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Power neural search with AI/ML connectors in Amazon OpenSearch Service

Post Syndicated from Aruna Govindaraju original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/power-neural-search-with-ai-ml-connectors-in-amazon-opensearch-service/

With the launch of the neural search feature for Amazon OpenSearch Service in OpenSearch 2.9, it’s now effortless to integrate with AI/ML models to power semantic search and other use cases. OpenSearch Service has supported both lexical and vector search since the introduction of its k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) feature in 2020; however, configuring semantic search required building a framework to integrate machine learning (ML) models to ingest and search. The neural search feature facilitates text-to-vector transformation during ingestion and search. When you use a neural query during search, the query is translated into a vector embedding and k-NN is used to return the nearest vector embeddings from the corpus.

To use neural search, you must set up an ML model. We recommend configuring AI/ML connectors to AWS AI and ML services (such as Amazon SageMaker or Amazon Bedrock) or third-party alternatives. Starting with version 2.9 on OpenSearch Service, AI/ML connectors integrate with neural search to simplify and operationalize the translation of your data corpus and queries to vector embeddings, thereby removing much of the complexity of vector hydration and search.

In this post, we demonstrate how to configure AI/ML connectors to external models through the OpenSearch Service console.

Solution Overview

Specifically, this post walks you through connecting to a model in SageMaker. Then we guide you through using the connector to configure semantic search on OpenSearch Service as an example of a use case that is supported through connection to an ML model. Amazon Bedrock and SageMaker integrations are currently supported on the OpenSearch Service console UI, and the list of UI-supported first- and third-party integrations will continue to grow.

For any models not supported through the UI, you can instead set them up using the available APIs and the ML blueprints. For more information, refer to Introduction to OpenSearch Models. You can find blueprints for each connector in the ML Commons GitHub repository.

Prerequisites

Before connecting the model via the OpenSearch Service console, create an OpenSearch Service domain. Map an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role by the name LambdaInvokeOpenSearchMLCommonsRole as the backend role on the ml_full_access role using the Security plugin on OpenSearch Dashboards, as shown in the following video. The OpenSearch Service integrations workflow is pre-filled to use the LambdaInvokeOpenSearchMLCommonsRole IAM role by default to create the connector between the OpenSearch Service domain and the model deployed on SageMaker. If you use a custom IAM role on the OpenSearch Service console integrations, make sure the custom role is mapped as the backend role with ml_full_access permissions prior to deploying the template.

Deploy the model using AWS CloudFormation

The following video demonstrates the steps to use the OpenSearch Service console to deploy a model within minutes on Amazon SageMaker and generate the model ID via the AI connectors. The first step is to choose Integrations in the navigation pane on the OpenSearch Service AWS console, which routes to a list of available integrations. The integration is set up through a UI, which will prompt you for the necessary inputs.

To set up the integration, you only need to provide the OpenSearch Service domain endpoint and provide a model name to uniquely identify the model connection. By default, the template deploys the Hugging Face sentence-transformers model, djl://ai.djl.huggingface.pytorch/sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2.

When you choose Create Stack, you are routed to the AWS CloudFormation console. The CloudFormation template deploys the architecture detailed in the following diagram.

The CloudFormation stack creates an AWS Lambda application that deploys a model from Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), creates the connector, and generates the model ID in the output. You can then use this model ID to create a semantic index.

If the default all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model doesn’t serve your purpose, you can deploy any text embedding model of your choice on the chosen model host (SageMaker or Amazon Bedrock) by providing your model artifacts as an accessible S3 object. Alternatively, you can select one of the following pre-trained language models and deploy it to SageMaker. For instructions to set up your endpoint and models, refer to Available Amazon SageMaker Images.

SageMaker is a fully managed service that brings together a broad set of tools to enable high-performance, low-cost ML for any use case, delivering key benefits such as model monitoring, serverless hosting, and workflow automation for continuous training and deployment. SageMaker allows you to host and manage the lifecycle of text embedding models, and use them to power semantic search queries in OpenSearch Service. When connected, SageMaker hosts your models and OpenSearch Service is used to query based on inference results from SageMaker.

View the deployed model through OpenSearch Dashboards

To verify the CloudFormation template successfully deployed the model on the OpenSearch Service domain and get the model ID, you can use the ML Commons REST GET API through OpenSearch Dashboards Dev Tools.

The GET _plugins REST API now provides additional APIs to also view the model status. The following command allows you to see the status of a remote model:

GET _plugins/_ml/models/<modelid>

As shown in the following screenshot, a DEPLOYED status in the response indicates the model is successfully deployed on the OpenSearch Service cluster.

Alternatively, you can view the model deployed on your OpenSearch Service domain using the Machine Learning page of OpenSearch Dashboards.

This page lists the model information and the statuses of all the models deployed.

Create the neural pipeline using the model ID

When the status of the model shows as either DEPLOYED in Dev Tools or green and Responding in OpenSearch Dashboards, you can use the model ID to build your neural ingest pipeline. The following ingest pipeline is run in your domain’s OpenSearch Dashboards Dev Tools. Make sure you replace the model ID with the unique ID generated for the model deployed on your domain.

PUT _ingest/pipeline/neural-pipeline
{
  "description": "Semantic Search for retail product catalog ",
  "processors" : [
    {
      "text_embedding": {
        "model_id": "sfG4zosBIsICJFsINo3X",
        "field_map": {
           "description": "desc_v",
           "name": "name_v"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Create the semantic search index using the neural pipeline as the default pipeline

You can now define your index mapping with the default pipeline configured to use the new neural pipeline you created in the previous step. Ensure the vector fields are declared as knn_vector and the dimensions are appropriate to the model that is deployed on SageMaker. If you have retained the default configuration to deploy the all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model on SageMaker, keep the following settings as is and run the command in Dev Tools.

PUT semantic_demostore
{
  "settings": {
    "index.knn": true,  
    "default_pipeline": "neural-pipeline",
    "number_of_shards": 1,
    "number_of_replicas": 1
  },
  "mappings": {
    "properties": {
      "desc_v": {
        "type": "knn_vector",
        "dimension": 384,
        "method": {
          "name": "hnsw",
          "engine": "nmslib",
          "space_type": "cosinesimil"
        }
      },
      "name_v": {
        "type": "knn_vector",
        "dimension": 384,
        "method": {
          "name": "hnsw",
          "engine": "nmslib",
          "space_type": "cosinesimil"
        }
      },
      "description": {
        "type": "text" 
      },
      "name": {
        "type": "text" 
      } 
    }
  }
}

Ingest sample documents to generate vectors

For this demo, you can ingest the sample retail demostore product catalog to the new semantic_demostore index. Replace the user name, password, and domain endpoint with your domain information and ingest raw data into OpenSearch Service:

curl -XPOST -u 'username:password' 'https://domain-end-point/_bulk' --data-binary @semantic_demostore.json -H 'Content-Type: application/json'

Validate the new semantic_demostore index

Now that you have ingested your dataset to the OpenSearch Service domain, validate if the required vectors are generated using a simple search to fetch all fields. Validate if the fields defined as knn_vectors have the required vectors.

Compare lexical search and semantic search powered by neural search using the Compare Search Results tool

The Compare Search Results tool on OpenSearch Dashboards is available for production workloads. You can navigate to the Compare search results page and compare query results between lexical search and neural search configured to use the model ID generated earlier.

Clean up

You can delete the resources you created following the instructions in this post by deleting the CloudFormation stack. This will delete the Lambda resources and the S3 bucket that contain the model that was deployed to SageMaker. Complete the following steps:

  1. On the AWS CloudFormation console, navigate to your stack details page.
  2. Choose Delete.

  1. Choose Delete to confirm.

You can monitor the stack deletion progress on the AWS CloudFormation console.

Note that, deleting the CloudFormation stack doesn’t delete the model deployed on the SageMaker domain and the AI/ML connector created. This is because these models and the connector can be associated with multiple indexes within the domain. To specifically delete a model and its associated connector, use the model APIs as shown in the following screenshots.

First, undeploy the model from the OpenSearch Service domain memory:

POST /_plugins/_ml/models/<model_id>/_undeploy

Then you can delete the model from the model index:

DELETE /_plugins/_ml/models/<model_id>

Lastly, delete the connector from the connector index:

DELETE /_plugins/_ml/connectors/<connector_id>

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to deploy a model in SageMaker, create the AI/ML connector using the OpenSearch Service console, and build the neural search index. The ability to configure AI/ML connectors in OpenSearch Service simplifies the vector hydration process by making the integrations to external models native. You can create a neural search index in minutes using the neural ingestion pipeline and the neural search that use the model ID to generate the vector embedding on the fly during ingest and search.

To learn more about these AI/ML connectors, refer to Amazon OpenSearch Service AI connectors for AWS services, AWS CloudFormation template integrations for semantic search, and Creating connectors for third-party ML platforms.


About the Authors

Aruna Govindaraju is an Amazon OpenSearch Specialist Solutions Architect and has worked with many commercial and open source search engines. She is passionate about search, relevancy, and user experience. Her expertise with correlating end-user signals with search engine behavior has helped many customers improve their search experience.

Dagney Braun is a Principal Product Manager at AWS focused on OpenSearch.

Strengthen the DevOps pipeline and protect data with AWS Secrets Manager, AWS KMS, and AWS Certificate Manager

Post Syndicated from Magesh Dhanasekaran original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/strengthen-the-devops-pipeline-and-protect-data-with-aws-secrets-manager-aws-kms-and-aws-certificate-manager/

In this blog post, we delve into using Amazon Web Services (AWS) data protection services such as Amazon Secrets Manager, AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS), and AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) to help fortify both the security of the pipeline and security in the pipeline. We explore how these services contribute to the overall security of the DevOps pipeline infrastructure while enabling seamless integration of data protection measures. We also provide practical insights by demonstrating the implementation of these services within a DevOps pipeline for a three-tier WordPress web application deployed using Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS).

DevOps pipelines involve the continuous integration, delivery, and deployment of cloud infrastructure and applications, which can store and process sensitive data. The increasing adoption of DevOps pipelines for cloud infrastructure and application deployments has made the protection of sensitive data a critical priority for organizations.

Some examples of the types of sensitive data that must be protected in DevOps pipelines are:

  • Credentials: Usernames and passwords used to access cloud resources, databases, and applications.
  • Configuration files: Files that contain settings and configuration data for applications, databases, and other systems.
  • Certificates: TLS certificates used to encrypt communication between systems.
  • Secrets: Any other sensitive data used to access or authenticate with cloud resources, such as private keys, security tokens, or passwords for third-party services.

Unintended access or data disclosure can have serious consequences such as loss of productivity, legal liabilities, financial losses, and reputational damage. It’s crucial to prioritize data protection to help mitigate these risks effectively.

The concept of security of the pipeline encompasses implementing security measures to protect the entire DevOps pipeline—the infrastructure, tools, and processes—from potential security issues. While the concept of security in the pipeline focuses on incorporating security practices and controls directly into the development and deployment processes within the pipeline.

By using Secrets Manager, AWS KMS, and ACM, you can strengthen the security of your DevOps pipelines, safeguard sensitive data, and facilitate secure and compliant application deployments. Our goal is to equip you with the knowledge and tools to establish a secure DevOps environment, providing the integrity of your pipeline infrastructure and protecting your organization’s sensitive data throughout the software delivery process.

Sample application architecture overview

WordPress was chosen as the use case for this DevOps pipeline implementation due to its popularity, open source nature, containerization support, and integration with AWS services. The sample architecture for the WordPress application in the AWS cloud uses the following services:

  • Amazon Route 53: A DNS web service that routes traffic to the correct AWS resource.
  • Amazon CloudFront: A global content delivery network (CDN) service that securely delivers data and videos to users with low latency and high transfer speeds.
  • AWS WAF: A web application firewall that protects web applications from common web exploits.
  • AWS Certificate Manager (ACM): A service that provides SSL/TLS certificates to enable secure connections.
  • Application Load Balancer (ALB): Routes traffic to the appropriate container in Amazon EKS.
  • Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS): A scalable and highly available Kubernetes cluster to deploy containerized applications.
  • Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS): A managed relational database service that provides scalable and secure databases for applications.
  • AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS): A key management service that allows you to create and manage the encryption keys used to protect your data at rest.
  • AWS Secrets Manager: A service that provides the ability to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials.
  • AWS CodePipeline: A fully managed continuous delivery service that helps to automate release pipelines for fast and reliable application and infrastructure updates.
  • AWS CodeBuild: A fully managed continuous integration service that compiles source code, runs tests, and produces ready-to-deploy software packages.
  • AWS CodeCommit: A secure, highly scalable, fully managed source-control service that hosts private Git repositories.

Before we explore the specifics of the sample application architecture in Figure 1, it’s important to clarify a few aspects of the diagram. While it displays only a single Availability Zone (AZ), please note that the application and infrastructure can be developed to be highly available across multiple AZs to improve fault tolerance. This means that even if one AZ is unavailable, the application remains operational in other AZs, providing uninterrupted service to users.

Figure 1: Sample application architecture

Figure 1: Sample application architecture

The flow of the data protection services in the post and depicted in Figure 1 can be summarized as follows:

First, we discuss securing your pipeline. You can use Secrets Manager to securely store sensitive information such as Amazon RDS credentials. We show you how to retrieve these secrets from Secrets Manager in your DevOps pipeline to access the database. By using Secrets Manager, you can protect critical credentials and help prevent unauthorized access, strengthening the security of your pipeline.

Next, we cover data encryption. With AWS KMS, you can encrypt sensitive data at rest. We explain how to encrypt data stored in Amazon RDS using AWS KMS encryption, making sure that it remains secure and protected from unauthorized access. By implementing KMS encryption, you add an extra layer of protection to your data and bolster the overall security of your pipeline.

Lastly, we discuss securing connections (data in transit) in your WordPress application. ACM is used to manage SSL/TLS certificates. We show you how to provision and manage SSL/TLS certificates using ACM and configure your Amazon EKS cluster to use these certificates for secure communication between users and the WordPress application. By using ACM, you can establish secure communication channels, providing data privacy and enhancing the security of your pipeline.

Note: The code samples in this post are only to demonstrate the key concepts. The actual code can be found on GitHub.

Securing sensitive data with Secrets Manager

In this sample application architecture, Secrets Manager is used to store and manage sensitive data. The AWS CloudFormation template provided sets up an Amazon RDS for MySQL instance and securely sets the master user password by retrieving it from Secrets Manager using KMS encryption.

Here’s how Secrets Manager is implemented in this sample application architecture:

  1. Creating a Secrets Manager secret.
    1. Create a Secrets Manager secret that includes the Amazon RDS database credentials using CloudFormation.
    2. The secret is encrypted using an AWS KMS customer managed key.
    3. Sample code:
      RDSMySQL:
          Type: AWS::RDS::DBInstance
          Properties: 
      		ManageMasterUserPassword: true
      		MasterUserSecret:
              		KmsKeyId: !Ref RDSMySqlSecretEncryption

    The ManageMasterUserPassword: true line in the CloudFormation template indicates that the stack will manage the master user password for the Amazon RDS instance. To securely retrieve the password for the master user, the CloudFormation template uses the MasterUserSecret parameter, which retrieves the password from Secrets Manager. The KmsKeyId: !Ref RDSMySqlSecretEncryption line specifies the KMS key ID that will be used to encrypt the secret in Secrets Manager.

    By setting the MasterUserSecret parameter to retrieve the password from Secrets Manager, the CloudFormation stack can securely retrieve and set the master user password for the Amazon RDS MySQL instance without exposing it in plain text. Additionally, specifying the KMS key ID for encryption adds another layer of security to the secret stored in Secrets Manager.

  2. Retrieving secrets from Secrets Manager.
    1. The secrets store CSI driver is a Kubernetes-native driver that provides a common interface for Secrets Store integration with Amazon EKS. The secrets-store-csi-driver-provider-aws is a specific provider that provides integration with the Secrets Manager.
    2. To set up Amazon EKS, the first step is to create a SecretProviderClass, which specifies the secret ID of the Amazon RDS database. This SecretProviderClass is then used in the Kubernetes deployment object to deploy the WordPress application and dynamically retrieve the secrets from the secret manager during deployment. This process is entirely dynamic and verifies that no secrets are recorded anywhere. The SecretProviderClass is created on a specific app namespace, such as the wp namespace.
    3. Sample code:
      apiVersion: secrets-store.csi.x-k8s.io/v1
      kind: SecretProviderClass
      spec:
        provider: aws
        parameters:
          objects: |
              - objectName: 'rds!db-0x0000-0x0000-0x0000-0x0000-0x0000'
      

When using Secrets manager, be aware of the following best practices for managing and securing Secrets Manager secrets:

  • Use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) identity policies to define who can perform specific actions on Secrets Manager secrets, such as reading, writing, or deleting them.
  • Secrets Manager resource policies can be used to manage access to secrets at a more granular level. This includes defining who has access to specific secrets based on attributes such as IP address, time of day, or authentication status.
  • Encrypt the Secrets Manager secret using an AWS KMS key.
  • Using CloudFormation templates to automate the creation and management of Secrets Manager secrets including rotation.
  • Use AWS CloudTrail to monitor access and changes to Secrets Manager secrets.
  • Use CloudFormation hooks to validate the Secrets Manager secret before and after deployment. If the secret fails validation, the deployment is rolled back.

Encrypting data with AWS KMS

Data encryption involves converting sensitive information into a coded form that can only be accessed with the appropriate decryption key. By implementing encryption measures throughout your pipeline, you make sure that even if unauthorized individuals gain access to the data, they won’t be able to understand its contents.

Here’s how data at rest encryption using AWS KMS is implemented in this sample application architecture:

  1. Amazon RDS secret encryption
    1. Encrypting secrets: An AWS KMS customer managed key is used to encrypt the secrets stored in Secrets Manager to ensure their confidentiality during the DevOps build process.
    2. Sample code:
      RDSMySQL:
          Type: AWS::RDS::DBInstance
          Properties:
            ManageMasterUserPassword: true
            MasterUserSecret:
              KmsKeyId: !Ref RDSMySqlSecretEncryption
      
      RDSMySqlSecretEncryption:
          Type: "AWS::KMS::Key"
          Properties:
            KeyPolicy:
              Id: rds-mysql-secret-encryption
              Statement:
                - Sid: Allow administration of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Create*",
                      "kms:Describe*",
                      "kms:Enable*",
                      "kms:List*",
                      "kms:Put*",
      					.
      					.
      					.
                  ]
                - Sid: Allow use of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Decrypt",
                      "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                      "kms:DescribeKey"
                  ]

  2. Amazon RDS data encryption
    1. Enable encryption for an Amazon RDS instance using CloudFormation. Specify the KMS key ARN in the CloudFormation stack and RDS will use the specified KMS key to encrypt data at rest.
    2. Sample code:
      RDSMySQL:
          Type: AWS::RDS::DBInstance
          Properties:
        KmsKeyId: !Ref RDSMySqlDataEncryption
              StorageEncrypted: true
      
      RDSMySqlDataEncryption:
          Type: "AWS::KMS::Key"
          Properties:
            KeyPolicy:
              Id: rds-mysql-data-encryption
              Statement:
                - Sid: Allow administration of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Create*",
                      "kms:Describe*",
                      "kms:Enable*",
                      "kms:List*",
                      "kms:Put*",
      .
      .
      .
                  ]
                - Sid: Allow use of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Decrypt",
                      "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                      "kms:DescribeKey"
                  ]

  3. Kubernetes Pods storage
    1. Use encrypted Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volumes to store configuration data. Create a managed encrypted Amazon EBS volume using the following code snippet, and then deploy a Kubernetes pod with the persistent volume claim (PVC) mounted as a volume.
    2. Sample code:
      kind: StorageClass
      provisioner: ebs.csi.aws.com
      parameters:
        csi.storage.k8s.io/fstype: xfs
        encrypted: "true"
      
      kind: Deployment
      spec:
        volumes:      
            - name: persistent-storage
              persistentVolumeClaim:
                claimName: ebs-claim

  4. Amazon ECR
    1. To secure data at rest in Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR), enable encryption at rest for Amazon ECR repositories using the AWS Management Console or AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI). ECR uses AWS KMS to encrypt the data at rest.
    2. Create a KMS key for Amazon ECR and use that key to encrypt the data at rest.
    3. Automate the creation of encrypted ECR repositories and enable encryption at rest using a DevOps pipeline, use CodePipeline to automate the deployment of the CloudFormation stack.
    4. Define the creation of encrypted Amazon ECR repositories as part of the pipeline.
    5. Sample code:
      ECRRepository:
          Type: AWS::ECR::Repository
          Properties: 
            EncryptionConfiguration: 
              EncryptionType: KMS
              KmsKey: !Ref ECREncryption
      
      ECREncryption:
          Type: AWS::KMS::Key
          Properties:
            KeyPolicy:
              Id: ecr-encryption-key
              Statement:
                - Sid: Allow administration of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Create*",
                      "kms:Describe*",
                      "kms:Enable*",
                      "kms:List*",
                      "kms:Put*",
      .
      .
      .
       ]
                - Sid: Allow use of the key
                  Effect: Allow
                  "Action": [
                      "kms:Decrypt",
                      "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                      "kms:DescribeKey"
                  ]

AWS best practices for managing encryption keys in an AWS environment

To effectively manage encryption keys and verify the security of data at rest in an AWS environment, we recommend the following best practices:

  • Use separate AWS KMS customer managed KMS keys for data classifications to provide better control and management of keys.
  • Enforce separation of duties by assigning different roles and responsibilities for key management tasks, such as creating and rotating keys, setting key policies, or granting permissions. By segregating key management duties, you can reduce the risk of accidental or intentional key compromise and improve overall security.
  • Use CloudTrail to monitor AWS KMS API activity and detect potential security incidents.
  • Rotate KMS keys as required by your regulatory requirements.
  • Use CloudFormation hooks to validate KMS key policies to verify that they align with organizational and regulatory requirements.

Following these best practices and implementing encryption at rest for different services such as Amazon RDS, Kubernetes Pods storage, and Amazon ECR, will help ensure that data is encrypted at rest.

Securing communication with ACM

Secure communication is a critical requirement for modern environments and implementing it in a DevOps pipeline is crucial for verifying that the infrastructure is secure, consistent, and repeatable across different environments. In this WordPress application running on Amazon EKS, ACM is used to secure communication end-to-end. Here’s how to achieve this:

  1. Provision TLS certificates with ACM using a DevOps pipeline
    1. To provision TLS certificates with ACM in a DevOps pipeline, automate the creation and deployment of TLS certificates using ACM. Use AWS CloudFormation templates to create the certificates and deploy them as part of infrastructure as code. This verifies that the certificates are created and deployed consistently and securely across multiple environments.
    2. Sample code:
      DNSDomainCertificate:
          Type: AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate
          Properties:
            DomainName: !Ref DNSDomainName
            ValidationMethod: 'DNS'
      
      DNSDomainName:
          Description: dns domain name 
          TypeM: String
          Default: "example.com"

  2. Provisioning of ALB and integration of TLS certificate using AWS ALB Ingress Controller for Kubernetes
    1. Use a DevOps pipeline to create and configure the TLS certificates and ALB. This verifies that the infrastructure is created consistently and securely across multiple environments.
    2. Sample code:
      kind: Ingress
      metadata:
        annotations:
          alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/scheme: internet-facing
          alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/certificate-arn: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:000000000000:certificate/0x0000-0x0000-0x0000-0x0000-0x0000
          alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/listen-ports: '[{"HTTPS":443}]'
          alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/security-groups:  sg-0x00000x0000,sg-0x00000x0000
      spec:
        ingressClassName: alb

  3. CloudFront and ALB
    1. To secure communication between CloudFront and the ALB, verify that the traffic from the client to CloudFront and from CloudFront to the ALB is encrypted using the TLS certificate.
    2. Sample code:
      CloudFrontDistribution:
          Type: AWS::CloudFront::Distribution
          Properties:
            DistributionConfig:
              Origins:
                - DomainName: !Ref ALBDNSName
                  Id: !Ref ALBDNSName
                  CustomOriginConfig:
                    HTTPSPort: '443'
                    OriginProtocolPolicy: 'https-only'
                    OriginSSLProtocols:
                      - LSv1
      	    ViewerCertificate:
      AcmCertificateArn: !Sub 'arn:aws:acm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:certificate/${ACMCertificateIdentifier}'
                  SslSupportMethod:  'sni-only'
                  MinimumProtocolVersion: 'TLSv1.2_2021'
      
      ALBDNSName:
          Description: alb dns name
          Type: String
          Default: "k8s-wp-ingressw-x0x0000x000-x0x0000x000.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com"

  4. ALB to Kubernetes Pods
    1. To secure communication between the ALB and the Kubernetes Pods, use the Kubernetes ingress resource to terminate SSL/TLS connections at the ALB. The ALB sends the PROTO metadata http connection header to the WordPress web server. The web server checks the incoming traffic type (http or https) and enables the HTTPS connection only hereafter. This verifies that pod responses are sent back to ALB only over HTTPS.
    2. Additionally, using the X-Forwarded-Proto header can help pass the original protocol information and help avoid issues with the $_SERVER[‘HTTPS’] variable in WordPress.
    3. Sample code:
      define('WP_HOME','https://example.com/');
      define('WP_SITEURL','https://example.com/');
      
      define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
      if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO']) && strpos($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO'], 'https') !== false) {
          $_SERVER['HTTPS'] = 'on';

  5. Kubernetes Pods to Amazon RDS
    1. To secure communication between the Kubernetes Pods in Amazon EKS and the Amazon RDS database, use SSL/TLS encryption on the database connection.
    2. Configure an Amazon RDS MySQL instance with enhanced security settings to verify that only TLS-encrypted connections are allowed to the database. This is achieved by creating a DB parameter group with a parameter called require_secure_transport set to ‘1‘. The WordPress configuration file is also updated to enable SSL/TLS communication with the MySQL database. Then enable the TLS flag on the MySQL client and the Amazon RDS public certificate is passed to ensure that the connection is encrypted using the TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 protocol. The sample code that follows focuses on enhancing the security of the RDS MySQL instance by enforcing encrypted connections and configuring WordPress to use SSL/TLS for communication with the database.
    3. Sample code:
      RDSDBParameterGroup:
          Type: 'AWS::RDS::DBParameterGroup'
          Properties:
            DBParameterGroupName: 'rds-tls-custom-mysql'
            Parameters:
              require_secure_transport: '1'
      
      RDSMySQL:
          Type: AWS::RDS::DBInstance
          Properties:
            DBName: 'wordpress'
            DBParameterGroupName: !Ref RDSDBParameterGroup
      
      wp-config-docker.php:
      // Enable SSL/TLS between WordPress and MYSQL database
      define('MYSQL_CLIENT_FLAGS', MYSQLI_CLIENT_SSL);//This activates SSL mode
      define('MYSQL_SSL_CA', '/usr/src/wordpress/amazon-global-bundle-rds.pem');

In this architecture, AWS WAF is enabled at CloudFront to protect the WordPress application from common web exploits. AWS WAF for CloudFront is recommended and use AWS managed WAF rules to verify that web applications are protected from common and the latest threats.

Here are some AWS best practices for securing communication with ACM:

  • Use SSL/TLS certificates: Encrypt data in transit between clients and servers. ACM makes it simple to create, manage, and deploy SSL/TLS certificates across your infrastructure.
  • Use ACM-issued certificates: This verifies that your certificates are trusted by major browsers and that they are regularly renewed and replaced as needed.
  • Implement certificate revocation: Implement certificate revocation for SSL/TLS certificates that have been compromised or are no longer in use.
  • Implement strict transport security (HSTS): This helps protect against protocol downgrade attacks and verifies that SSL/TLS is used consistently across sessions.
  • Configure proper cipher suites: Configure your SSL/TLS connections to use only the strongest and most secure cipher suites.

Monitoring and auditing with CloudTrail

In this section, we discuss the significance of monitoring and auditing actions in your AWS account using CloudTrail. CloudTrail is a logging and tracking service that records the API activity in your AWS account, which is crucial for troubleshooting, compliance, and security purposes. Enabling CloudTrail in your AWS account and securely storing the logs in a durable location such as Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) with encryption is highly recommended to help prevent unauthorized access. Monitoring and analyzing CloudTrail logs in real-time using CloudWatch Logs can help you quickly detect and respond to security incidents.

In a DevOps pipeline, you can use infrastructure-as-code tools such as CloudFormation, CodePipeline, and CodeBuild to create and manage CloudTrail consistently across different environments. You can create a CloudFormation stack with the CloudTrail configuration and use CodePipeline and CodeBuild to build and deploy the stack to different environments. CloudFormation hooks can validate the CloudTrail configuration to verify it aligns with your security requirements and policies.

It’s worth noting that the aspects discussed in the preceding paragraph might not apply if you’re using AWS Organizations and the CloudTrail Organization Trail feature. When using those services, the management of CloudTrail configurations across multiple accounts and environments is streamlined. This centralized approach simplifies the process of enforcing security policies and standards uniformly throughout the organization.

By following these best practices, you can effectively audit actions in your AWS environment, troubleshoot issues, and detect and respond to security incidents proactively.

Complete code for sample architecture for deployment

The complete code repository for the sample WordPress application architecture demonstrates how to implement data protection in a DevOps pipeline using various AWS services. The repository includes both infrastructure code and application code that covers all aspects of the sample architecture and implementation steps.

The infrastructure code consists of a set of CloudFormation templates that define the resources required to deploy the WordPress application in an AWS environment. This includes the Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC), subnets, security groups, Amazon EKS cluster, Amazon RDS instance, AWS KMS key, and Secrets Manager secret. It also defines the necessary security configurations such as encryption at rest for the RDS instance and encryption in transit for the EKS cluster.

The application code is a sample WordPress application that is containerized using Docker and deployed to the Amazon EKS cluster. It shows how to use the Application Load Balancer (ALB) to route traffic to the appropriate container in the EKS cluster, and how to use the Amazon RDS instance to store the application data. The code also demonstrates how to use AWS KMS to encrypt and decrypt data in the application, and how to use Secrets Manager to store and retrieve secrets. Additionally, the code showcases the use of ACM to provision SSL/TLS certificates for secure communication between the CloudFront and the ALB, thereby ensuring data in transit is encrypted, which is critical for data protection in a DevOps pipeline.

Conclusion

Strengthening the security and compliance of your application in the cloud environment requires automating data protection measures in your DevOps pipeline. This involves using AWS services such as Secrets Manager, AWS KMS, ACM, and AWS CloudFormation, along with following best practices.

By automating data protection mechanisms with AWS CloudFormation, you can efficiently create a secure pipeline that is reproducible, controlled, and audited. This helps maintain a consistent and reliable infrastructure.

Monitoring and auditing your DevOps pipeline with AWS CloudTrail is crucial for maintaining compliance and security. It allows you to track and analyze API activity, detect any potential security incidents, and respond promptly.

By implementing these best practices and using data protection mechanisms, you can establish a secure pipeline in the AWS cloud environment. This enhances the overall security and compliance of your application, providing a reliable and protected environment for your deployments.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Magesh Dhanasekaran

Magesh Dhanasekaran

Magesh has significant experience in the cloud security space especially in data protection, threat detection and security governance, risk & compliance domain. Magesh has a track record in providing Information Security consulting service to financial industry and government agencies in Australia. He is using his extensive experience in cloud security architecture, digital transformation, and secure application development practice to provide security advisory on AWS products and services to WWPS Federal Financial Customers. Magesh currently holds cybersecurity industry certifications such as ISC2’s CISSP, ISACA’s CISM, CompTIA Security+ and AWS Solution Architect / Security Specialty Certification.

Karna Thandapani

Karna Thandapani

Karna is a Cloud Consultant with extensive experience in DevOps/DevSecOps and application development activities as a Developer. Karna has in-depth knowledge and hands-on experience in the major AWS services (Cloudformation, EC2, Lambda, Serverless, Step Functions, Glue, API Gateway, ECS, EKS, LB, AutoScaling, Route53, etc.,)and holding Developer Associate, Solutions Architect Associate, and DevOps Engineer Professional.

Automate Cedar policy validation with AWS developer tools

Post Syndicated from Pontus Palmenäs original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/automate-cedar-policy-validation-with-aws-developer-tools/

Cedar is an open-source language that you can use to authorize policies and make authorization decisions based on those policies. AWS security services including AWS Verified Access and Amazon Verified Permissions use Cedar to define policies. Cedar supports schema declaration for the structure of entity types in those policies and policy validation with that schema.

In this post, we show you how to use developer tools on AWS to implement a build pipeline that validates the Cedar policy files against a schema and runs a suite of tests to isolate the Cedar policy logic. As part of the walkthrough, you will introduce a subtle policy error that impacts permissions to observe how the pipeline tests catch the error. Detecting errors earlier in the development lifecycle is often referred to as shifting left. When you shift security left, you can help prevent undetected security issues during the application build phase.

Scenario

This post extends a hypothetical photo sharing application from the Cedar policy language in action workshop. By using that app, users organize their photos into albums and share them with groups of users. Figure 1 shows the entities from the photo application.

Figure 1: Photo application entities

Figure 1: Photo application entities

For the purpose of this post, the important requirements are that user JohnDoe has view access to the album JaneVacation, which contains two photos that user JaneDoe owns:

  • Photo sunset.jpg has a contest label (indicating that the role PhotoJudge has view access)
  • Photo nightclub.jpg has a private label (indicating that only the owner has access)

Cedar policies separate application permissions from the code that retrieves and displays photos. The following Cedar policy explicitly permits the principal of user JohnDoe to take the action viewPhoto on resources in the album JaneVacation.

permit (
  principal == PhotoApp::User::"JohnDoe",
  action == PhotoApp::Action::"viewPhoto",
  resource in PhotoApp::Album::"JaneVacation"
);

The following Cedar policy forbids non-owners from accessing photos labeled as private, even if other policies permit access. In our example, this policy prevents John Doe from viewing the nightclub.jpg photo (denoted by an X in Figure 1).

forbid (
  principal,
  action,
  resource in PhotoApp::Application::"PhotoApp"
)
when { resource.labels.contains("private") }
unless { resource.owner == principal };

A Cedar authorization request asks the question: Can this principal take this action on this resource in this context? The request also includes attribute and parent information for the entities. If an authorization request is made with the following test data, against the Cedar policies and entity data described earlier, the authorization result should be DENY.

{
  "principal": "PhotoApp::User::\"JohnDoe\"",
  "action": "PhotoApp::Action::\"viewPhoto\"",
  "resource": "PhotoApp::Photo::\"nightclub.jpg\"",
  "context": {}
}

The project test suite uses this and other test data to validate the expected behaviors when policies are modified. An error intentionally introduced into the preceding forbid policy lets the first policy satisfy the request and ALLOW access. That unexpected test result compared to the requirements fails the build.

Developer tools on AWS

With AWS developer tools, you can host code and build, test, and deploy applications and infrastructure. AWS CodeCommit hosts the Cedar policies and a test suite, AWS CodeBuild runs the tests, and AWS CodePipeline automatically runs the CodeBuild job when a CodeCommit repository state change event occurs.

In the following steps, you will create a pipeline, commit policies and tests, run a passing build, and observe how a policy error during validation fails a test case.

Prerequisites

To follow along with this walkthrough, make sure to complete the following prerequisites:

Set up the local environment

The first step is to set up your local environment.

To set up the local environment

  1. Using Git, clone the GitHub repository for this post:
  2. git clone [email protected]:aws-samples/cedar-policy-validation-pipeline.git

  3. Before you commit this source code to a CodeCommit repository, run the test suite locally; this can help you shorten the feedback loop. To run the test suite locally, choose one of the following options:
  4. Option 1: Install Rust and compile the Cedar CLI binary

    1. Install Rust by using the rustup tool.
    2. curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y

    3. Compile the Cedar CLI (version 2.4.2) binary by using cargo.
    4. cargo install [email protected]

    5. Run the cedar_testrunner.sh script, which tests authorize requests by using the Cedar CLI.
    6. cd policystore/tests && ./cedar_testrunner.sh

    Option 2: Run the CodeBuild agent

    1. Locally evaluate the buildspec.yml inside a CodeBuild container image by using the codebuild_build.sh script from aws-codebuild-docker-images with the following parameters:
    2. ./codebuild_build.sh -i public.ecr.aws/codebuild/amazonlinux2-x86_64-standard:5.0 -a .codebuild

Project structure

The policystore directory contains one Cedar policy for each .cedar file. The Cedar schema is defined in the cedarschema.json file. A tests subdirectory contains a cedarentities.json file that represents the application data; its subdirectories (for example, album JaneVacation) represent the test suites. The test suite directories contain individual tests inside their ALLOW and DENY subdirectories, each with one or more JSON files that contain the authorization request that Cedar will evaluate against the policy set. A README file in the tests directory provides a summary of the test cases in the suite.

