage Cassandra databases running on Amazon EC2. AWS also provides managed offerings for a number of databases. To learn more, see Purpose-built databases for all your application needs.

If you have questions or suggestions, please comment below.

Additional Reading

If you found this post useful, be sure to check out Analyze Your Data on Amazon DynamoDB with Apache Spark and Analysis of Top-N DynamoDB Objects using Amazon Athena and Amazon QuickSight.

About the Authors

Prasad Alle is a Senior Big Data Consultant with AWS Professional Services. He spends his time leading and building scalable, reliable Big data, Machine learning, Artificial Intelligence and IoT solutions for AWS Enterprise and Strategic customers. His interests extend to various technologies such as Advanced Edge Computing, Machine learning at Edge. In his spare time, he enjoys spending time with his family.

Provanshu Dey is a Senior IoT Consultant with AWS Professional Services. He works on highly scalable and reliable IoT, data and machine learning solutions with our customers. In his spare time, he enjoys spending time with his family and tinkering with electronics & gadgets.

How Realtor.com Monitors Amazon Athena Usage with AWS CloudTrail and Amazon QuickSight

2018-02-20 Ajay Rathod

Post Syndicated from Ajay Rathod original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/analyzing-amazon-athena-usage-by-teams-within-a-real-estate-company/

This is a customer post by Ajay Rathod, a Staff Data Engineer at Realtor.com.

Realtor.com, in their own words: Realtor.com^®, operated by Move, Inc., is a trusted resource for home buyers, sellers, and dreamers. It offers the most comprehensive database of for-sale properties, among competing national sites, and the information, tools, and professional expertise to help people move confidently through every step of their home journey.

Move, Inc. processes hundreds of terabytes of data partitioned by day and hour. Various teams run hundreds of queries on this data. Using AWS services, Move, Inc. has built an infrastructure for gathering and analyzing data:

The data is obtained from various sources.
The data is then loaded into an Amazon S3 data lake with Amazon Kinesis and AWS Data Pipeline.
To increase the effectiveness of the storage and subsequent querying, the data is converted into a Parquet format, and stored again in S3.
Amazon Athena is used as the SQL (Structured Query Language) engine to query the data in S3. Athena is easy to use and is often quickly adopted by various teams.
Teams visualize query results in Amazon QuickSight. Amazon QuickSight is a business analytics service that allows you to quickly and easily visualize data and collaborate with other users in your account.
Data access is controlled by AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles.

This architecture is known as the data platform and is shared by the data science, data engineering, and the data operations teams within the organization. Move, Inc. also enables other cross-functional teams to use Athena. When many users use Athena, it helps to monitor its usage to ensure cost-effectiveness. This leads to a strong need for Athena metrics that can give details about the following:

Users
Amount of data scanned (to monitor the cost of AWS service usage)
The databases used for queries
Actual queries that teams run

Currently, the Move, Inc. team does not have an easy way of obtaining all these metrics from a single tool. Having a way to do this would greatly simplify monitoring efforts. For example, the data operations team wants to collect several metrics every day obtained from queries run on Athena for their data. They require the following metrics:

Amount of data scanned by each user
Number of queries by each user
Databases accessed by each user

In this post, I discuss how to build a solution for monitoring Athena usage. To build this solution, you rely on AWS CloudTrail. CloudTrail is a web service that records AWS API calls for your AWS account and delivers log files to an S3 bucket.

Solution

Here is the high-level overview:

Use the CloudTrail API to audit the user queries, and then use Athena to create a table from the CloudTrail logs.
Query the Athena API with the AWS CLI to gather metrics about the data scanned by the user queries and put this information into another table in Athena.
Combine the information from these two sources by joining the two tables.
Use the resulting data to analyze, build insights, and create a dashboard that shows the usage of Athena by users within different teams in the organization.

The architecture of this solution is shown in the following diagram.

Take a look at this solution step by step.

IAM and permissions setup

This solution uses CloudTrail, Athena, and S3. Make sure that the users who run the following scripts and steps have the appropriate IAM roles and policies. For more information, see Tutorial: Delegate Access Across AWS Accounts Using IAM Roles.

Step 1: Create a table in Athena for data in CloudTrail

The CloudTrail API records all Athena queries run by different teams within the organization. These logs are saved in S3. The fields of most interest are:

User identity
Start time of the API call
Source IP address
Request parameters
Response elements returned by the service

When end users make queries in Athena, these queries are recorded by CloudTrail as responses from Athena web service calls. In these responses, each query is represented as a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) string.

You can use the following CREATE TABLE statement to create the cloudtrail_logs table in Athena. For more information, see Querying CloudTrail Logs in the Athena documentation.

CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE cloudtrail_logs (
         eventversion STRING,
         userIdentity STRUCT< type:STRING,
         principalid:STRING,
         arn:STRING,
         accountid:STRING,
         invokedby:STRING,
         accesskeyid:STRING,
         userName:String,
         sessioncontext:STRUCT< attributes:STRUCT< mfaauthenticated:STRING,
         creationdate:STRING>,
         sessionIssuer:STRUCT< type:STRING,
         principalId:STRING,
         arn:STRING,
         accountId:STRING,
         userName:STRING>>>,
         eventTime STRING,
         eventSource STRING,
         eventName STRING,
         awsRegion STRING,
         sourceIpAddress STRING,
         userAgent STRING,
         errorCode STRING,
         errorMessage STRING,
         requestId STRING,
         eventId STRING,
         resources ARRAY<STRUCT< ARN:STRING,
         accountId:STRING,
         type:STRING>>,
         eventType STRING,
         apiVersion STRING,
         readOnly BOOLEAN,
         recipientAccountId STRING,
         sharedEventID STRING,
         vpcEndpointId STRING,
         requestParameters STRING,
         responseElements STRING,
         additionalEventData STRING,
         serviceEventDetails STRING 
) 
ROW FORMAT SERDE 'com.amazon.emr.hive.serde.CloudTrailSerde'
STORED AS INPUTFORMAT 'com.amazon.emr.cloudtrail.CloudTrailInputFormat'
OUTPUTFORMAT 'org.apache.hadoop.hive.ql.io.HiveIgnoreKeyTextOutputFormat'
LOCATION 's3://<s3 location of the CloudTrail logs>';

Step 2: Create a table in Amazon Athena for data from API output

Athena provides an API that can be queried to obtain information of a specific query ID. It also provides an API to obtain information of a batch of query IDs, with a batch size of up to 50 query IDs.

You can use this API call to obtain information about the Athena queries that you are interested in and store this information in an S3 location. Create an Athena table to represent this data in S3. For the purpose of this post, the response fields that are of interest are as follows:

QueryExecutionId
Database
EngineExecutionTimeInMillis
DataScannedInBytes
Status
SubmissionDateTime
CompletionDateTime

The CREATE TABLE statement for athena_api_output, is as follows:

CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS athena_api_output(
  queryid string,
  querydatabase string,
  executiontime bigint,
  datascanned bigint,
  status string,
  submissiondatetime string,
  completiondatetime string
  )
ROW FORMAT SERDE 'org.apache.hadoop.hive.serde2.lazy.LazySimpleSerDe'
WITH SERDEPROPERTIES (
  'serialization.format' = ',',
  'field.delim' = ','
) LOCATION 's3://<s3 location of the output from the API calls>'
TBLPROPERTIES ('has_encrypted_data'='false')

You can inspect the query IDs and user information for the last day. The query is as follows:

with data AS (
    SELECT
            json_extract(responseelements,
            '$.queryExecutionId') AS query_id,
            (useridentity.arn) AS uid,
            (useridentity.sessioncontext.sessionIssuer.userName) AS role,
            from_iso8601_timestamp(eventtime) AS dt
    FROM    cloudtrail_logs
    WHERE   eventsource='athena.amazonaws.com'
            AND eventname='StartQueryExecution'
            AND json_extract(responseelements, '$.queryExecutionId') is NOT null)
SELECT *
FROM   data
WHERE  dt > date_add('day',-1,now() )

Step 3: Obtain Query Statistics from Athena API

You can write a simple Python script to loop through queries in batches of 50 and query the Athena API for query statistics. You can use the Boto library for these lookups. Boto is a library that provides you with an easy way to interact with and automate your AWS development. The response from the Boto API can be parsed to extract the fields that you need as described in Step 2.