The cedar_testrunner.sh script runs the Cedar CLI to perform a validate command for each .cedar file against the Cedar schema, outputting either PASS or ERROR. The script also performs an authorize command on each test file, outputting either PASS or FAIL depending on whether the results match the expected authorization decision.

Set up the CodePipeline

In this step, you use AWS CloudFormation to provision the services used in the pipeline.

To set up the pipeline

  1. Navigate to the directory of the cloned repository.

    cd cedar-policy-validation-pipeline

  2. Create a new CloudFormation stack from the template.
    aws cloudformation deploy \
    --template-file template.yml \
    --stack-name cedar-policy-validation \
    --capabilities CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM

  3. Wait for the message Successfully created/updated stack.

Invoke CodePipeline

The next step is to commit the source code to a CodeCommit repository, and then configure and invoke CodePipeline.

To invoke CodePipeline

  1. Add an additional Git remote named codecommit to the repository that you previously cloned. The following command points the Git remote to the CodeCommit repository that CloudFormation created. The CedarPolicyRepoCloneUrl stack output is the HTTPS clone URL. Replace it with CedarPolicyRepoCloneGRCUrl to use the HTTPS (GRC) clone URL when you connect to CodeCommit with git-remote-codecommit.

    git remote add codecommit $(aws cloudformation describe-stacks --stack-name cedar-policy-validation --query 'Stacks[0].Outputs[?OutputKey==`CedarPolicyRepoCloneUrl`].OutputValue' --output text)

  2. Push the code to the CodeCommit repository. This starts a pipeline run.

    git push codecommit main

  3. Check the progress of the pipeline run.
    aws codepipeline get-pipeline-execution \
    --pipeline-name cedar-policy-validation \
    --pipeline-execution-id $(aws codepipeline list-pipeline-executions --pipeline-name cedar-policy-validation --query 'pipelineExecutionSummaries[0].pipelineExecutionId' --output text) \
    --query 'pipelineExecution.status' --output text

The build installs Rust in CodePipeline in your account and compiles the Cedar CLI. After approximately four minutes, the pipeline run status shows Succeeded.

Refactor some policies

This photo sharing application sample includes overlapping policies to simulate a refactoring workflow, where after changes are made, the test suite continues to pass. The DoePhotos.cedar and JaneVacation.cedar static policies are replaced by the logically equivalent viewPhoto.template.cedar policy template and two template-linked policies defined in cedartemplatelinks.json. After you delete the extra policies, the passing tests illustrate a successful refactor with the same expected application permissions.

To refactor policies

  1. Delete DoePhotos.cedar and JaneVacation.cedar.
  2. Commit the change to the repository.
    git add .
    git commit -m "Refactor some policies"
    git push codecommit main

  3. Check the pipeline progress. After about 20 seconds, the pipeline status shows Succeeded.

The second pipeline build runs quicker because the build specification is configured to cache a version of the Cedar CLI. Note that caching isn’t implemented in the local testing described in Option 2 of the local environment setup.

Break the build

After you confirm that you have a working pipeline that validates the Cedar policies, see what happens when you commit an invalid Cedar policy.

To break the build

  1. Using a text editor, open the file policystore/Photo-labels-private.cedar.
  2. In the when clause, change resource.labels to resource.label (removing the “s”). This policy syntax is valid, but no longer validates against the Cedar schema.
  3. Commit the change to the repository.
    git add .
    git commit -m "Break the build"
    git push codecommit main

  4. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the CodePipeline console.
  5. Wait for the Most recent execution field to show Failed.
  6. Select the pipeline and choose View in CodeBuild.
  7. Choose the Reports tab, and then choose the most recent report.
  8. Review the report summary, which shows details such as the total number of Passed and Failed/Error test case totals, and the pass rate, as shown in Figure 2.
  9. Figure 2: CodeBuild test report summary

    Figure 2: CodeBuild test report summary

  10. To get the error details, in the Details section, select the Test case called validate Photo-labels-private.cedar that has a Status of Error.
  11. Figure 3: CodeBuild test report test cases

    Figure 3: CodeBuild test report test cases

    That single policy change resulted in two test cases that didn’t pass. The detailed error message shown in Figure 4 is the output from the Cedar CLI. When the policy was validated against the schema, Cedar found the invalid attribute label on the entity type PhotoApp::Photo. The Failed message of unexpected ALLOW occurred because the label attribute typo prevented the forbid policy from matching and producing a DENY result. Each of these tests helps you avoid deploying invalid policies.

    Figure 4: CodeBuild test case error message

    Figure 4: CodeBuild test case error message

Clean up

To avoid ongoing costs and to clean up the resources that you deployed in your AWS account, complete the following steps:

To clean up the resources

  1. Open the Amazon S3 console, select the bucket that begins with the phrase cedar-policy-validation-codepipelinebucket, and Empty the bucket.
  2. Open the CloudFormation console, select the cedar-policy-validation stack, and then choose Delete.
  3. Open the CodeBuild console, choose Build History, filter by cedar-policy-validation, select all results, and then choose Delete builds.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to use AWS developer tools to implement a pipeline that automatically validates and tests when Cedar policies are updated and committed to a source code repository. Using this approach, you can detect invalid policies and potential application permission errors earlier in the development lifecycle and before deployment.

To learn more about the Cedar policy language, see the Cedar Policy Language Reference Guide or browse the source code at the cedar-policy organization on GitHub. For real-time validation of Cedar policies and schemas, install the Cedar policy language for Visual Studio Code extension.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the Amazon Verified Permissions re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Pontus Palmenas

Pontus Palmenäs

Pontus is a Startup Solutions Architect based in Stockholm, Sweden, where he is helping customers in healthcare and life sciences and FinTech. He is passionate about all things security. Outside of work, he enjoys making electronic music in his home studio and spending quality time with his family.

Kevin Hakanson

Kevin Hakanson

Kevin is a Senior Solutions Architect for AWS World Wide Public Sector based in Minnesota. He works with EdTech and GovTech customers to ideate, design, validate, and launch products using cloud-native technologies and modern development practices. When not staring at a computer screen, he is probably staring at another screen, either watching TV or playing video games with his family.

Best Practices for Prompt Engineering with Amazon CodeWhisperer

Post Syndicated from Brendan Jenkins original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/best-practices-for-prompt-engineering-with-amazon-codewhisperer/

Generative AI coding tools are changing the way developers accomplish day-to-day development tasks. From generating functions to creating unit tests, these tools have helped customers accelerate software development. Amazon CodeWhisperer is an AI-powered productivity tools for the IDE and command line that helps improve developer productivity by providing code recommendations based on developers’ natural language comments and surrounding code. With CodeWhisperer, developers can simply write a comment that outlines a specific task in plain English, such as “create a lambda function to upload a file to S3.”

When writing these input prompts to CodeWhisperer like the natural language comments, one important concept is prompt engineering. Prompt engineering is the process of refining interactions with large language models (LLMs) in order to better refine the output of the model. In this case, we want to refine our prompts provided to CodeWhisperer to produce better code output.

In this post, we’ll explore how to take advantage of CodeWhisperer’s capabilities through effective prompt engineering in Python. A well-crafted prompt lets you tap into the tool’s full potential to boost your productivity and help generate the correct code for your use case. We’ll cover prompt engineering best practices like writing clear, specific prompts and providing helpful context and examples. We’ll also discuss how to iteratively refine prompts to produce better results.

Prompt Engineering with CodeWhisperer

We will demonstrate the following best practices when it comes to prompt engineering with CodeWhisperer.

  • Keep your prompt specific and concise
  • Additional context in prompts
  • Utilizing multiple comments
  • Context taken from comments and code
  • Generating unit tests with cross file context
  • Prompts with cross file context

Prerequisites

The following prerequisites are required to experiment locally:

CodeWhisperer User Actions

Reference the following user actions documentation for CodeWhisperer user actions according to your IDE. In this documentation, you will see how to accept a recommendation, cycle through recommendation options, reject a recommendation, and manually trigger CodeWhisperer.

Keep prompts specific & concise

In this section, we will cover keeping your prompt specific and concise. When crafting prompts for CodeWhisperer, conciseness while maintaining objectives in your prompt is important.  Overly complex prompts lead to poor results. A good prompt contains just enough information to convey the request clearly and concisely. For example, if you prompt CodeWhisperer “create a function that eliminates duplicates lines in a text file”. This is an example of a specific and concise prompt. On the other hand, a prompt such as “create a function to look for lines of code that are seen multiple times throughout the file and delete them” may be unclear and overly wordy. In summary, focused, straightforward prompts helps CodeWhisperer understand exactly what you want and provide better outputs.

In this example, we would like to write a function in Python that will open a CSV file and store the contents into a dictionary. We will use the following simple and concise prompt that will guide CodeWhisperer to generate recommendations. Please use the left/right arrow key to cycle through the various recommendations before you hit tab to accept the recommendation.

Example 1:

Sample comment:

#load the csv file content in a dictionary

Sample solution:

#load the csv file content in a dictionary
import csv
def csv_to_dict(csv_file):
    with open(csv_file, 'r') as f:
        reader = csv.DictReader(f)
        return list(reader)

Simple and concise prompts are crucial in prompt engineering because they help CodeWhisperer understand the key information without confusion from extraneous details. Simplicity and brevity enable faster iteration and allow prompts to maximize impact within character limits.

Additional context in prompts

In this section, we will cover how additional context can aid in prompt engineering. While specific and concise prompts are crucial, some additional context can aid CodeWhisperer comprehension. Concrete examples also guide CodeWhisperer if it struggles to infer expectations from just a brief prompt.

In this example, we would like to add additional context to Example 1 where we stored the CSV file content into a dictionary. Now, we have additional requirements to store the csv file content in alphabetical order and return the list keys from the dictionary. Take a look at the sample prompt below. Judicious context helps CodeWhisperer to produce higher-quality, tailored results.

Example 2:

Sample comment:

#load the csv file content in a dictionary in alphabetical order and return the list of keys

Sample solution:

#load the csv file content in a dictionary in alphabetical order and return the list of keys
import csv
def csv_to_dict(file_name):
    def read_csv_file(file_name):
    with open(file_name, 'r') as csv_file:
        csv_reader = csv.DictReader(csv_file)
        csv_dict = {}
        for row in csv_reader:
            csv_dict[row['name']] = row
            return csv_dict

Providing additional context through background details and examples can be beneficial when crafting prompts for CodeWhisperer, as long as the extra information adds useful clarity rather than obscuring the core request. The right balance of brevity and pointed contextual signals can help CodeWhisperer generate more tailored, high-quality results.

Utilizing multiple comments

In this section, we will cover how multiple comments can be a useful technique in prompt engineering. When used strategically, multiple comments allow prompt engineers to offer more context without sacrificing brevity or cluttering the prompt.

Say we would like to open a CSV file and return the list of lines in alphabetical order, remove duplicate lines, and insert a period at the end of each line from the CSV file. Take a look at the sample CodeWhisperer prompt below. Notice how you can break up multiple requirements into separate comments.

Example 3:

Sample comment:

#open a csv file and return a list of lines in alphabetical order
#Remove duplicate lines
#Insert a period at the end of each line

Sample solution:

#open a csv file and return a list of lines in alphabetical order
#Remove duplicate lines
#Insert a period at the end of each line
def open_csv(filename):
    with open(filename) as f:
        lines = f.readlines()
        lines = list(set(lines))
        lines = sorted(lines)
        for i in range(len(lines)):
            lines[i] = lines[i].rstrip() + '.'
    return lines

Multiple comments allow prompt engineers to add extended context and guidance for CodeWhisperer while keeping prompts succinct.

Context taken from comments and code

In this section, we will cover how CodeWhisperer’s context goes beyond just your comment and also looks at the surrounding code, including other functions, imports, and more. This broader context helps guide CodeWhisperer towards implementing the use case you intend with your comment.

We will now see how additional code in our project affects the responses. This time around, we will import the Pandas library to see how it effects our recommendation as compared to the previous section.

Example 4:

Sample Comment:

import pandas as pd
#open a csv file and return a list of lines in alphabetical order
#Insert a period at the end of each line
#Replace duplicate lines with a single line

Sample solution:

import pandas as pd
#open a csv file and return a list of lines in alphabetical order
#Insert a period at the end of each line
#Replace duplicate lines with a single line
def open_csv(filename):
    df = pd.read_csv(filename)
    df = df.sort_values(by='line')
    df = df.drop_duplicates(subset='line')
    df['line'] = df['line'] + '.'
    return df['line'].tolist()

By seeing Pandas imported, CodeWhisperer understands our intent is likely to leverage it in the solution. This allows it to provide a more relevant recommendation using Pandas functions like read_csv(), sort_values(), and drop_duplicates().

Overall, surrounding code context gives CodeWhisperer additional clues for the implementation you have in mind with your high-level instructions.

Prompts with cross file context

In the previous section, we saw how we were able to utilize the surrounding code that CodeWhisperer takes in as context to generate a function for our use case. In this section, we will use that same concept to generate unit tests for the function we’ve built utilizing CodeWhisperers cross file context capability. This section will demonstrate how we can use cross file context with our prompts for use cases like test driven development.

In this example, we will prompt CodeWhisperer to write a comment referencing the open_csv function in order to write unit tests. In this case, there will be a new python file in the project directory for unit testing. We will assume the file we have been working out of is “example4.py”, and the new file is “unittest.py”. We will incorporate the following comments in “unittest.py”.

Example 5:

Sample Comment in unittest.py:

#create unit tests for the open_csv function from example4.py file

Sample solution in unittest.py:

#create unit tests for the open_csv function from example4.py file
class TestOpenCsv(unittest.TestCase):
   def test_open_csv(self):
       self.assertEqual(open_csv('example4.csv'), ['a.', 'b.', 'c.'])
       self.assertEqual(open_csv('example4.csv'), ['a.', 'b.', 'c.', 'd.'])

Notice how CodeWhisperer is using context from one file to generate code recommendation in another file. By specifying the open_csv function within the comment of the “unittest.py”, CodeWhisperer was able to analyze the function, understand its purpose and interface, and generate a set of basic unit tests to validate it. With our prompts, we were able to utilize CodeWhisperers cross file context to help us generate unit tests.

Chain of thought prompting

Chain of thought prompting is a prompt engineering technique that allows large language models (LLMs) to have more natural, contextual outputs by linking multiple prompts together to solve a complex problem. In regard to CodeWhisperer, we can use this technique to break a very complex coding task down into smaller steps, allowing CodeWhisperer to provide more accurate suggestions to the use case.

In this example, we will examine a code snippet generated by CodeWhisperer that contains multiple comments. Our intention is to prompt the user to input a filename, ensure it’s a csv and alphanumeric, then process it with the logging.info method. We will analyze the output using both the chain of thought approach and a single comment.

Example 6:

Chain of thought prompt approach:

Comment 1 – “Take a user’s input using the input() function and store it in a variable called filename”

import logging
# Take a users input using the input() function and store it in a variable called filename
filename = input("Enter the name of the file you want to read: ")

Comment 2 – create a function that will take a filename as an input

import logging
# Take a users input using the input() function and store it in a variable called filename
filename = input("Enter the name of the file you want to read: ")

#create a function that will take a filename as an input
def open_file(filename):

Comment 3 – validate the input using the isalnum() method and ensure the file ends in .csv then process the file using logging.info()

import logging
# Take a users input using the input() function and store it in a variable called filename
filename = input("Enter the name of the file you want to read: ")

#create a function that will take a filename as an input
def open_file(filename):
    #validate the input using the isalnum() method and ensure the file ends in .csv then process the file using logging.info() 
    if filename.isalnum() and filename.endswith('.csv'):
        lines = open_csv(filename)
        logging.info(lines)
        return lines
    else:
        print('Invalid file name')
        return None

Single prompt approach:

import logging
'''
Using the input() function and store it in a variable called filename and create a function 
that will validate the input using the isalnum() method and ensure the file ends in .csv then process 
the file accordingly. 
'''
def validate_file(filename):
    if filename.isalnum() and filename.endswith('.csv'):
        return True
    else:
        return False

When analyzing these side-by-side, we see that with the chain of thought prompt approach, we used multiple comments to allow CodeWhisperer to implement all our requirements including the user input, input validation, .csv verification, and logging as we broke it down into steps for CodeWhisperer to implement. On the other hand, in the case where we had a single comment implementing multiple requirements, it didn’t take all the requirements into account for this slightly more complex problem.

In conclusion, chain of thought prompting allows large language models like CodeWhisperer to produce more accurate code pertaining to the use case by breaking down complex problems into logical steps. Guiding the model through comments and prompts helps it focus on each part of the task sequentially. This results in code that is more accurate to the desired functionality compared to a single broad prompt.

Conclusion

Effective prompt engineering is key to getting the most out of powerful AI coding assistants like Amazon CodeWhisperer. Following prompt best practices, we’ve covered like using clear language, providing context, and iteratively refining prompts can help CodeWhisperer generate high-quality code tailored to your specific needs. Analyzing all the code options CodeWhisperer provides you flexibility to select the optimal approach.

About the authors:

Brendan Jenkins

Brendan Jenkins is a Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services (AWS) working with Enterprise AWS customers providing them with technical guidance and helping achieve their business goals. He has an area of specialization in DevOps and Machine Learning technology.

Riya Dani

Riya Dani is a Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services (AWS), responsible for helping Enterprise customers on their journey in the cloud. She has a passion for learning and holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree from Virginia Tech in Computer Science with focus in Deep Learning. In her free time, she enjoys staying active and reading.

Best Practices to help secure your container image build pipeline by using AWS Signer

Post Syndicated from Jorge Castillo original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/best-practices-to-help-secure-your-container-image-build-pipeline-by-using-aws-signer/

AWS Signer is a fully managed code-signing service to help ensure the trust and integrity of your code. It helps you verify that the code comes from a trusted source and that an unauthorized party has not accessed it. AWS Signer manages code signing certificates and public and private keys, which can reduce the overhead of your public key infrastructure (PKI) management. It also provides a set of features to simplify lifecycle management of your keys and certificates so that you can focus on signing and verifying your code.

In June 2023, AWS announced Container Image Signing with AWS Signer and Amazon EKS, a new capability that gives you native AWS support for signing and verifying container images stored in Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR).

Containers and AWS Lambda functions are popular serverless compute solutions for applications built on the cloud. By using AWS Signer, you can verify that the software running in these workloads originates from a trusted source.

In this blog post, you will learn about the benefits of code signing for software security, governance, and compliance needs. Flexible continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) integration, management of signing identities, and native integration with other AWS services can help you simplify code security through automation.

Background

Code signing is an important part of the software supply chain. It helps ensure that the code is unaltered and comes from an approved source.

To automate software development workflows, organizations often implement a CI/CD pipeline to push, test, and deploy code effectively. You can integrate code signing into the workflow to help prevent untrusted code from being deployed, as shown in Figure 1. Code signing in the pipeline can provide you with different types of information, depending on how you decide to use the functionality. For example, you can integrate code signing into the build stage to attest that the code was scanned for vulnerabilities, had its software bill of materials (SBOM) approved internally, and underwent unit and integration testing. You can also use code signing to verify who has pushed or published the code, such as a developer, team, or organization. You can verify each of these steps separately by including multiple signing stages in the pipeline. For more information on the value provided by container image signing, see Cryptographic Signing for Containers.

Figure 1: Security IN the pipeline

Figure 1: Security IN the pipeline

In the following section, we will walk you through a simple implementation of image signing and its verification for Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS) deployment. The signature attests that the container image went through the pipeline and came from a trusted source. You can use this process in more complex scenarios by adding multiple AWS CodeBuild code signing stages that make use of various AWS Signer signing profiles.

Services and tools

In this section, we discuss the various AWS services and third-party tools that you need for this solution.

CI/CD services

For the CI/CD pipeline, you will use the following AWS services:

  • AWS CodePipeline — a fully managed continuous delivery service that you can use to automate your release pipelines for fast and reliable application and infrastructure updates.
  • AWS CodeCommit — a fully managed source control service that hosts secure Git-based repositories.
  • AWS Signer — a fully managed code-signing service that you can use to help ensure the trust and integrity of your code.
  • AWS CodeBuild — A fully managed continuous integration service that compiles source code, runs tests, and produces software packages that are ready to deploy.

Container services

You will use the following AWS services for containers for this walkthrough:

  • Amazon EKS — a managed Kubernetes service to run Kubernetes in the AWS Cloud and on-premises data centers.
  • Amazon ECR — a fully managed container registry for high-performance hosting, so that you can reliably deploy application images and artifacts anywhere.

Verification tools

The following are publicly available sign verification tools that we integrated into the pipeline for this post, but you could integrate other tools that meet your specific requirements.

  • Notation — A publicly available Notary project within the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF). With contributions from AWS and others, Notary is an open standard and client implementation that allows for vendor-specific plugins for key management and other integrations. AWS Signer manages signing keys, key rotation, and PKI management for you, and is integrated with Notation through a curated plugin that provides a simple client-based workflow.
  • Kyverno — A publicly available policy engine that is designed for Kubernetes.

Solution overview

Figure 2: Solution architecture

Figure 2: Solution architecture

Here’s how the solution works, as shown in Figure 2:

  1. Developers push Dockerfiles and application code to CodeCommit. Each push to CodeCommit starts a pipeline hosted on CodePipeline.
  2. CodeBuild packages the build, containerizes the application, and stores the image in the ECR registry.
  3. CodeBuild retrieves a specific version of the image that was previously pushed to Amazon ECR. AWS Signer and Notation sign the image by using the signing profile established previously, as shown in more detail in Figure 3.
    Figure 3: Signing images described

    Figure 3: Signing images described

  4. AWS Signer and Notation verify the signed image version and then deploy it to an Amazon EKS cluster.

    If the image has not previously been signed correctly, the CodeBuild log displays an output similar to the following:

    Error: signature verification failed: no signature is associated with "<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>.dkr.ecr.<AWS_REGION>.amazonaws.com/hello-server@<DIGEST>" , make sure the artifact was signed successfully

    If there is a signature mismatch, the CodeBuild log displays an output similar to the following:

    Error: signature verification failed for all the signatures associated with <AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>.dkr.ecr.<AWS_REGION>.amazonaws.com/hello-server@<DIGEST>

  5. Kyverno verifies the container image signature for use in the Amazon EKS cluster.

    Figure 4 shows steps 4 and 5 in more detail.

    Figure 4: Verification of image signature for Kubernetes

    Figure 4: Verification of image signature for Kubernetes

Prerequisites

Before getting started, make sure that you have the following prerequisites in place:

  • An Amazon EKS cluster provisioned.
  • An Amazon ECR repository for your container images.
  • A CodeCommit repository with your application code. For more information, see Create an AWS CodeCommit repository.
  • A CodePipeline pipeline deployed with the CodeCommit repository as the code source and four CodeBuild stages: Build, ApplicationSigning, ApplicationDeployment, and VerifyContainerSign. The CI/CD pipeline should look like that in Figure 5.
    Figure 5: CI/CD pipeline with CodePipeline

    Figure 5: CI/CD pipeline with CodePipeline

Walkthrough

You can create a signing profile by using the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI), AWS Management Console or the AWS Signer API. In this section, we’ll walk you through how to sign the image by using the AWS CLI.

To sign the image (AWS CLI)

  1. Create a signing profile for each identity.
    # Create an AWS Signer signing profile with default validity period
    $ aws signer put-signing-profile \
        --profile-name build_signer \
        --platform-id Notation-OCI-SHA384-ECDSA

  2. Sign the image from the CodeBuild build—your buildspec.yaml configuration file should look like the following:
    version: 0.2
    
    phases:
      pre_build:
        commands:
          - aws ecr get-login-password --region $AWS_REGION | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin $AWS_ACCOUNT_ID.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
          - REPOSITORY_URI=$AWS_ACCOUNT_ID.dkr.ecr. $AWS_REGION.amazonaws.com/hello-server
          - COMMIT_HASH=$(echo $CODEBUILD_RESOLVED_SOURCE_VERSION | cut -c 1-7)
          - IMAGE_TAG=${COMMIT_HASH:=latest}
          - DIGEST=$(docker manifest inspect $AWS_ACCOUNT_ID.dkr.ecr. $AWS_REGION.amazonaws.com/hello-server:$IMAGE_TAG -v | jq -r '.Descriptor.digest')
          - echo $DIGEST
          
          - wget https://d2hvyiie56hcat.cloudfront.net/linux/amd64/installer/rpm/latest/aws-signer-notation-cli_amd64.rpm
          - sudo rpm -U aws-signer-notation-cli_amd64.rpm
          - notation version
          - notation plugin ls
      build:
        commands:
          - notation sign $REPOSITORY_URI@$DIGEST --plugin com.amazonaws.signer.notation.plugin --id arn:aws:signer: $AWS_REGION:$AWS_ACCOUNT_ID:/signing-profiles/notation_container_signing
          - notation inspect $AWS_ACCOUNT_ID.dkr.ecr. $AWS_REGION.amazonaws.com/hello-server@$DIGEST
          - notation verify $AWS_ACCOUNT_ID.dkr.ecr. $AWS_REGION.amazonaws.com/hello-server@$DIGEST
      post_build:
        commands:
          - printf '[{"name":"hello-server","imageUri":"%s"}]' $REPOSITORY_URI:$IMAGE_TAG > imagedefinitions.json
    artifacts:
        files: imagedefinitions.json

    The commands in the buildspec.yaml configuration file do the following:

    1. Sign you in to Amazon ECR to work with the Docker images.
    2. Reference the specific image that will be signed by using the commit hash (or another versioning strategy that your organization uses). This gets the digest.
    3. Sign the container image by using the notation sign command. This command uses the container image digest, instead of the image tag.
    4. Install the Notation CLI. In this example, you use the installer for Linux. For a list of installers for various operating systems, see the AWS Signer Developer Guide,
    5. Sign the image by using the notation sign command.
    6. Inspect the signed image to make sure that it was signed successfully by using the notation inspect command.
    7. To verify the signed image, use the notation verify command. The output should look similar to the following:
      Successfully verified signature for <AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>.dkr.ecr.<AWS_REGION>.amazonaws.com/hello-server@<DIGEST>

  3. (Optional) For troubleshooting, print the notation policy from the pipeline itself to check that it’s working as expected by running the notation policy show command:
    notation policy show

    For this, include the command in the pre_build phase after the notation version command in the buildspec.yaml configuration file.

    After the notation policy show command runs, CodeBuild logs should display an output similar to the following:

    {
      "version": "1.0",
      "trustPolicies": [
        {
          "name": "aws-signer-tp",
          "registryScopes": [
          "<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>.dkr.ecr.<AWS_REGION>.amazonaws.com/hello-server"
          ],
          "signatureVerification": {
            "level": "strict"
          },
          "trustStores": [
            "signingAuthority:aws-signer-ts"
          ],
          "trustedIdentities": [
            "arn:aws:signer:<AWS_REGION>:<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>:/signing-profiles/notation_test"
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

  4. To verify the image in Kubernetes, set up both Kyverno and the Kyverno-notation-AWS Signer in your EKS cluster. To get started with Kyverno and the Kyverno-notation-AWS Signer solution, see the installation instructions.
  5. After you install Kyverno and Kyverno-notation-AWS Signer, verify that the controller is running—the STATUS should show Running:
    $ kubectl get pods -n kyverno-notation-aws -w
    
    NAME                                    READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
    kyverno-notation-aws-75b7ddbcfc-kxwjh   1/1     Running   0          6h58m

  6. Configure the CodeBuild buildspec.yaml configuration file to verify that the images deployed in the cluster have been previously signed. You can use the following code to configure the buildspec.yaml file.
    version: 0.2
    
    phases:
      pre_build:
        commands:
          - echo Logging in to Amazon ECR...
          - aws --version
          - REPOSITORY_URI=${REPO_ECR}
          - COMMIT_HASH=$(echo $CODEBUILD_RESOLVED_SOURCE_VERSION | cut -c 1-7)
          - IMAGE_TAG=${COMMIT_HASH:=latest}
          - curl -LO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/$(curl -L -s https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl"
          - curl -LO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/$(curl -L -s https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha256"
          - echo "$(cat kubectl.sha256)  kubectl" | sha256sum --check
          — chmod +x kubectl
          - mv ./kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
          - kubectl version --client
      build:
        commands:
          - echo Build started on `date`
          - aws eks update-kubeconfig -—name ${EKS_NAME} —-region ${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION}
          - echo Deploying Application
          - sed -i '/image:\ image/image:\ '\"${REPOSITORY_URI}:${IMAGE_TAG}\"'/g' deployment.yaml
          - kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml 
          - KYVERNO_NOTATION_POD=$(kubectl get pods --no-headers -o custom-columns=":metadata.name" -n kyverno-notation-aws)
          - STATUS=$(kubectl logs --tail=1 kyverno-notation-aws-75b7ddbcfc-kxwjh -n kyverno-notation-aws | grep $IMAGE_TAG | grep ERROR)
          - |
            if [[ $STATUS ]]; then
              echo "There is an error"
              exit 1
            else
              echo "No Error"
            fi
      post_build:
        commands:
          - printf '[{"name":"hello-server","imageUri":"%s"}]' $REPOSITORY_URI:$IMAGE_TAG > imagedefinitions.json
    artifacts:
        files: imagedefinitions.json

    The commands in the buildspec.yaml configuration file do the following:

    1. Set up the environment variables, such as the ECR repository URI and the Commit hash, to build the image tag. The kubectl tool will use this later to reference the container image that will be deployed with the Kubernetes objects.
    2. Use kubectl to connect to the EKS cluster and insert the container image reference in the deployment.yaml file.
    3. After the container is deployed, you can observe the kyverno-notation-aws controller and access its logs. You can check if the deployed image is signed. If the logs contain an error, stop the pipeline run with an error code, do a rollback to a previous version, or delete the deployment if you detect that the image isn’t signed.

Decommission the AWS resources

If you no longer need the resources that you provisioned for this post, complete the following steps to delete them.

To clean up the resources

  1. Delete the EKS cluster and delete the ECR image.
  2. Delete the IAM roles and policies that you used for the configuration of IAM roles for service accounts.
  3. Revoke the AWS Signer signing profile that you created and used for the signing process by running the following command in the AWS CLI:
    $ aws signer revoke-signing-profile

  4. Delete signatures from the Amazon ECR repository. Make sure to replace <AWS_ACCOUNT_ID> and <AWS_REGION> with your own information.
    # Use oras CLI, with Amazon ECR Docker Credential Helper, to delete signature
    $ oras manifest delete <AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>.dkr.ecr.<AWS_REGION>.amazonaws.com/pause@sha256:ca78e5f730f9a789ef8c63bb55275ac12dfb9e8099e6a0a64375d8a95ed501c4

Note: Using the ORAS project’s oras client, you can delete signatures and other reference type artifacts. It implements deletion by first removing the reference from an index, and then deleting the manifest.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to implement container image signing in a CI/CD pipeline by using AWS services such as CodePipeline, CodeBuild, Amazon ECR, and AWS Signer along with publicly available tools such as Notary and Kyverno. By implementing mandatory image signing in your pipelines, you can confirm that only validated and authorized container images are deployed to production. Automating the signing process and signature verification is vital to help securely deploy containers at scale. You also learned how to verify signed images both during deployment and at runtime in Kubernetes. This post provides valuable insights for anyone looking to add image signing capabilities to their CI/CD pipelines on AWS to provide supply chain security assurances. The combination of AWS managed services and publicly available tools provides a robust implementation.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Jorge Castillo

Jorge Castillo

Jorge is a Solutions Architect at AWS for the public sector based in Santiago, Chile. He focuses on security and compliance and works with many government agencies.

Joseph Rodríguez

Joseph Rodríguez

Joseph is a Solutions Architect at AWS for the public sector based in Chile. Joseph has collaborated with multiple public sector institutions on cloud technology adoption, with a focus on containers. He previously worked as a Software Architect at financial services institutions.

Monika Vu Minh

Monika Vu Minh

Monika is a ProServe Security Consultant at AWS based in London. She works with financial services customers to help them follow security best practices on AWS. In her free time, she likes painting, cooking, and travelling.

Accelerate analytics on Amazon OpenSearch Service with AWS Glue through its native connector

Post Syndicated from Basheer Sheriff original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/accelerate-analytics-on-amazon-opensearch-service-with-aws-glue-through-its-native-connector/

As the volume and complexity of analytics workloads continue to grow, customers are looking for more efficient and cost-effective ways to ingest and analyse data. Data is stored from online systems such as the databases, CRMs, and marketing systems to data stores such as data lakes on Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), data warehouses in Amazon Redshift, and purpose-built stores such as Amazon OpenSearch Service, Amazon Neptune, and Amazon Timestream.

OpenSearch Service is used for multiple purposes, such as observability, search analytics, consolidation, cost savings, compliance, and integration. OpenSearch Service also has vector database capabilities that let you implement semantic search and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) with large language models (LLMs) to build recommendation and media search engines. Previously, to integrate with OpenSearch Service, you could use open source clients for specific programming languages such as Java, Python, or JavaScript or use REST APIs provided by OpenSearch Service.

Movement of data across data lakes, data warehouses, and purpose-built stores is achieved by extract, transform, and load (ETL) processes using data integration services such as AWS Glue. AWS Glue is a serverless data integration service that makes it straightforward to discover, prepare, and combine data for analytics, machine learning (ML), and application development. AWS Glue provides both visual and code-based interfaces to make data integration effortless. Using a native AWS Glue connector increases agility, simplifies data movement, and improves data quality.

In this post, we explore the AWS Glue native connector to OpenSearch Service and discover how it eliminates the need to build and maintain custom code or third-party tools to integrate with OpenSearch Service. This accelerates analytics pipelines and search use cases, providing instant access to your data in OpenSearch Service. You can now use data stored in OpenSearch Service indexes as a source or target within the AWS Glue Studio no-code, drag-and-drop visual interface or directly in an AWS Glue ETL job script. When combined with AWS Glue ETL capabilities, this new connector simplifies the creation of ETL pipelines, enabling ETL developers to save time building and maintaining data pipelines.

Solution overview

The new native OpenSearch Service connector is a powerful tool that can help organizations unlock the full potential of their data. It enables you to efficiently read and write data from OpenSearch Service without needing to install or manage OpenSearch Service connector libraries.

In this post, we demonstrate exporting the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) Trip Record Data dataset into OpenSearch Service using the AWS Glue native connector. The following diagram illustrates the solution architecture.

By the end of this post, your visual ETL job will resemble the following screenshot.

Prerequisites

To follow along with this post, you need a running OpenSearch Service domain. For setup instructions, refer to Getting started with Amazon OpenSearch Service. Ensure it is public, for simplicity, and note the primary user and password for later use.

Note that as of this writing, the AWS Glue OpenSearch Service connector doesn’t support Amazon OpenSearch Serverless, so you need to set up a provisioned domain.

Create an S3 bucket

We use an AWS CloudFormation template to create an S3 bucket to store the sample data. Complete the following steps:

  1. Choose Launch Stack.
  2. On the Specify stack details page, enter a name for the stack.
  3. Choose Next.
  4. On the Configure stack options page, choose Next.
  5. On the Review page, select I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources.
  6. Choose Submit.

The stack takes about 2 minutes to deploy.

Create an index in the OpenSearch Service domain

To create an index in the OpenSearch service domain, complete the following steps:

  1. On the OpenSearch Service console, choose Domains in the navigation pane.
  2. Open the domain you created as a prerequisite.
  3. Choose the link under OpenSearch Dashboards URL.
  4. On the navigation menu, choose Dev Tools.
  5. Enter the following code to create the index:
PUT /yellow-taxi-index
{
  "mappings": {
    "properties": {
      "VendorID": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "tpep_pickup_datetime": {
        "type": "date",
        "format": "epoch_millis"
      },
      "tpep_dropoff_datetime": {
        "type": "date",
        "format": "epoch_millis"
      },
      "passenger_count": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "trip_distance": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "RatecodeID": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "store_and_fwd_flag": {
        "type": "keyword"
      },
      "PULocationID": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "DOLocationID": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "payment_type": {
        "type": "integer"
      },
      "fare_amount": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "extra": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "mta_tax": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "tip_amount": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "tolls_amount": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "improvement_surcharge": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "total_amount": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "congestion_surcharge": {
        "type": "float"
      },
      "airport_fee": {
        "type": "integer"
      }
    }
  }
}

Create a secret for OpenSearch Service credentials

In this post, we use basic authentication and store our authentication credentials securely using AWS Secrets Manager. Complete the following steps to create a Secrets Manager secret:

  1. On the Secrets Manager console, choose Secrets in the navigation pane.
  2. Choose Store a new secret.
  3. For Secret type, select Other type of secret.
  4. For Key/value pairs, enter the user name opensearch.net.http.auth.user and the password opensearch.net.http.auth.pass.
  5. Choose Next.
  6. Complete the remaining steps to create your secret.

Create an IAM role for the AWS Glue job

Complete the following steps to configure an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role for the AWS Glue job:

  1. On the IAM console, create a new role.
  2. Attach the AWS managed policy GlueServiceRole.
  3. Attach the following policy to the role. Replace each ARN with the corresponding ARN of the OpenSearch Service domain, Secrets Manager secret, and S3 bucket.
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "OpenSearchPolicy",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "es:ESHttpPost",
                "es:ESHttpPut"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:es:<region>:<aws-account-id>:domain/<amazon-opensearch-domain-name>"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Sid": "GetDescribeSecret",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy",
                "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                "secretsmanager:ListSecretVersionIds"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<aws-account-id>:secret:<secret-name>"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "S3Policy",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:GetBucketLocation",
                "s3:ListBucket",
                "s3:GetBucketAcl",
                "s3:GetObject",
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:DeleteObject"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:s3:::<bucket-name>",
                "arn:aws:s3:::<bucket-name>/*"
            ]
        }
    ]
}

Create an AWS Glue connection

Before you can use the OpenSearch Service connector, you need to create an AWS Glue connection for connecting to OpenSearch Service. Complete the following steps:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, choose Connections in the navigation pane.
  2. Choose Create connection.
  3. For Name, enter opensearch-connection.
  4. For Connection type, choose Amazon OpenSearch.
  5. For Domain endpoint, enter the domain endpoint of OpenSearch Service.
  6. For Port, enter HTTPS port 443.
  7. For Resource, enter yellow-taxi-index.

In this context, resource means the index of OpenSearch Service where the data is read from or written to.

  1. Select Wan only enabled.
  2. For AWS Secret, choose the secret you created earlier.
  3. Optionally, if you’re connecting to an OpenSearch Service domain in a VPC, specify a VPC, subnet, and security group to run AWS Glue jobs inside the VPC. For security groups, a self-referencing inbound rule is required. For more information, see Setting up networking for development for AWS Glue.
  4. Choose Create connection.

Create an ETL job using AWS Glue Studio

Complete the following steps to create your AWS Glue ETL job:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, choose Visual ETL in the navigation pane.
  2. Choose Create job and Visual ETL.
  3. On the AWS Glue Studio console, change the job name to opensearch-etl.
  4. Choose Amazon S3 for the data source and Amazon OpenSearch for the data target.

Between the source and target, you can optionally insert transform nodes. In this solution, we create a job that has only source and target nodes for simplicity.

  1. In the Data source properties section, specify the S3 bucket where the sample data is located, and choose Parquet as the data format.
  2. In the Data sink properties section, specify the connection you created in the previous section (opensearch-connection).
  3. Choose the Job details tab, and in the Basic properties section, specify the IAM role you created earlier.
  4. Choose Save to save your job, and choose Run to run the job.
  5. Navigate to the Runs tab to check the status of the job. When it is successful, the run status should be Succeeded.
  6. After the job runs successfully, navigate to OpenSearch Dashboards, and log in to the dashboard.
  7. Choose Dashboards Management on the navigation menu.
  8. Choose Index patterns, and choose Create index pattern.
  9. Enter yellow-taxi-index for Index pattern name.
  10. Choose tpep_pickup_datetime for Time.
  11. Choose Create index pattern. This index pattern will be used to visualize the index.
  12. Choose Discover on the navigation menu, and choose yellow-taxi-index.


You have now created an index in OpenSearch Service and loaded data into it from Amazon S3 in just a few steps using the AWS Glue OpenSearch Service native connector.

Clean up

To avoid incurring charges, clean up the resources in your AWS account by completing the following steps:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, choose ETL jobs in the navigation pane.
  2. From the list of jobs, select the job opensearch-etl, and on the Actions menu, choose Delete.
  3. On the AWS Glue console, choose Data connections in the navigation pane.
  4. Select opensearch-connection from the list of connectors, and on the Actions menu, choose Delete.
  5. On the IAM console, choose Roles in the navigation page.
  6. Select the role you created for the AWS Glue job and delete it.
  7. On the CloudFormation console, choose Stacks in the navigation pane.
  8. Select the stack you created for the S3 bucket and sample data and delete it.
  9. On the Secrets Manager console, choose Secrets in the navigation pane.
  10. Select the secret you created, and on the Actions menu, choose Delete.
  11. Reduce the waiting period to 7 days and schedule the deletion.

Conclusion

The integration of AWS Glue with OpenSearch Service adds the powerful ability to perform data transformation when integrating with OpenSearch Service for analytics use cases. This enables organizations to streamline data integration and analytics with OpenSearch Service. The serverless nature of AWS Glue means no infrastructure management, and you pay only for the resources consumed while your jobs are running. As organizations increasingly rely on data for decision-making, this native Spark connector provides an efficient, cost-effective, and agile solution to swiftly meet data analytics needs.


About the authors

Basheer Sheriff is a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS. He loves to help customers solve interesting problems leveraging new technology. He is based in Melbourne, Australia, and likes to play sports such as football and cricket.

Shunsuke Goto is a Prototyping Engineer working at AWS. He works closely with customers to build their prototypes and also helps customers build analytics systems.

How to implement client certificate revocation list checks at scale with API Gateway

Post Syndicated from Arthur Mnev original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-implement-client-certificate-revocation-list-checks-at-scale-with-api-gateway/

ityAs you design your Amazon API Gateway applications to rely on mutual certificate authentication (mTLS), you need to consider how your application will verify the revocation status of a client certificate. In your design, you should account for the performance and availability of your verification mechanism to make sure that your application endpoints perform reliably.

In this blog post, I demonstrate an architecture that will help you on your journey to implement custom revocation checks against your certificate revocation list (CRL) for API Gateway. You will also learn advanced Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) and AWS Lambda techniques to achieve higher performance and scalability.

Choosing the right certificate verification method

One of your first considerations is whether to use a CRL or the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), if your certificate authority (CA) offers this option. For an in-depth analysis of these two options, see my earlier blog post, Choosing the right certificate revocation method in ACM Private CA. In that post, I demonstrated that OCSP is a good choice when your application can tolerate high latency or a failure for certificate verification due to TLS service-to-OCSP connectivity. When you rely on mutual TLS authentication in a high-rate transactional environment, increased latency or OCSP reachability failures may affect your application. We strongly recommend that you validate the revocation status of your mutual TLS certificates. Verifying your client certificate status against the CRL is the correct approach for certificate verification if you require reliability and lower, predictable latency. A potential exception to this approach is the use case of AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (AWS Private CA) with an OCSP responder hosted on AWS CloudFront.

With an AWS Private CA OCSP responder hosted on CloudFront, you can reduce the risks of network and latency challenges by relying on communication between AWS native services. While this post focuses on the solution that targets CRLs originating from any CA, if you use AWS Private CA with an OCSP responder, you should consider generating an OCSP request in your Lambda authorizer.

Mutual authentication with API Gateway

API Gateway mutual TLS authentication (mTLS) requires you to define a root of trust that will contain your certificate authority public key. During the mutual TLS authentication process, API Gateway performs the undifferentiated heavy lifting by offloading the certificate authentication and negotiation process. During the authentication process, API Gateway validates that your certificate is trusted, has valid dates, and uses a supported algorithm. Additionally, you can refer to the API Gateway documentation and related blog post for details about the mutual TLS authentication process on API Gateway.

Implementing mTLS certificate verification for API Gateway

In the remainder of this blog post, I’ll describe the architecture for a scalable implementation of a client certificate verification mechanism against a CRL on your API Gateway.

The certificate CRL verification process presented here relies on a custom Lambda authorizer that validates the certificate revocation status against the CRL. The Lambda authorizer caches CRL data to optimize the query time for subsequent requests and allows you to define custom business logic that could go beyond CRL verification. For example, you could include other, just-in-time authorization decisions as a part of your evaluation logic.

Implementation mechanisms

This section describes the implementation mechanisms that help you create a high-performing extension to the API Gateway mutual TLS authentication process.

Data repository for your certificate revocation list

API Gateway mutual TLS configuration uses Amazon S3 as a repository for your root of trust. The design for this sample implementation extends the use of S3 buckets to store your CRL and the public key for the certificate authority that signed the CRL.

We strongly recommend that you maintain an updated CRL and verify its signature before data processing. This process is automatic if you use AWS Private CA, because AWS Private CA will update your CRL automatically on revocation. AWS Private CA also allows you to retrieve the CA’s public key by using an API call.

Certificate validation

My sample implementation architecture uses the API Gateway Lambda authorizer to validate the serial number of the client certificate used in the mutual TLS authentication session against the list of serial numbers present in the CRL you publish to the S3 bucket. In the process, the API Gateway custom authorizer will read the client certificate serial number, read and validate the CRL’s digital signature, search for the client’s certificate serial number within the CRL, and return the authorization policy based on the findings.

Optimizing for performance

The mechanisms that enable a predictable, low-latency performance are CRL preprocessing and caching. Your CRL is an ASN.1 data structure that requires a relatively high computing time for processing. Preprocessing your CRL into a simple-to-parse data structure reduces the computational cost you would otherwise incur for every validation; caching the CRL will help you reduce the validation latency and improve predictability further.

Performance optimizations

The process of parsing and validating CRLs is computationally expensive. In the case of large CRL files, parsing the CRL in the Lambda authorizer on every request can result in high latency and timeouts. To improve latency and reduce compute costs, this solution optimizes for performance by preprocessing the CRL and implementing function-level caching.

Preprocessing and generation of a cached CRL file

The first optimization happens when S3 receives a new CRL object. As shown in Figure 1, the S3 PutObject event invokes a preprocessing Lambda that validates the signature of your uploaded CRL and decodes its ASN.1 format. The output of the preprocessing Lambda function is the list of the revoked certificate serial numbers from the CRL, in a data structure that is simpler to read by your programming language of choice, and that won’t require extensive parsing by your Lambda authorizer. The asynchronous approach mitigates the impact of CRL processing on your API Gateway workload.

Figure 1: Sample implementation flow of the pre-processing component

Figure 1: Sample implementation flow of the pre-processing component

Client certificate lookup in a CRL

The optimization happens as part of your Lambda authorizer that retrieves the preprocessed CRL data generated from the first step and searches through the data structure for your client certificate serial number. If the Lambda authorizer finds your client’s certificate serial number in the CRL, the authorization request fails, and the Lambda authorizer generates a “Deny” policy. Searching through a read-optimized data structure prepared by your preprocessing step is the second optimization that reduces the lookup time and the compute requirements.

Function-level caching

Because of the preprocessing, the Lambda authorizer code no longer needs to perform the expensive operation of decoding the ASN.1 data structures of the original CRL; however, network transfer latency will remain and may impact your application.

To improve performance, and as a third optimization, the Lambda service retains the runtime environment for a recently-run function for a non-deterministic period of time. If the function is invoked again during this time period, the Lambda function doesn’t have to initialize and can start running immediately. This is called a warm start. Function-level caching takes advantage of this warm start to hold the CRL data structure in memory persistently between function invocations so the Lambda function doesn’t have to download the preprocessed CRL data structure from S3 on every request.

The duration of the Lambda container’s warm state depends on multiple factors, such as usage patterns and parallel requests processed by your function. If, in your case, API use is infrequent or its usage pattern is spiky, pre-provisioned concurrency is another technique that can further reduce your Lambda startup times and the duration of your warm cache. Although provisioned concurrency does have additional costs, I recommend you evaluate its benefits for your specific environment. You can also check out the blog dedicated to this topic, Scheduling AWS Lambda Provisioned Concurrency for recurring peak usage.

To validate that the Lambda authorizer has the latest copy of the CRL data structure, the S3 ETag value is used to determine if the object has changed. The preprocessed CRL object’s ETag value is stored as a Lambda global variable, so its value is retained between invocations in the same runtime environment. When API Gateway invokes the Lambda authorizer, the function checks for existing global preprocessed CRL data structure and ETag variables. The process will only retrieve a read-optimized CRL when the ETag is absent, or its value differs from the ETag of the preprocessed CRL object in S3.

Figure 2 demonstrates this process flow.

Figure 2: Sample implementation flow for the Lambda authorizer component

Figure 2: Sample implementation flow for the Lambda authorizer component

In summary, you will have a Lambda container with a persistent in-memory lookup data structure for your CRL by doing the following:

  • Asynchronously start your preprocessing workflow by using the S3 PutObject event so you can generate and store your preprocessed CRL data structure in a separate S3 object.
  • Read the preprocessed CRL from S3 and its ETag value and store both values in global variables.
  • Compare the value of the ETag stored in your global variables to the current ETag value of the preprocessed CRL S3 object, to reduce unnecessary downloads if the current ETag value of your S3 object is the same as the previous value.
  • We recommend that you avoid using built-in API Gateway Lambda authorizer result caching, because the status of your certificate might change, and your authorization decision would rest on out-of-date verification results.
  • Consider setting a reserved concurrency for your CRL verification function so that API Gateway can invoke your function even if the overall capacity for your account in your AWS Region is exhausted.

The sample implementation flow diagram in Figure 3 demonstrates the overall architecture of the solution.

Figure 3: Sample implementation flow for the overall CRL verification architecture

Figure 3: Sample implementation flow for the overall CRL verification architecture

The workflow for the solution overall is as follows:

  1. An administrator publishes a CRL and its signing CA’s certificate to their non-public S3 bucket, which is accessible by the Lambda authorizer and preprocessor roles.
  2. An S3 event invokes the Lambda preprocessor to run upon CRL upload. The function retrieves the CRL from S3, validates its signature against the issuing certificate, and parses the CRL.
  3. The preprocessor Lambda stores the results in an S3 bucket with a name in the form <crlname>.cache.json.
  4. A TLS client requests an mTLS connection and supplies its certificate.
  5. API Gateway completes mTLS negotiation and invokes the Lambda authorizer.
  6. The Lambda authorizer function parses the client’s mTLS certificate, retrieves the cached CRL object, and searches the object for the serial number of the client’s certificate.
  7. The authorizer function returns a deny policy if the certificate is revoked or in error.
  8. API Gateway, if authorized, proceeds with the integrated function or denies the client’s request.

Conclusion

In this post, I presented a design for validating your API Gateway mutual TLS client certificates against a CRL, with support for extra-large certificate revocation files. This approach will help you align with the best security practices for validating client certificates and use advanced S3 access and Lambda caching techniques to minimize time and latency for validation.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, and Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Arthur Mnev

Arthur is a Senior Specialist Security Architect for AWS Industries. He spends his day working with customers and designing innovative approaches to help customers move forward with their initiatives, improve their security posture, and reduce security risks in their cloud journeys. Outside of work, Arthur enjoys being a father, skiing, scuba diving, and Krav Maga.

Rafael Cassolato de Meneses

Rafael Cassolato de Meneses

Rafael Cassolato is a Solutions Architect with 20+ years in IT, holding bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Computer Science and 10 AWS certifications. Specializing in migration and modernization, Rafael helps strategic AWS customers achieve their business goals and solve technical challenges by leveraging AWS’s cloud platform.

Build efficient ETL pipelines with AWS Step Functions distributed map and redrive feature

Post Syndicated from Sriharsh Adari original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/build-efficient-etl-pipelines-with-aws-step-functions-distributed-map-and-redrive-feature/

AWS Step Functions is a fully managed visual workflow service that enables you to build complex data processing pipelines involving a diverse set of extract, transform, and load (ETL) technologies such as AWS Glue, Amazon EMR, and Amazon Redshift. You can visually build the workflow by wiring individual data pipeline tasks and configuring payloads, retries, and error handling with minimal code.

While Step Functions supports automatic retries and error handling when data pipeline tasks fail due to momentary or transient errors, there can be permanent failures such as incorrect permissions, invalid data, and business logic failure during the pipeline run. This requires you to identify the issue in the step, fix the issue and restart the workflow. Previously, to rerun the failed step, you needed to restart the entire workflow from the very beginning. This leads to delays in completing the workflow, especially if it’s a complex, long-running ETL pipeline. If the pipeline has many steps using map and parallel states, this also leads to increased cost due to increases in the state transition for running the pipeline from the beginning.

Step Functions now supports the ability for you to redrive your workflow from a failed, aborted, or timed-out state so you can complete workflows faster and at a lower cost, and spend more time delivering business value. Now you can recover from unhandled failures faster by redriving failed workflow runs, after downstream issues are resolved, using the same input provided to the failed state.

In this post, we show you an ETL pipeline job that exports data from Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) tables using the Step Functions distributed map state. Then we simulate a failure and demonstrate how to use the new redrive feature to restart the failed task from the point of failure.

Solution overview

One of the common functionalities involved in data pipelines is extracting data from multiple data sources and exporting it to a data lake or synchronizing the data to another database. You can use the Step Functions distributed map state to run hundreds of such export or synchronization jobs in parallel. Distributed map can read millions of objects from Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) or millions of records from a single S3 object, and distribute the records to downstream steps. Step Functions runs the steps within the distributed map as child workflows at a maximum parallelism of 10,000. A concurrency of 10,000 is well above the concurrency supported by many other AWS services such as AWS Glue, which has a soft limit of 1,000 job runs per job.

The sample data pipeline sources product catalog data from Amazon DynamoDB and customer order data from Amazon RDS for PostgreSQL database. The data is then cleansed, transformed, and uploaded to Amazon S3 for further processing. The data pipeline starts with an AWS Glue crawler to create the Data Catalog for the RDS database. Because starting an AWS Glue crawler is asynchronous, the pipeline has a wait loop to check if the crawler is complete. After the AWS Glue crawler is complete, the pipeline extracts data from the DynamoDB table and RDS tables. Because these two steps are independent, they are run as parallel steps: one using an AWS Lambda function to export, transform, and load the data from DynamoDB to an S3 bucket, and the other using a distributed map with AWS Glue job sync integration to do the same from the RDS tables to an S3 bucket. Note that AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions are required for invoking an AWS Glue job from Step Functions. For more information, refer to IAM Policies for invoking AWS Glue job from Step Functions.

The following diagram illustrates the Step Functions workflow.

There are multiple tables related to customers and order data in the RDS database. Amazon S3 hosts the metadata of all the tables as a .csv file. The pipeline uses the Step Functions distributed map to read the table metadata from Amazon S3, iterate on every single item, and call the downstream AWS Glue job in parallel to export the data. See the following code:

"States": {
            "Map": {
              "Type": "Map",
              "ItemProcessor": {
                "ProcessorConfig": {
                  "Mode": "DISTRIBUTED",
                  "ExecutionType": "STANDARD"
                },
                "StartAt": "Export data for a table",
                "States": {
                  "Export data for a table": {
                    "Type": "Task",
                    "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::glue:startJobRun.sync",
                    "Parameters": {
                      "JobName": "ExportTableData",
                      "Arguments": {
                        "--dbtable.$": "$.tables"
                      }
                    },
                    "End": true
                  }
                }
              },
              "Label": "Map",
              "ItemReader": {
                "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::s3:getObject",
                "ReaderConfig": {
                  "InputType": "CSV",
                  "CSVHeaderLocation": "FIRST_ROW"
                },
                "Parameters": {
                  "Bucket": "123456789012-stepfunction-redrive",
                  "Key": "tables.csv"
                }
              },
              "ResultPath": null,
              "End": true
            }
          }

Prerequisites

To deploy the solution, you need the following prerequisites:

Launch the CloudFormation template

Complete the following steps to deploy the solution resources using AWS CloudFormation:

  1. Choose Launch Stack to launch the CloudFormation stack:
  2. Enter a stack name.
  3. Select all the check boxes under Capabilities and transforms.
  4. Choose Create stack.

The CloudFormation template creates many resources, including the following:

  • The data pipeline described earlier as a Step Functions workflow
  • An S3 bucket to store the exported data and the metadata of the tables in Amazon RDS
  • A product catalog table in DynamoDB
  • An RDS for PostgreSQL database instance with pre-loaded tables
  • An AWS Glue crawler that crawls the RDS table and creates an AWS Glue Data Catalog
  • A parameterized AWS Glue job to export data from the RDS table to an S3 bucket
  • A Lambda function to export data from DynamoDB to an S3 bucket

Simulate the failure

Complete the following steps to test the solution:

  1. On the Step Functions console, choose State machines in the navigation pane.
  2. Choose the workflow named ETL_Process.
  3. Run the workflow with default input.

Within a few seconds, the workflow fails at the distributed map state.

You can inspect the map run errors by accessing the Step Functions workflow execution events for map runs and child workflows. In this example, you can identity the exception is due to Glue.ConcurrentRunsExceededException from AWS Glue. The error indicates there are more concurrent requests to run an AWS Glue job than are configured. Distributed map reads the table metadata from Amazon S3 and invokes as many AWS Glue jobs as the number of rows in the .csv file, but AWS Glue job is set with the concurrency of 3 when it is created. This resulted in the child workflow failure, cascading the failure to the distributed map state and then the parallel state. The other step in the parallel state to fetch the DynamoDB table ran successfully. If any step in the parallel state fails, the whole state fails, as seen with the cascading failure.

Handle failures with distributed map

By default, when a state reports an error, Step Functions causes the workflow to fail. There are multiple ways you can handle this failure with distributed map state:

  • Step Functions enables you to catch errors, retry errors, and fail back to another state to handle errors gracefully. See the following code:
    Retry": [
                          {
                            "ErrorEquals": [
                              "Glue.ConcurrentRunsExceededException "
                            ],
                            "BackoffRate": 20,
                            "IntervalSeconds": 10,
                            "MaxAttempts": 3,
                            "Comment": "Exception",
                            "JitterStrategy": "FULL"
                          }
                        ]
    

  • Sometimes, businesses can tolerate failures. This is especially true when you are processing millions of items and you expect data quality issues in the dataset. By default, when an iteration of map state fails, all other iterations are aborted. With distributed map, you can specify the maximum number of, or percentage of, failed items as a failure threshold. If the failure is within the tolerable level, the distributed map doesn’t fail.
  • The distributed map state allows you to control the concurrency of the child workflows. You can set the concurrency to map it to the AWS Glue job concurrency. Remember, this concurrency is applicable only at the workflow execution level—not across workflow executions.
  • You can redrive the failed state from the point of failure after fixing the root cause of the error.

Redrive the failed state

The root cause of the issue in the sample solution is the AWS Glue job concurrency. To address this by redriving the failed state, complete the following steps:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, navigate to the job named ExportsTableData.
  2. On the Job details tab, under Advanced properties, update Maximum concurrency to 5.

With the launch of redrive feature, You can use redrive to restart executions of standard workflows that didn’t complete successfully in the last 14 days. These include failed, aborted, or timed-out runs. You can only redrive a failed workflow from the step where it failed using the same input as the last non-successful state. You can’t redrive a failed workflow using a state machine definition that is different from the initial workflow execution. After the failed state is redriven successfully, Step Functions runs all the downstream tasks automatically. To learn more about how distributed map redrive works, refer to Redriving Map Runs.

Because the distributed map runs the steps inside the map as child workflows, the workflow IAM execution role needs permission to redrive the map run to restart the distributed map state:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "states:RedriveExecution"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-2:123456789012:execution:myStateMachine/myMapRunLabel:*"
    }
  ]
}

You can redrive a workflow from its failed step programmatically, via the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or AWS SDK, or using the Step Functions console, which provides a visual operator experience.

  1. On the Step Functions console, navigate to the failed workflow you want to redrive.
  2. On the Details tab, choose Redrive from failure.

The pipeline now runs successfully because there is enough concurrency to run the AWS Glue jobs.

To redrive a workflow programmatically from its point of failure, call the new Redrive Execution API action. The same workflow starts from the last non-successful state and uses the same input as the last non-successful state from the initial failed workflow. The state to redrive from the workflow definition and the previous input are immutable.

Note the following regarding different types of child workflows:

  • Redrive for express child workflows – For failed child workflows that are express workflows within a distributed map, the redrive capability ensures a seamless restart from the beginning of the child workflow. This allows you to resolve issues that are specific to individual iterations without restarting the entire map.
  • Redrive for standard child workflows – For failed child workflows within a distributed map that are standard workflows, the redrive feature functions the same way as with standalone standard workflows. You can restart the failed state within each map iteration from its point of failure, skipping unnecessary steps that have already successfully run.

You can use Step Functions status change notifications with Amazon EventBridge for failure notifications such as sending an email on failure.

Clean up

To clean up your resources, delete the CloudFormation stack via the AWS CloudFormation console.

Conclusion

In this post, we showed you how to use the Step Functions redrive feature to redrive a failed step within a distributed map by restarting the failed step from the point of failure. The distributed map state allows you to write workflows that coordinate large-scale parallel workloads within your serverless applications. Step Functions runs the steps within the distributed map as child workflows at a maximum parallelism of 10,000, which is well above the concurrency supported by many AWS services.

To learn more about distributed map, refer to Step Functions – Distributed Map. To learn more about redriving workflows, refer to Redriving executions.


About the Authors

Sriharsh Adari is a Senior Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services (AWS), where he helps customers work backwards from business outcomes to develop innovative solutions on AWS. Over the years, he has helped multiple customers on data platform transformations across industry verticals. His core area of expertise include Technology Strategy, Data Analytics, and Data Science. In his spare time, he enjoys playing Tennis.

Joe Morotti is a Senior Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services (AWS), working with Enterprise customers across the Midwest US to develop innovative solutions on AWS. He has held a wide range of technical roles and enjoys showing customers the art of the possible. He has attained seven AWS certification and has a passion for AI/ML and the contact center space. In his free time, he enjoys spending quality time with his family exploring new places and overanalyzing his sports team’s performance.

Uma Ramadoss is a specialist Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services, focused on the Serverless platform. She is responsible for helping customers design and operate event-driven cloud-native applications and modern business workflows using services like Lambda, EventBridge, Step Functions, and Amazon MWAA.

Four use cases for GuardDuty Malware Protection On-demand malware scan

Post Syndicated from Eduardo Ortiz Pineda original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/four-use-cases-for-guardduty-malware-protection-on-demand-malware-scan/

Amazon GuardDuty is a threat detection service that continuously monitors your Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts and workloads for malicious activity and delivers detailed security findings for visibility and remediation. GuardDuty Malware Protection helps detect the presence of malware by performing agentless scans of the Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volumes that are attached to Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances and container workloads. GuardDuty findings for identified malware provide additional insights of potential threats related to EC2 instances and containers running on an instance. Malware findings can also provide additional context for EC2 related threats identified by GuardDuty such as observed cryptocurrency-related activity and communication with a command and control server. Examples of malware categories that GuardDuty Malware Protection helps identify include ransomware, cryptocurrency mining, remote access, credential theft, and phishing. In this blog post, we provide an overview of the On-demand malware scan feature in GuardDuty and walk through several use cases where you can use On-demand malware scanning.

GuardDuty offers two types of malware scanning for EC2 instances: GuardDuty-initiated malware scans and On-demand malware scans. GuardDuty initiated malware scans are launched after GuardDuty generates an EC2 finding that indicates behavior typical of malware on an EC2 instance or container workload. The initial EC2 finding helps to provide insight that a specific threat is being observed based on VPC Flow Logs and DNS logs. Performing a malware scan on the instance goes beyond what can be observed from log activity and helps to provide additional context at the instance file system level, showing a connection between malware and the observed network traffic. This additional context can also help you determine your response and remediation steps for the identified threat.

There are multiple use cases where you would want to scan an EC2 instance for malware even when there’s no GuardDuty EC2 finding for the instance. This could include scanning as part of a security investigation or scanning certain instances on a regular schedule. You can use the On-demand malware scan feature to scan an EC2 instance when you want, providing flexibility in how you maintain the security posture of your EC2 instances.

On-demand malware scanning

To perform on-demand malware scanning, your account must have GuardDuty enabled. If the service-linked role (SLR) permissions for Malware Protection don’t exist in the account the first time that you submit an on-demand scan, the SLR for Malware Protection will automatically be created. An on-demand malware scan is initiated by providing the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the EC2 instance to scan. The malware scan of the instance is performed using the same functionality as GuardDuty-initiated scans. The malware scans that GuardDuty performs are agentless and the feature is designed in a way that it won’t affect the performance of your resources.

An on-demand malware scan can be initiated through the GuardDuty Malware Protection section of the AWS Management Console for GuardDuty or through the StartMalwareScan API. On-demand malware scans can be initiated from the GuardDuty delegated administrator account for EC2 instances in a member account where GuardDuty is enabled, or the scan can be initiated from a member account or a stand-alone account for Amazon EC2 instances within that account. High-level details for every malware scan that GuardDuty runs are reported in the Malware scans section of the GuardDuty console. The Malware scans section identifies which EC2 instance the scan was initiated for, the status of the scan (completed, running, skipped, or failed), the result of the scan (clean or infected), and when the malware scan was initiated. This summary information on malware scans is also available through the DescribeMalwareScans API.

When an on-demand scan detects malware on an EC2 instance, a new GuardDuty finding is created. This finding lists the details about the impacted EC2 instance, where malware was found in the instance file system, how many occurrences of malware were found, and details about the actual malware. Additionally, if malware was found in a Docker container, the finding also lists details about the container and, if the EC2 instance is used to support Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS) or Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS) container deployments, details about the cluster, task, and pod are also included in the finding. Findings about identified malware can be viewed in the GuardDuty console along with other GuardDuty findings or can be retrieved using the GuardDuty APIs. Additionally, each finding that GuardDuty generates is sent to Amazon EventBridge and AWS Security Hub. With EventBridge, you can author rules that allow you to match certain GuardDuty findings and then send the findings to a defined target in an event-driven flow. Security Hub helps you include GuardDuty findings in your aggregation and prioritization of security findings for your overall AWS environment.

GuardDuty charges for the total amount of Amazon EBS data that’s scanned. You can use the provisioned storage for an Amazon EBS volume to get an initial estimate on what the scan will cost. When the actual malware scan runs, the final cost is based on the amount of data that was actually scanned by GuardDuty to perform a malware scan. To get a more accurate estimate of what a malware scan on an Amazon EBS volume might cost, you must obtain the actual storage amount used from the EC2 instance that the volume is attached to. There are multiple methods available to determine the actual amount of storage currently being used on an EBS volume including using the CloudWatch Logs agent to collect disk-used metrics, and running individual commands to see the amount of free disk space on Linux and Windows EC2 instances.

Use cases using GuardDuty On-demand malware scan

Now that you’ve reviewed the on-demand malware scan feature and how it works, let’s walk through four use cases where you can incorporate it to help you achieve your security goals. In use cases 1 and 2, we provide you with deployable assets to help demonstrate the solution in your own environment.

Use case 1 – Initiating scans for EC2 instances with specific tags

This first use case walks through how on-demand scanning can be performed based on tags applied to an EC2 instance. Each tag is a label consisting of a key and an optional value to store information about the resource or data retained on that resource. Resource tagging can be used to help identify a specific target group of EC2 instances for malware scanning to meet your security requirements. Depending on your organization’s strategy, tags can indicate the data classification strategy, workload type, or the compliance scope of your EC2 instance, which can be used as criteria for malware scanning.

In this solution, you use a combination of GuardDuty, an AWS Systems Manager document (SSM document)Amazon CloudWatch Logs subscription filters, AWS Lambda, and Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) to initiate a malware scan of EC2 instances containing a specific tag. This solution is designed to be deployed in a member account and identifies EC2 instances to scan within that member account.

Solution architecture

Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of the solution which depicts an on-demand malware scan being initiated based on a tag key.

Figure 1: Tag based on-demand malware scan architecture

Figure 1: Tag based on-demand malware scan architecture

The high-level workflow is:

  1. Enter the tag scan parameters in the SSM document that’s deployed as part of the solution.
  2. When you initiate the SSM document, the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScanLambdaFunction Lambda function is invoked, which launches the collection of the associated Amazon EC2 ARNs that match your tag criteria.
  3. The Lambda function obtains ARNs of the EC2 instances and initiates a malware scan for each instance.
  4. GuardDuty scans each instance for malware.
  5. A CloudWatch Logs subscription filter created under the log group /aws/guardduty/malware-scan-events monitors for log file entries of on-demand malware scans which have a status of COMPLETED or SKIPPED. If a scan matches this filter criteria, it’s sent to the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandNotificationLambda Lambda function.
  6. The GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandNotificationLambda function parses the information from the scan events and sends the details to an Amazon SNS topic if the result of the scan is clean, skipped, or infected.
  7. Amazon SNS sends the message to the topic subscriptions. Information sent in the message will contain the account ID, resource ID, status, volume, and result of the scan.

Systems Manager document

AWS Systems Manager is a secure, end-to-end management solution for resources on AWS and in multi-cloud and hybrid environments. The SSM document feature is used in this solution to provide an interactive way to provide inputs to the Lambda function that’s responsible for identifying EC2 instances to scan for malware.

Identify Amazon EC2 targets Lambda

The GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScanLambdaFunction obtains the ARN of the associated EC2 instances that match the tag criteria provided in the Systems Manager document parameters. For the EC2 instances that are identified to match the tag criteria, an On-demand malware scan request is submitted by the StartMalwareScan API.

Monitoring and reporting scan status

The solution deploys an Amazon CloudWatch Logs subscription filter that monitors for log file entries of on-demand malware scans which have a status of COMPLETED or SKIPPED. See Monitoring scan status for more information. After an on-demand malware scan finishes, the filter criteria are matched and the scan result is sent to its Lambda function destination GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandNotificationLambda. This Lambda function generates an Amazon SNS notification email that’s sent by the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScanTopic Amazon SNS topic.

Deploy the solution

Now that you understand how the on-demand malware scan solution works, you can deploy it to your own AWS account. The solution should be deployed in a single member account. This section walks you through the steps to deploy the solution and shows you how to verify that each of the key steps is working.

Step 1: Activate GuardDuty

The sample solution provided by this blog post requires that you activate GuardDuty in your AWS account. If this service isn’t activated in your account, learn more about the free trial and pricing or this service, and follow the steps in Getting started with Amazon GuardDuty to set up the service and start monitoring your account.

Note: On-demand malware scanning is not part of the GuardDuty free trial.

Step 2: Deploy the AWS CloudFormation template

For this step, deploy the template within the AWS account and AWS Region where you want to test this solution.

  1. Choose the following Launch Stack button to launch an AWS CloudFormation stack in your account. Use the AWS Management Console navigation bar to choose the Region you want to deploy the stack in.

    Launch Stack

  2. Set the values for the following parameters based on how you want to use the solution:
    • Create On-demand malware scan sample tester condition — Set the value to True to generate two EC2 instances to test the solution. These instances will serve as targets for an on-demand malware scan. One instance will contain EICAR malware sample files, which contain strings that will be detected as malware but aren’t malicious. The other instance won’t contain malware.
    • Tag key — Set the key that you want to be added to the test EC2 instances that are launched by this template.
    • Tag value — Set the value that will be added to the test EC2 instances that are launched by this template.
    • Latest Amazon Linux instance used for tester — Leave as is.
  3. Scroll to the bottom of the Quick create stack screen and select the checkbox next to I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources.
  4. Choose Create stack. The deployment of this CloudFormation stack will take 5–10 minutes.

After the CloudFormation stack has been deployed successfully, you can proceed to reviewing and interacting with the deployed solution.

Step 3: Create an Amazon SNS topic subscription

The CloudFormation stack deploys an Amazon SNS topic to support sending notifications about initiated malware scans. For this post, you create an email subscription for receiving messages sent through the topic.

  1. In the Amazon SNS console, navigate to the Region that the stack was deployed in. On the Amazon SNS topics page, choose the created topic that includes the text GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScanTopic.
    Figure 2: Amazon SNS topic listing

    Figure 2: Amazon SNS topic listing

  2. On the Create subscription page, select Email for the Protocol, and for the Endpoint add a valid email address. Choose Create subscription.
    Figure 3: Amazon SNS topic subscription

    Figure 3: Amazon SNS topic subscription

After the subscription has been created, an email notification is sent that must be acknowledged to start receiving malware scan notifications.

Amazon SNS subscriptions support many other types of subscription protocols besides email. You can review the list of Amazon SNS event destinations to learn more about other ways that Amazon SNS notifications can be consumed.