An example Python script is available in the AthenaMetrics GitHub repo.

Format these fields, for each query ID, as CSV strings and store them for the entire batch response in an S3 bucket. This S3 bucket is represented by the table created in Step 2, cloudtrail_logs.

In your Python code, create a variable named sql_query, and assign it a string representing the SQL query defined in Step 2. The s3_query_folder is the location in S3 that is used by Athena for storing results of the query. The code is as follows:

sql_query = 
“””
with data AS (
    SELECT
            json_extract(responseelements,
            '$.queryExecutionId') AS query_id,
            (useridentity.arn) AS uid,
            (useridentity.sessioncontext.sessionIssuer.userName) AS role,
            from_iso8601_timestamp(eventtime) AS dt
    FROM    cloudtrail_logs
    WHERE   eventsource='athena.amazonaws.com'
            AND eventname='StartQueryExecution'
            AND json_extract(responseelements, '$.queryExecutionId') is NOT null)
SELECT *
FROM   data
WHERE  dt > date_add('day',-1,now() )
“””
athena_client = boto3.client('athena')
query_execution = self.client.start_query_execution(
    QueryString=sql_query,
    ClientRequestToken=str(uuid.uuid4()),
    ResultConfiguration={
        'OutputLocation': s3_staging_folder,
    }
)
query_execution_id = query_execution['QueryExecutionId']

### Allow query to complete, check for status response["QueryExecution"]["Status"]["State"]
response = athena_client.get_query_execution(QueryExecutionId=query_execution_id)
if response[“QueryExecution”][“Status”][“State”] == “SUCCEEDED”:
  results = athena_client.get_query_results(QueryEecutionId=query_exection_id)

You can iterate through the results in the response object and consolidate them in batches of 50 results. For each batch, you can invoke the Athena API, batch-get-query-execution.

Store the output in the S3 location pointed to by the CREATE TABLE definition for the table athena_api_output, in Step 2. The SQL statement above returns only queries run in the last 24 hours. You may want to increase that to get usage over a longer period of time. The code snippet for this API call is as follows:

response = athena_client.batch_get_query_execution(
    QueryExecutionIds=batchqueryids
)

The batchqueryids value is an array of 50 query IDs extracted from the result set of the SELECT query. This script creates the data needed by your second table, athena_api_output, and you are now ready to join both tables in Athena.

Step 4: Join the CloudTrail and Athena API data

Now that the two tables are available with the data that you need, you can run the following Athena query to look at the usage by user. You can limit the output of this query to the most recent five days.

SELECT
c.useridentity.arn,
json_extract(c.responseelements, '$.queryExecutionId') qid,
a.datascanned,
a.querydatabase,
a.executiontime,
a.submissiondatetime,
a.completiondatetime,
a.status
FROM  cloudtrail_logs c
JOIN  athena_api_output a
ON    cast(json_extract(c.responseelements, '$.queryExecutionId') as varchar) = a.queryid
WHERE eventsource = 'athena.amazonaws.com'
AND   eventname = 'StartQueryExecution'
AND   from_iso8601_timestamp(eventtime) >  date_add('day',-5 ,now()  )

Step 5: Analyze and visualize the results

In this step, using QuickSight, you can create a dashboard that shows the following metrics:

Average amount of data scanned (MB) by a user and database
Number of queries per user
Count of queries per database

For more information, see Working with Dashboards.

Conclusion

Using the solution described in this post, you can continuously monitor the usage of Athena by various teams. Taking this a step further, you can automate and set user limits for how much data the Athena users in your team can query within a given period of time. You may also choose to add notifications when the usage by a particular user crosses a specified threshold. This helps you manage costs incurred by different teams in your organization.

Realtor.com would like to acknowledge the tremendous support and guidance provided by Hemant Borole, Senior Consultant, Big Data & Analytics with AWS Professional Services in helping to author this post.

Additional Reading

If you found this post useful, be sure to check out Build a Schema-on-Read Analytics Pipeline Using Amazon Athena and Query and Visualize AWS Cost and Usage Data Using Amazon Athena and Amazon QuickSight.

About the Author

Ajay Rathod is Staff Data Engineer at Realtor.com. With a deep background in AWS Cloud Platform and Data Infrastructure, Ajay leads the Data Engineering and automation aspect of Data Operations at Realtor.com. He has designed and deployed many ETL pipelines and workflows for the Realtor Data Analytics Platform using AWS services like Data Pipeline, Athena, Batch, Glue and Boto3. He has created various operational metrics to monitor ETL Pipelines and Resource Usage.

How to Use New Advanced Security Features for Amazon Cognito User Pools

2018-02-19 Tim Hunt

Post Syndicated from Tim Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-new-advanced-security-features-for-amazon-cognito-user-pools/

Amazon Cognito lets you easily add user sign-up, sign-in, and access control to your mobile and web apps. You can use fully managed user directories, called Amazon Cognito user pools, to create accounts for your users, allow them to sign in, and update their profiles. Your users also can sign in by using external identity providers (IdPs) by federating with Amazon, Google, Facebook, SAML, or OpenID Connect (OIDC)–based IdPs. If your app is backed by resources, Amazon Cognito also gives you tools to manage permissions for accessing resources through AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and policies, and through integration with Amazon API Gateway.

In this post, I explain some new advanced security features (in beta) that were launched at AWS re:Invent 2017 for Amazon Cognito user pools and how to use them. Note that separate prices apply to these advanced security features, as described on our pricing page.

The new advanced security features of Amazon Cognito

Security is the top priority for Amazon Cognito. We handle user authentication and authorization to control access to your web and mobile apps, so security is vital. The new advanced security features add additional protections for your users that you manage in Amazon Cognito user pools. In particular, we have added protection against compromised credentials and risk-based adaptive authentication.

Compromised credentials protection

Our compromised credentials feature protects your users’ accounts by preventing your users from reusing credentials (a user name and password pair) that have been exposed elsewhere. This new feature addresses the issue of users reusing the same credentials for multiple websites and apps. For example, a user might use the same email address and password to sign in to multiple websites.

A security best practice is to never use the same user name password in different systems. If an attacker is able to obtain user credentials through a breach of one system, they could use those user credentials to access other systems. AWS has been able to form partnerships and programs so that Amazon Cognito is informed when a set of credentials has been compromised elsewhere. When you use compromised credentials protection in Amazon Cognito, you can prevent users of your application from signing up, signing in, and changing their password with credentials that are recognized as having been compromised. If a user attempts to use credentials that we detect have been compromised, that user is required to choose a different password.

Risk-based adaptive authentication

The other major advanced security feature we launched at AWS re:Invent 2017 is risk-based adaptive authentication. Adaptive authentication protects your users from attempts to compromise their accounts—and it does so intelligently to minimize any inconvenience for your customers. With adaptive authentication, Amazon Cognito examines each user pool sign-in attempt and generates a risk score for how likely the sign-in request is to be from a malicious attacker.

Amazon Cognito examines a number of factors, including whether the user has used the same device before, or has signed in from the same location or IP address. A detected risk is rated as low, medium, or high, and you can determine what actions should be taken at each risk level. You can choose to block the request if the risk level is high, or you can choose to require a second factor of authentication, in addition to the password, for the user to sign in using multi-factor authentication (MFA). With adaptive authentication, users continue to sign in with just their password when the request has characteristics of successful sign-ins in the past. Users are prompted for a second factor only when some risk is detected with a sign-in request.

To learn more about using MFA with adaptive authentication, see Multi-Factor (MFA) Authentication Settings. Amazon Cognito also can now verify email addresses and mobile phone numbers as part of the authentication process.

Metrics and data with the advanced security features

In addition, both the compromised credentials and adaptive authentication features provide metrics and data about the following:

Sign-up, sign-in, and forgotten-password events
The risk scores that are assigned to events
The results of sign-in attempts and second-factor challenges

You can view aggregate metrics by using the Amazon CloudWatch console. You also can view each user’s sign-in history in the Amazon Cognito console.

How to configure the advanced security features

Now that I’ve described the new advanced security features, I will show how to configure them for your mobile or web app. You have to create an Amazon Cognito user pool in the console and save it before you can see the advanced security settings.

First you must create and configure an Amazon Cognito user pool:

Go to the Amazon Cognito console, and choose Manage your User Pools to get started. If you already have a user pool that you can work with, choose that user pool. Otherwise, choose Create a user pool to create a new one.
On the MFA and verifications tab (see the following screenshot), enable MFA as Optional so that your individual users can choose to configure second factors of authentication, which are needed for adaptive authentication. (If you were to choose Required as the MFA setting for your user pool instead, all sign-ins would require a second factor of authentication. This would effectively disable adaptive authentication because a second factor of authentication would always be required.)

You should also enable at least one second factor of authentication. As shown in the following screenshot, I have enabled both SMS text message and Time-based One-time Password (TOTPs).

On the App clients tab, create an app client by choosing add an app client, entering a name, and choosing Create app client.

Second, configure the advanced security features:

After you’ve configured and saved your user pool, you will see the Advanced security tab, as shown in the following screenshot. You can choose one of three modes for enabling the advanced security features: Yes, Audit only, and No:
- If you choose No, the advanced features are all turned off.
- If you choose Audit only, Amazon Cognito logs all related events to CloudWatch metrics so that you can see what risks are detected, but Amazon Cognito doesn’t take any explicit actions to protect your users. Use the Audit only mode to understand what events are happening before you fully turn on the advanced security features.
- If you choose Yes, you turn on the advanced security features. We recommend that you initially run the advanced security features in Audit only mode for two weeks before choosing Yes.

When you choose Yes to turn on the advanced security features, configuration options appear, as shown in the following screenshot:
1. First, choose if you want to configure default settings for all of your app clients, or if you want to configure settings for a specific app client. As shown in the following screenshot, you can see that I’ve chosen global default settings for all my app clients.
2. Next, choose the action you want to take when compromised credentials are detected. You can either Allow compromised credentials, or you can Block use of them. If you want to protect your users, you should choose Block use. However, you first can watch the metrics in CloudWatch without taking action by choosing Allow. You also can choose Customize when compromised credentials are blocked, which allows you to choose for which operations—sign up, sign in, and forgotten password—Amazon Cognito will detect and block use of compromised credentials.

The next section on the Advanced security tab includes the configuration for adaptive authentication. For each risk level (Low, Medium, and High), you can require a second factor for MFA or you can block the request, and you can notify users about the events through email. You have two MFA choices for each risk level:
1. Optional MFA – Requires a second factor at that risk level for all users who have configured either SMS or TOTP as a second factor of authentication. Users who haven’t configured a second factor are allowed to sign in without a second factor. For optional MFA, you should encourage your users to configure a second factor of authentication for added security, but users who haven’t configured a second factor aren’t blocked from signing in.
2. Require MFA – Requires a second factor of authentication from all users when a risk is detected, so any users who haven’t configured a second factor are blocked from signing in at any risk level that requires MFA.
3. Block – Blocks the sign-in attempt.
4. Notify users – Sends an email to the users to notify them about the sign-in attempt. You can customize the emails as described below.
In the next section on the Advanced security tab, you can customize the email notifications that Amazon Cognito sends to your users if you have selected Notify users. Amazon Cognito sends these notification emails through Amazon Simple Email Service (Amazon SES). If you haven’t already, you should go to the Amazon SES console to configure and verify an email address or domain so that you can use it as the FROM email address for the notification emails that Amazon Cognito sends.

You can customize the email subject and body for the email notifications with both HTML and plain text versions, as shown in the following screenshot.

Optionally, you can enter IP addresses that you either want to Always allow by bypassing the compromised credentials and adaptive authentication features, or to Always block. For example, if you have a site where you do testing and development, you might want to include the IP address range from that site in the Always allow list so that it doesn’t get mistaken as a risky sign-in attempt.

That’s all it takes to configure the advanced security features in the Amazon Cognito console.

Enabling the advanced security features from you app

After you have configured the advanced security features for your user pool, you need to enable them in your mobile or web app. First you need to include a version of our SDK that is recent enough to support the features, and second in some cases, you need to set some values for iOS, Android, and JavaScript.

iOS: If you’re building your own user interface to sign in users and integrating the Amazon Cognito Identity Provider SDK, use at least version 2.6.7 of the SDK. If you’re using the Amazon Cognito Auth SDK to incorporate the customizable, hosted user interface to sign in users, also use at least version 2.6.7. If you’re configuring the Auth SDK by using Info.plist, add the PoolIdForEnablingASF key to your Amazon Cognito user pool configuration, and set it to your user pool ID. If you’re configuring the Auth SDK by using AWSCognitoAuthConfiguration, use this initializer and specify your user pool ID as userPoolIdForEnablingASF. For more details, see the CognitoAuth sample app.

Android: If you’re using the Amazon Cognito Auth SDK for Android that incorporates the hosted UI to sign in users, or if you’re using the Amazon Cognito Identity Provider SDK for Android to integrate your own native user interface, use at least version 2.6.9 of the SDK.

JavaScript: If you’re using the Amazon Cognito Auth JS SDK to incorporate the customizable, hosted UI to sign in users, use at least version 1.1.0 of the SDK. To configure the advanced security features, add the AdvancedSecurityDataCollectionFlag parameter and set it as true. Also add the UserPoolId parameter and set it to your user pool ID. In your application, you need to include "https://amazon-cognito-assets.<region>.amazoncognito.com/amazon-cognito-advanced-security-data.min.js" to collect data about requests. For more details, see the README.md of the Auth JavaScript SDK and the SAMPLEREADME.md of the web app sample. If you’re using the Amazon Cognito Identity SDK to build your own UI, use at least version 1.28.0 of the SDK.

Some examples of the advanced security features in action

Now that I have configured these advanced security features, let’s look at them in action. I’m using the customizable, hosted sign-up and sign-in screens that are built into Amazon Cognito user pools. I’ve done some minimal customization, and my sign-up page is shown in the following screenshot.

With the compromised credentials feature, if a user tries to sign up with credentials that have been exposed at another site, the user is told they cannot use that password for security reasons.

If a user signs in, Amazon Cognito detects a risk, and you have configured adaptive authentication, the user is asked for a second factor of authentication. The following screenshot shows an example of an SMS text message used for MFA. After the user enters a valid code from their phone, they’re successfully signed in.

As I mentioned earlier in this post, Amazon Cognito also can notify your users whenever there’s a sign-in attempt that’s determined to have some risk. The following screenshot shows a basic example of a notification message, and you can customize these messages, as described previously.

The advanced security features also provide aggregate metrics and event histories for individual users. You can view the aggregate metrics in the CloudWatch console. Navigate to the Metrics section under Cognito. When you’re graphing, choose the Graphed metrics tab and choose Sum as the Statistic.

You can view the event histories for users in the Amazon Cognito console on the Users and groups tab. When you choose an individual user, you see that user’s event history listed under their profile information. As the following screenshot shows, you can see information about users’ events, including the date and time, the event type, the risk detected, and location. The event history includes the Risk level that indicates the Low, Medium, or High ratings described earlier and the Risk decision that indicates if a risk was detected and what type.