Step 4: Provide scan parameters in an SSM document

After the AWS CloudFormation template has been deployed, the SSM document will be in the Systems Manager console. For this solution, the TagKey and TagValue parameters must be entered before you can run the SSM document.

  1. In the Systems Manager console choose the Documents link in the navigation pane.
  2. On the SSM document page, select the Owned by me tab and choose GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScan. If you have multiple documents, use the search bar to search for the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScan document.
    Figure 4: Systems Manager documents listing

    Figure 4: Systems Manager documents listing

  3. In the page for the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScan, choose Execute automation.
  4. In the Execute automation runbook page, follow the document description and input the required parameters. For this blog example, use the same tags as in the parameter section of the initial CloudFormation template. When you use this solution for your own instances, you can adjust these parameters to fit your tagging strategy.
    Figure 5: Automation document details and input parameters

    Figure 5: Automation document details and input parameters

  5. Choose Execute to run the document. This takes you to the Execution detail page for this run of the automation document. In a few minutes the Execution status should update its overall status to Success.
    Figure 6: Automation document execution detail

    Figure 6: Automation document execution detail

Step 5: Receive status messages about malware scans

  1. Upon completion of the scan, you should get a status of Success and email containing the results of the on-demand scan along with the scan IDs. The scan result includes a message for an INFECTED instance and one message for a CLEAN instance. For EC2 instances without a tag key, you will receive an Amazon SNS notification that says “No instances found that could be scanned.” Figure 7 shows an example email for an INFECTED instance.
    Figure 7: Example email for an infected instance

    Figure 7: Example email for an infected instance

Step 6: Review scan results in GuardDuty

In addition to the emails that are sent about the status of a malware scan, the details about each malware scan and the findings for identified malware can be viewed in GuardDuty.

  1. In the GuardDuty console, select Malware scans from the left navigation pane. The Malware scan page provides you with the results of the scans performed. The scan results, for the instances scanned in this post, should match the email notifications received in the previous step.
    Figure 8: GuardDuty malware scan summary

    Figure 8: GuardDuty malware scan summary

  2. You can select a scan to view its details. The details include the scan ID, the EC2 instance, scan type, scan result (which indicates if the scan is infected or clean), and the scan start time.
    Figure 9: GuardDuty malware scan details

    Figure 9: GuardDuty malware scan details

  3. In the details for the infected instance, choose Click to see malware findings. This takes you to the GuardDuty findings page with a filter for the specific malware scan.
    Figure 10: GuardDuty malware findings

    Figure 10: GuardDuty malware findings

  4. Select the finding for the MalicousFile finding to bring up details about the finding. Details of the Execution:EC2/Malicious file finding include the severity label, the overview of the finding, and the threats detected. We recommend that you treat high severity findings as high priority and immediately investigate and, if necessary, take steps to prevent unauthorized use of your resources.
    Figure 11: GuardDuty malware finding details

    Figure 11: GuardDuty malware finding details

Use case 2 – Initiating scans on a schedule

This use case walks through how to schedule malware scans. Scheduled malware scanning might be required for particularly sensitive workloads. After an environment is up and running, it’s important to establish a baseline to be able to quickly identify EC2 instances that have been infected with malware. A scheduled malware scan helps you proactively identify malware on key resources and that maintain the desired security baseline.

Solution architecture

Figure 12: Scheduled malware scan architecture

Figure 12: Scheduled malware scan architecture

The architecture of this use case is shown in figure 12. The main difference between this and the architecture of use case 1 is the presence of a scheduler that controls submitting the GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandObtainScanLambdaFunction function to identify the EC2 instances to be scanned. This architecture uses Amazon EventBridge Scheduler to set up flexible time windows for when a scheduled scan should be performed.

EventBridge Scheduler is a serverless scheduler that you can use to create, run, and manage tasks from a central, managed service. With EventBridge Scheduler, you can create schedules using cron and rate expressions for recurring patterns or configure one-time invocations. You can set up flexible time windows for delivery, define retry limits, and set the maximum retention time for failed invocations.

Deploying the solution

Step 1: Deploy the AWS CloudFormation template

For this step, you deploy the template within the AWS account and Region where you want to test the solution.

  1. Choose the following Launch Stack button to launch an AWS CloudFormation stack in your account. Use the AWS Management Console navigation bar to choose the Region you want to deploy the stack in.

    Launch Stack

  2. Set the values for the following parameters based on how you want to use the solution:
    • On-demand malware scan sample tester — Amazon EC2 configuration
      • Create On-demand malware scan sample tester condition — Set the value to True to generate two EC2 instances to test the solution. These instances will serve as targets for an on-demand malware scan. One instance will contain EICAR malware sample files, which contain strings that will be detected as malware but aren’t malicious. The other instance won’t contain malware.
      • Tag key — Set the key that you want to be added to the test EC2 instances that are launched by this template.
      • Tag Value — Set the value that will be added to the test EC2 instances that are launched by this template.
      • Latest Amazon Linux instance used for tester — Leave as is.
    • Scheduled malware scan parameters
      • Tag keys and values parameter — Enter the tag key-value pairs that the scheduled scan will look for. If you populated the tag key and tag value parameters for the sample EC2 instance, then that should be one of the values in this parameter to ensure that the test instances are scanned.
      • EC2 instances ARNs to scan — [Optional] EC2 instances ID list that should be scanned when the scheduled scan runs.
      • EC2 instances state — Enter the state the EC2 instances can be in when selecting instances to scan.
    • AWS Scheduler parameters
      • Rate for the schedule scan to be run — defines how frequently the schedule should run. Valid options are minutes, hours, or days.
      • First time scheduled scan will run — Enter the day and time, in UTC format, when the first scheduled scan should run.
      • Time zone — Enter the time zone that the schedule start time should be applied to. Here is a list of valid time zone values.
  3. Scroll to the bottom of the Quick create stack screen and select the checkbox for I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources.
  4. Choose Create stack. The deployment of this CloudFormation stack will take 5–10 minutes.

After the CloudFormation stack has been deployed successfully, you can review and interact with the deployed solution.

Step 2: Amazon SNS topic subscription

As in use case 1, this solution supports using Amazon SNS to send a notification with the results of a malware scan. See the Amazon SNS subscription set up steps in use case 1 for guidance on setting up a subscription for receiving the results. For this use case, the naming convention of the Amazon SNS topic will include GuardDutyMalwareOnDemandScheduledScanTopic.

Step 3: Review scheduled scan configuration

For this use case, the parameters that were filled in during submission of the CloudFormation template build out an initial schedule for scanning EC2 instances. The following details describe the various components of the schedule and where you can make changes to influence how the schedule runs in the future.

  1. In the console, go to the EventBridge service. On the left side of the console under Scheduler, select Schedules. Select the scheduler that was created as part of the CloudFormation deployment.
    Figure 13: List of EventBridge schedules

    Figure 13: List of EventBridge schedules

  2. The Specify schedule detail page is where you can set the appropriate Timezone, Start date and time. In this walkthrough, this information for the schedule was provided when launching the CloudFormation template.
    Figure 14: EventBridge schedule detail

    Figure 14: EventBridge schedule detail

  3. On the Invoke page, the JSON will include the instance state, tags, and IDs, as well as the tags associated with the instance that were filled in during the deployment of the CloudFormation template. Make additional changes, as needed, and choose Next.
    Figure 15: EventBridge schedule Lambda invoke parameters

    Figure 15: EventBridge schedule Lambda invoke parameters

  4. Review and save schedule.
    Figure 16: EventBridge schedule summary

    Figure 16: EventBridge schedule summary

Step 4: Review malware scan results from GuardDuty

After a scheduled scan has been performed, the scan results will be available in the GuardDuty Malware console and generate a GuardDuty finding if malware is found. The output emails and access to the results in GuardDuty is the same as explained in use case 1.

Use case 3 – Initiating scans to support a security investigation

You might receive security signals or events about infrastructure and applications from multiple tools or sources in addition to Amazon GuardDuty. Investigations that arise from these security signals necessitate malware scans on specific EC2 instances that might be a source or target of a security event. With GuardDuty On-demand malware scan, you can incorporate a scan as part of your investigation workflow and use the output of the scan to drive the next steps in your investigation.

From the GuardDuty delegated administrator account, you can initiate a malware scan against EC2 instances in a member account which is associated with the administrator account. This enables you to initiate your malware scans from a centralized location and without the need for access to the account where the EC2 instance is deployed. Initiating a malware scan for an EC2 instance uses the same StartMalwareScan API described in the other use cases of this post. Depending on the tools that you’re using to support your investigations, you can also use the GuardDuty console to initiate a malware scan.

After a malware scan is run, malware findings will be available in the delegated administrator and member accounts, allowing you to get details and orchestrate the next steps in your investigation from a centralized location.

Figure 17 is an example of how a security investigation, using an on-demand malware scan, might function.

Figure 17: Example security investigation using GuardDuty On-demand malware scans

Figure 17: Example security investigation using GuardDuty On-demand malware scans

If you’re using GuardDuty as your main source of security findings for EC2 instances, the GuardDuty-initiated malware scan feature can also help facilitate an investigation workflow. With GuardDuty initiated malware scans, you can reduce the time between when an EC2 instance finding is created and when a malware scan of the instance is initiated, making the scan results available to your investigation workflows faster, helping you develop a remediation plan sooner.

Use case 4 – Malware scanning in a deployment pipeline

If you’re using deployment pipelines to build and deploy your infrastructure and applications, you want to make sure that what you’re deploying is secure. In cases where deployments involve third-party software, you want to be sure that the software is free of malware before deploying into environments where the malware could be harmful. This applies to software deployed directly onto an EC2 instance as well as containers that are deployed on an EC2 instance. In this case, you can use the on-demand malware scan in an EC2 instance in a secure test environment prior to deploying it in production. You can use the techniques described earlier in this post to design your deployment pipelines with steps that call the StartMalwareScan API and then check the results of the scan. Based on the scan results, you can decide if the deployment should continue or be stopped due to detected malware.

Running these scans before deployment into production can help to ensure the integrity of your applications and data and increase confidence that the production environment is free of significant security issues.

Figure 18 is an example of how malware scanning might look in a deployment pipeline for a containerized application.

Figure 18: Example deployment pipeline incorporating GuardDuty On-demand malware scan

Figure 18: Example deployment pipeline incorporating GuardDuty On-demand malware scan

In the preceding example the following steps are represented:

  1. A container image is built as part of a deployment pipeline.
  2. The container image is deployed into a test environment.
  3. From the test environment, a GuardDuty On-demand malware scan is initiated against the EC2 instance where the container image has been deployed.
  4. After the malware scan is complete, the results of the scan are evaluated.
  5. A decision is made on allowing the image to be deployed into production. If the image is approved, it’s deployed to production. If it’s rejected, a message is sent back to the owner of the container image for remediation of the identified malware.

Conclusion

Scanning for malware on your EC2 instances is key to maintaining that your instances are free of malware before they’re deployed to production, and if malware does find its way onto a deployed instance, it’s quickly identified so that it can be investigated and remediated.

This post outlines four use cases you can use with the On-demand malware scan feature: Scan based on tag, scan on a schedule, scan as part of an investigation, and scan in a deployment pipeline. The examples provided in this post are intended to provide a foundation that you can build upon to meet your specific use cases. You can use the provided code examples and sample architectures to enhance your operational and deployment processes.

To learn more about GuardDuty and its malware protection features, see the feature documentation and the service quotas for Malware protection.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, & Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

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Author

Rodrigo Ferroni

Rodrigo is a Principal Security Specialist at AWS Enterprise Support. He’s certified in CISSP, an AWS Security Specialist, and AWS Solutions Architect Associate. He enjoys helping customers to continue adopting AWS security services to improve their security posture in the cloud. Outside of work, he loves to travel as much as he can. Every winter, he enjoys snowboarding with his friends.

Eduardo Ortiz Pineda

Eduardo Ortiz Pineda

Eduardo is a Senior Security Specialist at AWS Enterprise Support. He’s interested in different security topics, automation, and helping customers to improve their security posture. Outside of work, he spends his free time with family and friends, enjoying sports, reading, and traveling.

Author

Scott Ward

Scott is a Principal Solutions Architect with the External Security Services (ESS) product team and has been with Amazon for over 20 years. Scott provides technical guidance to customers on how to use security services to protect their AWS environments. Past roles include technical lead for the AWS Security Partner segment and member of the technical team for the Amazon.com global financial systems.

Howard Irabor

Howard Irabor

Howard is a Security Solutions Architect at AWS. Today, he’s devoted to assisting large-scale AWS customers in implementing and using AWS security services to lower risk and improve security. He’s a highly motivated person who relishes a good challenge. He’s an avid runner and soccer player in his spare time.

Blue/Green Deployments with Amazon ECS using Amazon CodeCatalyst

Post Syndicated from Hareesh Iyer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/blue-green-deployments-with-amazon-ecs-using-amazon-codecatalyst/

Amazon CodeCatalyst is a modern software development service that empowers teams to deliver software on AWS easily and quickly. Amazon CodeCatalyst provides one place where you can plan, code, and build, test, and deploy your container applications with continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) tools.

In this post, we will walk-through how you can configure Blue/Green and canary deployments for your container workloads within Amazon CodeCatalyst.

Pre-requisites 

To follow along with the instructions, you’ll need:

  • An AWS account. If you don’t have one, you can create a new AWS account.
  • An Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS) service using the Blue/Green deployment type. If you don’t have one, follow the Amazon ECS tutorial and complete steps 1-5.
  • An Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR) repository named codecatalyst-ecs-image-repo. Follow the Amazon ECR user guide to create one.
  • An Amazon CodeCatalyst space, with an empty Amazon CodeCatalyst project named codecatalyst-ecs-project and an Amazon CodeCatalyst environment called codecatalyst-ecs-environment. Follow the Amazon CodeCatalyst tutorial to set these up.
  • Follow the Amazon CodeCatalyst user guide to associate your account to the environment.

Walkthrough 

Now that you have setup an Amazon ECS cluster and configured Amazon CodeCatalyst to perform deployments, you can configure Blue/Green deployment for your workload. Here are the high-level steps:

  • Collect details of the Amazon ECS environment that you created in the prerequisites step.
  • Add source files for the containerized application to Amazon CodeCatalyst.
  • Create Amazon CodeCatalyst Workflow.
  • Validate the setup.

Step 1: Collect details from your ECS service and Amazon CodeCatalyst role

In this step, you will collect information from your prerequisites that will be used in the Blue/Green Amazon CodeCatalyst configuration further down this post.

If you followed the prerequisites tutorial, below are AWS CLI commands to extract values that are used in this post. You can run this on your local workstation or with AWS CloudShell in the same region you created your Amazon ECS cluster.

ECSCLUSTER='tutorial-bluegreen-cluster'
ECSSERVICE='service-bluegreen'

ECSCLUSTERARN=$(aws ecs describe-clusters --clusters $ECSCLUSTER --query 'clusters[*].clusterArn' --output text)
ECSSERVICENAME=$(aws ecs describe-services --services $ECSSERVICE --cluster $ECSCLUSTER  --query 'services[*].serviceName' --output text)
TASKDEFARN=$(aws ecs describe-services --services $ECSSERVICE --cluster $ECSCLUSTER  --query 'services[*].taskDefinition' --output text)
TASKROLE=$(aws ecs describe-task-definition --task-definition tutorial-task-def --query 'taskDefinition.executionRoleArn' --output text)
ACCOUNT=$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query "Account" --output text)

echo Account_ID value: $ACCOUNT
echo EcsRegionName value: $AWS_DEFAULT_REGION
echo EcsClusterArn value: $ECSCLUSTERARN
echo EcsServiceName value: $ECSSERVICENAME
echo TaskDefinitionArn value: $TASKDEFARN
echo TaskExecutionRoleArn value: $TASKROLE

Note down the values of Account_ID, EcsRegionName, EcsClusterArn, EcsServiceName, TaskDefinitionArn and TaskExecutionRoleArn. You will need these values in later steps.

Step 2: Add Amazon IAM roles to Amazon CodeCatalyst

In this step, you will create a role called CodeCatalystWorkflowDevelopmentRole-spacename to provide Amazon CodeCatalyst service permissions to build and deploy applications. This role is only recommended for use with development accounts and uses the AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy, giving it full access to create new policies and resources in this AWS account.

  • In Amazon CodeCatalyst, navigate to your space. Choose the Settings tab.
  • In the Navigation page, select AWS accounts. A list of account connections appears. Choose the account connection that represents the AWS account where you created your build and deploy roles.
  • Choose Manage roles from AWS management console.
  • The Add IAM role to Amazon CodeCatalyst space page appears. You might need to sign in to access the page.
  • Choose Create CodeCatalyst development administrator role in IAM. This option creates a service role that contains the permissions policy and trust policy for the development role.
  • Note down the role name. Choose Create development role.

Step 3: Create Amazon CodeCatalyst source repository

In this step, you will create a source repository in CodeCatalyst. This repository stores the tutorial’s source files, such as the task definition file.

  • In Amazon CodeCatalyst, navigate to your project.
  • In the navigation pane, choose Code, and then choose Source repositories.
  • Choose Add repository, and then choose Create repository.
  •  In Repository name, enter:

codecatalyst-advanced-deployment

  • Choose Create.

Step 4: Create Amazon CodeCatalyst Dev Environment

In this step, you will create a Amazon CodeCatalyst Dev environment to work on the sample application code and configuration in the codecatalyst-advanced-deployment repository. Learn more about Amazon CodeCatalyst dev environments in Amazon CodeCatalyst user guide.

  • In Amazon CodeCatalyst, navigate to your project.
  • In the navigation pane, choose Code, and then choose Source repositories.
  • Choose the source repository for which you want to create a dev environment.
  • Choose Create Dev Environment.
  • Choose AWS Cloud9 from the drop-down menu.
  • In Create Dev Environment and open with AWS Cloud9 page (Figure 1), choose Create to create a Cloud9 development environment.

Create Dev Environment in Amazon CodeCatalyst

Figure 1: Create Dev Environment in Amazon CodeCatalyst

AWS Cloud9 IDE opens on a new browser tab. Stay in AWS Cloud9 window to continue with Step 5.

Step 5: Add Source files to Amazon CodeCatalyst source repository

In this step, you will add source files from a sample application from GitHub to Amazon CodeCatalyst repository. You will be using this application to configure and test blue-green deployments.

  • On the menu bar at the top of the AWS Cloud9 IDE, choose Window, New Terminal or use an existing terminal window.
  • Download the Github project as a zip file, un-compress it and move it to your project folder by running the below commands in the terminal.

cd codecatalyst-advanced-deployment
wget -O SampleApp.zip https://github.com/build-on-aws/automate-web-app-amazon-ecs-cdk-codecatalyst/zipball/main/
unzip SampleApp.zip
mv build-on-aws-automate-web-app-amazon-ecs-cdk-codecatalyst-*/SampleApp/* .
rm -rf build-on-aws-automate-web-app-amazon-ecs-cdk-codecatalyst-*
rm SampleApp.zip

  • Update the task definition file for the sample application. Open task.json in the current directory. Find and replace “<arn:aws:iam::<account_ID>:role/AppRole> with the value collected from step 1: <TaskExecutionRoleArn>.
  • Amazon CodeCatalyst works with AWS CodeDeploy to perform Blue/Green deployments on Amazon ECS. You will create an Application Specification file, which will be used by CodeDeploy to manage the deployment. Create a file named appspec.yaml inside the codecatalyst-advanced-deployment directory. Update the <TaskDefinitionArn> with value from Step 1.
version: 0.0
Resources:
  - TargetService:
      Type: AWS::ECS::Service
      Properties:
        TaskDefinition: "<TaskDefinitionArn>"
        LoadBalancerInfo:
          ContainerName: "MyContainer"
          ContainerPort: 80
        PlatformVersion: "LATEST"
  • Commit the changes to Amazon CodeCatalyst repository by following the below commands. Update <your_email> and <your_name> with your email and name.

git config user.email "<your_email>"
git config user.name "<your_name>"
git add .
git commit -m "Initial commit"
git push

Step 6: Create Amazon CodeCatalyst Workflow

In this step, you will create the Amazon CodeCatalyst workflow which will automatically build your source code when changes are made. A workflow is an automated procedure that describes how to build, test, and deploy your code as part of a continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) system. A workflow defines a series of steps, or actions, to take during a workflow run.

  • In the navigation pane, choose CI/CD, and then choose Workflows.
  • Choose Create workflow. Select codecatalyst-advanced-deployment from the Source repository dropdown.
  • Choose main in the branch. Select Create (Figure 2). The workflow definition file appears in the Amazon CodeCatalyst console’s YAML editor.
    Create workflow page in Amazon CodeCatalyst

    Figure 2: Create workflow page in Amazon CodeCatalyst

  • Update the workflow by replacing the contents in the YAML editor with the below. Replace <Account_ID> with your AWS account ID. Replace <EcsRegionName>, <EcsClusterArn>, <EcsServiceName> with values from Step 1. Replace <CodeCatalyst-Dev-Admin-Role> with the Role Name from Step 3.
Name: BuildAndDeployToECS
SchemaVersion: "1.0"

# Set automatic triggers on code push.
Triggers:
  - Type: Push
    Branches:
      - main

Actions:
  Build_application:
    Identifier: aws/build@v1
    Inputs:
      Sources:
        - WorkflowSource
      Variables:
        - Name: region
          Value: <EcsRegionName>
        - Name: registry
          Value: <Account_ID>.dkr.ecr.<EcsRegionName>.amazonaws.com
        - Name: image
          Value: codecatalyst-ecs-image-repo
    Outputs:
      AutoDiscoverReports:
        Enabled: false
      Variables:
        - IMAGE
    Compute:
      Type: EC2
    Environment:
      Connections:
        - Role: <CodeCatalystPreviewDevelopmentAdministrator role>
          Name: "<Account_ID>"
      Name: codecatalyst-ecs-environment
    Configuration:
      Steps:
        - Run: export account=`aws sts get-caller-identity --output text | awk '{ print $1 }'`
        - Run: aws ecr get-login-password --region ${region} | docker login --username AWS --password-stdin ${registry}
        - Run: docker build -t appimage .
        - Run: docker tag appimage ${registry}/${image}:${WorkflowSource.CommitId}
        - Run: docker push --all-tags ${registry}/${image}
        - Run: export IMAGE=${registry}/${image}:${WorkflowSource.CommitId}
  RenderAmazonECStaskdefinition:
    Identifier: aws/ecs-render-task-definition@v1
    Configuration:
      image: ${Build_application.IMAGE}
      container-name: MyContainer
      task-definition: task.json
    Outputs:
      Artifacts:
        - Name: TaskDefinition
          Files:
            - task-definition*
    DependsOn:
      - Build_application
    Inputs:
      Sources:
        - WorkflowSource
  DeploytoAmazonECS:
    Identifier: aws/ecs-deploy@v1
    Configuration:
      task-definition: /artifacts/DeploytoAmazonECS/TaskDefinition/${RenderAmazonECStaskdefinition.task-definition}
      service: <EcsServiceName>
      cluster: <EcsClusterArn>
      region: <EcsRegionName>
      codedeploy-appspec: appspec.yaml
      codedeploy-application: tutorial-bluegreen-app
      codedeploy-deployment-group: tutorial-bluegreen-dg
      codedeploy-deployment-description: "Blue-green deployment for sample app"
    Compute:
      Type: EC2
      Fleet: Linux.x86-64.Large
    Environment:
      Connections:
        - Role: <CodeCatalyst-Dev-Admin-Role>
        # Add account id within quotes. Eg: "12345678"
          Name: "<Account_ID>"
      Name: codecatalyst-ecs-environment
    DependsOn:
      - RenderAmazonECStaskdefinition
    Inputs:
      Artifacts:
        - TaskDefinition
      Sources:
        - WorkflowSource

The workflow above does the following:

  • Whenever a code change is pushed to the repository, a Build action is triggered. The Build action builds a container image and pushes the image to the Amazon ECR repository created in Step 1.
  • Once the Build stage is complete, the Amazon ECS task definition is updated with the new ECR repository image.
  • The DeploytoECS action then deploys the new image to Amazon ECS using Blue/Green Approach.

To confirm everything was configured correctly, choose the Validate button. It should add a green banner with The workflow definition is valid at the top.

Select Commit to add the workflow to the repository (Figure 3)

Commit Workflow page in Amazon CodeCatalyst
Figure 3: Commit workflow page in Amazon CodeCatalyst

The workflow file is stored in a ~/.codecatalyst/workflows/ folder in the root of your source repository. The file can have a .yml or .yaml extension.

Let’s review our work, using the load balancer’s URL that you created during prerequisites, paste it into your browser. Your page should look similar to (Figure 4).

Sample Application (Blue Version)
Figure 4: Sample Application (Blue version)

Step 7: Validate the setup

To validate the setup, you will make a small change to the sample application.

  • Open Amazon CodeCatalyst dev environment that you created in Step 4.
  • Update your local copy of the repository. In the terminal run the command below.

git pull

  • In the terminal, navigate to /templates folder. Open index.html and search for “Las Vegas”. Replace the word with “New York”. Save the file.
  • Commit the change to the repository using the commands below.

git add .
git commit -m "Updating the city to New York"
git push

After the change is committed, the workflow should start running automatically. You can monitor of the workflow run in Amazon CodeCatalyst console (Figure 5)
Blue/Green Deployment Progress on Amazon CodeCatalyst

Figure 5: Blue/Green Deployment Progress on Amazon CodeCatalyst

You can also see the deployment status on the AWS CodeDeploy deployment page (Figure 6)

  • Going back to the AWS console.
  • In the upper left search bar, type in “CodeDeploy”.
  • In the left hand menu, select Deployments.

Blue/Green Deployment Progress on AWS CodeDeploy
Figure 6: Blue/Green Deployment Progress on AWS CodeDeploy

Let’s review our update, using the load balancer’s URL that you created during pre-requisites, paste it into your browser. Your page should look similar to (Figure 7).
Sample Application (Green version)

Figure 7: Sample Application (Green version)

Cleanup

If you have been following along with this workflow, you should delete the resources you deployed so you do not continue to incur charges.

  • Delete the Amazon ECS service and Amazon ECS cluster from AWS console.
  • Manually delete Amazon CodeCatalyst dev environment, source repository and project from your CodeCatalyst Space.
  • Delete the AWS CodeDeploy application through console or CLI.

Conclusion

In this post, we demonstrated how you can configure Blue/Green deployments for your container workloads using Amazon CodeCatalyst workflows. The same approach can be used to configure Canary deployments as well. Learn more about AWS CodeDeploy configuration for advanced container deployments in AWS CodeDeploy user guide.

William Cardoso

William Cardoso is a Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services based in South Florida area. He has 20+ years of experience in designing and developing enterprise systems. He leverages his real world experience in IT operations to work with AWS customers providing architectural and best practice recommendations for new and existing solutions. Outside of work, William enjoys woodworking, walking and cooking for friends and family.

Piyush Mattoo

Piyush Mattoo is a Solution Architect for enterprises at Amazon Web Services. He is a software technology leader with over 15 years of experience building scalable and distributed software systems that require a combination of broad T-shaped skills across multiple technologies. He has an educational background in Computer Science with a Masters degree in Computer and Information Science from University of Massachusetts. He is based out of Southern California and current interests include outdoor camping and nature walks.

Hareesh Iyer

Hareesh Iyer is a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS. He helps customers build scalable, secure, resilient and cost-efficient architectures on AWS. He is passionate about cloud-native patterns, containers and microservices.

Simplify workforce identity management using IAM Identity Center and trusted token issuers

Post Syndicated from Roberto Migli original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/simplify-workforce-identity-management-using-iam-identity-center-and-trusted-token-issuers/

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles are a powerful way to manage permissions to resources in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Cloud. IAM roles are useful when granting permissions to users whose workloads are static. However, for users whose access patterns are more dynamic, relying on roles can add complexity for administrators who are faced with provisioning roles and making sure the right people have the right access to the right roles.

The typical solution to handle dynamic workforce access is the OAuth 2.0 framework, which you can use to propagate an authenticated user’s identity to resource services. Resource services can then manage permissions based on the user—their attributes or permissions—rather than building a complex role management system. AWS IAM Identity Center recently introduced trusted identity propagation based on OAuth 2.0 to support dynamic access patterns.

With trusted identity propagation, your requesting application obtains OAuth tokens from IAM Identity Center and passes them to an AWS resource service. The AWS resource service trusts tokens that Identity Center generates and grants permissions based on the Identity Center tokens.

What happens if the application you want to deploy uses an external OAuth authorization server, such as Okta Universal Directory or Microsoft Entra ID, but the AWS service uses IAM Identity Center? How can you use the tokens from those applications with your applications that AWS hosts?

In this blog post, we show you how you can use IAM Identity Center trusted token issuers to help address these challenges. You also review the basics of Identity Center and OAuth and how Identity Center enables the use of external OAuth authorization servers.

IAM Identity Center and OAuth

IAM Identity Center acts as a central identity service for your AWS Cloud environment. You can bring your workforce users to AWS and authenticate them from an identity provider (IdP) that’s external to AWS (such as Okta or Microsoft Entra), or you can create and authenticate the users on AWS.

Trusted identity propagation in IAM Identity Center lets AWS workforce identities use OAuth 2.0, helping applications that need to share who’s using them with AWS services. In OAuth, a client application and a resource service both trust the same authorization server. The client application gets an OAuth token for the user and sends it to the resource service. Because both services trust the OAuth server, the resource service can identify the user from the token and set permissions based on their identity.

AWS supports two OAuth patterns:

  • AWS applications authenticate directly with IAM Identity Center: Identity Center redirects authentication to your identity source, which generates OAuth tokens that the AWS managed application uses to access AWS services. This is the default pattern because the AWS services that support trusted identity propagation use Identity Center as their OAuth authorization server.
  • Third-party, non-AWS applications authenticate outside of AWS (typically to your IdP) and access AWS resources: During authentication, these third-party applications obtain an OAuth token from an OAuth authorization server outside of AWS. In this pattern, the AWS services aren’t connected to the same OAuth authorization server as the client application. To enable this pattern, AWS introduced a model called the trusted token issuer.

Trusted token issuer

When AWS services use IAM Identity Center as their authentication service, directory, and OAuth authorization server, the AWS services that use OAuth tokens require that Identity Center issues the tokens. However, most third-party applications federate with an external IdP and obtain OAuth tokens from an external authorization server. Although the identities in Identity Center and the external authorization server might be for the same person, the identities exist in separate domains, one in Identity Center, the other in the external authorization server. This is required to manage authorization of workforce identities with AWS services.

The trusted token issuer (TTI) feature provides a way to securely associate one identity from the external IdP with the other identity in IAM Identity Center.

When using third-party applications to access AWS services, there’s an external OAuth authorization server for the third-party application, and IAM Identity Center is the OAuth authorization server for AWS services; each has its own domain of users. The Identity Center TTI feature connects these two systems so that tokens from the external OAuth authorization server can be exchanged for tokens from Identity Center that AWS services can use to identify the user in the AWS domain of users. A TTI is the external OAuth authorization server that Identity Center trusts to provide tokens that third-party applications use to call AWS services, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Conceptual model using a trusted token issuer and token exchange

Figure 1: Conceptual model using a trusted token issuer and token exchange

How the trust model and token exchange work

There are two levels of trust involved with TTIs. First, the IAM Identity Center administrator must add the TTI, which makes it possible to exchange tokens. This involves connecting Identity Center to the Open ID Connect (OIDC) discovery URL of the external OAuth authorization server and defining an attribute-based mapping between the user from the external OAuth authorization server and a corresponding user in Identity Center. Second, the applications that exchange externally generated tokens must be configured to use the TTI. There are two models for how tokens are exchanged:

  • Managed AWS service-driven token exchange: A third-party application uses an AWS driver or API to access a managed AWS service, such as accessing Amazon Redshift by using Amazon Redshift drivers. This works only if the managed AWS service has been designed to accept and exchange tokens. The application passes the external token to the AWS service through an API call. The AWS service then makes a call to IAM Identity Center to exchange the external token for an Identity Center token. The service uses the Identity Center token to determine who the corresponding Identity Center user is and authorizes resource access based on that identity.
  • Third-party application-driven token exchange: A third-party application not managed by AWS exchanges the external token for an IAM Identity Center token before calling AWS services. This is different from the first model, where the application that exchanges the token is the managed AWS service. An example is a third-party application that uses Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) Access Grants to access S3. In this model, the third-party application obtains a token from the external OAuth authorization server and then calls Identity Center to exchange the external token for an Identity Center token. The application can then use the Identity Center token to call AWS services that use Identity Center as their OAuth authorization server. In this case, the Identity Center administrator must register the third-party application and authorize it to exchange tokens from the TTI.

TTI trust details

When using a TTI, IAM Identity Center trusts that the TTI authenticated the user and authorized them to use the AWS service. This is expressed in an identity token or access token from the external OAuth authorization server (the TTI).

These are the requirements for the external OAuth authorization server (the TTI) and the token it creates:

  • The token must be a signed JSON Web Token (JWT). The JWT must contain a subject (sub) claim, an audience (aud) claim, an issuer (iss), a user attribute claim, and a JWT ID (JTI) claim.
    • The subject in the JWT is the authenticated user and the audience is a value that represents the AWS service that the application will use.
    • The audience claim value must match the value that is configured in the application that exchanges the token.
    • The issuer claim value must match the value configured in the issuer URL in the TTI.
    • There must be a claim in the token that specifies a user attribute that IAM Identity Center can use to find the corresponding user in the Identity Center directory.
    • The JWT token must contain the JWT ID claim. This claim is used to help prevent replay attacks. If a new token exchange is attempted after the initial exchange is complete, IAM Identity Center rejects the new exchange request.
  • The TTI must have an OIDC discovery URL that IAM Identity Center can use to obtain keys that it can use to verify the signature on JWTs created by your TTI. Identity Center appends the suffix /.well-known/openid-configuration to the provider URL that you configure to identify where to fetch the signature keys.

Note: Typically, the IdP that you use as your identity source for IAM Identity Center is your TTI. However, your TTI doesn’t have to be the IdP that Identity Center uses as an identity source. If the users from a TTI can be mapped to users in Identity Center, the tokens can be exchanged. You can have as many as 10 TTIs configured for a single Identity Center instance.

Details for applications that exchange tokens

Your OAuth authorization server service (the TTI) provides a way to authorize a user to access an AWS service. When a user signs in to the client application, the OAuth authorization server generates an ID token or an access token that contains the subject (the user) and an audience (the AWS services the user can access). When a third-party application accesses an AWS service, the audience must include an identifier of the AWS service. The third-party client application then passes this token to an AWS driver or an AWS service.

To use IAM Identity Center and exchange an external token from the TTI for an Identity Center token, you must configure the application that will exchange the token with Identity Center to use one or more of the TTIs. Additionally, as part of the configuration process, you specify the audience values that are expected to be used with the external OAuth token.

  • If the applications are managed AWS services, AWS performs most of the configuration process. For example, the Amazon Redshift administrator connects Amazon Redshift to IAM Identity Center, and then connects a specific Amazon Redshift cluster to Identity Center. The Amazon Redshift cluster exchanges the token and must be configured to do so, which is done through the Amazon Redshift administrative console or APIs and doesn’t require additional configuration.
  • If the applications are third-party and not managed by AWS, your IAM Identity Center administrator must register the application and configure it for token exchange. For example, suppose you create an application that obtains an OAuth token from Okta Universal Directory and calls S3 Access Grants. The Identity Center administrator must add this application as a customer managed application and must grant the application permissions to exchange tokens.

How to set up TTIs

To create new TTIs, open the IAM Identity Center console, choose Settings, and then choose Create trusted token issuer, as shown in Figure 2. In this section, I show an example of how to use the console to create a new TTI to exchange tokens with my Okta IdP, where I already created my OIDC application to use with my new IAM Identity Center application.

Figure 2: Configure the TTI in the IAM Identity Center console

Figure 2: Configure the TTI in the IAM Identity Center console

TTI uses the issuer URL to discover the OpenID configuration. Because I use Okta, I can verify that my IdP discovery URL is accessible at https://{my-okta-domain}.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration. I can also verify that the OpenID configuration URL responds with a JSON that contains the jwks_uri attribute, which contains a URL that lists the keys that are used by my IdP to sign the JWT tokens. Trusted token issuer requires that both URLs are publicly accessible.