When you choose an entry, you see the event details and the option to Mark event as valid if it was from the user, or Mark event as invalid if it wasn’t.

Summary

You can use these advanced security features of Amazon Cognito user pools to protect your users from compromised credentials and attempts to compromise their user pool–based accounts in your app. You also can customize the actions taken in response to different risks, or you can use audit mode to gather metrics on detected risks without taking action. For more information about using these features, see the Amazon Cognito Developer Guide.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about how to configure or use these features, start a new thread on the Amazon Cognito forum or contact AWS Support.

– Tim

How to Use Your Own Identity and Access Management Systems to Control Access to AWS IoT Resources

2018-02-14 Ramkishore Bhattacharyya

Post Syndicated from Ramkishore Bhattacharyya original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-your-own-identity-and-access-management-systems-to-control-access-to-aws-iot-resources/

AWS IoT is a managed cloud platform that lets connected devices easily and securely interact with cloud applications and other devices by using the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol, HTTP, and the MQTT over the WebSocket protocol. Every connected device must authenticate to AWS IoT, and AWS IoT must authorize all requests to determine if access to the requested operations or resources is allowed. Until now, AWS IoT has supported two kinds of authentication techniques: the Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual authentication protocol and the AWS Signature Version 4 algorithm. Callers must possess either an X.509 certificate or AWS security credentials to be able to authenticate their calls. The requests are authorized based on the policies attached to the certificate or the AWS security credentials.

However, many of our customers have their own systems that issue custom authorization tokens to their devices. These systems use different access control mechanisms such as OAuth over JWT or SAML tokens. AWS IoT now supports a custom authorizer to enable you to use custom authorization tokens for access control. You can now use custom tokens to authenticate and authorize HTTPS over the TLS server authentication protocol and MQTT over WebSocket connections to AWS IoT.

In this blog post, I explain the AWS IoT custom authorizer design and then demonstrate the end-to-end process of setting up a custom authorizer to authorize an HTTPS over TLS server authentication connection to AWS IoT using a custom authorization token. In this process, you configure an AWS Lambda function, which will validate the token and provide the policies necessary to control the access privileges on the connection.

Note: This post assumes you are familiar with AWS IoT and AWS Lambda enough to perform steps using the AWS CLI and OpenSSL. Make sure you are running the latest version of the AWS CLI.

Overview of the custom authorizer workflow

The following numbered diagram illustrates the custom authorizer workflow. The diagram is followed by explanations of the steps.

To explain the steps of the workflow as illustrated in the preceding diagram:

The connected device uses the AWS SDK or custom client to make an HTTPS or MQTT over WebSocket request to the AWS IoT gateway. The request includes a custom authorization token and the name of a preconfigured authorizer Lambda function that is to be invoked to validate the authorization token.
The AWS IoT gateway identifies the authorization token in the request and determines that it is a custom authorization request. The gateway checks if a Lambda authorization function is configured for the AWS account that owns the device. If yes, the gateway invokes the Lambda function by passing the authorization token.
The Lambda function verifies the authorization token and returns to the AWS IoT gateway a principal that identifies the connection and a set of AWS IoT policies that determine permissions for the requested operation. The Lambda function also returns two time-to-live values that determine the validity (in seconds) of the connection and policy documents.
The AWS IoT gateway invokes the AWS policy evaluation engine to authorize the requested operation against the set of policies that are received from the authorizer Lambda function.
The AWS policy evaluation engine evaluates the policy documents and returns the result to the AWS IoT gateway. The gateway then caches the policy documents.
If the policy evaluation allows the requested operation, the AWS IoT gateway serves the request. If the requested operation is denied, the AWS IoT gateway returns an AccessDenied exception with the status code of 403 to the device (the red line in the preceding diagram).

Outline of the steps to configure and use the custom authorizer

The following are the steps you will perform as part of the solution:

Create a Lambda function: Start by creating a Lambda function. The function takes the authorization token in the input, verifies it, and returns authorization policies to determine the caller’s permissions for the requested operation.
Create an authorizer: Create an authorizer in AWS IoT. An authorizer is an alternate data model pointing to a pre-created Lambda function. You can specify in the custom authorization request an authorizer name. AWS IoT invokes a corresponding Lambda function to verify the authorization token. You may update the authorizer to point to a different Lambda function and thus easily control which Lambda function to invoke to verify an authorization token.
Designate the default authorizer: You may designate one of your authorizers as the default authorizer. AWS IoT invokes the default authorizer implicitly when a custom authorization request does not include a specific authorizer name.
Add Lambda invocation permissions: AWS IoT needs to be able to call your Lambda function on your behalf to verify the token in the custom authorization request. You need to associate a resource policy with the Lambda function to allow this.
Test the Lambda function: When the Lambda function and the custom authorizer are configured, use the test function to verify that they are functioning correctly.
Invoke the custom authorizer: Finally, make an HTTPS request to the gateway that includes a custom authorization token. The request invokes the custom authorizer.

Deploy the solution

1. Create a Lambda function

In this step, I show you how to create a Lambda function that runs your custom authorizer code and returns a set of essential attributes to authorize the request.

Sign in to your AWS account and create from the Lambda console a Lambda function that takes as input an authorization token and performs whichever actions are necessary to validate the token, as shown in the following code example. The output, in JSON format, must contain the following attributes:

IsAuthenticated: This is a Boolean (true/false) attribute that indicates whether the request is authenticated.
PrincipalId: This is an alphanumeric string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 128 characters. This string acts as an identifier associated with the token that is received in the custom authorization request.
PolicyDocuments: This is a list of JSON formatted policy documents following the same conventions as an AWS IoT policy. The list contains at most 10 policy documents, each of which can be a maximum of 2,048 characters.
DisconnectAfterInSeconds: This indicates the maximum duration (in seconds) of the connection to the AWS IoT gateway, after which it will be disconnected. The minimum value is 300 seconds, and the maximum value is 86,400 seconds.
RefreshAfterInSeconds: This is the period between policy refreshes. When it lapses, the Lambda function is invoked again to allow for policy refreshes. The minimum value is 300 seconds, and the maximum value is 86,400 seconds.

The following code example is a Lambda function in Node.js 6.10 that authenticates a token.

// A simple authorizer Lambda function demonstrating
// how to parse auth token and generate response 

exports.handler = function(event, context, callback) { 
    var token = event.token; 
    switch (token.toLowerCase()) { 
        case 'allow': 
            callback(null, generateAuthResponse(token, 'Allow')); 
        case 'deny': 
            callback(null, generateAuthResponse(token, 'Deny')); 
        default: 
            callback("Error: Invalid token"); 
    }
};

// Helper function to generate authorization response 
var generateAuthResponse = function(token, effect) { 
    // Invoke your preferred identity provider 
    // to get the authN and authZ response. 
    // Following is just for simplicity sake 

    var authResponse = {}; 
    authResponse.isAuthenticated = true; 
    authResponse.principalId = 'principalId'; 
    
    var policyDocument = {}; 
    policyDocument.Version = '2012-10-17'; 
    policyDocument.Statement = []; 
    var statement = {}; 
    statement.Action = 'iot:Publish'; 
    statement.Effect = effect; 
    statement.Resource = "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:topic/customauthtesting"; 
    policyDocument.Statement[0] = statement; 
    authResponse.policyDocuments = [policyDocument]; 
    authResponse.disconnectAfterInSeconds = 3600; 
    authResponse.refreshAfterInSeconds = 600; 
    
    return authResponse; 
}

The preceding function takes an authorization token and returns an object containing the five attributes (a-e) described earlier in this step.

2. Create an authorizer

Now that you have created the Lambda function, you will create an authorizer with AWS IoT pointing to the Lambda function. You do this so that you can easily control which Lambda function to invoke to verify an authorization token. The following attributes are required to create an authorizer:

AuthorizerName: This is the name of the authorizer. It is a string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 128 characters.
AuthorizerFunctionArn: This is the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the Lambda function that you created in the previous step.
TokenKeyName: This specifies the key name that your device chooses, which indicates the token in the custom authorization HTTP request header. It is a string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 128 characters.
TokenSigningPublicKeys: This is a map of one (minimum) and two (maximum) public keys. It is a 2,048-bit key at minimum. You need to generate a key pair, sign the custom authorization token and include the digital signature in the request in order to be able to use custom authorization successfully. AWS IoT needs the corresponding public key to verify the digital signature. Therefore, you must provide the public key while creating an authorizer.
Status: This specifies the status (ACTIVE or INACTIVE) of the authorizer. It is optional. The default value is INACTIVE.

Run the following command in OpenSSL to create an RSA key pair that will be used to generate a token signature.

openssl genrsa -out private.pem 2048

Run the following command to create the public key out of the key pair generated in the previous step.

openssl rsa -in private.pem -outform PEM -pubout -out public.pem

You need to store the key pair securely and pass the public key in the TokenSigningPublicKeys parameter when creating the authorizer in AWS IoT. You will use the private key in the key pair to sign the authorization token and include the signature in the custom authorization request.

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to create an authorizer.

aws iot create-authorizer --authorizer-name <authorizer_name> --authorizer-function-arn <Lambda_function_arn> --token-key-name <token_key_name> --token-signing-public-keys FIRST_KEY="<public_key_pem>" --status ACTIVE

The following is sample output of the create-authorizer command. It contains the authorizerName and authorizerArn.

{
    "authorizerName": "MyAuthorizer", 
    "authorizerArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:authorizer/MyAuthorizer"
}

You must set the authorizer in the ACTIVE status to be invoked. The describe-authorizer API returns the attributes of an existing authorizer. You can use the following command to verify if all the attributes in the authorizer are set correctly.

aws iot describe-authorizer --authorizer-name <authorizer_name>

The following is sample output of the describe-authorizer command.

{
  "authorizerDescription": {
    "status": "ACTIVE",
    "lastModifiedDate": 1515351241.568,
    "authorizerName": "<authorizer_name>",
    "tokenKeyName": "<token_key_name>",
    "authorizerArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:authorizer/MyAuthorizer",
    "tokenSigningPublicKeys": {
        FIRST_KEY": "<public_key_pem>"
    },
    "creationDate": 1515351241.568,
    "authorizerFunctionArn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:function:MyCustomAuthFunction"
  }
}

3. Designate the default authorizer (optional)

You can have multiple authorizers in your account. You can designate one of them as the default so that AWS IoT invokes it if the custom authorization request does not specify an authorizer name. Run the following command in the AWS CLI to designate a default authorizer.

aws iot set-default-authorizer --authorizer-name <authorizer_name>

The following is sample output of the set-default-authorizer command. It contains the authorizerName and authorizerArn.

{
    "authorizerName": "MyAuthorizer", 
    "authorizerArn": "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:authorizer/MyAuthorizer"
}

4. Add Lambda invocation permissions

AWS IoT needs to invoke your authorizer Lambda function to evaluate the custom authorizer token. You need to provide AWS IoT appropriate permissions to invoke your Lambda function when a custom authorization request is made. Use the AWS CLI with the AddPermission command to grant the AWS IoT service principal permission to call lambda:InvokeFunction, as shown in the following command.

aws lambda add-permission --function-name <lambda_function_name> --principal iot.amazonaws.com --source-arn <authorizer_arn> --statement-id Id-123 --action "lambda:InvokeFunction"

The following is sample output of the add-permission command.

{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\":\"Id-123\",\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Principal\":{\"Service\":\"iot.amazonaws.com\"},\"Action\":\"lambda:InvokeFunction\",\"Resource\":\"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:function:MyCustomAuthFunction\",\"Condition\":{\"ArnLike\":{\"AWS:SourceArn\":\"arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:authorizer/MyAuthorizer\"}}}"
}

Note that you are using the precreated AuthorizerArn as the SourceArn while granting the permission. The Lambda function gets triggered only if the source ARN provided by AWS IoT during the invocation matches with the SourceArn that you have given permission. Even if your Lambda function ARN is put in an authorizer owned by someone else, they cannot trigger the function causing illegitimate charge to you.

5. Test the Lambda function

To verify the configuration, test to see if AWS IoT can invoke the Lambda function and get the correct output. You can do this by using the TestInvokeAuthorizer API. The API takes the following input:

AuthorizerName: This is the name of the authorizer. It is a string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 128 characters.
Token: This specifies the custom authorization token to authorize the request to the AWS IoT gateway. It is a string; the minimum length is 1 character, and the maximum length is 1,024 characters.
TokenSignature: This is the token signature generated by using the private key with the SHA256withRSA algorithm. This is a string with a maximum length 2,560 characters. You must Base64-encode the signature while passing it as an input (the command follows).

Run the following command in OpenSSL to generate a signature for string, allow.

echo -n allow > token.txt
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign private.pem -out token.sign token.txt

Run the following command to Base64-encode the string.

base64 token.sign > token.sign.b64

Now, run the following command in the AWS CLI to test your authorizer.

aws iot test-invoke-authorizer --authorizer-name <authorizer_name> --token allow --token-signature <token_signature>

If AWS IoT is able to invoke the Lambda function successfully, the output of the TestInvokeAuthorizer API will be exactly the same as the output of the Lambda function. The following is sample output of the test-invoke-authorizer command for the Lambda function you created in Step 1 earlier in this post.

{
    "isAuthenticated": true,
    "refreshAfterInSeconds": 600,
    "policyDocuments": [
        {\"Version\":\"2012-10-17\",\"Statement\":[{\"Action\":\"iot:Publish\",\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Resource\":\"arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:<your_aws_account_id>:topic/customauthtesting\"}]}"
    ],
    "disconnectAfterInSeconds": 3600,
    "principalId": "principalId"
}

6. Invoke the custom authorizer

You can now make a custom authorization request to the AWS IoT gateway. Custom authorization is supported for HTTPS over TLS server authentication and MQTT over WebSocket connections. Regardless of the protocol, requests must include the following attributes in the header. Note that supplying these attributes through query parameters is not allowed for security reasons.

Token: This specifies the authorization token. The header name must be the same as the TokenKeyName of the authorizer.
TokenSignature: This specifies the Base64-encoded digital signature of the token string. The header name must be x-amz-customauthorizer-signature.
AuthorizerName: This specifies the name of one of the ACTIVE authorizers preconfigured in your account. The header name must be x-amz-customauthorizer-name. If this field is not present and you have preconfigured a default custom authorizer for your account, the AWS IoT gateway invokes the default authorizer to authenticate and authorize the request.

Run the following command in the AWS CLI to obtain your AWS account-specific AWS IoT endpoint. See the DescribeEndpoint API documentation for further details. You need to specify the endpoint when making requests to the AWS IoT gateway.

aws iot describe-endpoint

The following is sample output of the describe-endpoint command. It contains the endpointAddress.