I then configure the attributes I want to use to map the identity of the Okta user with the user in IAM Identity Center in the Map attributes section. I can get the attributes from an OIDC identity token issued by Okta:

{
    "sub": "00u22603n2TgCxTgs5d7",
    "email": "<masked>",
    "ver": 1,
    "iss": "https://<masked>.okta.com",
    "aud": "123456nqqVBTdtk7890",
    "iat": 1699550469,
    "exp": 1699554069,
    "jti": "ID.MojsBne1SlND7tCMtZPbpiei9p-goJsOmCiHkyEhUj8",
    "amr": [
        "pwd"
    ],
    "idp": "<masked>",
    "auth_time": 1699527801,
    "at_hash": "ZFteB9l4MXc9virpYaul9A"
}

I’m requesting a token with an additional email scope, because I want to use this attribute to match against the email of my IAM Identity Center users. In most cases, your Identity Center users are synchronized with your central identity provider by using automatic provisioning with the SCIM protocol. In this case, you can use the Identity Center external ID attribute to match with oid or sub attributes. The only requirement for TTI is that those attributes create a one-to-one mapping between the two IdPs.

Now that I have created my TTI, I can associate it with my IAM Identity Center applications. As explained previously, there are two use cases. For the managed AWS service-driven token exchange use case, use the service-specific interface to do so. For example, I can use my TTI with Amazon Redshift, as shown in Figure 3:

Figure 3: Configure the TTI with Amazon Redshift

Figure 3: Configure the TTI with Amazon Redshift

I selected Okta as the TTI to use for this integration, and I now need to configure the audclaim value that the application will use to accept the token. I can find it when creating the application from the IdP side–in this example, the value is 123456nqqVBTdtk7890, and I can obtain it by using the preceding example OIDC identity token.

I can also use the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to configure the IAM Identity Center application with the appropriate application grants:

aws sso put-application-grant \
    --application-arn "<my-application-arn>" \
    --grant-type "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" \
    --grant '
    {
        "JwtBearer": { 
            "AuthorizedTokenIssuers": [
                {
                    "TrustedTokenIssuerArn": "<my-tti-arn>", 
                    "AuthorizedAudiences": [
                        "123456nqqVBTdtk7890"
                    ]
                 }
            ]
       }
    }'

Perform a token exchange

For AWS service-driven use cases, the token exchange between your IdP and IAM Identity Center is performed automatically by the service itself. For third-party application-driven token exchange, such as when building your own Identity Center application with S3 Access Grants, your application performs the token exchange by using the Identity Center OIDC API action CreateTokenWithIAM:

aws sso-oidc create-token-with-iam \  
    --client-id "<my-application-arn>" \ 
    --grant-type "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" \
    --assertion "<jwt-from-idp>"

This action is performed by an IAM principal, which then uses the result to interact with AWS services.

If successful, the result looks like the following:

{
    "accessToken": "<idc-access-token>",
    "tokenType": "Bearer",
    "expiresIn": 3600,
    "idToken": "<jwt-idc-identity-token>",
    "issuedTokenType": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
    "scope": [
        "sts:identity_context",
        "openid",
        "aws"
    ]
}

The value of the scope attribute varies depending on the IAM Identity Center application that you’re interacting with, because it defines the permissions associated with the application.

You can also inspect the idToken attribute because it’s JWT-encoded:

{
    "aws:identity_store_id": "d-123456789",
    "sub": "93445892-f001-7078-8c38-7f2b978f686f",
    "aws:instance_account": "12345678912",
    "iss": "https://identitycenter.amazonaws.com/ssoins-69870e74abba8440",
    "sts:audit_context": "<sts-token>",
    "aws:identity_store_arn": "arn:aws:identitystore::12345678912:identitystore/d-996701d649",
    "aud": "20bSatbAF2kiR7lxX5Vdp2V1LWNlbnRyYWwtMQ",
    "aws:instance_arn": "arn:aws:sso:::instance/ssoins-69870e74abba8440",
    "aws:credential_id": "<masked>",
    "act": {
      "sub": "arn:aws:sso::12345678912:trustedTokenIssuer/ssoins-69870e74abba8440/c38448c2-e030-7092-0f0a-b594f83fcf82"
    },
    "aws:application_arn": "arn:aws:sso::12345678912:application/ssoins-69870e74abba8440/apl-0ed2bf0be396a325",
    "auth_time": "2023-11-10T08:00:08Z",
    "exp": 1699606808,
    "iat": 1699603208
  }

The token contains:

  • The AWS account and the IAM Identity Center instance and application that accepted the token exchange
  • The unique user ID of the user that was matched in IAM Identity Center (attribute sub)

AWS services can now use the STS Audit Context token (found in the attribute sts:audit_context) to create identity-aware sessions with the STS API. You can audit the API calls performed by the identity-aware sessions in AWS CloudTrail, by inspecting the attribute onBehalfOf within the field userIdentity. In this example, you can see an API call that was performed with an identity-aware session:

"userIdentity": {
    ...
    "onBehalfOf": {
        "userId": "93445892-f001-7078-8c38-7f2b978f686f",
        "identityStoreArn": "arn:aws:identitystore::425341151473:identitystore/d-996701d649"
    }
}

You can thus quickly filter actions that an AWS principal performs on behalf of your IAM Identity Center user.

Troubleshooting TTI

You can troubleshoot token exchange errors by verifying that:

  • The OpenID discovery URL is publicly accessible.
  • The OpenID discovery URL response conforms with the OpenID standard.
  • The OpenID keys URL referenced in the discovery response is publicly accessible.
  • The issuer URL that you configure in the TTI exactly matches the value of the iss scope that your IdP returns.
  • The user attribute that you configure in the TTI exists in the JWT that your IdP returns.
  • The user attribute value that you configure in the TTI matches exactly one existing IAM Identity Center user on the target attribute.
  • The aud scope exists in the token returned from your IdP and exactly matches what is configured in the requested IAM Identity Center application.
  • The jti claim exists in the token returned from your IdP.
  • If you use an IAM Identity Center application that requires user or group assignments, the matched Identity Center user is already assigned to the application or belongs to a group assigned to the application.

Note: When an IAM Identity Center application doesn’t require user or group assignments, the token exchange will succeed if the preceding conditions are met. This configuration implies that the connected AWS service requires additional security assignments. For example, Amazon Redshift administrators need to configure access to the data within Amazon Redshift. The token exchange doesn’t grant implicit access to the AWS services.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we introduced the trust token issuer feature of IAM Identity Center and what it offers, how it’s configured, and how you can use it to integrate your IdP with AWS services. You learned how to use TTI with AWS-managed applications and third-party applications by configuring the appropriate parameters. You also learned how to troubleshoot token-exchange issues and audit access through CloudTrail.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS IAM Identity Center re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Roberto Migli

Roberto Migli

Roberto is a Principal Solutions Architect at AWS. Roberto supports global financial services customers, focusing on security and identity and access management. In his free time, he enjoys building electronic gadgets, learning about space, and spending time with his family.

Ron Cully

Ron Cully

Ron is a Principal Product Manager at AWS where he leads feature and roadmap planning for workforce identity products at AWS. Ron has over 20 years of industry experience in product and program management in networking and directory related products. He is passionate about delivering secure, reliable solutions that help make it simple for customers to migrate directory-aware applications and workloads to the cloud.

Rafael Koike

Rafael Koike

Rafael is a Principal Solutions Architect supporting enterprise customers in the Southeast and is a Storage SME. Rafael has a passion to build, and his expertise in security, storage, networking, and application development has been instrumental in helping customers move to the cloud quickly and securely.

How to improve cross-account access for SaaS applications accessing customer accounts

Post Syndicated from Ashwin Phadke original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-improve-cross-account-access-for-saas-applications-accessing-customer-accounts/

Several independent software vendors (ISVs) and software as a service (SaaS) providers need to access their customers’ Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts, especially if the SaaS product accesses data from customer environments. SaaS providers have adopted multiple variations of this third-party access scenario. In some cases, the providers ask the customer for an access key and a secret key, which is not recommended because these are long-term user credentials and require processes to be built for periodic rotation. However, in most cases, the provider has an integration guide with specific details on creating a cross-account AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role.

In all these scenarios, as a SaaS vendor, you should add the necessary protections to your SaaS implementation. At AWS, security is the top priority and we recommend that customers follow best practices and incorporate security in their product design. In this blog post intended for SaaS providers, I describe three ways to improve your cross-account access implementation for your products.

Why is this important?

As a security specialist, I’ve worked with multiple ISV customers on improving the security of their products, specifically on this third-party cross-account access scenario. Consumers of your SaaS products don’t want to give more access permissions than are necessary for the product’s proper functioning. At the same time, you should maintain and provide a secure SaaS product to protect your customers’ and your own AWS accounts from unauthorized access or privilege escalations.

Let’s consider a hypothetical scenario with a simple SaaS implementation where a customer is planning to use a SaaS product. In Figure 1, you can see that the SaaS product has multiple different components performing separate functions, for example, a SaaS product with separate components performing compute analysis, storage analysis, and log analysis. The SaaS provider asks the customer to provide IAM user credentials and uses those in their product to access customer resources. Let’s look at three techniques for improving the cross-account access for this scenario. Each technique builds on the previous one, so you could adopt an incremental approach to implement these techniques.

Figure 1: SaaS architecture using customer IAM user credentials

Figure 1: SaaS architecture using customer IAM user credentials

Technique 1 – Using IAM roles and an external ID

As stated previously, IAM user credentials are long-term, so customers would need to implement processes to rotate these periodically and share them with the ISV.

As a better option, SaaS product components can use IAM roles, which provide short-term credentials to the component assuming the role. These credentials need to be refreshed depending on the role’s session duration setting (the default is 1 hour) to continue accessing the resources. IAM roles also provide an advantage for auditing purposes because each time an IAM principal assumes a role, a new session is created, and this can be used to identify and audit activity for separate sessions.

When using IAM roles for third-party access, an important consideration is the confused deputy problem, where an unauthorized entity could coerce the product components into performing an action against another customers’ resources. To mitigate this problem, a highly recommended approach is to use the external ID parameter when assuming roles in customers’ accounts. It’s important and recommended that you generate these external ID parameters to make sure they’re unique for each of your customers, for example, using a customer ID or similar attribute. For external ID character restrictions, see the IAM quotas page. Your customers will use this external ID in their IAM role’s trust policy, and your product components will pass this as a parameter in all AssumeRole API calls to customer environments. An example of the trust policy principal and condition blocks for the role to be assumed in the customer’s account follows:

    "Principal": {"AWS": "<SaaS Provider’s AWS account ID>"},
    "Condition": {"StringEquals": {"sts:ExternalId": "<Unique ID Assigned by SaaS Provider>"}}
Figure 2: SaaS architecture using an IAM role and external ID

Figure 2: SaaS architecture using an IAM role and external ID

Technique 2 – Using least-privilege IAM policies and role chaining

As an IAM best practice, we recommend that an IAM role should only have the minimum set of permissions as required to perform its functions. When your customers create an IAM role in Technique 1, they might inadvertently provide more permissions than necessary to use your product. The role could have permissions associated with multiple AWS services and might become overly permissive. If you provide granular permissions for separate AWS services, you might reach the policy size quota or policies per role quota. See IAM quotas for more information. That’s why, in addition to Technique 1, we recommend that each component have a separate IAM role in the customer’s account with only the minimum permissions required for its functions.

As a part of your integration guide to the customer, you should ask them to create appropriate IAM policies for these IAM roles. There needs to be a clear separation of duties and least privilege access for the product components. For example, an account-monitoring SaaS provider might use a separate IAM role for Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) monitoring and another one for AWS CloudTrail monitoring. Your components will also use separate IAM roles in your own AWS account. However, you might want to provide a single integration IAM role to customers to establish the trust relationship with each component role in their account. In effect, you will be using the concept of role chaining to access your customer’s accounts. The auditing mechanisms on the customer’s end will only display the integration IAM role sessions.

When using role chaining, you must be aware of certain caveats and limitations. Your components will each have separate roles: Role A, which will assume the integration role (Role B), and then use the Role B credentials to assume the customer role (Role C) in customer’s accounts. You need to properly define the correct permissions for each of these roles, because the permissions of the previous role aren’t passed while assuming the role. Optionally, you can pass an IAM policy document known as a session policy as a parameter while assuming the role, and the effective permissions will be a logical intersection of the passed policy and the attached permissions for the role. To learn more about these session policies, see session policies.

Another consideration of using role chaining is that it limits your AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or AWS API role session duration to a maximum of one hour. This means that you must track the sessions and perform credential refresh actions every hour to continue accessing the resources.

Figure 3: SaaS architecture with role chaining

Figure 3: SaaS architecture with role chaining

Technique 3 – Using role tags and session tags for attribute-based access control

When you create your IAM roles for role chaining, you define which entity can assume the role. You will need to add each component-specific IAM role to the integration role’s trust relationship. As the number of components within your product increases, you might reach the maximum length of the role trust policy. See IAM quotas for more information.

That’s why, in addition to the above two techniques, we recommend using attribute-based access control (ABAC), which is an authorization strategy that defines permissions based on tag attributes. You should tag all the component IAM roles with role tags and use these role tags as conditions in the trust policy for the integration role as shown in the following example. Optionally, you could also include instructions in the product integration guide for tagging customers’ IAM roles with certain role tags and modify the IAM policy of the integration role to allow it to assume only roles with those role tags. This helps in reducing IAM policy length and minimizing the risk of reaching the IAM quota.

"Condition": {
     "StringEquals": {"iam:ResourceTag/<Product>": "<ExampleSaaSProduct>"}

Another consideration for improving the auditing and traceability for your product is IAM role session tags. These could be helpful if you use CloudTrail log events for alerting on specific role sessions. If your SaaS product also operates on CloudTrail logs, you could use these session tags to identify the different sessions from your product. As opposed to role tags, which are tags attached to an IAM role, session tags are key-value pair attributes that you pass when you assume an IAM role. These can be used to identify a session and further control or restrict access to resources based on the tags. Session tags can also be used along with role chaining. When you use session tags with role chaining, you can set the keys as transitive to make sure that you pass them to subsequent sessions. CloudTrail log events for these role sessions will contain the session tags, transitive tags, and role (also called principal) tags.

Conclusion

In this post, we discussed three incremental techniques that build on each other and are important for SaaS providers to improve security and access control while implementing cross-account access to their customers. As a SaaS provider, it’s important to verify that your product adheres to security best practices. When you improve security for your product, you’re also improving security for your customers.

To see more tutorials about cross-account access concepts, visit the AWS documentation on IAM Roles, ABAC, and session tags.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Identity and Access Management re:Post or contact AWS Support.

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Ashwin Phadke

Ashwin Phadke

Ashwin is a Sr. Solutions Architect, working with large enterprises and ISV customers to build highly available, scalable, and secure applications, and to help them successfully navigate through their cloud journey. He is passionate about information security and enjoys working on creative solutions for customers’ security challenges.

Optimize AWS administration with IAM paths

Post Syndicated from David Rowe original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/optimize-aws-administration-with-iam-paths/

As organizations expand their Amazon Web Services (AWS) environment and migrate workloads to the cloud, they find themselves dealing with many AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and policies. These roles and policies multiply because IAM fills a crucial role in securing and controlling access to AWS resources. Imagine you have a team creating an application. You create an IAM role to grant them access to the necessary AWS resources, such as Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) buckets, Amazon Key Management Service (Amazon KMS) keys, and Amazon Elastic File Service (Amazon EFS) shares. With additional workloads and new data access patterns, the number of IAM roles and policies naturally increases. With the growing complexity of resources and data access patterns, it becomes crucial to streamline access and simplify the management of IAM policies and roles

In this blog post, we illustrate how you can use IAM paths to organize IAM policies and roles and provide examples you can use as a foundation for your own use cases.

How to use paths with your IAM roles and policies

When you create a role or policy, you create it with a default path. In IAM, the default path for resources is “/”. Instead of using a default path, you can create and use paths and nested paths as a structure to manage IAM resources. The following example shows an IAM role named S3Access in the path developer:

arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/developer/S3Access

Service-linked roles are created in a reserved path /aws-service-role/. The following is an example of a service-linked role path.

arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/SERVICE-NAME.amazonaws.com/SERVICE-LINKED-ROLE-NAME

The following example is of an IAM policy named S3ReadOnlyAccess in the path security:

arn:aws:iam::111122223333:policy/security/S3ReadOnlyAccess

Why use IAM paths with roles and policies?

By using IAM paths with roles and policies, you can create groupings and design a logical separation to simplify management. You can use these groupings to grant access to teams, delegate permissions, and control what roles can be passed to AWS services. In the following sections, we illustrate how to use IAM paths to create groupings of roles and policies by referencing a fictional company and its expansion of AWS resources.

First, to create roles and policies with a path, you use the IAM API or AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to run aws cli create-role.

The following is an example of an AWS CLI command that creates a role in an IAM path.

aws iam create-role --role-name <ROLE-NAME> --assume-role-policy-document file://assume-role-doc.json --path <PATH>

Replace <ROLE-NAME> and <PATH> in the command with your role name and role path respectively. Use a trust policy for the trust document that matches your use case. An example trust policy that allows Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances to assume this role on your behalf is below:

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "sts:AssumeRole"
            ],
            "Principal": {
                "Service": [
                    "ec2.amazonaws.com"
                ]
            }
        }
    ]
}

The following is an example of an AWS CLI command that creates a policy in an IAM path.

aws iam create-policy --policy-name <POLICY-NAME> --path <PATH> --policy-document file://policy.json

IAM paths sample implementation

Let’s assume you’re a cloud platform architect at AnyCompany, a startup that’s planning to expand its AWS environment. By the end of the year, AnyCompany is going to expand from one team of developers to multiple teams, all of which require access to AWS. You want to design a scalable way to manage IAM roles and policies to simplify the administrative process to give permissions to each team’s roles. To do that, you create groupings of roles and policies based on teams.

Organize IAM roles with paths

AnyCompany decided to create the following roles based on teams.

Team name Role name IAM path Has access to
Security universal-security-readonly /security/ All resources
Team A database administrators DBA-role-A /teamA/ TeamA’s databases
Team B database administrators DBA-role-B /teamB/ TeamB’s databases

The following are example Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) for the roles listed above. In this example, you define IAM paths to create a grouping based on team names.

  1. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/security/universal-security-readonly-role
  2. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/DBA-role-A
  3. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamB/DBA-role-B

Note: Role names must be unique within your AWS account regardless of their IAM paths. You cannot have two roles named DBA-role, even if they’re in separate paths.

Organize IAM policies with paths

After you’ve created roles in IAM paths, you will create policies to provide permissions to these roles. The same path structure that was defined in the IAM roles is used for the IAM policies. The following is an example of how to create a policy with an IAM path. After you create the policy, you can attach the policy to a role using the attach-role-policy command.

aws iam create-policy --policy-name <POLICY-NAME> --policy-document file://policy-doc.json --path <PATH>
  1. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/security/universal-security-readonly-policy
  2. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/teamA/DBA-policy-A
  3. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/teamB/DBA-policy-B

Grant access to groupings of IAM roles with resource-based policies

Now that you’ve created roles and policies in paths, you can more readily define which groups of principals can access a resource. In this deny statement example, you allow only the roles in the IAM path /teamA/ to act on your bucket, and you deny access to all other IAM principals. Rather than use individual roles to deny access to the bucket, which would require you to list every role, you can deny access to an entire group of principals by path. If you create a new role in your AWS account in the specified path, you don’t need to modify the policy to include them. The path-based deny statement will apply automatically.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Action": "s3:*",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Resource": [
		"arn:aws:s3:::EXAMPLE-BUCKET",
		"arn:aws:s3:::EXAMPLE-BUCKET/*"
		],
      "Principal": "*",
"Condition": {
        "ArnNotLike": {
          "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/teamA/*"
        }
      }
}
  ]
}

Delegate access with IAM paths

IAM paths can also enable teams to more safely create IAM roles and policies and allow teams to only use the roles and policies contained by the paths. Paths can help prevent teams from privilege escalation by denying the use of roles that don’t belong to their team.

Continuing the example above, AnyCompany established a process that allows each team to create their own IAM roles and policies, providing they’re in a specified IAM path. For example, AnyCompany allows team A to create IAM roles and policies for team A in the path /teamA/:

  1. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/<role-name>
  2. arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/teamA/<policy-name>

Using IAM paths, AnyCompany can allow team A to more safely create and manage their own IAM roles and policies and safely pass those roles to AWS services using the iam:PassRole permission.

At AnyCompany, four IAM policies using IAM paths allow teams to more safely create and manage their own IAM roles and policies. Following recommended best practices, AnyCompany uses infrastructure as code (IaC) for all IAM role and policy creation. The four path-based policies that follow will be attached to each team’s CI/CD pipeline role, which has permissions to create roles. The following example focuses on team A, and how these policies enable them to self-manage their IAM credentials.

  1. Create a role in the path and modify inline policies on the role: This policy allows three actions: iam:CreateRole, iam:PutRolePolicy, and iam:DeleteRolePolicy. When this policy is attached to a principal, that principal is allowed to create roles in the IAM path /teamA/ and add and delete inline policies on roles in that IAM path.
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
    {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:CreateRole",
                "iam:PutRolePolicy",
                "iam:DeleteRolePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/*"
        }
    ]
    }

  2. Add and remove managed policies: The second policy example allows two actions: iam:AttachRolePolicy and iam:DetachRolePolicy. This policy allows a principal to attach and detach managed policies in the /teamA/ path to roles that are created in the /teamA/ path.
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
    
    {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
                "iam:DetachRolePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/*",
            "Condition": {
                "ArnLike": {
                    "iam:PolicyARN": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/teamA/*"
                }          
            }
        }
    ]}

  3. Delete roles, tag and untag roles, read roles: The third policy allows a principal to delete roles, tag and untag roles, and retrieve information about roles that are created in the /teamA/ path.
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
    
    
    {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:DeleteRole",
                "iam:TagRole",
                "iam:UntagRole",
                "iam:GetRole",
                "iam:GetRolePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/*"
        }]}

  4. Policy management in IAM path: The final policy example allows access to create, modify, get, and delete policies that are created in the /teamA/ path. This includes creating, deleting, and tagging policies.
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
    
    {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "iam:CreatePolicy",
                "iam:DeletePolicy",
                "iam:CreatePolicyVersion",            
                "iam:DeletePolicyVersion",
                "iam:GetPolicy",
                "iam:TagPolicy",
                "iam:UntagPolicy",
                "iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion",
                "iam:ListPolicyVersions"
             ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:policy/teamA/*"
        }]}

Safely pass roles with IAM paths and iam:PassRole

To pass a role to an AWS service, a principal must have the iam:PassRole permission. IAM paths are the recommended option to restrict which roles a principal can pass when granted the iam:PassRole permission. IAM paths help verify principals can only pass specific roles or groupings of roles to an AWS service.

At AnyCompany, the security team wants to allow team A to add IAM roles to an instance profile and attach it to Amazon EC2 instances, but only if the roles are in the /teamA/ path. The IAM action that allows team A to provide the role to the instance is iam:PassRole. The security team doesn’t want team A to be able to pass other roles in the account, such as an administrator role.

The policy that follows allows passing of a role that was created in the /teamA/ path and does not allow the passing of other roles such as an administrator role.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": "iam:PassRole",
        "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/teamA/*"
    }]
}

How to create preventative guardrails for sensitive IAM paths

You can use service control policies (SCP) to restrict access to sensitive roles and policies within specific IAM paths. You can use an SCP to prevent the modification of sensitive roles and policies that are created in a defined path.

You will see the IAM path under the resource and condition portion of the statement. Only the role named IAMAdministrator created in the /security/ path can create or modify roles in the security path. This SCP allows you to delegate IAM role and policy management to developers with confidence that they won’t be able to create, modify, or delete any roles or policies in the security path.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
	    "Sid": "RestrictIAMWithPathManagement",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": [
                "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
                "iam:CreateRole",
                "iam:DeleteRole",
                "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary",
                "iam:DeleteRolePolicy",
                "iam:DetachRolePolicy",
                "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary",
                "iam:PutRolePolicy",
                "iam:UpdateRole",
                "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy",
                "iam:UpdateRoleDescription",
                "sts:AssumeRole",
                "iam:TagRole",
                "iam:UntagRole"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::*:role/security/* "
            ],
            "Condition": {
                "ArnNotLike": {
                    "aws:PrincipalARN": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/security/IAMAdministrator"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

This next example shows you how you can safely exempt IAM roles created in the security path from specific controls in your organization. The policy denies all roles except the roles created in the /security/ IAM path to close member accounts.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "PreventCloseAccount",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "organizations:CloseAccount",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "ArnNotLikeIfExists": {
          "aws:PrincipalArn": [
            "arn:aws:iam::*:role/security/*"
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Additional considerations when using IAM paths

You should be aware of some additional considerations when you start using IAM paths.

  1. Paths are immutable for IAM roles and policies. To change a path, you must delete the IAM resource and recreate the IAM resource in the alternative path. Deleting roles or instance profiles has step-by-step instructions to delete an IAM resource.
  2. You can only create IAM paths using AWS API or command line tools. You cannot create IAM paths with the AWS console.
  3. IAM paths aren’t added to the uniqueness of the role name. Role names must be unique within your account without the path taken into consideration.
  4. AWS reserves several paths including /aws-service-role/ and you cannot create roles in this path.

Conclusion

IAM paths provide a powerful mechanism for effectively grouping IAM resources. Path-based groupings can streamline access management across AWS services. In this post, you learned how to use paths with IAM principals to create structured access with IAM roles, how to delegate and segregate access within an account, and safely pass roles using iam:PassRole. These techniques can empower you to fine-tune your AWS access management and help improve security while streamlining operational workflows.

You can use the following references to help extend your knowledge of IAM paths. This post references the processes outlined in the user guides and blog post, and sources the IAM policies from the GitHub repositories.

  1. AWS Organizations User Guide, SCP General Examples
  2. AWS-Samples Service-control-policy-examples GitHub Repository
  3. AWS Security Blog: IAM Policy types: How and when to use them
  4. AWS-Samples how-and-when-to-use-aws-iam-policy-blog-samples GitHub Repository

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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David Rowe

David Rowe

As a Senior Solutions Architect, David unites diverse global teams to drive cloud transformation through strategies and intuitive identity solutions. He creates consensus, guiding teams to adopt emerging technologies. He thrives on bringing together cross-functional perspectives to transform vision into reality in dynamic industries.

Security at multiple layers for web-administered apps

Post Syndicated from Guy Morton original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/security-at-multiple-layers-for-web-administered-apps/

In this post, I will show you how to apply security at multiple layers of a web application hosted on AWS.

Apply security at all layers is a design principle of the Security pillar of the AWS Well-Architected Framework. It encourages you to apply security at the network edge, virtual private cloud (VPC), load balancer, compute instance (or service), operating system, application, and code.

Many popular web apps are designed with a single layer of security: the login page. Behind that login page is an in-built administration interface that is directly exposed to the internet. Admin interfaces for these apps typically have simple login mechanisms and often lack multi-factor authentication (MFA) support, which can make them an attractive target for threat actors.

The in-built admin interface can also be problematic if you want to horizontally scale across multiple servers. The admin interface is available on every server that runs the app, so it creates a large attack surface. Because the admin interface updates the software on its own server, you must synchronize updates across a fleet of instances.

Multi-layered security is about identifying (or creating) isolation boundaries around the parts of your architecture and minimizing what is permitted to cross each boundary. Adding more layers to your architecture gives you the opportunity to introduce additional controls at each layer, creating more boundaries where security controls can be enforced.

In the example app scenario in this post, you have the opportunity to add many additional layers of security.

Example of multi-layered security

This post demonstrates how you can use the Run Web-Administered Apps on AWS sample project to help address these challenges, by implementing a horizontally-scalable architecture with multi-layered security. The project builds and configures many different AWS services, each designed to help provide security at different layers.

By running this solution, you can produce a segmented architecture that separates the two functions of these apps into an unprivileged public-facing view and an admin view. This design limits access to the web app’s admin functions while creating a fleet of unprivileged instances to serve the app at scale.

Figure 1 summarizes how the different services in this solution work to help provide security at the following layers:

  1. At the network edge
  2. Within the VPC
  3. At the load balancer
  4. On the compute instances
  5. Within the operating system
Figure 1: Logical flow diagram to apply security at multiple layers

Figure 1: Logical flow diagram to apply security at multiple layers

Deep dive on a multi-layered architecture

The following diagram shows the solution architecture deployed by Run Web-Administered Apps on AWS. The figure shows how the services deployed in this solution are deployed in different AWS Regions, and how requests flow from the application user through the different service layers.

Figure 2: Multi-layered architecture

Figure 2: Multi-layered architecture

This post will dive deeper into each of the architecture’s layers to see how security is added at each layer. But before we talk about the technology, let’s consider how infrastructure is built and managed — by people.

Perimeter 0 – Security at the people layer

Security starts with the people in your team and your organization’s operational practices. How your “people layer” builds and manages your infrastructure contributes significantly to your security posture.

A design principle of the Security pillar of the Well-Architected Framework is to automate security best practices. This helps in two ways: it reduces the effort required by people over time, and it helps prevent resources from being in inconsistent or misconfigured states. When people use manual processes to complete tasks, misconfigurations and missed steps are common.

The simplest way to automate security while reducing human effort is to adopt services that AWS manages for you, such as Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS). With Amazon RDS, AWS is responsible for the operating system and database software patching, and provides tools to make it simple for you to back up and restore your data.

You can automate and integrate key security functions by using managed AWS security services, such as Amazon GuardDuty, AWS Config, Amazon Inspector, and AWS Security Hub. These services provide network monitoring, configuration management, and detection of software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. As your cloud environments grow in scale and complexity, automated security monitoring is critical.

Infrastructure as code (IaC) is a best practice that you can follow to automate the creation of infrastructure. By using IaC to define, configure, and deploy the AWS resources that you use, you reduce the likelihood of human error when building AWS infrastructure.

Adopting IaC can help you improve your security posture because it applies the rigor of application code development to infrastructure provisioning. Storing your infrastructure definition in a source control system (such as AWS CodeCommit) creates an auditable artifact. With version control, you can track changes made to it over time as your architecture evolves.

You can add automated testing to your IaC project to help ensure that your infrastructure is aligned with your organization’s security policies. If you ever need to recover from a disaster, you can redeploy the entire architecture from your IaC project.

Another people-layer discipline is to apply the principle of least privilege. AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) is a flexible and fine-grained permissions system that you can use to grant the smallest set of actions that your solution needs. You can use IAM to control access for both humans and machines, and we use it in this project to grant the compute instances the least privileges required.

You can also adopt other IAM best practices such as using temporary credentials instead of long-lived ones (such as access keys), and regularly reviewing and removing unused users, roles, permissions, policies, and credentials.

Perimeter 1 – network protections

The internet is public and therefore untrusted, so you must proactively address the risks from threat actors and network-level attacks.

To reduce the risk of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, this solution uses AWS Shield for managed protection at the network edge. AWS Shield Standard is automatically enabled for all AWS customers at no additional cost and is designed to provide protection from common network and transport layer DDoS attacks. For higher levels of protection against attacks that target your applications, subscribe to AWS Shield Advanced.

Amazon Route 53 resolves the hostnames that the solution uses and maps the hostnames as aliases to an Amazon CloudFront distribution. Route 53 is a robust and highly available globally distributed DNS service that inspects requests to protect against DNS-specific attack types, such as DNS amplification attacks.

Perimeter 2 – request processing

CloudFront also operates at the AWS network edge and caches, transforms, and forwards inbound requests to the relevant origin services across the low-latency AWS global network. The risk of DDoS attempts overwhelming your application servers is further reduced by caching web requests in CloudFront.

The solution configures CloudFront to add a shared secret to the origin request within a custom header. A CloudFront function copies the originating user’s IP to another custom header. These headers get checked when the request arrives at the load balancer.

AWS WAF, a web application firewall, blocks known bad traffic, including cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection events that come into CloudFront. This project uses AWS Managed Rules, but you can add your own rules, as well. To restrict frontend access to permitted IP CIDR blocks, this project configures an IP restriction rule on the web application firewall.

Perimeter 3 – the VPC

After CloudFront and AWS WAF check the request, CloudFront forwards it to the compute services inside an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC). VPCs are logically isolated networks within your AWS account that you can use to control the network traffic that is allowed in and out. This project configures its VPC to use a private IPv4 CIDR block that cannot be directly routed to or from the internet, creating a network perimeter around your resources on AWS.

The Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances are hosted in private subnets within the VPC that have no inbound route from the internet. Using a NAT gateway, instances can make necessary outbound requests. This design hosts the database instances in isolated subnets that don’t have inbound or outbound internet access. Amazon RDS is a managed service, so AWS manages patching of the server and database software.

The solution accesses AWS Secrets Manager by using an interface VPC endpoint. VPC endpoints use AWS PrivateLink to connect your VPC to AWS services as if they were in your VPC. In this way, resources in the VPC can communicate with Secrets Manager without traversing the internet.

The project configures VPC Flow Logs as part of the VPC setup. VPC flow logs capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. GuardDuty analyzes these logs and uses threat intelligence data to identify unexpected, potentially unauthorized, and malicious activity within your AWS environment.

Although using VPCs and subnets to segment parts of your application is a common strategy, there are other ways that you can achieve partitioning for application components:

  • You can use separate VPCs to restrict access to a database, and use VPC peering to route traffic between them.
  • You can use a multi-account strategy so that different security and compliance controls are applied in different accounts to create strong logical boundaries between parts of a system. You can route network requests between accounts by using services such as AWS Transit Gateway, and control them using AWS Network Firewall.

There are always trade-offs between complexity, convenience, and security, so the right level of isolation between components depends on your requirements.

Perimeter 4 – the load balancer

After the request is sent to the VPC, an Application Load Balancer (ALB) processes it. The ALB distributes requests to the underlying EC2 instances. The ALB uses TLS version 1.2 to encrypt incoming connections with an AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) certificate.

Public access to the load balancer isn’t allowed. A security group applied to the ALB only allows inbound traffic on port 443 from the CloudFront IP range. This is achieved by specifying the Region-specific AWS-managed CloudFront prefix list as the source in the security group rule.

The ALB uses rules to decide whether to forward the request to the target instances or reject the traffic. As an additional layer of security, it uses the custom headers that the CloudFront distribution added to make sure that the request is from CloudFront. In another rule, the ALB uses the originating user’s IP to decide which target group of Amazon EC2 instances should handle the request. In this way, you can direct admin users to instances that are configured to allow admin tasks.

If a request doesn’t match a valid rule, the ALB returns a 404 response to the user.

Perimeter 5 – compute instance network security

A security group creates an isolation boundary around the EC2 instances. The only traffic that reaches the instance is the traffic that the security group rules allow. In this solution, only the ALB is allowed to make inbound connections to the EC2 instances.

A common practice is for customers to also open ports, or to set up and manage bastion hosts to provide remote access to their compute instances. The risk in this approach is that the ports could be left open to the whole internet, exposing the instances to vulnerabilities in the remote access protocol. With remote work on the rise, there is an increased risk for the creation of these overly permissive inbound rules.

Using AWS Systems Manager Session Manager, you can remove the need for bastion hosts or open ports by creating secure temporary connections to your EC2 instances using the installed SSM agent. As with every software package that you install, you should check that the SSM agent aligns with your security and compliance requirements. To review the source code to the SSM agent, see amazon-ssm-agent GitHub repo.

The compute layer of this solution consists of two separate Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling groups of EC2 instances. One group handles requests from administrators, while the other handles requests from unprivileged users. This creates another isolation boundary by keeping the functions separate while also helping to protect the system from a failure in one component causing the whole system to fail. Each Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling group spans multiple Availability Zones (AZs), providing resilience in the event of an outage in an AZ.

By using managed database services, you can reduce the risk that database server instances haven’t been proactively patched for security updates. Managed infrastructure helps reduce the risk of security issues that result from the underlying operating system not receiving security patches in a timely manner and the risk of downtime from hardware failures.

Perimeter 6 – compute instance operating system

When instances are first launched, the operating system must be secure, and the instances must be updated as required when new security patches are released. We recommend that you create immutable servers that you build and harden by using a tool such as EC2 Image Builder. Instead of patching running instances in place, replace them when an updated Amazon Machine Image (AMI) is created. This approach works in our example scenario because the application code (which changes over time) is stored on Amazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS), so when you replace the instances with a new AMI, you don’t need to update them with data that has changed after the initial deployment.