{
    "endpointAddress": "<your_aws_account_specific_prefix>.iot.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
}

Now, make an HTTPS request to the AWS IoT gateway to post a message. You may use your preferred HTTP client for the request. I use curl in the following example, which posts the message, “Hello from custom auth,” to an MQTT topic, customauthtesting, by using the token, allow.

curl -X POST -k -i -N -H "Host: <your_aws_iot_endpoint>" -H "X-Amz-CustomAuthorizer-Name: <authorizer_name>" -H "X-Amz-CustomAuthorizer-Signature: <token_signature>" -H "<token_key_name>: allow" -H "User-Agent: aws-cli/1.10.65 Python/2.7.11 Darwin/16.1.0 botocore/1.4.55" --data 'Hello from custom auth' https://<your_aws_iot_endpoint>/topics/customauthtesting

If the command succeeds, you will see the following output.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json
content-length: 65
date: Sun, 07 Jan 2018 19:56:12 GMT
x-amzn-RequestId: e7c13873-6c61-a12c-1216-9a935901c130
connection: keep-alive
{"message":"OK","traceId":"e7c13873-6c61-a12c-1216-9a935901c130"}

Conclusion

In this blog post, I have shown how to configure a custom authorizer in your AWS account and use it to authorize an HTTPS over TLS server authentication connection and publish a message to a specific MQTT topic by using a custom authorization token. Similarly, you can use custom authorizers to authorize MQTT over WebSocket requests to the AWS IoT gateway to publish messages to a specific topic or subscribe to a topic filter.

If you have comments about this blog post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing this solution, start a new thread in the AWS IoT forum.

– Ramkishore

Sharing Secrets with AWS Lambda Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store

2018-02-09 Chris Munns

Post Syndicated from Chris Munns original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/sharing-secrets-with-aws-lambda-using-aws-systems-manager-parameter-store/

This post courtesy of Roberto Iturralde, Sr. Application Developer- AWS Professional Services

Application architects are faced with key decisions throughout the process of designing and implementing their systems. One decision common to nearly all solutions is how to manage the storage and access rights of application configuration. Shared configuration should be stored centrally and securely with each system component having access only to the properties that it needs for functioning.

With AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store, developers have access to central, secure, durable, and highly available storage for application configuration and secrets. Parameter Store also integrates with AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), allowing fine-grained access control to individual parameters or branches of a hierarchical tree.

This post demonstrates how to create and access shared configurations in Parameter Store from AWS Lambda. Both encrypted and plaintext parameter values are stored with only the Lambda function having permissions to decrypt the secrets. You also use AWS X-Ray to profile the function.

Solution overview

This example is made up of the following components:

An AWS SAM template that defines:
- A Lambda function and its permissions
- An unencrypted Parameter Store parameter that the Lambda function loads
- A KMS key that only the Lambda function can access. You use this key to create an encrypted parameter later.
Lambda function code in Python 3.6 that demonstrates how to load values from Parameter Store at function initialization for reuse across invocations.

Launch the AWS SAM template

To create the resources shown in this post, you can download the SAM template or choose the button to launch the stack. The template requires one parameter, an IAM user name, which is the name of the IAM user to be the admin of the KMS key that you create. In order to perform the steps listed in this post, this IAM user will need permissions to execute Lambda functions, create Parameter Store parameters, administer keys in KMS, and view the X-Ray console. If you have these privileges in your IAM user account you can use your own account to complete the walkthrough. You can not use the root user to administer the KMS keys.

SAM template resources

The following sections show the code for the resources defined in the template.
Lambda function

ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev:
    Type: 'AWS::Serverless::Function'
    Properties:
      FunctionName: 'ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev'
      Description: 'Integrating lambda with Parameter Store'
      Handler: 'lambda_function.lambda_handler'
      Role: !GetAtt ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev.Arn
      CodeUri: './code'
      Environment:
        Variables:
          ENV: 'dev'
          APP_CONFIG_PATH: 'parameterStoreBlog'
          AWS_XRAY_TRACING_NAME: 'ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev'
      Runtime: 'python3.6'
      Timeout: 5
      Tracing: 'Active'

  ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: '2012-10-17'
        Statement:
          -
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service:
                - 'lambda.amazonaws.com'
            Action:
              - 'sts:AssumeRole'
      ManagedPolicyArns:
        - 'arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole'
      Policies:
        -
          PolicyName: 'ParameterStoreBlogDevParameterAccess'
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: '2012-10-17'
            Statement:
              -
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'ssm:GetParameter*'
                Resource: !Sub 'arn:aws:ssm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/dev/parameterStoreBlog*'
        -
          PolicyName: 'ParameterStoreBlogDevXRayAccess'
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: '2012-10-17'
            Statement:
              -
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'xray:PutTraceSegments'
                  - 'xray:PutTelemetryRecords'
                Resource: '*'

In this YAML code, you define a Lambda function named ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev using the SAM AWS::Serverless::Function type. The environment variables for this function include the ENV (dev) and the APP_CONFIG_PATH where you find the configuration for this app in Parameter Store. X-Ray tracing is also enabled for profiling later.

The IAM role for this function extends the AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole by adding IAM policies that grant the function permissions to write to X-Ray and get parameters from Parameter Store, limited to paths under /dev/parameterStoreBlog*.
Parameter Store parameter

SimpleParameter:
    Type: AWS::SSM::Parameter
    Properties:
      Name: '/dev/parameterStoreBlog/appConfig'
      Description: 'Sample dev config values for my app'
      Type: String
      Value: '{"key1": "value1","key2": "value2","key3": "value3"}'

This YAML code creates a plaintext string parameter in Parameter Store in a path that your Lambda function can access.
KMS encryption key

ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKeyAlias:
    Type: AWS::KMS::Alias
    Properties:
      AliasName: 'alias/ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev'
      TargetKeyId: !Ref ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKey

  ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKey:
    Type: AWS::KMS::Key
    Properties:
      Description: 'Encryption key for secret config values for the Parameter Store blog post'
      Enabled: True
      EnableKeyRotation: False
      KeyPolicy:
        Version: '2012-10-17'
        Id: 'key-default-1'
        Statement:
          -
            Sid: 'Allow administration of the key & encryption of new values'
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              AWS:
                - !Sub 'arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/${IAMUsername}'
            Action:
              - 'kms:Create*'
              - 'kms:Encrypt'
              - 'kms:Describe*'
              - 'kms:Enable*'
              - 'kms:List*'
              - 'kms:Put*'
              - 'kms:Update*'
              - 'kms:Revoke*'
              - 'kms:Disable*'
              - 'kms:Get*'
              - 'kms:Delete*'
              - 'kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion'
              - 'kms:CancelKeyDeletion'
            Resource: '*'
          -
            Sid: 'Allow use of the key'
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              AWS: !GetAtt ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev.Arn
            Action:
              - 'kms:Encrypt'
              - 'kms:Decrypt'
              - 'kms:ReEncrypt*'
              - 'kms:GenerateDataKey*'
              - 'kms:DescribeKey'
            Resource: '*'

This YAML code creates an encryption key with a key policy with two statements.

The first statement allows a given user (${IAMUsername}) to administer the key. Importantly, this includes the ability to encrypt values using this key and disable or delete this key, but does not allow the administrator to decrypt values that were encrypted with this key.

The second statement grants your Lambda function permission to encrypt and decrypt values using this key. The alias for this key in KMS is ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev, which is how you reference it later.

Lambda function

Here I walk you through the Lambda function code.

import os, traceback, json, configparser, boto3
from aws_xray_sdk.core import patch_all
patch_all()

# Initialize boto3 client at global scope for connection reuse
client = boto3.client('ssm')
env = os.environ['ENV']
app_config_path = os.environ['APP_CONFIG_PATH']
full_config_path = '/' + env + '/' + app_config_path
# Initialize app at global scope for reuse across invocations
app = None

class MyApp:
    def __init__(self, config):
        """
        Construct new MyApp with configuration
        :param config: application configuration
        """
        self.config = config

    def get_config(self):
        return self.config

def load_config(ssm_parameter_path):
    """
    Load configparser from config stored in SSM Parameter Store
    :param ssm_parameter_path: Path to app config in SSM Parameter Store
    :return: ConfigParser holding loaded config
    """
    configuration = configparser.ConfigParser()
    try:
        # Get all parameters for this app
        param_details = client.get_parameters_by_path(
            Path=ssm_parameter_path,
            Recursive=False,
            WithDecryption=True
        )

        # Loop through the returned parameters and populate the ConfigParser
        if 'Parameters' in param_details and len(param_details.get('Parameters')) > 0:
            for param in param_details.get('Parameters'):
                param_path_array = param.get('Name').split("/")
                section_position = len(param_path_array) - 1
                section_name = param_path_array[section_position]
                config_values = json.loads(param.get('Value'))
                config_dict = {section_name: config_values}
                print("Found configuration: " + str(config_dict))
                configuration.read_dict(config_dict)

    except:
        print("Encountered an error loading config from SSM.")
        traceback.print_exc()
    finally:
        return configuration

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    global app
    # Initialize app if it doesn't yet exist
    if app is None:
        print("Loading config and creating new MyApp...")
        config = load_config(full_config_path)
        app = MyApp(config)

    return "MyApp config is " + str(app.get_config()._sections)

Beneath the import statements, you import the patch_all function from the AWS X-Ray library, which you use to patch boto3 to create X-Ray segments for all your boto3 operations.