Another way that the solution helps improve security on your instances at the operating system is to use EC2 instance profiles to allow them to assume IAM roles. IAM roles grant temporary credentials to applications running on EC2, instead of using hard-coded credentials stored on the instance. Access to other AWS resources is provided using these temporary credentials.

The IAM roles have least privilege policies attached that grant permission to mount the EFS file system and access AWS Systems Manager. If a database secret exists in Secrets Manager, the IAM role is granted permission to access it.

Perimeter 7 – at the file system

Both Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling groups of EC2 instances share access to Amazon EFS, which hosts the files that the application uses. IAM authorization applies IAM file system policies to control the instance’s access to the file system. This creates another isolation boundary that helps prevent the non-admin instances from modifying the application’s files.

The admin group’s instances have the file system mounted in read-write mode. This is necessary so that the application can update itself, install add-ons, upload content, or make configuration changes. On the unprivileged instances, the file system is mounted in read-only mode. This means that these instances can’t make changes to the application code or configuration files.

The unprivileged instances have local file caching enabled. This caches files from the EFS file system on the local Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volume to help improve scalability and performance.

Perimeter 8 – web server configuration

This solution applies different web server configurations to the instances running in each Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling group. This creates a further isolation boundary at the web server layer.

The admin instances use the default configuration for the application that permits access to the admin interface. Non-admin, public-facing instances block admin routes, such as wp-login.php, and will return a 403 Forbidden response. This creates an additional layer of protection for those routes.

Perimeter 9 – database security

The database layer is within two additional isolation boundaries. The solution uses Amazon RDS, with database instances deployed in isolated subnets. Isolated subnets have no inbound or outbound internet access and can only be reached through other network interfaces within the VPC. The RDS security group further isolates the database instances by only allowing inbound traffic from the EC2 instances on the database server port.

By using IAM authentication for the database access, you can add an additional layer of security by configuring the non-admin instances with less privileged database user credentials.

Perimeter 10 – Security at the application code layer

To apply security at the application code level, you should establish good practices around installing updates as they become available. Most applications have email lists that you can subscribe to that will notify you when updates become available.

You should evaluate the quality of an application before you adopt it. The following are some metrics to consider:

  • Number of developers who are actively working on it
  • Frequency of updates to it
  • How quickly the developers respond with patches when bugs are reported

Other steps that you can take

Use AWS Verified Access to help secure application access for human users. With Verified Access, you can add another user authentication stage, to help ensure that only verified users can access an application’s administrative functions.

Amazon GuardDuty is a threat detection service that continuously monitors your AWS accounts and workloads for malicious activity and delivers detailed security findings for visibility and remediation. It can detect communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses and identify anomalous behavior. GuardDuty Malware Protection helps you detect the potential presence of malware by scanning the EBS volumes that are attached to your EC2 instances.

Amazon Inspector is an automated vulnerability management service that automatically discovers the Amazon EC2 instances that are running and scans them for software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. To help ensure that your web server instances are updated when security patches are available, use AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager.

Deploy the sample project

We wrote the Run Web-Administered Apps on AWS project by using the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK). With the AWS CDK, you can use the expressive power of familiar programming languages to define your application resources and accelerate development. The AWS CDK has support for multiple languages, including TypeScript, Python, .NET, Java, and Go.

This project uses Python. To deploy it, you need to have a working version of Python 3 on your computer. For instructions on how to install the AWS CDK, see Get Started with AWS CDK.

Configure the project

To enable this project to deploy multiple different web projects, you must do the configuration in the parameters.properties file. Two variables identify the configuration blocks: app (which identifies the web application to deploy) and env (which identifies whether the deployment is to a dev or test environment, or to production).

When you deploy the stacks, you specify the app and env variables as CDK context variables so that you can select between different configurations at deploy time. If you don’t specify a context, a [default] stanza in the parameters.properties file specifies the default app name and environment that will be deployed.

To name other stanzas, combine valid app and env values by using the format <app>-<env>. For each stanza, you can specify its own Regions, accounts, instance types, instance counts, hostnames, and more. For example, if you want to support three different WordPress deployments, you might specify the app name as wp, and for env, you might want devtest, and prod, giving you three stanzas: wp-devwp-test, and wp-prod.

The project includes sample configuration items that are annotated with comments that explain their function.

Use CDK bootstrapping

Before you can use the AWS CDK to deploy stacks into your account, you need to use CDK bootstrapping to provision resources in each AWS environment (account and Region combination) that you plan to use. For this project, you need to bootstrap both the US East (N. Virginia) Region (us-east-1)  and the home Region in which you plan to host your application.

Create a hosted zone in the target account

You need to have a hosted zone in Route 53 to allow the creation of DNS records and certificates. You must manually create the hosted zone by using the AWS Management Console. You can delegate a domain that you control to Route 53 and use it with this project. You can also register a domain through Route 53 if you don’t currently have one.

Run the project

Clone the project to your local machine and navigate to the project root. To create the Python virtual environment (venv) and install the dependencies, follow the steps in the Generic CDK instructions.

To create and configure the parameters.properties file

Copy the parameters-template.properties file (in the root folder of the project) to a file called parameters.properties and save it in the root folder. Open it with a text editor and then do the following:

If you want to restrict public access to your site, change 192.0.2.0/24 to the IP range that you want to allow. By providing a comma-separated list of allowedIps, you can add multiple allowed CIDR blocks.

If you don’t want to restrict public access, set allowedIps=* instead.

If you have forked this project into your own private repository, you can commit the parameters.properties file to your repo. To do that, comment out the parameters.properties  line in the .gitignore file.

To install the custom resource helper

The solution uses an AWS CloudFormation custom resource for cross-Region configuration management. To install the needed Python package, run the following command in the custom_resource directory:

cd custom_resource
pip install crhelper -t .

To learn more about CloudFormation custom resource creation, see AWS CloudFormation custom resource creation with Python, AWS Lambda, and crhelper.

To configure the database layer

Before you deploy the stacks, decide whether you want to include a data layer as part of the deployment. The dbConfig parameter determines what will happen, as follows:

  • If dbConfig is left empty — no database will be created and no database credentials will be available in your compute stacks
  • If dbConfig is set to instance — you will get a new Amazon RDS instance
  • If dbConfig is set to cluster — you will get an Amazon Aurora cluster
  • If dbConfig is set to none — if you previously created a database in this stack, the database will be deleted

If you specify either instance or cluster, you should also configure the following database parameters to match your requirements:

  • dbEngine — set the database engine to either mysql or postgres
  • dbSnapshot — specify the named snapshot for your database
  • dbSecret — if you are using an existing database, specify the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the secret where the database credentials and DNS endpoint are located
  • dbMajorVersion — set the major version of the engine that you have chosen; leave blank to get the default version
  • dbFullVersion — set the minor version of the engine that you have chosen; leave blank to get the default version
  • dbInstanceType — set the instance type that you want (note that these vary by service); don’t prefix with db. because the CDK will automatically prepend it
  • dbClusterSize — if you request a cluster, set this parameter to determine how many Amazon Aurora replicas are created

You can choose between mysql or postgres for the database engine. Other settings that you can choose are determined by that choice.

You will need to use an Amazon Machine Image (AMI) that has the CLI preinstalled, such as Amazon Linux 2, or install the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) yourself with a user data command. If instead of creating a new, empty database, you want to create one from a snapshot, supply the snapshot name by using the dbSnapshot parameter.

To create the database secret

AWS automatically creates and stores the RDS instance or Aurora cluster credentials in a Secrets Manager secret when you create a new instance or cluster. You make these credentials available to the compute stack through the db_secret_command variable, which contains a single-line bash command that returns the JSON from the AWS CLI command aws secretsmanager get-secret-value. You can interpolate this variable into your user data commands as follows:

SECRET=$({db_secret_command})
USERNAME=`echo $SECRET | jq -r '.username'`
PASSWORD=`echo $SECRET | jq -r '.password'`
DBNAME=`echo $SECRET | jq -r '.dbname'`
HOST=`echo $SECRET | jq -r '.host'`

If you create a database from a snapshot, make sure that your Secrets Manager secret and Amazon RDS snapshot are in the target Region. If you supply the secret for an existing database, make sure that the secret contains at least the following four key-value pairs (replace the <placeholder values> with your values):

{
    "password":"<your-password>",
    "dbname":"<your-database-name>",
    "host":"<your-hostname>",
    "username":"<your-username>"
}

The name for the secret must match the app value followed by the env value (both in title case), followed by DatabaseSecret, so for app=wp and env=dev, your secret name should be WpDevDatabaseSecret.

To deploy the stacks

The following commands deploy the stacks defined in the CDK app. To deploy them individually, use the specific stack names (these will vary according to the info that you supplied previously), as shown in the following.

cdk deploy wp-dev-network-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev
cdk deploy wp-dev-database-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev
cdk deploy wp-dev-compute-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev
cdk deploy wp-dev-cdn-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev

To create a database stack, deploy the network and database stacks first.

cdk deploy wp-dev-network-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev
cdk deploy wp-dev-database-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev

You can then initiate the deployment of the compute stack.

cdk deploy wp-dev-compute-stack -c app=wp -c env=dev

After the compute stack deploys, you can deploy the stack that creates the CloudFront distribution.

cdk deploy wp-dev-cdn-stack -c env=dev

This deploys the CloudFront infrastructure to the US East (N. Virginia) Region (us-east-1). CloudFront is a global AWS service, which means that you must create it in this Region. The other stacks are deployed to the Region that you specified in your configuration stanza.

To test the results

If your stacks deploy successfully, your site appears at one of the following URLs:

  • subdomain.hostedZone (if you specified a value for the subdomain) — for example, www.example.com
  • appName-env.hostedZone (if you didn’t specify a value for the subdomain) — for example, wp-dev.example.com.

If you connect through the IP address that you configured in the adminIps configuration, you should be connected to the admin instance for your site. Because the admin instance can modify the file system, you should use it to do your administrative tasks.

Users who connect to your site from an IP that isn’t in your allowedIps list will be connected to your fleet instances and won’t be able to alter the file system (for example, they won’t be able to install plugins or upload media).

If you need to redeploy the same app-env combination, manually remove the parameter store items and the replicated secret that you created in us-east-1. You should also delete the cdk.context.json file because it caches values that you will be replacing.

One project, multiple configurations

You can modify the configuration file in this project to deploy different applications to different environments using the same project. Each app can have different configurations for dev, test, or production environments.

Using this mechanism, you can deploy sites for test and production into different accounts or even different Regions. The solution uses CDK context variables as command-line switches to select different configuration stanzas from the configuration file.

CDK projects allow for multiple deployments to coexist in one account by using unique names for the deployed stacks, based on their configuration.

Check the configuration file into your source control repo so that you track changes made to it over time.

Got a different web app that you want to deploy? Create a new configuration by copying and pasting one of the examples and then modify the build commands as needed for your use case.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to build an architecture on AWS that implements multi-layered security. You can use different AWS services to provide protections to your application at different stages of the request lifecycle.

You can learn more about the services used in this sample project by building it in your own account. It’s a great way to explore how the different services work and the full features that are available. By understanding how these AWS services work, you will be ready to use them to add security, at multiple layers, in your own architectures.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Guy Morton

Guy Morton

Guy is a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS. He enjoys bringing his decades of experience as a full stack developer, architect, and people manager to helping customers build and scale their applications securely in the AWS Cloud. Guy has a passion for automation in all its forms, and is also an occasional songwriter and musician who performs under the pseudonym Whtsqr.

Introducing IAM Access Analyzer custom policy checks

Post Syndicated from Mitch Beaumont original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-iam-access-analyzer-custom-policy-checks/

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) Access Analyzer was launched in late 2019. Access Analyzer guides customers toward least-privilege permissions across Amazon Web Services (AWS) by using analysis techniques, such as automated reasoning, to make it simpler for customers to set, verify, and refine IAM permissions. Today, we are excited to announce the general availability of IAM Access Analyzer custom policy checks, a new IAM Access Analyzer feature that helps customers accurately and proactively check IAM policies for critical permissions and increases in policy permissiveness.

In this post, we’ll show how you can integrate custom policy checks into builder workflows to automate the identification of overly permissive IAM policies and IAM policies that contain permissions that you decide are sensitive or critical.

What is the problem?

Although security teams are responsible for the overall security posture of the organization, developers are the ones creating the applications that require permissions. To enable developers to move fast while maintaining high levels of security, organizations look for ways to safely delegate the ability of developers to author IAM policies. Many AWS customers implement manual IAM policy reviews before deploying developer-authored policies to production environments. Customers follow this practice to try to prevent excessive or unwanted permissions finding their way into production. Depending on the volume and complexity of the policies that need to be reviewed; these reviews can be intensive and take time. The result is a slowdown in development and potential delay in deployment of applications and services. Some customers write custom tooling to remove the manual burden of policy reviews, but this can be costly to build and maintain.

How do custom policy checks solve that problem?

Custom policy checks are a new IAM Access Analyzer capability that helps security teams accurately and proactively identify critical permissions in their policies. Custom policy checks can also tell you if a new version of a policy is more permissive than the previous version. Custom policy checks use automated reasoning, a form of static analysis, to provide a higher level of security assurance in the cloud. For more information, see Formal Reasoning About the Security of Amazon Web Services.

Custom policy checks can be embedded in a continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipeline so that checks can be run against policies without having to deploy the policies. In addition, developers can run custom policy checks from their local development environments and get fast feedback about whether or not the policies they are authoring are in line with your organization’s security standards.

How to analyze IAM policies with custom policy checks

In this section, we provide step-by-step instructions for using custom policy checks to analyze IAM policies.

Prerequisites

To complete the examples in our walkthrough, you will need the following:

  1. An AWS account, and an identity that has permissions to use the AWS services, and create the resources, used in the following examples. For more information, see the full sample code used in this blog post on GitHub.
  2. An installed and configured AWS CLI. For more information, see Configure the AWS CLI.
  3. The AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK). For installation instructions, refer to Install the AWS CDK.

Example 1: Use custom policy checks to compare two IAM policies and check that one does not grant more access than the other

In this example, you will create two IAM identity policy documents, NewPolicyDocument and ExistingPolicyDocument. You will use the new CheckNoNewAccess API to compare these two policies and check that NewPolicyDocument does not grant more access than ExistingPolicyDocument.

Step 1: Create two IAM identity policy documents

  1. Use the following command to create ExistingPolicyDocument.
    cat << EOF > existing-policy-document.json
    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "ec2:StartInstances",
                    "ec2:StopInstances"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*",
                "Condition": {
                    "StringEquals": {
                        "aws:ResourceTag/Owner": "\${aws:username}"
                    }
                }
            }
        ]
    }
    EOF

  2. Use the following command to create NewPolicyDocument.
    cat << EOF > new-policy-document.json
    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "ec2:StartInstances",
                    "ec2:StopInstances"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*"
            }
        ]
    }
    EOF

Notice that ExistingPolicyDocument grants access to the ec2:StartInstances and ec2:StopInstances actions if the condition key aws:ResourceTag/Owner resolves to true. In other words, the value of the tag matches the policy variable aws:username. NewPolicyDocument grants access to the same actions, but does not include a condition key.

Step 2: Check the policies by using the AWS CLI

  1. Use the following command to call the CheckNoNewAccess API to check whether NewPolicyDocument grants more access than ExistingPolicyDocument.
    aws accessanalyzer check-no-new-access \
    --new-policy-document file://new-policy-document.json \
    --existing-policy-document file://existing-policy-document.json \
    --policy-type IDENTITY_POLICY

After a moment, you will see a response from Access Analyzer. The response will look similar to the following.

{
    "result": "FAIL",
    "message": "The modified permissions grant new access compared to your existing policy.",
    "reasons": [
        {
            "description": "New access in the statement with index: 1.",
            "statementIndex": 1
        }
    ]
}

In this example, the validation returned a result of FAIL. This is because NewPolicyDocument is missing the condition key, potentially granting any principal with this identity policy attached more access than intended or needed.

Example 2: Use custom policy checks to check that an IAM policy does not contain sensitive permissions

In this example, you will create an IAM identity-based policy that contains a set of permissions. You will use the CheckAccessNotGranted API to check that the new policy does not give permissions to disable AWS CloudTrail or delete any associated trails.

Step 1: Create a new IAM identity policy document

  • Use the following command to create IamPolicyDocument.
    cat << EOF > iam-policy-document.json
    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "cloudtrail:StopLogging",
                    "cloudtrail:Delete*"
                ],
                "Resource": ["*"] 
            }
        ]
    }
    EOF

Step 2: Check the policy by using the AWS CLI

  • Use the following command to call the CheckAccessNotGranted API to check if the new policy grants permission to the set of sensitive actions. In this example, you are asking Access Analyzer to check that IamPolicyDocument does not contain the actions cloudtrail:StopLogging or cloudtrail:DeleteTrail (passed as a list to the access parameter).
    aws accessanalyzer check-access-not-granted \
    --policy-document file://iam-policy-document.json \
    --access actions=cloudtrail:StopLogging,cloudtrail:DeleteTrail \
    --policy-type IDENTITY_POLICY

Because the policy that you created contains both cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail actions, Access Analyzer returns a FAIL.

{
    "result": "FAIL",
    "message": "The policy document grants access to perform one or more of the listed actions.",
    "reasons": [
        {
            "description": "One or more of the listed actions in the statement with index: 0.",
            "statementIndex": 0
        }
    ]
}

Example 3: Integrate custom policy checks into the developer workflow

Building on the previous two examples, in this example, you will automate the analysis of the IAM policies defined in an AWS CloudFormation template. Figure 1 shows the workflow that will be used. The workflow will initiate each time a pull request is created against the main branch of an AWS CodeCommit repository called my-iam-policy (the commit stage in Figure 1). The first check uses the CheckNoNewAccess API to determine if the updated policy is more permissive than a reference IAM policy. The second check uses the CheckAccessNotGranted API to automatically check for critical permissions within the policy (the validation stage in Figure 1). In both cases, if the updated policy is more permissive, or contains critical permissions, a comment with the results of the validation is posted to the pull request. This information can then be used to decide whether the pull request is merged into the main branch for deployment (the deploy stage is shown in Figure 1).

Figure 1: Diagram of the pipeline that will check policies

Figure 1: Diagram of the pipeline that will check policies

Step 1: Deploy the infrastructure and set up the pipeline

  1. Use the following command to download and unzip the Cloud Development Kit (CDK) project associated with this blog post.
    git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/access-analyzer-automated-policy-analysis-blog.git
    cd ./access-analyzer-automated-policy-analysis-blog

  2. Create a virtual Python environment to contain the project dependencies by using the following command.
    python3 -m venv .venv

  3. Activate the virtual environment with the following command.
    source .venv/bin/activate

  4. Install the project requirements by using the following command.
    pip install -r requirements.txt

  5. Use the following command to update the CDK CLI to the latest major version.
    npm install -g aws-cdk@2 --force

  6. Before you can deploy the CDK project, use the following command to bootstrap your AWS environment. Bootstrapping is the process of creating resources needed for deploying CDK projects. These resources include an Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket for storing files and IAM roles that grant permissions needed to perform deployments.
    cdk bootstrap

  7. Finally, use the following command to deploy the pipeline infrastructure.
    cdk deploy --require-approval never

    The deployment will take a few minutes to complete. Feel free to grab a coffee and check back shortly.

    When the deployment completes, there will be two stack outputs listed: one with a name that contains CodeCommitRepo and another with a name that contains ConfigBucket. Make a note of the values of these outputs, because you will need them later.

    The deployed pipeline is displayed in the AWS CodePipeline console and should look similar to the pipeline shown in Figure 2.

    Figure 2: AWS CodePipeline and CodeBuild Management Console view

    Figure 2: AWS CodePipeline and CodeBuild Management Console view

    In addition to initiating when a pull request is created, the newly deployed pipeline can also be initiated when changes to the main branch of the AWS CodeCommit repository are detected. The pipeline has three stages, CheckoutSources, IAMPolicyAnalysis, and deploy. The CheckoutSource stage checks out the contents of the my-iam-policy repository when the pipeline is triggered due to a change in the main branch.

    The IAMPolicyAnalysis stage, which runs after the CheckoutSource stage or when a pull request has been created against the main branch, has two actions. The first action, Check no new access, verifies that changes to the IAM policies in the CloudFormation template do not grant more access than a pre-defined reference policy. The second action, Check access not granted, verifies that those same updates do not grant access to API actions that are deemed sensitive or critical. Finally, the Deploy stage will deploy the resources defined in the CloudFormation template, if the actions in the IAMPolicyAnalysis stage are successful.

    To analyze the IAM policies, the Check no new access and Check access not granted actions depend on a reference policy and a predefined list of API actions, respectively.

  8. Use the following command to create the reference policy.
    cd ../ 
    cat << EOF > cnna-reference-policy.json
    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "*",
                "Resource": "*"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Deny",
                "Action": "iam:PassRole",
                "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/my-sensitive-roles/*"
            }
        ]
    }	
    EOF

    This reference policy sets out the maximum permissions for policies that you plan to validate with custom policy checks. The iam:PassRole permission is a permission that allows an IAM principal to pass an IAM role to an AWS service, like Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) or AWS Lambda. The reference policy says that the only way that a policy is more permissive is if it allows iam:PassRole on this group of sensitive resources: arn:aws:iam::*:role/my-sensitive-roles/*”.

    Why might a reference policy be useful? A reference policy helps ensure that a particular combination of actions, resources, and conditions is not allowed in your environment. Reference policies typically allow actions and resources in one statement, then deny the problematic permissions in a second statement. This means that a policy that is more permissive than the reference policy allows access to a permission that the reference policy has denied.

    In this example, a developer who is authorized to create IAM roles could, intentionally or unintentionally, create an IAM role for an AWS service (like EC2 for AWS Lambda) that has permission to pass a privileged role to another service or principal, leading to an escalation of privilege.

  9. Use the following command to create a list of sensitive actions. This list will be parsed during the build pipeline and passed to the CheckAccessNotGranted API. If the policy grants access to one or more of the sensitive actions in this list, a result of FAIL will be returned. To keep this example simple, add a single API action, as follows.
    cat << EOF > sensitive-actions.file
    dynamodb:DeleteTable
    EOF

  10. So that the CodeBuild projects can access the dependencies, use the following command to copy the cnna-reference-policy.file and sensitive-actions.file to an S3 bucket. Refer to the stack outputs you noted earlier and replace <ConfigBucket> with the name of the S3 bucket created in your environment.
    aws s3 cp ./cnna-reference-policy.json s3://<ConfgBucket>/cnna-reference-policy.json
    aws s3 cp ./sensitive-actions.file s3://<ConfigBucket>/sensitive-actions.file

Step 2: Create a new CloudFormation template that defines an IAM policy

With the pipeline deployed, the next step is to clone the repository that was created and populate it with a CloudFormation template that defines an IAM policy.

  1. Install git-remote-codecommit by using the following command.
    pip install git-remote-codecommit

    For more information on installing and configuring git-remote-codecommit, see the AWS CodeCommit User Guide.

  2. With git-remote-codecommit installed, use the following command to clone the my-iam-policy repository from AWS CodeCommit.
    git clone codecommit://my-iam-policy && cd ./my-iam-policy

    If you’ve configured a named profile for use with the AWS CLI, use the following command, replacing <profile> with the name of your named profile.

    git clone codecommit://<profile>@my-iam-policy && cd ./my-iam-policy

  3. Use the following command to create the CloudFormation template in the local clone of the repository.
    cat << EOF > ec2-instance-role.yaml
    ---
    AWSTemplateFormatVersion: 2010-09-09
    Description: CloudFormation Template to deploy base resources for access_analyzer_blog
    Resources:
      EC2Role:
        Type: AWS::IAM::Role
        Properties:
          AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
            Version: 2012-10-17
            Statement:
            - Effect: Allow
              Principal:
                Service: ec2.amazonaws.com
              Action: sts:AssumeRole
          Path: /
          Policies:
          - PolicyName: my-application-permissions
            PolicyDocument:
              Version: 2012-10-17
              Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'ec2:RunInstances'
                  - 'lambda:CreateFunction'
                  - 'lambda:InvokeFunction'
                  - 'dynamodb:Scan'
                  - 'dynamodb:Query'
                  - 'dynamodb:UpdateItem'
                  - 'dynamodb:GetItem'
                Resource: '*'
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole 
                Resource: "arn:aws:iam::*:role/my-custom-role"
            
      EC2InstanceProfile:
        Type: AWS::IAM::InstanceProfile
        Properties:
          Path: /
          Roles:
            - !Ref EC2Role
    EOF

The actions in the IAMPolicyValidation stage are run by a CodeBuild project. CodeBuild environments run arbitrary commands that are passed to the project using a buildspec file. Each project has already been configured to use an inline buildspec file.

You can inspect the buildspec file for each project by opening the project’s Build details page as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: AWS CodeBuild console and build details

Figure 3: AWS CodeBuild console and build details

Step 3: Run analysis on the IAM policy

The next step involves checking in the first version of the CloudFormation template to the repository and checking two things. First, that the policy does not grant more access than the reference policy. Second, that the policy does not contain any of the sensitive actions defined in the sensitive-actions.file.

  1. To begin tracking the CloudFormation template created earlier, use the following command.
    git add ec2-instance-role.yaml 

  2. Commit the changes you have made to the repository.
    git commit -m 'committing a new CFN template with IAM policy'

  3. Finally, push these changes to the remote repository.
    git push

  4. Pushing these changes will initiate the pipeline. After a few minutes the pipeline should complete successfully. To view the status of the pipeline, do the following:
    1. Navigate to https://<region>.console.aws.amazon.com/codesuite/codepipeline/pipelines (replacing <region> with your AWS Region).
    2. Choose the pipeline called accessanalyzer-pipeline.
    3. Scroll down to the IAMPolicyValidation stage of the pipeline.
    4. For both the check no new access and check access not granted actions, choose View Logs to inspect the log output.
  5. If you inspect the build logs for both the check no new access and check access not granted actions within the pipeline, you should see that there were no blocking or non-blocking findings, similar to what is shown in Figure 4. This indicates that the policy was validated successfully. In other words, the policy was not more permissive than the reference policy, and it did not include any of the critical permissions.
    Figure 4: CodeBuild log entry confirming that the IAM policy was successfully validated

    Figure 4: CodeBuild log entry confirming that the IAM policy was successfully validated

Step 4: Create a pull request to merge a new update to the CloudFormation template

In this step, you will make a change to the IAM policy in the CloudFormation template. The change deliberately makes the policy grant more access than the reference policy. The change also includes a critical permission.

  1. Use the following command to create a new branch called add-new-permissions in the local clone of the repository.
    git checkout -b add-new-permissions

  2. Next, edit the IAM policy in ec2-instance-role.yaml to include an additional API action, dynamodb:Delete* and update the resource property of the inline policy to use an IAM role in the /my-sensitive-roles/*” path. You can copy the following example, if you’re unsure of how to do this.
    ---
    AWSTemplateFormatVersion: 2010-09-09
    Description: CloudFormation Template to deploy base resources for access_analyzer_blog
    Resources:
      EC2Role:
        Type: AWS::IAM::Role
        Properties:
          AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
            Version: 2012-10-17
            Statement:
            - Effect: Allow
              Principal:
                Service: ec2.amazonaws.com
              Action: sts:AssumeRole
          Path: /
          Policies:
          - PolicyName: my-application-permissions
            PolicyDocument:
              Version: 2012-10-17
              Statement:
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'ec2:RunInstances'
                  - 'lambda:CreateFunction'
                  - 'lambda:InvokeFunction'
                  - 'dynamodb:Scan'
                  - 'dynamodb:Query'
                  - 'dynamodb:UpdateItem'
                  - 'dynamodb:GetItem'
                  - 'dynamodb:Delete*'
                Resource: '*'
              - Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - iam:PassRole 
                Resource: "arn:aws:iam::*:role/my-sensitive-roles/my-custom-admin-role"
            
      EC2InstanceProfile:
        Type: AWS::IAM::InstanceProfile
        Properties:
          Path: /
          Roles:
            - !Ref EC2Role

  3. Commit the policy change and push the updated policy document to the repo by using the following commands.
    git add ec2-instance-role.yaml 
    git commit -m "adding new permission and allowing my ec2 instance to assume a pass sensitive IAM role"

  4. The add-new-permissions branch is currently a local branch. Use the following command to push the branch to the remote repository. This action will not initiate the pipeline, because the pipeline only runs when changes are made to the repository’s main branch.
    git push -u origin add-new-permissions

  5. With the new branch and changes pushed to the repository, follow these steps to create a pull request:
    1. Navigate to https://console.aws.amazon.com/codesuite/codecommit/repositories (don’t forget to the switch to the correct Region).
    2. Choose the repository called my-iam-policy.
    3. Choose the branch add-new-permissions from the drop-down list at the top of the repository screen.
      Figure 5: my-iam-policy repository with new branch available

      Figure 5: my-iam-policy repository with new branch available

    4. Choose Create pull request.
    5. Enter a title and description for the pull request.
    6. (Optional) Scroll down to see the differences between the current version and new version of the CloudFormation template highlighted.
    7. Choose Create pull request.
  6. The creation of the pull request will Initiate the pipeline to fetch the CloudFormation template from the repository and run the check no new access and check access not granted analysis actions.
  7. After a few minutes, choose the Activity tab for the pull request. You should see a comment from the pipeline that contains the results of the failed validation.
    Figure 6: Results from the failed validation posted as a comment to the pull request

    Figure 6: Results from the failed validation posted as a comment to the pull request

Why did the validations fail?

The updated IAM role and inline policy failed validation for two reasons. First, the reference policy said that no one should have more permissions than the reference policy does. The reference policy in this example included a deny statement for the iam:PassRole permission with a resource of /my-sensitive-role/*. The new created inline policy included an allow statement for the iam:PassRole permission with a resource of arn:aws:iam::*:role/my-sensitive-roles/my-custom-admin-role. In other words, the new policy had more permissions than the reference policy.

Second, the list of critical permissions included the dynamodb:DeleteTable permission. The inline policy included a statement that would allow the EC2 instance to perform the dynamodb:DeleteTable action.

Cleanup

Use the following command to delete the infrastructure that was provisioned as part of the examples in this blog post.

cdk destroy 

Conclusion

In this post, I introduced you to two new IAM Access Analyzer APIs: CheckNoNewAccess and CheckAccessNotGranted. The main example in the post demonstrated one way in which you can use these APIs to automate security testing throughout the development lifecycle. The example did this by integrating both APIs into the developer workflow and validating the developer-authored IAM policy when the developer created a pull request to merge changes into the repository’s main branch. The automation helped the developer to get feedback about the problems with the IAM policy quickly, allowing the developer to take action in a timely way. This is often referred to as shifting security left — identifying misconfigurations early and automatically supporting an iterative, fail-fast model of continuous development and testing. Ultimately, this enables teams to make security an inherent part of a system’s design and architecture and can speed up product development workflow.

You can find the full sample code used in this blog post on GitHub.

To learn more about IAM Access Analyzer and the new custom policy checks feature, see the IAM Access Analyzer documentation.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Mitch Beaumont

Mitch Beaumont

Mitch is a Principal Solutions Architect for AWS, based in Sydney, Australia. Mitch works with some of Australia’s largest financial services customers, helping them to continually raise the security bar for the products and features that they build and ship. Outside of work, Mitch enjoys spending time with his family, photography, and surfing.

Author

Matt Luttrell

Matt is a Principal Solutions Architect on the AWS Identity Solutions team. When he’s not spending time chasing his kids around, he enjoys skiing, cycling, and the occasional video game.

How to use the PassRole permission with IAM roles

Post Syndicated from Liam Wadman original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-the-passrole-permission-with-iam-roles/

iam:PassRole is an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permission that allows an IAM principal to delegate or pass permissions to an AWS service by configuring a resource such as an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance or AWS Lambda function with an IAM role. The service then uses that role to interact with other AWS resources in your accounts. Typically, workloads, applications, or services run with different permissions than the developer who creates them, and iam:PassRole is the mechanism in AWS to specify which IAM roles can be passed to AWS services, and by whom.

In this blog post, we’ll dive deep into iam:PassRole, explain how it works and what’s required to use it, and cover some best practices for how to use it effectively.

A typical example of using iam:PassRole is a developer passing a role’s Amazon Resource Name (ARN) as a parameter in the Lambda CreateFunction API call. After the developer makes the call, the service verifies whether the developer is authorized to do so, as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Developer passing a role to a Lambda function during creation

Figure 1: Developer passing a role to a Lambda function during creation

The following command shows the parameters the developer needs to pass during the CreateFunction API call. Notice that the role ARN is a parameter, but there is no passrole parameter.

aws lambda create-function 
    --function-name my-function 
    --runtime nodejs14.x 
    --zip-file fileb://my-function.zip 
    --handler my-function.handler 
    --role arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/service-role/MyTestFunction-role-tges6bf4

The API call will create the Lambda function only if the developer has the iam:PassRole permission as well as the CreateFunction API permissions. If the developer is lacking either of these, the request will be denied.

Now that the permissions have been checked and the Function resource has been created, the Lambda service principal will assume the role you passed whenever your function is invoked and use the role to make requests to other AWS services in your account.

Understanding IAM PassRole

When we say that iam:PassRole is a permission, we mean specifically that it is not an API call; it is an IAM action that can be specified within an IAM policy. The iam:PassRole permission is checked whenever a resource is created with an IAM service role or is updated with a new IAM service role.

Here is an example IAM policy that allows a principal to pass a role named lambda_role.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/lambda_role"
      ]
    }
  ]
}

The roles that can be passed are specified in the Resource element of the IAM policy. It is possible to list multiple IAM roles, and it is possible to use a wildcard (*) to match roles that begins with the pattern you specify. Use a wildcard as the last characters only when you’re matching a role pattern, to help prevent over-entitlement.

Note: We recommend that you avoid using resource ”*” with the iam:PassRole action in most cases, because this could grant someone the permission to pass any role, opening the possibility of unintended privilege escalation.

The iam:PassRole action can only grant permissions when used in an identity-based policy attached to an IAM role or user, and it is governed by all relevant AWS policy types, such as service control policies (SCPs) and VPC endpoint policies.

When a principal attempts to pass a role to an AWS service, there are three prerequisites that must be met to allow the service to use that role:

  1. The principal that attempts to pass the role must have the iam:PassRole permission in an identity-based policy with the role desired to be passed in the Resource field, all IAM conditions met, and no implicit or explicit denies in other policies such as SCPs, VPC endpoint policies, session policies, or permissions boundaries.
  2. The role that is being passed is configured via the trust policy to trust the service principal of the service you’re trying to pass it to. For example, the role that you pass to Amazon EC2 has to trust the Amazon EC2 service principal, ec2.amazonaws.com.

    To learn more about role trust policies, see this blog post. In certain scenarios, the resource may end up being created or modified even if a passed IAM role doesn’t trust the required service principal, but the AWS service won’t be able to use the role to perform actions.

  3. The role being passed and the principal passing the role must both be in the same AWS account.

Best practices for using iam:PassRole

In this section, you will learn strategies to use when working with iam:PassRole within your AWS account.

Place iam:PassRole in its own policy statements

As we demonstrated earlier, the iam:PassRole policy action takes an IAM role for a resource. If you specify a wildcard as a resource in a policy granting iam:PassRole permission, it means that the principals to whom this policy applies will be able to pass any role in that account, allowing them to potentially escalate their privilege beyond what you intended.

To be able to specify the Resource value and be more granular in comparison to other permissions you might be granting in the same policy, we recommend that you keep the iam:PassRole action in its own policy statement, as indicated by the following example.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/lambda_role"
      ]
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "cloudwatch:GetMetricData",
      "Resource": [
        "*"
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Use IAM paths or naming conventions to organize IAM roles within your AWS accounts

You can use IAM paths or a naming convention to grant a principal access to pass IAM roles using wildcards (*) in a portion of the role ARN. This reduces the need to update IAM policies whenever new roles are created.

In your AWS account, you might have IAM roles that are used for different reasons, for example roles that are used for your applications, and roles that are used by your security team. In most circumstances, you would not want your developers to associate a security team’s role to the resources they are creating, but you still want to allow them to create and pass business application roles.

You may want to give developers the ability to create roles for their applications, as long as they are safely governed. You can do this by verifying that those roles have permissions boundaries attached to them, and that they are created in a specific IAM role path. You can then allow developers to pass only the roles in that path. To learn more about using permissions boundaries, see our Example Permissions Boundaries GitHub repo.

In the following example policy, access is granted to pass only the roles that are in the /application_role/ path.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/application_role/*"
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Protect specific IAM paths with an SCP

You can also protect specific IAM paths by using an SCP.