Next, you create a boto3 SSM client at the global scope for reuse across function invocations, following Lambda best practices. Using the function environment variables, you assemble the path where you expect to find your configuration in Parameter Store. The class MyApp is meant to serve as an example of an application that would need its configuration injected at construction. In this example, you create an instance of ConfigParser, a class in Python’s standard library for handling basic configurations, to give to MyApp.

The load_config function loads the all the parameters from Parameter Store at the level immediately beneath the path provided in the Lambda function environment variables. Each parameter found is put into a new section in ConfigParser. The name of the section is the name of the parameter, less the base path. In this example, the full parameter name is /dev/parameterStoreBlog/appConfig, which is put in a section named appConfig.

Finally, the lambda_handler function initializes an instance of MyApp if it doesn’t already exist, constructing it with the loaded configuration from Parameter Store. Then it simply returns the currently loaded configuration in MyApp. The impact of this design is that the configuration is only loaded from Parameter Store the first time that the Lambda function execution environment is initialized. Subsequent invocations reuse the existing instance of MyApp, resulting in improved performance. You see this in the X-Ray traces later in this post. For more advanced use cases where configuration changes need to be received immediately, you could implement an expiry policy for your configuration entries or push notifications to your function.

To confirm that everything was created successfully, test the function in the Lambda console.

Open the Lambda console.
In the navigation pane, choose Functions.
In the Functions pane, filter to ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev to find the function created by the SAM template earlier. Open the function name to view its details.
On the top right of the function detail page, choose Test. You may need to create a new test event. The input JSON doesn’t matter as this function ignores the input.

After running the test, you should see output similar to the following. This demonstrates that the function successfully fetched the unencrypted configuration from Parameter Store.

Create an encrypted parameter

You currently have a simple, unencrypted parameter and a Lambda function that can access it.

Next, you create an encrypted parameter that only your Lambda function has permission to use for decryption. This limits read access for this parameter to only this Lambda function.

To follow along with this section, deploy the SAM template for this post in your account and make your IAM user name the KMS key admin mentioned earlier.

In the Systems Manager console, under Shared Resources, choose Parameter Store.
Choose Create Parameter.
- For Name, enter /dev/parameterStoreBlog/appSecrets.
- For Type, select Secure String.
- For KMS Key ID, choose alias/ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev, which is the key that your SAM template created.
- For Value, enter {"secretKey": "secretValue"}.
- Choose Create Parameter.
If you now try to view the value of this parameter by choosing the name of the parameter in the parameters list and then choosing Show next to the Value field, you won’t see the value appear. This is because, even though you have permission to encrypt values using this KMS key, you do not have permissions to decrypt values.
In the Lambda console, run another test of your function. You now also see the secret parameter that you created and its decrypted value.

If you do not see the new parameter in the Lambda output, this may be because the Lambda execution environment is still warm from the previous test. Because the parameters are loaded at Lambda startup, you need a fresh execution environment to refresh the values.

Adjust the function timeout to a different value in the Advanced Settings at the bottom of the Lambda Configuration tab. Choose Save and test to trigger the creation of a new Lambda execution environment.

Profiling the impact of querying Parameter Store using AWS X-Ray

By using the AWS X-Ray SDK to patch boto3 in your Lambda function code, each invocation of the function creates traces in X-Ray. In this example, you can use these traces to validate the performance impact of your design decision to only load configuration from Parameter Store on the first invocation of the function in a new execution environment.

From the Lambda function details page where you tested the function earlier, under the function name, choose Monitoring. Choose View traces in X-Ray.

This opens the X-Ray console in a new window filtered to your function. Be aware of the time range field next to the search bar if you don’t see any search results.
In this screenshot, I’ve invoked the Lambda function twice, one time 10.3 minutes ago with a response time of 1.1 seconds and again 9.8 minutes ago with a response time of 8 milliseconds.

Looking at the details of the longer running trace by clicking the trace ID, you can see that the Lambda function spent the first ~350 ms of the full 1.1 sec routing the request through Lambda and creating a new execution environment for this function, as this was the first invocation with this code. This is the portion of time before the initialization subsegment.

Next, it took 725 ms to initialize the function, which includes executing the code at the global scope (including creating the boto3 client). This is also a one-time cost for a fresh execution environment.

Finally, the function executed for 65 ms, of which 63.5 ms was the GetParametersByPath call to Parameter Store.

Looking at the trace for the second, much faster function invocation, you see that the majority of the 8 ms execution time was Lambda routing the request to the function and returning the response. Only 1 ms of the overall execution time was attributed to the execution of the function, which makes sense given that after the first invocation you’re simply returning the config stored in MyApp.

While the Traces screen allows you to view the details of individual traces, the X-Ray Service Map screen allows you to view aggregate performance data for all traced services over a period of time.

In the X-Ray console navigation pane, choose Service map. Selecting a service node shows the metrics for node-specific requests. Selecting an edge between two nodes shows the metrics for requests that traveled that connection. Again, be aware of the time range field next to the search bar if you don’t see any search results.

After invoking your Lambda function several more times by testing it from the Lambda console, you can view some aggregate performance metrics. Look at the following:

From the client perspective, requests to the Lambda service for the function are taking an average of 50 ms to respond. The function is generating ~1 trace per minute.
The function itself is responding in an average of 3 ms. In the following screenshot, I’ve clicked on this node, which reveals a latency histogram of the traced requests showing that over 95% of requests return in under 5 ms.
Parameter Store is responding to requests in an average of 64 ms, but note the much lower trace rate in the node. This is because you only fetch data from Parameter Store on the initialization of the Lambda execution environment.

Conclusion

Deduplication, encryption, and restricted access to shared configuration and secrets is a key component to any mature architecture. Serverless architectures designed using event-driven, on-demand, compute services like Lambda are no different.

In this post, I walked you through a sample application accessing unencrypted and encrypted values in Parameter Store. These values were created in a hierarchy by application environment and component name, with the permissions to decrypt secret values restricted to only the function needing access. The techniques used here can become the foundation of secure, robust configuration management in your enterprise serverless applications.

How to Create an AWS IAM Policy to Grant AWS Lambda Access to an Amazon DynamoDB Table

2018-01-23 Andrew Robinson

Post Syndicated from Andrew Robinson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-create-an-aws-iam-policy-to-grant-aws-lambda-access-to-an-amazon-dynamodb-table/

When managing your AWS resources, you often need to grant one AWS service access to another to accomplish tasks. For example, you could use an AWS Lambda function to resize, watermark, and postprocess images, for which you would need to store the associated metadata in Amazon DynamoDB. You also could use Lambda, Amazon S3, and Amazon CloudFront to build a serverless website that uses a DynamoDB table as a session store, with Lambda updating the information in the table. In both these examples, you need to grant Lambda functions permissions to write to DynamoDB.