In the following example, the SCP prevents your principals from passing a role unless they have a tag of “team” with a value of “security” when the role they are trying to pass is in the IAM path /security_app_roles/.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/security_app_roles/*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringNotEquals": {
          "aws:PrincipalTag/team": "security"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Similarly, you can craft a policy to only allow a specific naming convention or IAM path to pass a role in a specific path. For example, the following SCP shows how to prevent a role outside of the IAM path security_response_team from passing a role in the IAM path security_app_roles.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/security_app_roles/*",
      "Condition": {
        "ArnNotLike": {
          "aws:PrincipalARN": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/security_response_team/*"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Using variables and tags with iam:PassRole

iam:PassRole does not support using the iam:ResourceTag or aws:ResourceTag condition keys to specify which roles can be passed. However, the IAM policy language supports using variables as part of the Resource element in an IAM policy.

The following IAM policy example uses the aws:PrincipalTag condition key as a variable in the Resource element. That allows this policy to construct the IAM path based on the values of the caller’s IAM tags or Session tags.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": [
"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/${aws:PrincipalTag/AllowedRolePath}/*"
      ]
    }
  ]
}

If there was no value set for the AllowedRolePath tag, the resource would not match any role ARN, and no iam:PassRole permissions would be granted.

Pass different IAM roles for different use cases, and for each AWS service

As a best practice, use a single IAM role for each use case, and avoid situations where the same role is used by multiple AWS services.

We recommend that you also use different IAM roles for different workloads in your AWS accounts, even if those workloads are built on the same AWS service. This will allow you to grant only the permissions necessary to your workloads and make it possible to adhere to the principle of least privilege.

Using iam:PassRole condition keys

The iam:PassRole action has two available condition keys, iam:PassedToService and iam:AssociatedResourceArn.

iam:PassedToService allows you to specify what service a role may be passed to. iam:AssociatedResourceArn allows you to specify what resource ARNs a role may be associated with.

As mentioned previously, we typically recommend that customers use an IAM role with only one AWS service wherever possible. This is best accomplished by listing a single AWS service in a role’s trust policy, reducing the need to use the iam:PassedToService condition key in the calling principal’s identity-based policy. In circumstances where you have an IAM role that can be assumed by more than one AWS service, you can use iam:PassedToService to specify which service the role can be passed to. For example, the following policy allows ExampleRole to be passed only to the Amazon EC2 service.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/ExampleRole",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "iam:PassedToService": "ec2.amazonaws.com"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

When you use iam:AssociatedResourceArn, it’s important to understand that ARN formats typically do not change, but each AWS resource will have a unique ARN. Some AWS resources have non-predictable components, such as EC2 instance IDs in their ARN. This means that when you’re using iam:AssociatedResourceArn, if an AWS resource is ever deleted and a new resource created, you might need to modify the IAM policy with a new resource ARN to allow a role to be associated with it.

Most organizations prefer to limit who can delete and modify resources in their AWS accounts, rather than limit what resource a role can be associated with. An example of this would be limiting which principals can modify a Lambda function, rather than limiting which function a role can be associated with, because in order to pass a role to Lambda, the principals would need permissions to update the function itself.

Using iam:PassRole with service-linked roles

If you’re dealing with a service that uses service-linked roles (SLRs), most of the time you don’t need the iam:PassRole permission. This is because in most cases such services will create and manage the SLR on your behalf, so that you don’t pass a role as part of a service configuration, and therefore, the iam:PassRole permission check is not performed.

Some AWS services allow you to create multiple SLRs and pass them when you create or modify resources by using those services. In this case, you need the iam:PassRole permission on service-linked roles, just the same as you do with a service role.

For example, Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling allows you to create multiple SLRs with specific suffixes and then pass a role ARN in the request as part of the ec2:CreateAutoScalingGroup API action. For the Auto Scaling group to be successfully created, you need permissions to perform both the ec2:CreateAutoScalingGroup and iam:PassRole actions.

SLRs are created in the /aws-service-role/ path. To help confirm that principals in your AWS account are only passing service-linked roles that they are allowed to pass, we recommend using suffixes and IAM policies to separate SLRs owned by different teams.

For example, the following policy allows only SLRs with the _BlueTeamSuffix to be passed.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PassRole",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/*_BlueTeamSuffix"
      ]
    }
  ]
}

You could attach this policy to the role used by the blue team to allow them to pass SLRs they’ve created for their use case and that have their specific suffix.

AWS CloudTrail logging

Because iam:PassRole is not an API call, there is no entry in AWS CloudTrail for it. To identify what role was passed to an AWS service, you must check the CloudTrail trail for events that created or modified the relevant AWS service’s resource.

In Figure 2, you can see the CloudTrail log created after a developer used the Lambda CreateFunction API call with the role ARN noted in the role field.

Figure 2: CloudTrail log of a CreateFunction API call

Figure 2: CloudTrail log of a CreateFunction API call

PassRole and VPC endpoints

Earlier, we mentioned that iam:PassRole is subject to VPC endpoint policies. If a request that requires the iam:PassRole permission is made over a VPC endpoint with a custom VPC endpoint policy configured, iam:PassRole should be allowed through the Action element of that VPC endpoint policy, or the request will be denied.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned about iam:PassRole, how you use it to interact with AWS services and resources, and the three prerequisites to successfully pass a role to a service. You now also know best practices for using iam:PassRole in your AWS accounts. To learn more, see the documentation on granting a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS service.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, & Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Laura Reith

Laura is an Identity Solutions Architect at AWS, where she thrives on helping customers overcome security and identity challenges.

Liam Wadman

Liam Wadman

Liam is a Solutions Architect with the Identity Solutions team. When he’s not building exciting solutions on AWS or helping customers, he’s often found in the hills of British Columbia on his mountain bike. Liam points out that you cannot spell LIAM without IAM.

Establishing a data perimeter on AWS: Require services to be created only within expected networks

Post Syndicated from Harsha Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/establishing-a-data-perimeter-on-aws-require-services-to-be-created-only-within-expected-networks/

Welcome to the fifth post in the Establishing a data perimeter on AWS series. Throughout this series, we’ve discussed how a set of preventative guardrails can create an always-on boundary to help ensure that your trusted identities are accessing your trusted resources over expected networks. In a previous post, we emphasized the importance of preventing access from unexpected locations, even for authorized users. For example, you wouldn’t expect non-public corporate data to be accessed from outside the corporate network. In this post, we demonstrate how to use preventative controls to help ensure that your resources are deployed within your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC), so that you can effectively enforce the network perimeter controls. We also explore detective controls you can use to detect the lack of adherence to this requirement.

Let’s begin with a quick refresher on the fundamental concept of data perimeters using Figure 1 as a reference. Customers generally prefer establishing a high-level perimeter to help prevent untrusted entities from coming in and data from going out. The perimeter defines what access customers expect within their AWS environment. It refers to the access patterns among your identities, resources, and networks that should always be blocked. Using those three elements, an assertion can be made to define your perimeter’s goal: access can only be allowed if the identity is trusted, the resource is trusted, and the network is expected. If any of these conditions are false, then the access inside the perimeter is unintended and should be denied. The perimeter is composed of controls implemented on your identities, resources, and networks to maintain that the necessary conditions are true.

Figure 1: A high-level depiction of defining a perimeter around your AWS resources to prevent interaction with unintended IAM principals, unintended resources, and unexpected networks

Figure 1: A high-level depiction of defining a perimeter around your AWS resources to prevent interaction with unintended IAM principals, unintended resources, and unexpected networks

Now, let’s consider a scenario to understand the problem statement this post is trying to solve. Assume a setup like the one in Figure 2, where an application needs to access an Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket using its temporary AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) credentials over an Amazon S3 VPC endpoint.

Figure 2: Scenario of a simple app using its temporary credential to access an S3 bucket

Figure 2: Scenario of a simple app using its temporary credential to access an S3 bucket

From our previous posts in this series, we’ve learned that we can use the following set of capabilities to build a network perimeter to achieve our control objectives for this sample scenario.

Control objective Implemented using Applicable IAM capability
My identities can access resources only from expected networks. For example, in Figure 2, my application’s temporary credential can only access my S3 bucket when my application is within my expected network space. Service control policies (SCP) aws:SourceIp
aws:SourceVpc
aws:SourceVpce
My resources can only be accessed from expected networks. For example, in Figure 2, my S3 bucket can only be accessed from my expected network space. Resource-based policies aws:SourceIp
aws:SourceVpc
aws:SourceVpce

But there are certain AWS services that allow for different network deployment models, such as providing the choice of associating the service resources with either an AWS managed VPC or a customer managed VPC. For example, an AWS Lambda function always runs inside a VPC owned by the Lambda service (AWS managed VPC) and by default isn’t connected to VPCs in your account (customer managed VPC). For more information, see Connecting Lambda functions to your VPC.

This means that if your application code was deployed as a Lambda function that isn’t connected to your VPC, then the function cannot access your resources with standard network perimeter controls enforced. Let’s understand this situation better using Figure 3, where a Lambda function isn’t configured to connect to the customer VPC. This function cannot access your S3 bucket over the internet because of how the recommended data perimeter in the preceding table has been defined, that is, to only allow your bucket to be accessible from a known network segment (the customer VPC and IP CIDR range) and only allow the IAM role associated with the Lambda function to allow accessing the bucket from known networks. The function also cannot access your S3 bucket through your S3 VPC endpoint because the function isn’t associated with the customer VPC. Lastly, unless other compensating controls are in place, this function might be able to access untrusted resources as your standard data perimeter controls enforced with the VPC endpoint policies won’t be in effect, which might not meet your company’s security requirements.

Figure 3: Lambda function configured to be associated with AWS managed VPC

Figure 3: Lambda function configured to be associated with AWS managed VPC

This means that for the Lambda function to conform to your data perimeter, it must be associated with your network segment (customer VPC) as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Lambda function configured to be associated with the customer managed VPC

Figure 4: Lambda function configured to be associated with the customer managed VPC

To make sure that your Lambda functions are deployed into your networks so that they can access your resources under the purview of data perimeter controls, it’s preferable to have a way to automatically prevent deployment or configuration errors. Additionally, if you have a large deployment of Lambda functions across hundreds or even thousands of accounts, you want an efficient way to enforce conformance of these functions to your data perimeter.

To solve for this problem and make sure that an application team or a developer cannot create a function that’s not associated with your VPC, you can use the lambda:VpcIds or lambda:SubnetIds IAM condition keys (for more information, see Using IAM condition keys for VPC settings). These keys allow you to create and update functions only when VPC settings are satisfied.

In the following SCP example, an IAM principal that is subject to the following SCP policy will only be able to create or update a Lambda function if the function is associated with a VPC (customer VPC). When the customer VPC isn’t specified, the lambda:VpcIds condition key has no value—it is null—and thus this policy will deny creating or updating the function. For more information about how the Null condition operator functions, see Condition operator to check existence of condition keys.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnforceVPCFunction",
      "Action": [
          "lambda:CreateFunction",
          "lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration"
       ],
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "Null": {
           "lambda:VpcIds": "true"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Additionally, you can use variations of the preceding example and create more fine-grained controls using these condition keys. For more such examples, see Example policies with condition keys for VPC settings.

AWS services such as AWS Glue and Amazon SageMaker have similar feature behavior and provide similar condition keys. For example, the glue:VpcIds condition key allows you to govern the creation of AWS Glue jobs only in your VPC. For further details and an example policy, see Control policies that control settings using condition keys.

Similarly, Amazon SageMaker Studio, SageMaker notebook instances, SageMaker training, and deployed inference containers are internet accessible or enabled by default. The sagemaker:VpcSubnets condition key can be used to restrict launching these resources in a VPC. For more information, see Condition keys for Amazon SageMaker, Connect to Resources From Within a VPC, and Run Training and Inference Containers in Internet-Free Mode.

Detective controls

The AWS Well-Architected Framework recommends applying a defense in-depth approach with multiple security controls (see Security Pillar). This is why in addition to the preventative controls discussed in the form of condition keys in this post, you should also consider using AWS native fully managed governance tools to help you manage your environment’s deployed resources and their conformance to your data perimeter (see Management and Governance on AWS).

For example, AWS Config provides managed rules to check for Lambda functions inside a VPC and Sagemaker notebooks inside a VPC. You can also use the built-in checks of AWS Security Hub to detect and consolidate findings, such as [Lambda.3] Lambda functions should be in a VPC and [SageMaker.2] SageMaker notebook instances should be launched in a custom VPC.

You can also use similar detective controls for AWS services that don’t currently offer built-in preventative controls. For example, OpenSearch Service has an AWS Config managed rule for OpenSearch in VPC only and security hub check for [Opensearch.2] OpenSearch domains should be in a VPC.

Conclusion

In this post, we discussed how you can enforce that specific AWS services resources can only be created such that they adhere to your data perimeter. We used a sample scenario to dive into AWS Lambda and its network deployment options. We then used IAM condition keys as preventative controls to enforce predictable creation of Lambda functions conforming with our security standard. We also discussed additional AWS services that have similar behavior when the same concepts apply. Finally, we briefly discussed some AWS provided managed rules and security checks that you can use as supplementary detective controls to ensure that your preventative controls are in effect as expected.

Additional resources

The following are some additional resources that you can use to further explore data perimeters.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Harsha Sharma

Harsha Sharma

Harsha is a Principal Solutions Architect with AWS in New York. He joined AWS in 2016 and works with Global Financial Services customers to design and develop architectures on AWS, supporting their journey on the AWS Cloud.

Visualize Amazon DynamoDB insights in Amazon QuickSight using the Amazon Athena DynamoDB connector and AWS Glue

Post Syndicated from Antonio Samaniego Jurado original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/visualize-amazon-dynamodb-insights-in-amazon-quicksight-using-the-amazon-athena-dynamodb-connector-and-aws-glue/

Amazon DynamoDB is a fully managed, serverless, key-value NoSQL database designed to run high-performance applications at any scale. DynamoDB offers built-in security, continuous backups, automated multi-Region replication, in-memory caching, and data import and export tools. The scalability and flexible data schema of DynamoDB make it well-suited for a variety of use cases. These include internet-scale web and mobile applications, low-latency metadata stores, high-traffic retail websites, Internet of Things (IoT) and time series data, online gaming, and more.

Data stored in DynamoDB is the basis for valuable business intelligence (BI) insights. To make this data accessible to data analysts and other consumers, you can use Amazon Athena. Athena is a serverless, interactive service that allows you to query data from a variety of sources in heterogeneous formats, with no provisioning effort. Athena accesses data stored in DynamoDB via the open source Amazon Athena DynamoDB connector. Table metadata, such as column names and data types, is stored using the AWS Glue Data Catalog.

Finally, to visualize BI insights, you can use Amazon QuickSight, a cloud-powered business analytics service. QuickSight makes it straightforward for organizations to build visualizations, perform ad hoc analysis, and quickly get business insights from their data, anytime, on any device. Its generative BI capabilities enable you to ask questions about your data using natural language, without having to write SQL queries or learn a BI tool.

This post shows how you can use the Athena DynamoDB connector to easily query data in DynamoDB with SQL and visualize insights in QuickSight.

Solution overview

The following diagram illustrates the solution architecture.

Architecture Diagram

  1. The Athena DynamoDB connector runs in a pre-built, serverless AWS Lambda function. You don’t need to write any code.
  2. AWS Glue provides supplemental metadata from the DynamoDB table. In particular, an AWS Glue crawler is run to infer and store the DynamoDB table format, schema, and associated properties in the Glue Data Catalog.
  3. The Athena editor is used to test the connector and perform analysis via SQL queries.
  4. QuickSight uses the Athena connector to visualize BI insights from DynamoDB.

This walkthrough uses data from the ProductCatalog table, part of the DynamoDB developer guide sample data files.

Prerequisites

Before you get started, you should meet the following prerequisites:

Set up the Athena DynamoDB connector

The Athena DynamoDB connector comprises a pre-built, serverless Lambda function provided by AWS that communicates with DynamoDB so you can query your tables with SQL using Athena. The connector is available in the AWS Serverless Application Repository, and is used to create the Athena data source for later use in data analysis and visualization. To set up the connector, complete the following steps:

  1. On the Athena console, choose Data sources in the navigation pane.
  2. Choose Create data source.
  3. In the search bar, search for and choose Amazon DynamoDB.
  4. Choose Next.
  5. Under Data source details, enter a name. Note that this name should be unique and will be referenced in your SQL statements when you query your Athena data source.
  6. Under Connection details, choose Create Lambda function.

This will take you to the Lambda applications page on the Lambda console. Do not close the Athena data source creation tab; you will return to it in a later step.

  1. Scroll down to Application settings and enter a value for the following parameters (leave the other parameters as default):
    • SpillBucket – Specifies the Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket name for storing data that exceeds Lambda function response size limits. To create an S3 bucket, refer to Creating a bucket.
    • AthenaCatalogName – A lowercase name for the Lambda function to be created.Lambda Application Settings
  2. Select the acknowledgement check box and choose Deploy.

Wait for deployment to complete before moving to the next step.

  1. Return to the Athena data source creation tab.
  2. Under Connection details, choose the refresh icon and choose the Lambda function you created.Lambda Connection Details
  3. Choose Next.
  4. Review and choose Create data source.

Provide supplemental metadata via AWS Glue

The Athena connector already comes with a built-in inference capability to discover the schema and table properties of your data source. However, this capability is limited. To accurately discover the metadata of your DynamoDB table and centralize schema management as your data evolves over time, the connector integrates with AWS Glue.

To achieve this, an AWS Glue crawler is run to automatically determine the format, schema, and associated properties of the raw data stored in your DynamoDB table, writing the resulting metadata to a Glue database. Glue databases contain tables, which hold metadata from different data stores, independent from the actual location of the data. The Athena connector then references the Glue table and retrieves the corresponding DynamoDB metadata to enable queries.

Create the AWS Glue database

Complete the following steps to create the Glue database:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, under Data Catalog in the navigation pane, choose Databases.
  2. Choose Add database (you can also edit an existing database if you already have one).
  3. For Name, enter a database name.
  4. For Location, enter the string literal dynamo-db-flag. This keyword indicates that the database contains tables that the connector can use for supplemental metadata.
  5. Choose Create database.

Following security best practices, it is also recommended that you enable encryption at rest for your Data Catalog. For details, refer to Encrypting your Data Catalog.

Create the AWS Glue crawler

Complete the following steps to create and run the Glue crawler:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, under Data Catalog in the navigation pane, choose Crawlers.
  2. Choose Create crawler.
  3. Enter a crawler name and choose Next.
  4. For Data sources, choose Add a data source.
  5. On the Data source drop-down menu, choose DynamoDB. For Table name, enter the name of your DynamoDB table (string literal).
  6. Choose Add a DynamoDB data source.
  7. Choose Next.
  8. For IAM Role, choose Create new IAM role.
  9. Enter a role name and choose Create. This will automatically create an IAM role that trusts AWS Glue and has permissions to access the crawler targets.
  10. Choose Next.
  11. For Target database, choose the database previously created.
  12. Choose Next.
  13. Review and choose Create crawler.
  14. On the newly created crawler page, choose Run crawler.

Crawler runtimes depend on your DynamoDB table size and properties. You can find crawler run details under Crawler runs.

Validate the output metadata

When your crawler run status shows as Completed, follow the below steps to validate the output metadata:

  1. On the AWS Glue console, choose Tables in the navigation pane. Here, you can confirm a new table has been added to the database as a result of the crawler run.
  2. Navigate to the newly created table and take a look at the Schema tab. This tab shows the column names, data types, and other parameters inferred from your DynamoDB table.
  3. If needed, edit the schema by choosing Edit schema.Glue Table Details
  4. Choose Advanced properties.
  5. Under Table properties, verify the crawler automatically created and set the classification key to dynamodb. This indicates to the Athena connector that the table can be used for supplemental metadata.
  6. Optionally, add the following properties to correctly catalog and reference DynamoDB data in AWS Glue and Athena queries. This is due to capital letters not being permitted in AWS Glue table and column names, but being permitted in DynamoDB table and attribute names.
    1. If your DynamoDB table name contains any capital letters, choose Actions and Edit Table and add an extra table property as follows:
      • Key: sourceTable
      • Value: YourDynamoDBTableName
    2. If your DynamoDB table has attributes that contain any capital letters, add an extra table property as follows:
      • Key: columnMapping
      • Value: yourcolumn1=YourColumn1, yourcolumn2=YourColumn2, …

Test the connector with the Athena SQL editor

After the Athena DynamoDB connector is deployed and the AWS Glue table is populated with supplemental metadata, the DynamoDB table is ready for analysis. The example in this post uses the Athena editor to make SQL queries to the ProductCatalog table. For further options to interact with Athena, see Accessing Athena.

Complete the following steps to test the connector:

  1. Open the Athena query editor.
  2. If this is your first time visiting the Athena console in your current AWS Region, complete the following steps. This is a prerequisite before you can run Athena queries. See Getting Started for more details.
    1. Choose Query editor in the navigation pane to open the editor.
    2. Navigate to Settings and choose Manage to set up a query result location in Amazon S3.
  3. Under Data, select the data source and database you created (you may need to choose the refresh icon for them to sync up with Athena).
  4. Tables belonging to the selected database appear under Tables. You can choose a table name for Athena to show the table column list and data types.
  5. Test the connector by pulling data from your table via a SELECT statement. When you run Athena queries, you can reference Athena data sources, databases, and tables as <datasource_name>.<database>.<table_name>. Retrieved records are shown under Results.

For increased security, refer to Encrypting Athena query results stored in Amazon S3 to encrypt query results at rest.

Athena Query Results

For this post, we run a SELECT statement to validate the process. You can refer to the SQL reference for Athena to build more complex queries and analyses.

Visualize in QuickSight

QuickSight allows for building modern interactive dashboards, paginated reports, embedded analytics, and natural language queries through a unified BI solution. In this step, we use QuickSight to generate visual insights from the DynamoDB table by connecting to the Athena data source previously created.

Allow QuickSight to access to resources

Complete the following steps to grant QuickSight access to resources:

  1. On the QuickSight console, choose the profile icon and choose Manage QuickSight.
  2. In the navigation pane, choose Security & Permissions.
  3. Under QuickSight access to AWS services, choose Manage.
  4. QuickSight may ask you to switch to the Region in which users and groups in your account are managed. To change the current Region, navigate to the profile icon on the QuickSight console and choose the Region you want to switch to.
  5. For IAM Role, choose Use QuickSight-managed role (default).

Subsequent instructions assume that the default QuickSight-managed role is being used. If this is not the case, make sure to update the existing role to the same effect.

  1. Under Allow access and autodiscovery for these resources, select IAM and Amazon S3.
  2. For Amazon S3, choose Select S3 buckets.
  3. Choose the spill bucket you specified in earlier when deploying the Lambda function for the connector and the bucket you specified as the Athena query result location in Amazon S3.
  4. For both buckets, select Write permission for Athena Workgroup.
  5. Choose Amazon Athena.
  6. In the pop-up window, choose Next.
  7. Choose Lambda and choose the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the Lambda function previously used for the Athena data source connector.
  8. Choose Finish.
  9. Choose Save.

Create the Athena dataset

To create the Athena dataset, complete the following steps:

  1. On the QuickSight console, choose the user profile and switch to the Region you deployed the Athena data source to.
  2. Return to the QuickSight home page.
  3. In the navigation pane, choose Datasets.
  4. Choose New dataset.
  5. For Create a Dataset, select Athena.
  6. For Data source name, enter a name and choose Validate connection.
  7. When the connection shows as Validated, choose Create data source.
  8. Under Catalog, Database, and Tables, select the Athena data source, AWS Glue database, and AWS Glue table previously created.
  9. Choose Select.
  10. On the Finish dataset creation page, select Import to SPICE for quicker analytics.
  11. Choose Visualize.

For additional information on QuickSight query modes, see Importing data into SPICE and Using SQL to customize data.

Build QuickSight visualizations

Once the DynamoDB data is available in QuickSight via the Athena DynamoDB connector, it is ready to be visualized. The QuickSight analysis in the below example shows a vertical stacked bar chart with the average price per product category for the ProductCatalog sample dataset. In addition, it shows a donut chart with the proportion of products by product category, and a tree map containing the count of bicycles per bicycle type.

If you use data imported to SPICE in a QuickSight analysis, the dataset will only be available after the import is complete. For further details, see Using SPICE data in an analysis.

Quicksight Analysis

For comprehensive information on how to create and share visualizations in QuickSight, refer to Visualizing data in Amazon QuickSight and Sharing and subscribing to data in Amazon QuickSight.

Clean up

To avoid incurring continued AWS usage charges, make sure you delete all resources created as part of this walkthrough.

  • Delete the Athena data source:
    1. On the Athena console, switch to the Region you deployed your resources in.
    2. Choose Data sources in the navigation pane.
    3. Select the data source you created and on the Actions menu, choose Delete.
  • Delete the Lambda application:
    1. On the AWS CloudFormation console, switch to the Region you deployed your resources in.
    2. Choose Stacks in the navigation pane.
    3. Select serverlessrepo-AthenaDynamoDBConnector and choose Delete.
  • Delete the AWS Glue resources:
    1. On the AWS Glue console, switch to the Region you deployed your resources in.
    2. Choose Databases in the navigation pane.
    3. Select the database you created and choose Delete.
    4. Choose Crawlers in the navigation pane.
    5. Select the crawler you created and on the Action menu, choose Delete crawler.
  • Delete the QuickSight resources:
    1. On the QuickSight console, switch to the Region you deployed your resources in.
    2. Delete the analysis created for this walkthrough.
    3. Delete the Athena dataset created for this walkthrough.
    4. If you no longer need the Athena data source to create other datasets, delete the data source.

Summary

This post demonstrated how you can use the Athena DynamoDB connector to query data in DynamoDB with SQL and build visualizations in QuickSight.

Learn more about the Athena DynamoDB connector in the Amazon Athena User Guide. Discover more available data source connectors to query and visualize a variety of data sources without setting up or managing any infrastructure while only paying for the queries you run.

For advanced QuickSight capabilities powered by AI, see Gaining insights with machine learning (ML) in Amazon QuickSight and Answering business questions with Amazon QuickSight Q.


About the Authors

Antonio Samaniego Jurado is a Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. With a strong passion for modern technology, Antonio helps customers build state-of-the-art applications on AWS. A creator at heart, he loves community-driven learning and sharing of best practices across the AWS service portfolio to make the best of customers cloud journey.

Pascal Vogel is a Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. Pascal helps startups and enterprises build cloud-native solutions. As a cloud enthusiast, Pascal loves learning new technologies and connecting with like-minded customers who want to make a difference in their cloud journey.

Power enterprise-grade Data Vaults with Amazon Redshift – Part 1

Post Syndicated from Asser Moustafa original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/power-enterprise-grade-data-vaults-with-amazon-redshift-part-1/

Amazon Redshift is a popular cloud data warehouse, offering a fully managed cloud-based service that seamlessly integrates with an organization’s Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) data lake, real-time streams, machine learning (ML) workflows, transactional workflows, and much more—all while providing up to 7.9x better price-performance than other cloud data warehouses.

As with all AWS services, Amazon Redshift is a customer-obsessed service that recognizes there isn’t a one-size-fits-all for customers when it comes to data models, which is why Amazon Redshift supports multiple data models such as Star Schemas, Snowflake Schemas and Data Vault. This post discusses best practices for designing enterprise-grade Data Vaults of varying scale using Amazon Redshift; the second post in this two-part series discusses the most pressing needs when designing an enterprise-grade Data Vault and how those needs are addressed by Amazon Redshift.

Whether it’s a desire to easily retain data lineage directly within the data warehouse, establish a source-system agnostic data model within the data warehouse, or more easily comply with GDPR regulations, customers that implement a Data Vault model will benefit from this post’s discussion of considerations, best practices, and Amazon Redshift features relevant to the building of enterprise-grade Data Vaults. Building a starter version of anything can often be straightforward, but building something with enterprise-grade scale, security, resiliency, and performance typically requires knowledge of and adherence to battle-tested best practices, and using the right tools and features in the right scenario.

Data Vault overview

Let’s first briefly review the core Data Vault premise and concepts. Data models provide a framework for how the data in a data warehouse should be organized into database tables. Amazon Redshift supports a number of data models, and some of the most popular data models include STAR schemas and Data Vault.

Data Vault is not only a modeling methodology, it’s also an opinionated framework that tells you how to solve certain problems in your data ecosystem. An opinionated framework provides a set of guidelines and conventions that developers are expected to follow, rather than leaving all decisions up to the developer. You can compare this with what big enterprise frameworks like Spring or Micronauts do when developing applications at enterprise scale. This is incredibly helpful especially on large data warehouse projects, because it structures your extract, load, and transform (ELT) pipeline and clearly tells you how to solve certain problems within the data and pipeline contexts. This also allows for a high degree of automation.

Data Vault 2.0 allows for the following:

  • Agile data warehouse development
  • Parallel data ingestion
  • A scalable approach to handle multiple data sources even on the same entity
  • A high level of automation
  • Historization
  • Full lineage support

However, Data Vault 2.0 also comes with costs, and there are use cases where it’s not a good fit, such as the following:

  • You only have a few data sources with no related or overlapping data (for example, a bank with a single core system)
  • You have simple reporting with infrequent changes
  • You have limited resources and knowledge of Data Vault

Data Vault typically organizes an organization’s data into a pipeline of four layers: staging, raw, business, and presentation. The staging layer represents data intake and light data transformations and enhancements that occur before the data comes to its more permanent resting place, the raw Data Vault (RDV).

The RDV holds the historized copy of all of the data from multiple source systems. It is referred to as raw because no filters or business transformations have occurred at this point except for storing the data in source system independent targets. The RDV organizes data into three key types of tables:

  • Hubs – This type of table represents a core business entity such as a customer. Each record in a hub table is married with metadata that identifies the record’s creation time, originating source system, and unique business key.
  • Links – This type of table defines a relationship between two or more hubs—for example, how the customer hub and order hub are to be joined.
  • Satellites – This type of table records the historized reference data about either hubs or links, such as product_info and customer_info

The RDV is used to feed data into the business Data Vault (BDV), which is responsible for reorganizing, denormalizing, and aggregating data for optimized consumption by the presentation mart. The presentation marts, also known as the data mart layer, further reorganizes the data for optimized consumption by downstream clients such as business dashboards. The presentation marts may, for example, reorganize data into a STAR schema.

For a more detailed overview of Data Vault along with a discussion of its applicability in the context of very interesting use cases, refer to the following:

How does Data Vault fit into a modern data architecture?

Currently, the lake house paradigm is becoming a major pattern in data warehouse design, even as part of a data mesh architecture. This follows the pattern of data lakes getting closer to what a data warehouse can do and vice versa. To compete with the flexibility of a data lake, Data Vault is a good choice. This way, the data warehouse doesn’t become a bottleneck and you can achieve similar agility, flexibility, scalability, and adaptability when ingestion and onboarding new data.

Platform flexibility

In this section, we discuss some recommended Redshift configurations for Data Vaults of varying scale. As mentioned earlier, the layers within a Data Vault platform are well known. We typically see a flow from the staging layer to the RDV, BDV, and finally presentation mart.

The Amazon Redshift is highly flexible in supporting both modest and large-scale Data Vaults, offering features like the following:

Modest vs. large-scale Data Vaults

Amazon Redshift is flexible in how you decide to structure these layers. For modest data vaults, a single Redshift warehouse with one database with multiple schemas will work just fine.

For large data vaults with more complex transformations, we would look at multiple warehouses, each with their own schema of mastered data representing one or more layer. The reason for using multiple warehouses is to take advantage of the Amazon Redshift architecture’s flexibility for implementing large-scale data vault implementations, such as using Redshift RA3 nodes and Redshift Serverless for separating the compute from the data storage layer and using Redshift data sharing to share the data between different Redshift warehouses. This enables you to scale the compute capacity independently at each layer depending on the processing complexity. The staging layer, for example, can be a layer within your data lake (Amazon S3 storage) or a schema within a Redshift database.

Using Amazon Aurora zero-ETL integrations with Amazon Redshift, you can create a data vault implementation with a staging layer in an Amazon Aurora database that will take care of real-time transaction processing and move the data to Amazon Redshift automatically for further processing in the Data Vault implementation without creating any complex ETL pipelines. This way, you can use Amazon Aurora for transactions and Amazon Redshift for analytics. Compute resources are isolated for the same data, and you’re using the most efficient tools to process it.

Large-scale Data Vaults

For larger Data Vaults platforms, concurrency and compute power become important to process both the loading of data and any business transformations. Amazon Redshift offers flexibility to increase compute capacity both horizontally via concurrency scaling and vertically via cluster resize and also via different architectures for each Data Vault layer.

Staging layer

You can create a data warehouse for the staging layer and perform hard business rules processing here, including calculation of hash keys, hash diffs, and addition of technical metadata columns. If data is not loaded 24/7, consider either pause/resume or a Redshift Serverless workgroup.

Raw Data Vault layer

For raw Data Vault (RDV), it’s recommended to either create one Redshift warehouse for the whole RDV or one Redshift warehouse for one or more subject areas within the RDV. For example, if the volume of data and number of normalized tables within the RDV for a particular subject area is large (either the raw data layer has so many tables that it runs out of maximum table limit on Amazon Redshift or the advantage of workload isolation within a single Redshift warehouse outweighs the overhead of performance and management), this subject area within the RDV can be run and mastered on its own Redshift warehouse.

The RDV is typically loaded 24/7 so a provisioned Redshift data warehouse may be most suitable here to take advantage of reserved instance pricing.

Business Data Vault layer

For creating a data warehouse for the business Data Vault (BDV) layer, this could be larger in size than the previous data warehouses due to the nature of the BDV processing, typically denormalization of data from a large number of source RDV tables.

Some customers run their BDV processing once a day, so a pause/resume window for Redshift provisioned cluster may be cost beneficial here. You can also run BDV processing on an Amazon Redshift Serverless warehouse which will automatically pause when workloads complete and resume when workloads start processing again.

Presentation Data Mart layer

For creating Redshift (provisioned or serverless) warehouses for one or more data marts, the schemas within these marts typically contain views or materialized views, so a Redshift data share will be set up between the data marts and the previous layers.

We need to ensure there is enough concurrency to cope with the increased read traffic at this level. This is achieved via multiple read only warehouses with a data share or the use of concurrency scaling to auto scale.

Example architectures

The following diagram illustrates an example platform for a modest Data Vault model.

The following diagram illustrates the architecture for a large-scale Data Vault model.

Data Vault data model guiding principles

In this section, we discuss some recommended design principles for joining and filtering table access within a Data Vault implementation. These guiding principles address different combinations of entity type access, but should be tested for suitability with each client’s particular use case.

Let’s begin with a brief refresher of table distribution styles in Amazon Redshift. There are four ways that a table’s data can be distributed among the different compute nodes in a Redshift cluster: ALL, KEY, EVEN, and AUTO.

The ALL distribution style ensures that a full copy of the table is maintained on each compute node to eliminate the need for inter-node network communication during workload runs. This distribution style is ideal for tables that are relatively small in size (such as fewer than 5 million rows) and don’t exhibit frequent changes.

The KEY distribution style uses a hash-based approach to persisting a table’s rows in the cluster. A distribution key column is defined to be one of the columns in the row, and the value of that column is hashed to determine on which compute node the row will be persisted. The current generation RA3 node type is built on the AWS Nitro System with managed storage that uses high performance SSDs for your hot data and Amazon S3 for your cold data, providing ease of use, cost-effective storage, and fast query performance. Managed storage means this mapping of row to compute node is more in terms of metadata and compute node ownership rather than the actual persistence. This distribution style is ideal for large tables that have well-known and frequent join patterns on the distribution key column.

The EVEN distribution style uses a round-robin approach to locating a table’s row. Simply put, table rows are cycled through the different compute nodes and when the last compute node in the cluster is reached, the cycle begins again with the next row being persisted to the first compute node in the cluster. This distribution style is ideal for large tables that exhibit frequent table scans.

Finally, the default table distribution style in Amazon Redshift is AUTO, which empowers Amazon Redshift to monitor how a table is used and change the table’s distribution style at any point in the table’s lifecycle for greater performance with workloads. However, you are also empowered to explicitly state a particular distribution style at any point in time if you have a good understanding of how the table will be used by workloads.