In this post, I demonstrate how to create an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy that will be attached to an IAM role. The role is then used to grant a Lambda function access to a DynamoDB table. By using an IAM policy and role to control access, I don’t need to embed credentials in code and can tightly control which services the Lambda function can access. The policy also includes permissions to allow the Lambda function to write log files to Amazon CloudWatch Logs. This allows me to view utilization statistics for your Lambda functions and to have access to additional logging for troubleshooting issues.

Solution overview

The following architecture diagram presents an overview of the solution in this post.

The architecture of this post’s solution uses a Lambda function (1 in the preceding diagram) to make read API calls such as GET or SCAN and write API calls such as PUT or UPDATE to a DynamoDB table (2). The Lambda function also writes log files to CloudWatch Logs (3). The Lambda function uses an IAM role (4) that has an IAM policy attached (5) that grants access to DynamoDB and CloudWatch.

Overview of the AWS services used in this post

I use the following AWS services in this post’s solution:

IAM – For securely controlling access to AWS services. With IAM, you can centrally manage users, security credentials such as access keys, and permissions that control which AWS resources users and applications can access.
DynamoDB – A fast and flexible NoSQL database service for all applications that need consistent, single-digit-millisecond latency at any scale.
Lambda – Run code without provisioning or managing servers. You pay only for the compute time you consume—there is no charge when your code is not running.
CloudWatch Logs– For monitoring, storing, and accessing log files generated by AWS resources, including Lambda.

IAM access policies

I have authored an IAM access policy with JSON to grant the required permissions to the DynamoDB table and CloudWatch Logs. I will attach this policy to a role, and this role will then be attached to a Lambda function, which will assume the required access to DynamoDB and CloudWatch Logs

I will walk through this policy, and explain its elements and how to create the policy in the IAM console.

The following policy grants a Lambda function read and write access to a DynamoDB table and writes log files to CloudWatch Logs. This policy is called MyLambdaPolicy. The following is the full JSON document of this policy (the AWS account ID is a placeholder value that you would replace with your own account ID).

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [{
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": [
				"dynamodb:BatchGetItem",
				"dynamodb:GetItem",
				"dynamodb:GetRecords",
				"dynamodb:Query",
				"dynamodb:Scan",
"dynamodb:BatchWriteItem",
				"dynamodb:PutItem",
				"dynamodb:UpdateItem"

			],
			"Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:eu-west-1:123456789012:table/SampleTable"
		},
		{
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": [
				"logs:CreateLogGroup",
				"logs:CreateLogStream",
				"logs:PutLogEvents"
			],
			"Resource": "arn:aws:logs:eu-west-1:123456789012:*"
		}
	]
}

The first element in this policy is the Version, which defines the JSON version. At the time of this post’s publication, the most recent version of JSON is 2012-10-17.

The next element in this first policy is a Statement. This is the main section of the policy and includes multiple elements. This first statement is to Allow access to DynamoDB, and in this example, the elements I use are:

An Effect element – Specifies whether the statement results in an Allow or an explicit Deny. By default, access to resources is implicitly denied. In this example, I have used Allow because I want to allow the actions.
An Action element – Describes the specific actions for this statement. Each AWS service has its own set of actions that describe tasks that you can perform with that service. I have used the DynamoDB actions that I want to allow. For the definitions of all available actions for DynamoDB, see the DynamoDB API Reference.
A Resource element – Specifies the object or objects for this statement using Amazon Resource Names (ARNs). You use an ARN to uniquely identify an AWS resource. All Resource elements start with arn:aws and then define the object or objects for the statement. I use this to specify the DynamoDB table to which I want to allow access. To build the Resource element for DynamoDB, I have to specify:
- The AWS service (dynamodb)
- The AWS Region (eu-west-1)
- The AWS account ID (123456789012)
- The table (table/SampleTable)

The complete Resource element of the first statement is: arn:aws:dynamodb:eu-west-1:123456789012:table/SampleTable

In this policy, I created a second statement to allow access to CloudWatch Logs so that the Lambda function can write log files for troubleshooting and analysis. I have used the same elements as for the DynamoDB statement, but have changed the following values:

For the Action element, I used the CloudWatch actions that I want to allow. Definitions of all the available actions for CloudWatch are provided in the CloudWatch API Reference.
For the Resource element, I specified the AWS account to which I want to allow my Lambda function to write its log files. As in the preceding example for DynamoDB, you have to use the ARN for CloudWatch Logs to specify where access should be granted. To build the Resource element for CloudWatch Logs, I have to specify:
- The AWS service (logs)
- The AWS region (eu-west-1)
- The AWS account ID (123456789012)
- All log groups in this account (*)

The complete Resource element of the second statement is: arn:aws:logs:eu-west-1:123456789012:*

Create the IAM policy in your account

Before you can apply MyLambdaPolicy to a Lambda function, you have to create the policy in your own account and then apply it to an IAM role.

To create an IAM policy:

Navigate to the IAM console and choose Policies in the navigation pane. Choose Create policy.
Because I have already written the policy in JSON, you don’t need to use the Visual Editor, so you can choose the JSON tab and paste the content of the JSON policy document shown earlier in this post (remember to replace the placeholder account IDs with your own account ID). Choose Review policy.
Name the policy MyLambdaPolicy and give it a description that will help you remember the policy’s purpose. You also can view a summary of the policy’s permissions. Choose Create policy.

You have created the IAM policy that you will apply to the Lambda function.

Attach the IAM policy to an IAM role

To apply MyLambdaPolicy to a Lambda function, you first have to attach the policy to an IAM role.

To create a new role and attach MyLambdaPolicy to the role:

Navigate to the IAM console and choose Roles in the navigation pane. Choose Create role.
Choose AWS service and then choose Lambda. Choose Next: Permissions.
On the Attach permissions policies page, type MyLambdaPolicy in the Search box. Choose MyLambdaPolicy from the list of returned search results, and then choose Next: Review.
On the Review page, type MyLambdaRole in the Role name box and an appropriate description, and then choose Create role.

You have attached the policy you created earlier to a new IAM role, which in turn can be used by a Lambda function.

Apply the IAM role to a Lambda function

You have created an IAM role that has an attached IAM policy that grants both read and write access to DynamoDB and write access to CloudWatch Logs. The next step is to apply the IAM role to a Lambda function.

To apply the IAM role to a Lambda function:

Navigate to the Lambda console and choose Create function.
On the Create function page under Author from scratch, name the function MyLambdaFunction, and choose the runtime you want to use based on your application requirements. Lambda currently supports Node.js, Java, Python, Go, and .NET Core. From the Role dropdown, choose Choose an existing role, and from the Existing role dropdown, choose MyLambdaRole. Then choose Create function.

MyLambdaFunction now has access to CloudWatch Logs and DynamoDB. You can choose either of these services to see the details of which permissions the function has.

Summary

In this post, I demonstrated how to grant a Lambda function access to a DynamoDB table by using an IAM policy. The Lambda Developer Guide features guidance about how you can expand on the examples in this post and how to integrate Lambda with Amazon API Gateway, S3, DynamoDB, Amazon Kinesis, AWS CloudTrail, and Amazon SNS.

If you have any comments about this blog post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have any questions about the services used, start a new thread in the applicable AWS forum: IAM, Lambda, DynamoDB, or CloudWatch.

– Andrew

Noise

Tag Archives: Identity and Access Management

An easier way to control access to AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals

Condition concepts

AWS:PrincipalOrgID Condition Key

Example: Restrict access to only principals from my organization

Summary

Refining Access to Branches in AWS CodeCommit

Why would I do this?

What you need to get started

Create two groups in IAM

Create users in IAM

Create a conditional policy in IAM

Apply the policy to a group

Conclusion

Sharing Secrets with AWS Lambda Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store

Solution overview

Launch the AWS SAM template

SAM template resources

Lambda function

Create an encrypted parameter

Profiling the impact of querying Parameter Store using AWS X-Ray

Conclusion

The collective thoughts of the interwebz