Hub and hub satellites

Hub and hub satellites are often joined together, so it’s best to co-locate these datasets based on the primary key of the hub, which will also be part of the compound key of each satellite. As mentioned earlier, for smaller volumes (typically fewer than 5–7 million rows) use the ALL distribution style and for larger volumes, use the KEY distribution style (with the _PK column as the distribution KEY column).

Link and link satellites

Link and link satellites are often joined together, so it’s best to co-locate these datasets based on the primary key of the link, which will also be part of the compound key of each link satellite. These typically involve larger data volumes, so look at a KEY distribution style (with the _PK column as the distribution KEY column).

Point in time and satellites

You may decide to denormalize key satellite attributes by adding them to point in time (PIT) tables with the goal of reducing or eliminating runtime joins. Because denormalization of data helps reduce or eliminate the need for runtime joins, denormalized PIT tables can be defined with an EVEN distribution style to optimize table scans.

However, if you decide not to denormalize, then smaller volumes should use the ALL distribution style and larger volumes should use the KEY distribution style (with the _PK column as the distribution KEY column). Also, be sure to define the business key column as a sort key on the PIT table for optimized filtering.

Bridge and link satellites

Similar to PIT tables, you may decide to denormalize key satellite attributes by adding them to bridge tables with the goal of reducing or eliminating runtime joins. Although denormalization of data helps reduce or eliminate the need for runtime joins, denormalized bridge tables are still typically larger in data volume and involved frequent joins, so the KEY distribution style (with the _PK column as the distribution KEY column) would be the recommended distribution style. Also, be sure to define the bridge of the dominant business key columns as sort keys for optimized filtering.

KPI and reporting

KPI and reporting tables are designed to meet the specific needs of each customer, so flexibility on their structure is key here. These are often standalone tables that exhibit multiple types of interactions, so the EVEN distribution style may be the best table distribution style to evenly spread the scan workloads.

Be sure to choose a sort key that is based on common WHERE clauses such as a date[time] element or a common business key. In addition, a time series table can be created for very large datasets that are always sliced on a time attribute to optimize workloads that typically interact with one slice of time. We discuss this subject in greater detail later in the post.

Non-functional design principles

In this section, we discuss potential additional data dimensions that are often created and married with business data to satisfy non-functional requirements. In the physical data model, these additional data dimensions take the form of technical columns added to each row to enable tracking of non-functional requirements. Many of these technical columns will be populated by the Data Vault framework. The following table lists some of the common technical columns, but you can extend the list as needed.

Column Name Applies to Table Description
LOAD_DTS All A timestamp recording of when this row was inserted. This is a primary key column for historized targets (links, satellites, reference), and a non-primary key column for transactional links and hubs.
BATCH_ID All A unique process ID identifying the run of the ETL code that populated the row.
JOB_NAME All The process name from the ETL framework. This may be a sub-process within a larger process.
SOURCE_SYSTEM_CD All The system from which this data was discovered.
HASH_DIFF Satellite A method in Data Vault of performing change data capture (CDC) changes.
RECORD_ID Satellite
Link
Reference
A unique identifier captured by the code framework for each row.
EFFECTIVE_DTS Link Business effective dates to record the business validity of the row. It’s set to the LOAD_DTS if no business date is present or needed.
DQ_AUDIT Satellite
Link
Reference
Warnings and errors found during staging for this row, tied to the RECORD_ID.

Advanced optimizations and guidelines

In this section, we discuss potential optimizations that can be deployed at the start or later on in the lifecycle of the Data Vault implementation.

Time series tables

Let’s begin with a brief refresher on time series tables as a pattern. Time series tables involve taking a large table and segmenting it into multiple identical tables that hold a time-bound portion of the rows in the original table. One common scenario is to divide a monolithic sales table into monthly or annual versions of the sales table (such as sales_jan,sales_feb, and so on). For example, let’s assume we want to maintain data for a rolling time period using a series of tables, as the following diagram illustrates.

With each new calendar quarter, we create a new table to hold the data for the new quarter and drop the oldest table in the series. Furthermore, if the table rows arrive in a naturally sorted order (such as sales date), then no work is needed to sort the table data, resulting in skipping the expensive VACUUM SORT operation on table.

Time series tables can help significantly optimize workloads that often need to scan these large tables but within a certain time range. Furthermore, by segmenting the data across tables that represent calendar quarters, we are able to drop aged data with a single DROP command. Had we tried to perform the same DELETE operation on a monolithic table design using the DELETE command, for example, it would have been a more expensive deletion operation that would have left the table in a suboptimal state requiring defragmentation and also saves to run a subsequent VACUUM process to reclaim space.

Should a workload ever need to query against the entire time range, you can use standard or materialized views using a UNION ALL operation within Amazon Redshift to easily stitch all the component tables back into the unified dataset. Materialized views can also be used to abstract the table segmentation from downstream users.

In the context of Data Vault, time series tables can be useful for archiving rows within satellites, PIT, and bridge tables that aren’t used often. Time series tables can then be used to distribute the remaining hot rows (rows that are either recently added or referenced often) with more aggressive table properties.

Conclusion

In this post, we discussed a number of areas ripe for optimization and automation to successfully implement a Data Vault 2.0 system at scale and the Amazon Redshift capabilities that you can use to satisfy the related requirements. There are many more Amazon Redshift capabilities and features that will surely come in handy, and we strongly encourage current and prospective customers to reach out to us or other AWS colleagues to delve deeper into Data Vault with Amazon Redshift.


About the Authors

Asser Moustafa is a Principal Analytics Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS based out of Dallas, Texas. He advises customers globally on their Amazon Redshift and data lake architectures, migrations, and visions—at all stages of the data ecosystem lifecycle—starting from the POC stage to actual production deployment and post-production growth.

Philipp Klose is a Global Solutions Architect at AWS based in Munich. He works with enterprise FSI customers and helps them solve business problems by architecting serverless platforms. In this free time, Philipp spends time with his family and enjoys every geek hobby possible.

Saman Irfan is a Specialist Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. She focuses on helping customers across various industries build scalable and high-performant analytics solutions. Outside of work, she enjoys spending time with her family, watching TV series, and learning new technologies.

Power enterprise-grade Data Vaults with Amazon Redshift – Part 2

Post Syndicated from Asser Moustafa original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/power-enterprise-grade-data-vaults-with-amazon-redshift-part-2/

Amazon Redshift is a popular cloud data warehouse, offering a fully managed cloud-based service that seamlessly integrates with an organization’s Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) data lake, real-time streams, machine learning (ML) workflows, transactional workflows, and much more—all while providing up to 7.9x better price-performance than any other cloud data warehouses.

As with all AWS services, Amazon Redshift is a customer-obsessed service that recognizes there isn’t a one-size-fits-all for customers when it comes to data models, which is why Amazon Redshift supports multiple data models such as Star Schemas, Snowflake Schemas and Data Vault. This post discusses the most pressing needs when designing an enterprise-grade Data Vault and how those needs are addressed by Amazon Redshift in particular and AWS cloud in general. The first post in this two-part series discusses best practices for designing enterprise-grade data vaults of varying scale using Amazon Redshift.

Whether it’s a desire to easily retain data lineage directly within the data warehouse, establish a source-system agnostic data model within the data warehouse, or more easily comply with GDPR regulations, customers that implement a data vault model will benefit from this post’s discussion of considerations, best practices, and Amazon Redshift features as well as the AWS cloud capabilities relevant to the building of enterprise-grade data vaults. Building a starter version of anything can often be straightforward, but building something with enterprise-grade scale, security, resiliency, and performance typically requires knowledge and adherence to battle-tested best practices, and using the right tools and features in the right scenario.

Data Vault overview

For a brief review of the core Data Vault premise and concepts, refer to the first post in this series.

In the following sections, we discuss the most common areas of consideration that are critical for Data Vault implementations at scale: data protection, performance and elasticity, analytical functionality, cost and resource management, availability, and scalability. Although these areas can also be critical areas of consideration for any data warehouse data model, in our experience, these areas present their own flavor and special needs to achieve data vault implementations at scale.

Data protection

Security is always priority-one at AWS, and we see the same attention to security every day with our customers. Data security has many layers and facets, ranging from encryption at rest and in transit to fine-grained access controls and more. In this section, we explore the most common data security needs within the raw and business data vaults and the Amazon Redshift features that help achieve those needs.

Data encryption

Amazon Redshift encrypts data in transit by default. With the click of a button, you can configure Amazon Redshift to encrypt data at rest at any point in a data warehouse’s lifecycle, as shown in the following screenshot.

You can use either AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) or Hardware Security Module (HSM) to perform encryption of data at rest. If you use AWS KMS, you can either use an AWS managed key or customer managed key. For more information, refer to Amazon Redshift database encryption.

You can also modify cluster encryption after cluster creation, as shown in the following screenshot.

Moreover, Amazon Redshift Serverless is encrypted by default.

Fine-grained access controls

When it comes to achieving fine-grained access controls at scale, Data Vaults typically need to use both static and dynamic access controls. You can use static access controls to restrict access to databases, tables, rows, and columns to explicit users, groups, or roles. With dynamic access controls, you can mask part or all portions of a data item, such as a column based on a user’s role or some other functional analysis of a user’s privileges.

Amazon Redshift has long supported static access controls through the GRANT and REVOKE commands for databases, schemas, and tables, at row level and column level. Amazon Redshift also supports row-level security, where you can further restrict access to particular rows of the visible columns, as well as role-based access control, which helps simplify the management of security privileges in Amazon Redshift.

In the following example, we demonstrate how you can use GRANT and REVOKE statements to implement static access control in Amazon Redshift.

  1. First, create a table and populate it with credit card values:
    -- Create the credit cards table
    
    CREATE TABLE credit_cards 
    ( customer_id INT, 
    is_fraud BOOLEAN, 
    credit_card TEXT);
    
    --populate the table with sample values
    
    INSERT INTO credit_cards 
    VALUES
    (100,'n', '453299ABCDEF4842'),
    (100,'y', '471600ABCDEF5888'),
    (102,'n', '524311ABCDEF2649'),
    (102,'y', '601172ABCDEF4675'),
    (102,'n', '601137ABCDEF9710'),
    (103,'n', '373611ABCDEF6352');
    

  2. Create the user user1 and check permissions for user1 on the credit_cards table. We use SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION to switch to user1 in the current session:
       -- Create user
    
       CREATE USER user1 WITH PASSWORD '1234Test!';
    
       -- Check access permissions for user1 on credit_cards table
       SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION user1; 
       SELECT * FROM credit_cards; -- This will return permission defined error
    

  3. Grant SELECT access on the credit_cards table to user1:
    RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION;
     
    GRANT SELECT ON credit_cards TO user1;
    

  4. Verify access permissions on the table credit_cards for user1:
    SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION user1;
    
    SELECT * FROM credit_cards; -- Query will return rows
    RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION;

Data obfuscation

Static access controls are often useful to establish hard boundaries (guardrails) of the user communities that should be able to access certain datasets (for example, only those users that are part of the marketing user group should be allowed access to marketing data). However, what if access controls need to restrict only partial aspects of a field, not the entire field? Amazon Redshift supports partial, full, or custom data masking of a field through dynamic data masking. Dynamic data masking enables you to protect sensitive data in your data warehouse. You can manipulate how Amazon Redshift shows sensitive data to the user at query time without transforming it in the database by using masking policies.

In the following example, we achieve a full redaction of credit card numbers at runtime using a masking policy on the previously used credit_cards table.

  1. Create a masking policy that fully masks the credit card number:
    CREATE MASKING POLICY mask_credit_card_full 
    WITH (credit_card VARCHAR(256)) 
    USING ('000000XXXX0000'::TEXT);

  2. Attach mask_credit_card_full to the credit_cards table as the default policy. Note that all users will see this masking policy unless a higher priority masking policy is attached to them or their role.
    ATTACH MASKING POLICY mask_credit_card_full 
    ON credit_cards(credit_card) TO PUBLIC;

  3. Users will see credit card information being masked when running the following query
    SELECT * FROM credit_cards;

Centralized security policies

You can achieve a great deal of scale by combining static and dynamic access controls to span a broad swath of user communities, datasets, and access scenarios. However, what about datasets that are shared across multiple Redshift warehouses, as might be done between raw data vaults and business data vaults? How can scale be achieved with access controls for a dataset that resides on one Redshift warehouse but is authorized for use across multiple Redshift warehouses using Amazon Redshift data sharing?

The integration of Amazon Redshift with AWS Lake Formation enables centrally managed access and permissions for data sharing. Amazon Redshift data sharing policies are established in Lake Formation and will be honored by all of your Redshift warehouses.

Performance

It is not uncommon for sub-second SLAs to be associated with data vault queries, particularly when interacting with the business vault and the data marts sitting atop the business vault. Amazon Redshift delivers on that needed performance through a number of mechanisms such as caching, automated data model optimization, and automated query rewrites.

The following are common performance requirements for Data Vault implementations at scale:

  • Query and table optimization in support of high-performance query throughput
  • High concurrency
  • High-performance string-based data processing

Amazon Redshift features and capabilities for performance

In this section, we discuss Amazon Redshift features and capabilities that address those performance requirements.

Caching

Amazon Redshift uses multiple layers of caching to deliver subsecond response times for repeat queries. Through Amazon Redshift in-memory result set caching and compilation caching, workloads ranging from dashboarding to visualization to business intelligence (BI) that run repeat queries experience a significant performance boost.

With in-memory result set caching, queries that have a cached result set and no changes to the underlying data return immediately and typically within milliseconds.

The current generation RA3 node type is built on the AWS Nitro System with managed storage that uses high performance SSDs for your hot data and Amazon S3 for your cold data, providing ease of use, cost-effective storage, and fast query performance. In short, managed storage means fast retrieval for your most frequently accessed data and automated/managed identification of hot data by Amazon Redshift.

The large majority of queries in a typical production data warehouse are repeat queries, and data warehouses with data vault implementations observe the same pattern. The most optimal run profile for a repeat query is one that avoids costly query runtime interpretation, which is why queries in Amazon Redshift are compiled during the first run and the compiled code is cached in a global cache, providing repeat queries a significant performance boost.

Materialized views

Pre-computing the result set for repeat queries is a powerful mechanism for boosting performance. The fact that it automatically refreshes to reflect the latest changes in the underlying data is yet another powerful pattern for boosting performance. For example, consider the denormalization queries that might be run on the raw data vault to populate the business vault. It’s quite possible that some less-active source systems will have exhibited little to no changes in the raw data vault since the last run. Avoiding the hit of rerunning the business data vault population queries from scratch in those cases could be a tremendous boost to performance. Redshift materialized views provide that exact functionality by storing the precomputed result set of their backing query.

Queries that are similar to the materialized view’s backing query don’t have to rerun the same logic each time, because they can pull records from the existing result set. Developers and analysts can choose to create materialized views after analyzing their workloads to determine which queries would benefit. Materialized views also support automatic query rewriting to have Amazon Redshift rewrite queries to use materialized views, as well as auto refreshing materialized views, where Amazon Redshift can automatically refresh materialized views with up-to-date data from its base tables.

Alternatively, the automated materialized views (AutoMV) feature provides the same performance benefits of user-created materialized views without the maintenance overhead because Amazon Redshift automatically creates the materialized views based on observed query patterns. Amazon Redshift continually monitors the workload using machine learning and then creates new materialized views when they are beneficial. AutoMV balances the costs of creating and keeping materialized views up to date against expected benefits to query latency. The system also monitors previously created AutoMVs and drops them when they are no longer beneficial. AutoMV behavior and capabilities are the same as user-created materialized views. They are refreshed automatically and incrementally, using the same criteria and restrictions.

Also, whether the materialized views are user-created or auto-generated, Amazon Redshift automatically rewrites queries, without users to change queries, to use materialized views when there is enough of a similarity between the query and the materialized view’s backing query.

Concurrency scaling

Amazon Redshift automatically and elastically scales query processing power to provide consistently fast performance for hundreds of concurrent queries. Concurrency scaling resources are added to your Redshift warehouse transparently in seconds, as concurrency increases, to process read/write queries without wait time. When workload demand subsides, Amazon Redshift automatically shuts down concurrency scaling resources to save you cost. You can continue to use your existing applications and BI tools without any changes.

Because Data Vault allows for highly concurrent data processing and is primarily run within Amazon Redshift, concurrency scaling is the recommended way to handle concurrent transformation operations. You should avoid operations that aren’t supported by concurrency scaling.

Concurrent ingestion

One of the key attractions of Data Vault 2.0 is its ability to support high-volume concurrent ingestion from multiple source systems into the data warehouse. Amazon Redshift provides a number of options for concurrent ingestion, including batch and streaming.

For batch- and microbatch-based ingestion, we suggest using the COPY command in conjunction with CSV format. CSV is well supported by concurrency scaling. In case your data is already on Amazon S3 but in Bigdata formats like ORC or Parquet, always consider the trade-off of converting the data to CSV vs. non-concurrent ingestion. You can also use workload management to prioritize non-concurrent ingestion jobs to keep the throughput high.

For low-latency workloads, we suggest using the native Amazon Redshift streaming capability or the Amazon Redshift Zero ETL capability in conjunction with Amazon Aurora. By using Aurora as a staging layer for the raw data, you can handle small increments of data efficiently and with high concurrency, and then use this data inside your Redshift data warehouse without any extract, transform, and load (ETL) processes. For stream ingestion, we suggest using the native streaming feature (Amazon Redshift streaming ingestion) and have a dedicated stream for ingesting each table. This might require a stream processing solution upfront, which splits the input stream into the respective elements like the hub and the satellite record.

String-optimized compression

The Data Vault 2.0 methodology often involves time-sensitive lookup queries against potentially very large satellite tables (in terms of row count) that have low-cardinality hash/string indexes. Low-cardinality indexes and very large tables tend to work against time-sensitive queries. Amazon Redshift, however, provides a specialized compression method for low-cardinality string-based indexes called BYTEDICT. Using BYTEDICT creates a dictionary of the low-cardinality string indexes that allow Amazon Redshift to reads the rows even in a compressed state, thereby significantly improving performance. You can manually select the BYTEDICT compression method for a column, or alternatively rely on Amazon Redshift automated table optimization facilities to select it for you.

Support of transactional data lake frameworks

Data Vault 2.0 is an insert-only framework. Therefore, reorganizing data to save money is a challenge you may face. Amazon Redshift integrates seamlessly with S3 data lakes allowing you to perform data lake queries in your S3 using standard SQL as you would with native tables. This way, you can outsource less frequently used satellites to your S3 data lake, which is cheaper than keeping it as a native table.

Modern transactional lake formats like Apache Iceberg are also an excellent option to store this data. They ensure transactional safety and therefore ensure that your audit trail, which is a fundamental feature of Data Vault, doesn’t break.

We also see customers using these frameworks as a mechanism to implement incremental loads. Apache Iceberg lets you query for the last state for a given point in time. You can use this mechanism to optimize merge operations while still making the data accessible from within Amazon Redshift.

Amazon Redshift data sharing performance considerations

For large-scale Data Vault implementation, one of the preferred design principals is to have a separate Redshift data warehouse for each layer (staging, raw Data Vault, business Data Vault, and presentation data mart). These layers have separate Redshift provisioned or serverless warehouses according to their storage and compute requirements and use Amazon Redshift data sharing to share the data between these layers without physically moving the data.

Amazon Redshift data sharing enables you to seamlessly share live data across multiple Redshift warehouses without any data movement. Because the data sharing feature serves as the backbone in implementing large-scale Data Vaults, it’s important to understand the performance of Amazon Redshift in this scenario.

In a data sharing architecture, we have producer and consumer Redshift warehouses. The producer warehouse shares the data objects to one or more consumer warehouse for read purposes only without having to copy the data.

Producer/consumer Redshift cluster performance dependency

From a performance perspective, the producer (provisioned or serverless) warehouse is not responsible for query performance running on the consumer (provisioned or serverless) warehouse and has zero impact in terms of performance or activity on the producer Redshift warehouse. It depends on the consumer Redshift warehouse compute capacity. The producer warehouse is only responsible for the shared data.

Result set caching on the consumer Redshift cluster

Amazon Redshift uses result set caching to speed up the retrieval of data when it knows that the data in the underlying table has not changed. In a data sharing architecture, Amazon Redshift also uses result set caching on the consumer Redshift warehouse. This is quite helpful for repeatable queries that commonly occur in a data warehousing environment.

Best practices for materialized views in Data Vault with Amazon Redshift data sharing

In Data Vault implementation, the presentation data mart layer typically contains views or materialized views. There are two possible routes to create materialized views for the presentation data mart layer. First, create the materialized views on the producer Redshift warehouse (business data vault layer) and share materialized views with the consumer Redshift warehouse (dedicated data marts). Alternatively, share the table objects directly from the business data vault layer to the presentation data mart layer and build the materialized view on the shared objects directly on the consumer Redshift warehouse.

The second option is recommended in this case, because it gives us the flexibility of creating customized materialized views of data on each consumer according to the specific use case and simplifies the management because each data mart user can create and manage materialized views on their own Redshift warehouse rather than be dependent on the producer warehouse.

Table distribution implications in Amazon Redshift data sharing

Table distribution style and how data is distributed across Amazon Redshift plays a significant role in query performance. In Amazon Redshift data sharing, the data is distributed on the producer Redshift warehouse according to the distribution style defined for table. When we associate the data via a data share to the consumer Redshift warehouse, it maps to the same disk block layout. Also, a bigger consumer Redshift warehouse will result in better query performance for queries running on it.

Concurrency scaling

Concurrency scaling is also supported on both producer and consumer Redshift warehouses for read and write operations.

Cost and resource management

Given that multiple source systems and users will interact heavily with the data vault data warehouse, it’s a prudent best practice to enable usage and query limits to serve as guardrails against runaway queries and unapproved usage patterns. Furthermore, it often helps to have a systematic way for allocating service costs based on usage of the data vault to different source systems and user groups within your organization.

The following are common cost and resource management requirements for Data Vault implementations at scale:

  • Utilization limits and query resource guardrails
  • Advanced workload management
  • Chargeback capabilities

Amazon Redshift features and capabilities for cost and resource management

In this section, we discuss Amazon Redshift features and capabilities that address those cost and resource management requirements.

Utilization limits and query monitoring rules

Runaway queries and excessive auto scaling are likely to be the two most common runaway patterns observed with data vault implementations at scale.

A Redshift provisioned cluster supports usage limits for features such as Redshift Spectrum, concurrency scaling, and cross-Region data sharing. A concurrency scaling limit specifies the threshold of the total amount of time used by concurrency scaling in 1-minute increments. A limit can be specified for a daily, weekly, or monthly period (using UTC to determine the start and end of the period).

You can also define multiple usage limits for each feature. Each limit can have a different action, such as logging to system tables, alerting via Amazon CloudWatch alarms and optionally Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) subscriptions to that alarm (such as email or text), or disabling the feature outright until the next time period begins (such as the start of the month). When a usage limit threshold is reached, events are also logged to a system table.

Redshift provisioned clusters also support query monitoring rules to define metrics-based performance boundaries for workload management queues and the action that should be taken when a query goes beyond those boundaries. For example, for a queue dedicated to short-running queries, you might create a rule that cancels queries that run for more than 60 seconds. To track poorly designed queries, you might have another rule that logs queries that contain nested loops.

Each query monitoring rule includes up to three conditions, or predicates, and one query action (such as stop, hop, or log). A predicate consists of a metric, a comparison condition (=, <, or >), and a value. If all of the predicates for any rule are met, that rule’s action is triggered. Amazon Redshift evaluates metrics every 10 seconds and if more than one rule is triggered during the same period, Amazon Redshift initiates the most severe action (stop, then hop, then log).

Redshift Serverless also supports usage limits where you can specify the base capacity according to your price-performance requirements. You can also set the maximum RPU (Redshift Processing Units) hours used per day, per week, or per month to keep the cost predictable and specify different actions, such as write to system table, receive an alert, or turn off user queries when the limit is reached. A cross-Region data sharing usage limit is also supported, which limits how much data transferred from the producer Region to the consumer Region that consumers can query.

You can also specify query limits in Redshift Serverless to stop poorly performing queries that exceed the threshold value.

Auto workload management

Not all queries have the same performance profile or priority, and data vault queries are no different. Amazon Redshift workload management (WLM) adapts in real time to the priority, resource allocation, and concurrency settings required to optimally run different data vault queries. These queries could consist of a high number of joins between the hubs, links, and satellites tables; large-scale scans of the satellite tables; or massive aggregations. Amazon Redshift WLM enables you to flexibly manage priorities within workloads so that, for example, short or fast-running queries won’t get stuck in queues behind long-running queries.

You can use automatic WLM to maximize system throughput and use resources effectively. You can enable Amazon Redshift to manage how resources are divided to run concurrent queries with automatic WLM. Automatic WLM manages the resources required to run queries. Amazon Redshift determines how many queries run concurrently and how much memory is allocated to each dispatched query.

Chargeback metadata

Amazon Redshift provides different pricing models to cater to different customer needs. On-demand pricing offers the greatest flexibility, whereas Reserved Instances provide significant discounts for predictable and steady usage scenarios. Redshift Serverless provides a pay-as-you-go model that is ideal for sporadic workloads.

However, with any of these pricing models, Amazon Redshift customers can attribute cost to different users. To start, Amazon Redshift provides itemized billing like many other AWS services in AWS Cost Explorer to attain the overall cost of using Amazon Redshift. Moreover, the cross-group collaboration (data sharing) capability of Amazon Redshift enables a more explicit and structured chargeback model to different teams.

Availability

In the modern data organization, data warehouses are no longer used purely to perform historical analysis in batches overnight with relatively forgiving SLAs, Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs), and Recovery Point Objectives (RPOs). They have become mission-critical systems in their own right that are used for both historical analysis and near-real-time data analysis. Data Vault systems at scale very much fit that mission-critical profile, which makes availability key.

The following are common availability requirements for Data Vault implementations at scale:

  • RTO of near-zero
  • RPO of near-zero
  • Automated failover
  • Advanced backup management
  • Commercial-grade SLA

Amazon Redshift features and capabilities for availability

In this section, we discuss the features and capabilities in Amazon Redshift that address those availability requirements.

Separation of storage and compute

AWS and Amazon Redshift are inherently resilient. With Amazon Redshift, there’s no additional cost for active-passive disaster recovery. Amazon Redshift replicates all of your data within your data warehouse when it is loaded and also continuously backs up your data to Amazon S3. Amazon Redshift always attempts to maintain at least three copies of your data (the original and replica on the compute nodes, and a backup in Amazon S3).

With separation of storage and compute and Amazon S3 as the persistence layer, you can achieve an RPO of near-zero, if not zero itself.

Cluster relocation to another Availability Zone

Amazon Redshift provisioned RA3 clusters support cluster relocation to another Availability Zone in events where cluster operation in the current Availability Zone is not optimal, without any data loss or changes to your application. Cluster relocation is available free of charge; however, relocation might not always be possible if there is a resource constraint in the target Availability Zone.

Multi-AZ deployment

For many customers, the cluster relocation feature is sufficient; however, enterprise data warehouse customers require a low RTO and higher availability to support their business continuity with minimal impact to applications.

Amazon Redshift supports Multi-AZ deployment for provisioned RA3 clusters.

A Redshift Multi-AZ deployment uses compute resources in multiple Availability Zones to scale data warehouse workload processing as well as provide an active-active failover posture. In situations where there is a high level of concurrency, Amazon Redshift will automatically use the resources in both Availability Zones to scale the workload for both read and write requests using active-active processing. In cases where there is a disruption to an entire Availability Zone, Amazon Redshift will continue to process user requests using the compute resources in the sister Availability Zone.

With features such as multi-AZ deployment, you can achieve a low RTO, should there ever be a disruption to the primary Redshift cluster or an entire Availability Zone.

Automated backup

Amazon Redshift automatically takes incremental snapshots that track changes to the data warehouse since the previous automated snapshot. Automated snapshots retain all of the data required to restore a data warehouse from a snapshot. You can create a snapshot schedule to control when automated snapshots are taken, or you can take a manual snapshot any time.

Automated snapshots can be taken as often as once every hour and retained for up to 35 days at no additional charge to the customer. Manual snapshots can be kept indefinitely at standard Amazon S3 rates. Furthermore, automated snapshots can be automatically replicated to another Region and stored there as a disaster recovery site also at no additional charge (with the exception of data transfer charges across Regions) and manual snapshots can also be replicated with standard Amazon S3 rates applying (and data transfer costs).

Amazon Redshift SLA

As a managed service, Amazon Redshift frees you from being the first and only line of defense against disruptions. AWS will use commercially reasonable efforts to make Amazon Redshift available with a monthly uptime percentage for each Multi-AZ Redshift cluster during any monthly billing cycle, of at least 99.99% and for multi-node cluster, at least 99.9%. In the event that Amazon Redshift doesn’t meet the Service Commitment, you will be eligible to receive a Service Credit.

Scalability

One of the major motivations of organizations migrating to the cloud is improved and increased scalability. With Amazon Redshift, Data Vault systems will always have a number of scaling options available to them.

The following are common scalability requirements for Data Vault implementations at scale:

  • Automated and fast-initiating horizontal scaling
  • Robust and performant vertical scaling
  • Data reuse and sharing mechanisms

Amazon Redshift features and capabilities for scalability

In this section, we discuss the features and capabilities in Amazon Redshift that address those scalability requirements.

Horizontal and vertical scaling

Amazon Redshift uses concurrency scaling automatically to support virtually unlimited horizontal scaling of concurrent users and concurrent queries, with consistently fast query performance. Furthermore, concurrency scaling requires no downtime, supports read/write operations, and is typically the most impactful and used scaling option for customers during normal business operations to maintain consistent performance.

With Amazon Redshift provisioned warehouse, as your data warehousing capacity and performance needs to change or grow, you can vertically scale your cluster to make the best use of the computing and storage options that Amazon Redshift provides. Resizing your cluster by changing the node type or number of nodes can typically be achieved in 10–15 minutes. Vertical scaling typically occurs much less frequently in response to persistent and organic growth and is typically performed during a planned maintenance window when the short downtime doesn’t impact business operations.

Explicit horizontal or vertical resize and pause operations can be automated per a schedule (for example, development clusters can be automatically scaled down or paused for the weekends). Note that the storage of paused clusters remains accessible to clusters with which their data was shared.

For resource-intensive workloads that might benefit from a vertical scaling operation vs. concurrency scaling, there are also other best-practice options that avoid downtime, such as deploying the workload onto its own Redshift Serverless warehouse while using data sharing.

Redshift Serverless measures data warehouse capacity in RPUs, which are resources used to handle workloads. You can specify the base data warehouse capacity Amazon Redshift uses to serve queries (ranging from as little as 8 RPUs to as high as 512 RPUs) and change the base capacity at any time.

Data sharing

Amazon Redshift data sharing is a secure and straightforward way to share live data for read purposes across Redshift warehouses within the same or different accounts and Regions. This enables high-performance data access while preserving workload isolation. You can have separate Redshift warehouses, either provisioned or serverless, for different use cases according to your compute requirement and seamlessly share data between them.

Common use cases for data sharing include setting up a central ETL warehouse to share data with many BI warehouses to provide read workload isolation and chargeback, offering data as a service and sharing data with external consumers, multiple business groups within an organization, sharing and collaborating on data to gain differentiated insights, and sharing data between development, test, and production environments.

Reference architecture

The diagram in this section shows one possible reference architecture of a Data Vault 2.0 system implemented with Amazon Redshift.

We suggest using three different Redshift warehouses to run a Data Vault 2.0 model in Amazon Redshift. The data between these data warehouses is shared via Amazon Redshifts data sharing and allows you to consume data from a consumer data warehouse even if the provider data warehouse is inactive.

  • Raw Data Vault – The RDV data warehouse hosts hubs, links, and satellite tables. For large models, you can additionally slice the RDV into additional data warehouses to even better adopt the data warehouse sizing to your workload patterns. Data is ingested via the patterns described in the previous section as batch or high velocity data.
  • Business Data Vault – The BDV data warehouse hosts bridge and point in time (PIT) tables. These tables are computed based on the RDV tables using Amazon Redshift. Materialized or automatic materialized views are straightforward mechanisms to create those.
  • Consumption cluster – This data warehouse contains query-optimized data formats and marts. Users interact with this layer.

If the workload pattern is unknown, we suggest starting with a Redshift Serverless warehouse and learning the workload pattern. You can easily migrate between a serverless and provisioned Redshift cluster at a later stage based on your processing requirements, as discussed in Part 1 of this series.

Best practices building a Data Vault warehouse on AWS

In this section, we cover how the AWS Cloud as a whole plays its role in building an enterprise-grade Data Vault warehouse on Amazon Redshift.

Education

Education is a fundamental success factor. Data Vault is more complex than traditional data modeling methodologies. Before you start the project, make sure everyone understands the principles of Data Vault. Amazon Redshift is designed to be very easy to use, but to ensure the most optimal Data Vault implementation on Amazon Redshift, gaining a good understanding of how Amazon Redshift works is recommended. Start with free resources like reaching out to your AWS account representative to schedule a free Amazon Redshift Immersion Day or train for the AWS Analytics specialty certification.

Automation

Automation is a major benefit of Data Vault. This will increase efficiency and consistency across your data landscape. Most customers focus on the following aspects when automating Data Vault:

  • Automated DDL and DML creation, including modeling tools especially for the raw data vault
  • Automated ingestion pipeline creation
  • Automated metadata and lineage support

Depending on your needs and skills, we typically see three different approaches:

  • DSL – This is a common tool for generating data vault models and flows with Domain Specific Languages (DSL). Popular frameworks for building such DSLs are EMF with Xtext or MPS. This solution provides the most flexibility. You directly build your business vocabulary into the application and generate documentation and business glossary along with the code. This approach requires the most skill and biggest resource investment.
  • Modeling tool – You can build on an existing modeling language like UML 2.0. Many modeling tools come with code generators. Therefore, you don’t need to build your own tool, but these tools are often hard to integrate into modern DevOps pipelines. They also require UML 2.0 knowledge, which raises the bar for non-tech users.
  • Buy – There are a number of different third-party solutions that integrate well into Amazon Redshift and are available via AWS Marketplace.

Whichever approach of the above-mentioned approaches you choose, all three approaches offer multiple benefits. For example, you can take away repetitive tasks from your development team and enforce modeling standards like data types, data quality rules, and naming conventions. To generate the code and deploy it, you can use AWS DevOps services. As part of this process, you save the generated metadata to the AWS Glue Data Catalog, which serves as a central technical metadata catalog. You then deploy the generated code to Amazon Redshift (SQL scripts) and to AWS Glue.

We designed AWS CloudFormation for automation; it’s the AWS-native way of automating infrastructure creation and management. A major use case for infrastructure as code (IaC) is to create new ingestion pipelines for new data sources or add new entities to existing one.

You can also use our new AI coding tool Amazon CodeWhisperer, which helps you quickly write secure code by generating whole line and full function code suggestions in your IDE in real time, based on your natural language comments and surrounding code. For example, CodeWhisperer can automatically take a prompt such as “get new files uploaded in the last 24 hours from the S3 bucket” and suggest appropriate code and unit tests. This can greatly reduce development effort in writing code, for example for ETL pipelines or generating SQL queries, and allow more time for implementing new ideas and writing differentiated code.

Operations

As previously mentioned, one of the benefits of Data Vault is the high level of automation which, in conjunction with serverless technologies, can lower the operating efforts. On the other hand, some industry products come with built-in schedulers or orchestration tools, which might increase operational complexity. By using AWS-native services, you’ll benefit from integrated monitoring options of all AWS services.

Conclusion

In this series, we discussed a number of crucial areas required for implementing a Data Vault 2.0 system at scale, and the Amazon Redshift capabilities and AWS ecosystem that you can use to satisfy those requirements. There are many more Amazon Redshift capabilities and features that will surely come in handy, and we strongly encourage current and prospective customers to reach out to us or other AWS colleagues to delve deeper into Data Vault with Amazon Redshift.


About the Authors

Asser Moustafa is a Principal Analytics Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS based out of Dallas, Texas. He advises customers globally on their Amazon Redshift and data lake architectures, migrations, and visions—at all stages of the data ecosystem lifecycle—starting from the POC stage to actual production deployment and post-production growth.

Philipp Klose is a Global Solutions Architect at AWS based in Munich. He works with enterprise FSI customers and helps them solve business problems by architecting serverless platforms. In this free time, Philipp spends time with his family and enjoys every geek hobby possible.

Saman Irfan is a Specialist Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. She focuses on helping customers across various industries build scalable and high-performant analytics solutions. Outside of work, she enjoys spending time with her family, watching TV series, and learning new technologies.